Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
submittedVersion
Publication Date
6-2016
Abstract
We study the effect of dynamic and investment externalities in a one-sector growth model. In our model, two agents interact strategically in the utilization of capital for consumption, savings, and investment in technical progress. We consider two types of investment choices: complements and substitutes. For each case, we derive the equilibrium and provide the corresponding stationary distribution. We then compare the equilibrium with the social planner's solution.
Keywords
Capital accumulation, Dynamic game, Growth, Investment, Technical progress
Discipline
Growth and Development
Research Areas
Applied Microeconomics
Publication
Dynamic Games and Applications
Volume
6
Issue
2
First Page
209
Last Page
224
ISSN
2153-0785
Identifier
10.1007/s13235-015-0150-6
Publisher
Springer
Citation
FESSELMEYER, Eric; MIRMAN, Leonard J.; and SANTUGINI, Marc.
Strategic interactions in a one-sector growth model. (2016). Dynamic Games and Applications. 6, (2), 209-224.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cis_research/7
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
http://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0150-6