Publication Type

Master Thesis

Publication Date

2011

Abstract

In this thesis, we consider the standard voting model with a finite set of alternatives A and 2 voters, and address the following question: besides Domains D satisfying the

Property T (Chatterji & Sen (2011) ), what are other characteristics of domains that induce every strategy-proof and unanimous social choice function f : Dn A to satisfy the tops-only property? We impose a minimal richness condition which ensures that for every alternative a A, there exists a preference ordering where a is maximal. We identify a more general condition on domains that is sufficient for strategy-proofness and unanimity to imply tops-onlyness in the case of 2 voters. This condition is shown to apply to Linked Domains (Aswal, Chatterji & Sen (2003) ).

Keywords

social choice functions, the tops-only property

Degree Awarded

MSc in Economics

Discipline

Economic Theory | Public Economics

Supervisor(s)

Chatterji, Shurojit

Copyright Owner and License

Room 5016, School of Economics, Singapore Management University Singapore 178903

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