The board of directors plays an important role in solving the agency problem between shareholders and management. This paper investigates the relationships between ownership and board structure with the diversification strategy of large Japanese firms. The results show that corporate nominee directors are associated with lower levels of product diversification of their investee firms. This suggests that nominee directors in large Japanese corporations see themselves representing specific interests and therefore investors should pay attention to board composition in order to assess the level of protection they can expect to receive. Even without any apparent agency problem with management, there remains a potential “principal-principal” problem.
Corporate governance, ownership structure, board of directors, diversification, Japanese firm
Asian Studies | Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics | Strategic Management Policy
Strategy and Organisation
Corporate Governance: An International Review
Yoshikawa, Toru and PHAN, Phillip H..
The effects of ownership and capital structure on board composition and strategic diversification in Japanese corporations. (2005). Corporate Governance: An International Review. 13, (2), 303-312. Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/2720
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