Corporate Governance, Shareholder Rights, and Shareholder Rights Plans: Poison, Placebo, or Prescription?
We examine the effect of poison pill adoptions on firm value, controlling for the adopting firm's preexisting corporate governance structure. We find that only companies with the most democratic governance structures, defined as those with the fewest preexisting protective governance provisions, experience significantly positive abnormal stock returns and significantly positive abnormal revisions in five-year earnings growth rate forecasts. Moreover, regression results indicate that abnormal returns and forecast revisions are significantly related to governance structure and not to board composition or subsequent merger activity.
Finance and Financial Management | Portfolio and Security Analysis
Journal of Finance and Quantitative Analysis
Caton, Gary and GOH, Choo Yong, Jeremy.
Corporate Governance, Shareholder Rights, and Shareholder Rights Plans: Poison, Placebo, or Prescription?. (2008). Journal of Finance and Quantitative Analysis. 43, (2), 381-400. Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/1270
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