Knowledge@SMU

Authors

Knowledge@SMU

Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

9-2009

Abstract

Corporate governance, via the active monitoring of a company’s management by its board of directors, is an accepted practice. For publicly-listed companies controlled by families, the general perception is independent directors should actively take up the mantle of watching out for the interests and rights of minority shareholders. But, is there a possibility whereby over-zealous monitoring might crimp the growth of these family-run companies, thus, doing more harm than good? According to a new study: Yes, it does!

Disciplines

Accounting | Business | Finance and Financial Management

Copyright Owner and Holder

Copyright © Singapore Management University 2012

Licece/Creative Commons Licence

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.

Article ID

1235

Subject(s)

Finance and Accounting

Share

COinS