In this thesis, we consider the standard voting model with a finite set of alternatives A and 2 voters, and address the following question: besides Domains D satisfying the
Property T (Chatterji & Sen (2011) ), what are other characteristics of domains that induce every strategy-proof and unanimous social choice function f : Dn → A to satisfy the tops-only property? We impose a minimal richness condition which ensures that for every alternative a ∈ A, there exists a preference ordering where a is maximal. We identify a more general condition on domains that is sufficient for strategy-proofness and unanimity to imply tops-onlyness in the case of 2 voters. This condition is shown to apply to Linked Domains (Aswal, Chatterji & Sen (2003) ).
social choice functions, the tops-only property
MSc in Economics
Economic Theory | Public Economics
A Sufficient Condition for the Tops-Only Property of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions in the Case of Two Voters. (2011). Dissertations and Theses Collection (SMU Access Only).
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/etd_coll_smu/17
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