Publication Type

Master Thesis

Publication Date

2009

Abstract

Overvaluation might drive a firm to use its stock to acquire another firm whose stock is not as overpriced. Though hypothetically desirable, these acquisitions create little, if any, value for acquirer shareholders. Two factors impede value creation for acquirer stockholders from these transactions (despite large differences in relative overvaluation at announcement): acquirers paying large premiums to targets, and investors' correction of acquirer overvaluation during the bid period. Furthermore, acquirer CEOs obtain a large amount of new stock and option grants after acquisitions and realize a net gain in wealth, further suggesting that equity overvaluation increases agency costs and the resulting actions benefit managers more than shareholders (Jensen (2005)).

Keywords

Agency Costs, CEO compensation, Mergers and Acquisitions, Overvaluation

Degree Awarded

MSc in Finance

Discipline

Corporate Finance | Portfolio and Security Analysis

Supervisor(s)

FU, Fangjian

First Page

1

Last Page

38

Publisher

Singapore Management University

City or Country

Singapore

Copyright Owner and License

Author

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Share

COinS