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A regional approach to human security in East Asia: Global debate, regional insecurity and the role of civil society

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Introduction

The concept of human security as a new paradigm presents a particular challenge for East Asia. While the region experienced dramatic political, economic and social transformations in the last few decades, much of the region's key security concerns are state-focused. In fact East Asian regional security structures that are products of the Cold War era have remained largely intact

The debates and concerns over global human security problems have shaped the security agenda at the global level. The terrorist attack against the United States on September 11, 2001 have brought home the importance of human security in a borderless world where security threats are in multiple forms and initiated by different sources. While

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East Asia is particularly vulnerable to human security challenges, given the disparity in economic development, prevalence of traditional social values and continuing concentration of political powers in a few hands in many parts of the region. The global debate and changing agenda on human security as well the that changing nature of the security challenge at the regional level, however, have made an important impact on East Asia. Yet the region appears to lack a common approach and the institutional structure to manage the human security problems.

This paper examines the evolving concept of regional security from a traditional to a non-traditional agenda in the context of the challenges posed by the concept of human security in the global context. It also examines the extent to which civil society could be brought in to address human security problems at the regional level with huge cultural, economic political and social diversities.

National Security Versus Human Security: Reviewing the Global Debate

In 1983 Richard Ullman introduced a new agenda to international security studies in his work "Redefining Security" by incorporating non-military considerations such as natural disasters, population growth, environmental quality, world hunger and human rights.[1] While the attempt "made hardly a ripple in an entrenched security establishment still preoccupied with the more traditional imperatives of war and peace",[2] it has become a seminal study which has significantly altered our understanding of the concept of national security in the past two decades.

Ullman challenged the perspective on national security which dominated successive US administrations from the 1940s onward as being defined in "excessively narrow and excessively military terms". He argued that defining national security merely or primarily in military terms "conveys a false image of reality" which is both misleading and

1. Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security" *International Security* (Summer 1983), pp. 123-29.
2. Stephen J. Del Rosso, Jr., "The Insecure State (What Future for the State?)" *Daedalus,* Vol. 124, no. 2 (Spring 1995).

dangerous. He believed that national security defined narrowly in military terms caused states to concentrate on military threats and ignore other more harmful dangers, and contributed to a pervasive militarilization of international relations which in the longer run would increased global insecurity.[3]

In his pursuit for a more comprehensive understanding of security, Ullman argued that security is not absolute and should be understood as a tradeoff, e.g. order and liberty. He also argued that security should also be understood a consequence—security is defined and valorized by the threats which challenge it. According to Ullman, national security should be defined in the following terms.

> A threat to national security is an action or sequences of events that:
> (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state or
> (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, non-government entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state.[4]

Using this definition, Ullman identified security threats which include war, internal rebellions, blockades, boycotts, material shortages, natural disasters, but also preparation for confrontation with an enemy. While most violent conflicts in human history centered around the competition for territory and resources among states, Ullman suggested that security threats can also be understood on the one hand through rising worldwide demand for resources as a result of population growth, migration patterns, and the breaking down of regime legitimacy and authority especially in the developing world on the one hand, through the problem of constraints on resource supplies. The national security agenda therefore should be devoted not merely to military problems but also limiting population growth, enhancing environmental quality, eradicating world hunger, protecting human right.[5]

Following Ullman's footsteps, Jessica Tuchman Mathews predicted in 1989 that the 1990s would demand a redefinition of national security with the emergence of new realities of global developments which sug-

3. Ullman (1983), p. 129.
4. Ullman (1983), p. 133.
5. Ullman (1983), pp. 139-46.

gested "the need for another analogous, broadening definition of national security to include resource, environmental and demographic issues".[6] Arguing that such issues transcend national borders and are breaking down the boundaries of national sovereignty, Mathews also introduced a sense of urgency to the debate by suggesting that individual governments are forced to grapple contentious issues which cross the traditional international-domestic divide and are probably not fully capable of managing the problems through the existing international framework. If the fact that "for the first time in history, mankind is rapidly— if inadvertently—altering the basic physiology of the planet", potentially causing unreversible ecological damages, is not alarming enough, Mathews pointed to the population growth rate - world population took 130 years to grow from one billion to two billion: but just a decade to climb from 5 billion to 6 billion in the 1990s.[7] Other scholars who produced similar terms such as world security and common security shared this notion of global security centering on survival.[8]

The emergence of human security as a key issue on the international security agenda, however, had to wait until the mid 1990s. Matthew's 1989 call for redefining national security echoed more the thinking of those in the field of development rather than those in the field of traditional international security studies. If scholars in the field of development studies had to search for a new direction in the aftermath of the Cold war, those in the field of international security were determined initially return to the center of international relations. In 1991 Stephen Walt observed "the Renaissance of security studies" in the traditional sense because of three reasons. First, as the Persian Gulf war illustrates, military power remains as a central element in international politics. Second, security studies has been institutionalized as a subject in the institutions of higher learning. Third, the end of Cold War world order creates new policy problems and research puzzles.[9]

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6. Jessica Tuchman Matthews, "Redefining Security" *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1989), pp. 162.
7. Mathews (1989), pp. 162-163.
8. See discussions in Del Rosso Jr. (1995); Michael Clark, World Security (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).
9. Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies", *International Studies Quarterly* (1991) 35, p. 222.

In spite of Walt's attempt to project a sense of optimism, it is clear that security studies focusing narrowly on military issues, is being challenged by the post Cold War transformation in world politics. He warned that security studies had to steer between political opportunism and academic irrelevance. If the field of development studies is in need of a new impetus, there traditional security studies is also in search of a new direction too. In is in the context of the "conceptual turmoil" in both fields, a new concept—*human security* emerged.[10]

In the *1994 Human Development Report*, the United Nations Development Programme lamented that the concept of security has been shaped by the potential for conflict between states and equated with threats to a country's border for too long. The UNDP maintained that the battle for peace has to be fought on two fronts: the security front "where victory spells freedom from fear", and the economic and social front "where victory means freedom from want". In putting forward the concept of human security, the Human Development Report suggested that human security - hunger, disease, job insecurity, crimes, and environmental threats, is relevant to people everywhere, and it is less costly to address these threats, which are inter-linked, upstream rather than downstream.[11]

The Post-Cold War World Order and the Global Security Agenda

Instead of resolving the debate concerning the future of security studies, the introduction of the concept of human security led to two very different responses. The first is the re-assertion of traditional security. While it acknowledges the blurring of the domestic and international divide and incorporates some of the new concerns such as economic conflicts and environmental threats to the security agenda which led to institutional changes in foreign policy bureaucracies in some countries,

10. See Gary King and Christopher Murray, "Rethinking Human Security", May, 2000, paper for the Program on Human Security, Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences at Harvard University Harvard University.
11. *Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security* (UNDP: 1994).

the traditionalists are still uncomfortable with the new agenda and would prefer to adhere to a more state-focused orientation towards security.

It is true that countries such as Canada and Japan have formally adopted the notion of human security in their foreign policy agenda. Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, which defines human security as "freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, safety or lives". The official position of Canada position is that human security which places a focus on the security of people, "constitutes a major and necessary shift in international relations and world affairs, which have long placed predominant emphasis on the security of the state". The Canadian government has identified five foreign policy priorities for advancing human security:

1. Protection of civilians, concerned with building international will and strengthening norms and capacity to reduce the human costs of armed conflict.
2. Peace support operations, concerned with building UN capacities and addressing the demanding and increasingly complex requirements for deployment of skilled personnel, including Canadians, to these missions.
3. Conflict prevention, with strengthening the capacity of the international community to prevent or resolve conflict, and building local indigenous capacity to manage conflict without violence.
4. Governance and accountability, concerned with fostering improved accountability of public and private sector institutions in terms of established norms of democracy and human rights.
5. Public safety, concerned with building international expertise, capacities and instruments to counter the growing threats posed by the rise of transnational organized crime.[12]

Similarly, the Japanese government has also embraced the notion of human security in its official foreign policy agenda, even if its emphasis may differ from that of Canada's. The State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Keizo Takemi, for example, maintained in June 1999 that the concept of "human security" as a policy idea, is "one of the essential principles for

12. See the website of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada: http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreignp/humansecurity/menu-e.asp.

the conduct of Japanese foreign policy in the twenty-first century". Employing this concept to define new policy approaches for each area of development, he placed emphasis on the importance of individuals, and the role of NGOs and discussed the partnership among donor countries, developing countries, international organizations, and NGOs as well as the importance of strengthening the United Nations as an international coordinator. In addressing the problems arising from globalization and regional conflicts, however, Takemi stated that "the state-centered security and economic policies perspective should also include a focus placed on individual humans (human security)".[13] The willingness of the individual governments to place human security on their foreign policy agenda is not attempts to replace the state-centric agenda, but to broaden it.

In spite of the efforts by governments to take on board human security concerns, the security agenda for major powers are still dominated by a traditionalist approach. A 1994 report of the Joint Security Commission, *Redefining Security*, presented to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Center Intelligence, exemplified such an approach. The report responded to security challenges by recommending new national-level security policy structures to coordinate and monitor security resources and standards and provide guidance rather than by a reorientation of American security needs based on the concept of *human security*.[14] This more conservative approach is further complicated by the neo-interventionists' call for a pro-active American stance in promoting international human rights in different parts of the world which are resented by some other governments as an unacceptable interference of their domestic affairs.[15]

A second response to the notion of human security which is more radical, builds on the concept with reference to the literature on the world system[16] and argues for more fundamental changes to global gov-

13. See the website of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/index.html.
14. *Redefining Security: A Report to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Center Intelligence Joint Security Commission,* (Washington, D.C. 20505, February 28, 1994)
15. China's response to NATO's involvement with the Kosovo crisis in 1999 is a typical example.
16. See for example R. Cox, *Production, power, and world order* (New York: Columbia

ernance. Maintaining that the structure and functioning of the world order has been significantly rearranged after the end of the Cold war, Jorge Nef argues that, "security (risk reduction) at the higher levels of a global system depends.... Of achieving security at the lower levels". Nef suggests that the effect of applying national security, i.e. state security, is "to increase the overall levels of conflict and security both systemically and internally".[17]

The radicalists identify major problems threatening human security related to our environment, our social conditions, economic system, political system and culture. These problems are of a scale that it is leading to a global crisis. The manifestations of the crisis are visible in the form of poverty, violence, famine, the spread of life-threatening diseases, severe environmental deterioration, more personal insecurity and a decaying quality of life. This more radical response to international security calls for a vision of new universalism—a renaissance with a pluricultural global consciousness.[18]

While the two approaches may differ on how best to meet the challenge of the post-cold war security threat, there is a general understanding that geopolitical divides, (important as they are) and inter-state conflicts (still a dominant form of global conflict), may not remain the as the only principal form of international strife.[19] This is forcing policymakers to rethink their approach to international security and explore new institutional arrangements (domestic, regional and global) to manage the variegated security threats marked by multiple security faultlines.

The socio-economic problems created the Asian financial crisis has helped propel human security concerns onto the regional security agenda in East Asia, but traditional security concerns have remained the cen-

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University Press, 1978); J. Galtung, *The True Worlds: a transnational perspective* (New York, Free Press, 1980); I. Wallerstein, *The Modern World System* (New York, Academic Books, 1980).

17. Jorge Nef, *Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability: The Global Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2nd edn., 1999), pp. 20, pp. 23-26.
18. Nef (1999), p. 10.
19. Michael T. Klare, "Redefining Security: the New Global Schism", *Current History*, November 1996.

tral security focus. A review of research programmes of well established leading think tanks revealed that human security issues are not generally not the an area of research priority. The Asia research programme of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) for example, focuses on "core regional disputes with the potential to develop into international conflicts - the Taiwan Strait, the Korean Peninsula and Kashmir - while also exploring broader influences on regional security rooted in economic, environmental and energy-based factors". The Asia's programme's priority is "China's evolving role in the international system, focusing, inter alia, on the upcoming succession struggle and change of Communist Party leadership, the long-term implications of the country's recent admission to the WTO and the strategic and resource implications of the continuing modernisation of China's armed forces".[20] In fact scholarly works on East Asian security are still preoccupied with more traditional forms of conflicts. A search on the Academic Search Premier using East Asian and Security on articles from 1999 to 2003 identified 52 articles. Among these articles most focus on military conflict, with only a few address human security concerns such as food security.[21] Similarly, the news coverage of identified by search engines such as www.yahoo.com and www.google.com using "East Asian security" are predominantly on issues related to the traditional security agenda.

The Changing East Asian Security Agenda

If the debate between traditionalists and the radicalists have remained inconclusive in the United States and Europe, regional institutions and norms governing non-traditional security issues such as environmental protection and human rights have been well established. While many of these institutions are very much state-centric, there is a history of institutional cooperation backed by the presence of a vocal and often politi-

20. See IISS website at http://www.iiss.org/prog-asia.php.

21. *Academic Search Premier* is a multi-disciplinary database that provides full text for nearly 4,000 scholarly publications, including full text for more than 3,100 peer-reviewed journals. Coverage spans virtually every area of academic study and offers information dating as far back as 1975.

cal influential civil society. In East Asia where the international security structures have been more bilateral in nature and most countries are still dominated by authoritarian regimes with a very weak civil society traditions, the concept of non-traditional security has been on the margin of the regional security debate throughout most parts of the 1980s and the early 1990s.

During most part of the Cold war, international security in a divided East Asia evolved around the rivalry of the two super powers. International relations were marked by bilateral security structures in the form of alliances or security treaties between the United States and its Asian allies such as Japan, South Korea and other Southeast Asian countries. While no single country was powerful enough to assume leadership in establishing a regional-wide community, the existence of two major regional players - China and Japan, also discouraged the emergence of other forms of security arrangement in even in the immediate years of the Cold War. In fact some scholars have argued that one likely consequence of the Cold War in East Asia is a return to a balance-of-power future.[22]

By the mid 1990s, however, a growing network of multilateral security structures and initiatives at both the official "Track I" and unofficial "Track II" levels have emerged, including the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC), the Asean regional forum (ARF), and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP).[23] The regional security agenda, however, remained very much dominated by traditional security concerns focusing on the question of military power, such as the conflict in the Korean peninsula, the tensions across the Taiwan straits, the South China Sea disputes. While the security agenda in the region gradually broadens, and more regional institutions have emerged, many observers continue to believe that East Asia remains a potentially dangerous and unstable region. An unpredictable regime in North Korea, irreconcilable nationalist conflicts across the Taiwan straits

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22. Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, "Rethinking Asian Security", *Survival*, Vol. 36, no. 2, Summer 1994.
23. See discussions in A. Mack and P. Kerr, "The Evolving security discourse in the Asia-Pacific", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 18, no. 1, 1995 pp. 123-40; P. Evans, "Building security: the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific", *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 7, no. 2, 1994, pp. 125-39.

have created, in the words of Thomas Berger, "two highly combustible zones of perpetual crisis which could plunge the entire region into war and conflict". [24]

In the context of such security challenges, many East Asian governments which has jealously guarded their sovereignty, interpreting the concept of human security with suspicion. The Asian way of state-level mutual respect and consensus building was the preferred path for security enhancement. In fact defence spending in the region increased steadily throughout the early and mid 1990s. . The region was the second largest importer of arms after the Middle East prior to the Asian financial crisis, accounting for almost 23 per cent of the global arms trade in 1996. The Asian financial crisis which began in mid 1997, however, altered the security agenda in the region. The upward spiral pattern of military expenditure was arrested.

While governments often presented a strong nationalist response to the problems brought by the crisis, policymakers in the region appear to have reconsidered the role of regional and international institutions in facilitating political and economic stability in the region and have acknowledged the importance of socio-economic factors for regional security. The final statement of the fifth ARF meeting in Manila in July 1998, for example, addressed non-military issues. It cautioned that financial reforms may have significant implications for peace and security in the region and called for a more balanced approach in addressing the socio-economic impact on the less privileged sectors of society".[25]

In fact recent studies have indicated that impressive economic growth and dynamism in the region may have masked poverty and equality problems in the region. World Bank which had which had popularized the notion of the East Asian economic miracle in the early 1990s, called for a reappraisal in a 1997 study.[26] The study identified three worrying

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24. Thomas Berger, "Set for stability? Prospect for conflict and cooperation in East Asia", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 26, 2000, p. 406.
25. For a more comprehensive review of the discourse see Graeme Cheeseman, "Asian-Pacific security discourse in the wake of the Asian economic crisis", *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 12, No. 13, 1999, pp. 333-356.
26. Vinod Ahuja, Benu Bidani, Francisco Ferreira, Michael Walton, *Everyone's Miracle? Revisiting Poverty and Inequality in East Asia* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1997).

trends. First is the emergence of a number of transition economies such as Camboidia, Laos, Mongolia and Vietnam which began their reform process much later than China. Second, while economic growth lifted most of the population in many East Asian economies above comparable poverty lines internationally, poverty had become concentrated in specific areas/occupations. Finally, the level of inequality has increased in many East Asian economies including China, Hong Kong, Thailand. Other studies have also raised questions about growing environmental problems and identified capacity limitations for managing such problems which are often regional in nature.[27]

Identifying common interests and problems in the region and a shared approach in addressing regional security is a challenging task. In recent years liberalists have claimed cautious victory by pointing at the dynamic economic developments in East Asia have laid the foundation for a more secured regional environment with the emergence of regional economic institutions. Liberalists maintain that while East Asia still does not have significant and powerful region-wide institutions, the process of economic institutionalization had began. Regular annual meetings among economic ministers from ASEAN countries plus those from China, Japan and Korea in the form of ASEAN + 3 are taking place. A "Vision Group" has also been established to examine the future of East Asian economic cooperation. Central banks are also meeting regularly and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) which once has been discarded as empty talks has attracted serious official considerations. Fred Bergsten argued that as a result of the Asian financial crisis, East Asian governments have recognized the importance of strong and effective regional institutions and self-reliance. He suggested that East Asian governments are also becoming more aware of the limitations of global institutions which are usually dominated by the West, leading to the desire for institutional autonomy. Bergsten suggested that there was Asian determination to create their own regional institutions, but he was not able to predict how fast the process would proceed and what form it would take.[28] In fact regional economic cooperation has been further strengthened as a result of the

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27. See for example, David E. Anderson and Jessie P.H. Poon, eds., *Asia Pacific Transitions* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001).
28. C. Fred Bergsten, "The New Asian Challenge", Working Paper 00-4, 2000, Institute for International Economics.

Asian financial crisis. The ASEAN Plus Three process which involves the ten Asean members countries and the three Northeast Asian countries - China, Japan and South Korea has generated a stronger framework for dealing with common problems in the region.[29]

Realists, however, argue that without security structures, stability and continuing development for the region are in doubt. Surveying security challenges in the region Robert Karniol concluded that the past decade had been a period of relative peace and stability, but he pointed out that while most Asian countries which had been troubled by long-standing insurgencies managed to resolve or marginalized such conflicts, tensions between mainland China and Taiwan as well as North and South Korea could still be potentially catastrophic for the region. He warned that the combination of strong defence budgets, economic development and growing industralization had prompted several Asian countries to "establish or expand their own defence production capabilities" and the redefinition of defence policy by moving offshore to protect sea lines of communication because of economic interests. This has resulted in an Asian arms buildup with emphasis on naval and air power.[30]

Since the beginning of the 1990s a number of official collective security arrangements have been set up, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Conference for Cooperation and Confidence Measures (CCCMA) and the Chiefs of Defence conference. Track two mechanisms, namely, the Council for Security Coperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) and the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) have also been established since early the 1990s. Realists however have questioned the effectiveness of such security structures in mediating conflicts in the region.[31]

Regional Insecurity

"Why, in spite of unprecedented economic inter-dependence in Northeast Asia, does the region remain so insecure?" This is a question raised

29. For a discussion of the APT process see Richard Stubbs, The ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian regionalism?, *Asian Survey*, Vol. XLII, No. 3, May/June 2002.
30. Robert Karniol, "Why Asia must search for a security structure formula", *International Defense Review*, February 1, 2000.
31. Anthony Davis, Special Report on Security, *Asiaweek*, June 9, 2000.

by a team of Asian scholars.[32] Summarized the realist, liberal and constructivist perspectives, the team observed: "Realist reminded us that states still pursue parochial interest, Liberal institutionalists acknowledged that Northeast Asia lacked adequate security structures, and Constructivists saw a poor sense of collective interests as societies.

In arguing for a "mutualistic approach" emphasizing investment in interest-based mechanisms and the promotion of a greater degree of convergence across the region in socioeconomic and political terms, the team put forward a combination of new ideas, regional, bilateral and unilateral initiatives. They maintained that a general framework should be developed to "integrate the concepts of common security and security mutualism in regional policy thinking; achieve a greater degree of convergence in socioeconomic development, and recognize the necessity for small-scale and ad hoc interim measures".[33]

At the regional level, their believe that the region should "focus on multilateral dialogue within the region", "stablize economic interdependence through economic organizations, "establish Northeast Asian parliamentary mechanisms", "strengthen government commitments to track two mechanisms", "promote minilaterals among interested parties", and "support ad hoc multilateral groupings". At the bilateral level, the team proposes that there should be more intensified dialogue and consultation and the broadening of social, political and economic exchanges as well as the acknowledgement of the security benefits of the bilateral alliance system and the need to reform the system. Finally at the unilateral level, countries should "invest greater financial and political resources for regional engagement".[34]

There is no doubt that institutional building in economic and military spheres is critical to the development of a more secure environment for Northeast Asia. What the team do not address is emergence the immense threats to the stability and security of the region in the form of human security problems. As the Commission on Human Security stat-

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32. Ok-Nim Chung, C. H. Kwan, Alexandra Mansourov, Kiyoshi Sugawa, Wu Xinbo, I Yuan, CNAPS Paper Series, Brookings Institute, Working Paper Vol 2, No. 1, 2000.
33. Ok-Nim Chung, C. H. Kwan, Alexandra Mansourov, Kiyoshi Sugawa, Wu Xinbo, I Yuan, CNAPS Paper Series, Brookings Institute, Working Paper Vol 2, No. 1, 2000.
34. Ok-Nim Chung, C. H. Kwan, Alexandra Mansourov, Kiyoshi Sugawa, Wu Xinbo, I Yuan, 2000.

ed, "people throughout the world, in developing and developed countries alike, live under varied conditions of insecurity".[35] Like other parts of the world, East Asia also has to confront common human security problems as the region becomes more interlinked with each other. In fact consequences of the social and economic upheavals following the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis as well as the global disruption created by the Severed Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)—a highly infectious disease which can be transmitted through close personal contacts, highlighted the new regional insecurity. Human security, however, has only become a focal point of attention since last ten years. The following section provides an account of it has become accepted as a critical issue in the field of international security study.

In areas of environmental protection, human rights, cross border crimes such as drug trafficking, and poverty alleviation a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements and dialogue framework as well as regional programmes have been established. While their roles in the regionalization process has not been adequately explored, such networks and mechanisms are clearly part of the wider regional institutional fabric which is critically to regional cooperation and security in East Asia. One important dimension in the socio-economic-cultural regionalization process is the emergence of civil society in the form of the non-governmental organizations in the region.

Civil Society in East Asia

With the people-centreed focus of human security, the role of civil society is obviously critical. In fact non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the form of "a massive array of self-governing private organizations, not dedicated to distributing profits to shareholders or directors, pursuing public purposes outside the formal apparatus of state" have, according to Lester Salamond, has alreday led to a global "Associational Revolution".[36] The rise of transnational network of the "third sector" and its impact on decision-making processes has been well docu-

35. Final Report of the Commission on Human Rights, May 1, 2003, p. 2.
36. Lester M. Salamond., "The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector" in *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1994, pp. 108-122.

mented many other works.[37] The situation in Asia is, however, not consistent with the global picture detailed by Salamond and others. In a 1993 review of the growth of the non-profit sector in East Asia, a group of researchers have come to the conclusion that no "Associate Revolution" has taken place in the region. Nonetheless the NGO scene in East Asia has become dynamic since the 1980s, with a steady growth of the nonprofit sector throughout the region since the 1980s.[38] NGOs or the "third force" has grown further in East Asia during the 1990s and continued to expand in the early 2000s.

Reviewing the growth of civil society in the Asia-Pacific region, an Asia Pacific Philanthropy Consortium referred to the Chinese expression "bamboo shoots sprouting up after the rain". More importantly, many of the civil society organizations in the region have been "transforming themselves from traditional organizations that provide contributions and services to the disadvantaged to organizations that directly involve themselves in the development process or in addressing diverse social issues".[39]

The development of civil society in China is perhaps one of the most interesting cases in East Asia. Although the political system in China has remained dominated by the Chinese Communist Party, economic and social transformations have created an increasingly dynamic civil society scene. The number of non-profit organizations or "mass organizations" in China has grown dramatically since the 1980s. In 1965, there were less than 100 national mass organizations and around 6,000 at the local level. By 1989, the number of national mass organizations reached 1,600 and the number of local organizations went up to over 200,000. With the introduction of the Regulations on Registration and Management of Mass Organizations, the number has been reduced steadily in the early

37. Ann M. Florini, ed., *The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society* (Tokyo: JCIE and Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000).
38. Tadashi Yamamoto, "Integrative Report" in Tadashi Yamamoto ed., "Emerging Civil Society in the Asia Pacific Community" (Singapore: ISEAS and Tokyo: JCIE, 1995), pp. 4-5.
39. Tadashi Yamamoto, Overview of the Project: on 'Governance, Organisational Effectiveness, and the Non-Profit Sector', presented at the Asia Pacific Philanthropy Consortium's conference on 5-7 September 2003 at New World Renaissance Hotel, Makati City, Philippines, p. 4. Available on http://www.asianphilanthropy.org/staging/about/OVERVIEW2.pdf.

and mid 1990s, increased again slowly towards the end of the 1990s before the number came down again. By 1997 the total number of social organizations bounced back to reach over 180,000, but the number of reduced significantly in 1999 following the crackdown against the Falungong group. By the end of 2000, the Ministry of Civil Affairs de-registered 17459 organizations, reducing the total number of social organizations in China to 130,768. The number in 2001 went further down to 129,000. The social organizations has started to grow again in 2002 reaching 133,000. The growth of civil society in China, however, cannot simply be understood from the numbers. The "civil non-enterprise organizations" which are originally state institutions responsible for scientific research, education, medical and health work for example are conducting important civil society organization-style work with independent funding. More and more often we see political and administrative reform measures and new programmes for rationalisation and increase in efficiency, and resulted in down sizing and lay-off in government organizations. Social organizations were seen as an alternative form of providing public service and creating jobs for laid-off government bureaucrats. There was almost none in early 1980s, but in 1996 there were 700,000 private non-commercial institutions in China. Private non-commercial institutions are also a relatively new phenomenon in China. It started only in 1978. Since then a large number of educational and cultural institutions have emerged. Between the early 1980s and the early 1990s more than 20,000 non-government non-commercial schools, including 1,100 in Beijing, were opened nation wide.[40]

However, scholarly studies of civil society in China have also suggested that most "NGOs" in China are still established "from above" with the support of the government or are in fact formerly part of the government agencies. Although they may have alternative sources of funding, the management structure and style still resemble government

40. See bilingual publication by Wang Ying and Sun Bingyao, "Introduction to the development of Civil Organizations in China" in Yu keeping, The Emergence of Civil Society and Its Significance to Governance in Reform China (Beijing: Sheke Chubanshe, 2002), pp. 227-230. Information in Chinese language on the number of civil society organizations registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs in China since 1991 is available in the Ministry's annual report available in the Ministry's website: http://www.mca.gov.cn/statistics/shuju.html.

departments. In fact some even still operate from the same government offices of departments that they are associated with. The fact many such organizations have not be able to function because of the lack of government funding. Some even turn to commercial activities which are totally un-related to their mission and work.[41] Some Chinese scholars argued that the state-dominate model should be reformed to become a societal-dominate model for managing contemporary problems in China. However, NGOs in China would have to establish stronger and transparent governance and management structure wait for the establishment of effective public monitoring. The establishment of a vibrant and responsible civil society, however, would not be easy in China.[42]

Elsewhere in East Asia, the growth in civil society organizations and activities have been even more straight forward. In Japan the expansion and development of the civil society sector has been rapid. Japanese civil society organizations can be divided into different categories - nonprofit public interest corporations (NPOs). By mid 1997 there were 26,275 nonprofit public interest corporations (*koeki hojin*) in Japan including *Zaidan hojin*, or incorporated foundations- 13,532, and *Shadan hojin*, or incorporated associations- 12,743. There were also 14,832 social welfare corporations, 7,566 educational corporations, and 183,996 religious corporations, and 21,442 other third sector organizations. Third sector organizations in Japan, represent 2.4 percent of total employment (8.6% of the service sector, and 35.2% of public sector employment). Compared to Germany, France, Italy, and the U.K, Japan's NGO employment is less in percentage (2.4%) terms, but the sector employs more people in absolute terms with over 1.4 million, and has more economic strength. The third sector spent roughly $94 billion according to 1990 exchange rate or US$120 billion at the current rate in public goods which was 3.4% of GDP in 1989/90. The third sector is thus comparable to that of agriculture (2.3% of GDP), public utilities (3.7% of GDP), and is about half of the transportation and communication industry,

41. See Wang Ming et. al., *Zhongguo Shetuan Gaige: cong zhengfu xuanze dao shehui xuanze [China Society Reform: from governmental choice to societal choice]* (Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe: 2001), pp. 6-7.

42. See Wang Ming et. al., *Zhongguo Shetuan Gaige : cong zhengfu xuanze dao shehui xuanze [China Society Reform: from governmental choice to societal choice]* (Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe: 2001), pp. 142-53.

with 6.4% of GDP. [43]

In Hong Kong the number of third sector organizations has also grown steadily. One indicator is the number of organization on the "List of Approved Charitable Institutions and Trusts of a Public Character" prepared by the Inland Revenue Department. As at 31 March 2003 the Department listed 3,589 recognised third sector organizations, this is up from under three thousand since 31 March 1998. A large number of these organizations are concerned with religious, educational, and welfare activities. Many charitable organizations are, however, not included in the Inland Revenue listing. Further, some small, local, and neighbourhood initiatives are not registered or incorporated.[44]

In South Korea the third sector has also flourished in the last decade. Among the 730 nationwide umbrella third sector organizations listed in the Korean NGO Directory, more than 70% were established after democratization in 1987. Since a large number of third sector organizations are not registered in Korea it is difficult to identify all unregistered organizations. There are 11,050 registered third sector organizations. The total number of all third sector organizations (registered and unregistered) is estimated to be to have reached 60,000 by the end of the 1990s.

In the Philippines the number of registered non-profit, non-stock corporations is estimated to vary from 60,000 to 96,000. These figures include the whole range of civic organizations, business, professional and labor associations, and religious organizations. These figures, however, do not include an undetermined number of unregistered organizations. In addition, there are 35,000 cooperatives registered with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA). A recent government listing of active third sector organizations is the database of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG). These organizations received accreditations from the respective local government units as the parts of the implementation process of the Local Government Code 1991. The total number as of 1995 was 14,398 people's organiza-

43. The information on individual countries in subsequent paragraphs, except for Hong Kong, is taken directly from http://www.asianphilanthropy.org/countries/index.html with some minor editorial changes.

44. See the miscellaneous section of the annual reports of the Inland Revenue Department available on http://www.info.gov.hk/ird/eng/paf/are.htm.

tions and NGOs. (This list, however, has not been screened yet for pseudo- 'NGOs' seeking to take advantage of the loose definition of NGOs ie. private sector or business-oriented organizations enlisted by unscrupulous local government executives.)

Taiwan's third sector has also grown rapidly in the past two decades. In 1981 the number of membership associations were only 4,217. The number increased by 68% to 7,113 in 1990. The figure rose to 12,825 in 1997 increasing 80% after 1990. By 1997, there were 1,595 foundations of all types—75% formed since the 1980s. Thus most of the presently active third sector organizations have been established after the 1980s.

Like many other countries in the region, third sector organizations in Thailand vary from one another in terms of size, mission, objectives, assets. These organizations have been providing public services, supplementing government agencies in providing social support for the poor and other disadvantaged groups, monitoring public organizations and their activities, advocating for justice, human rights, environmental protection and anti-corruption measures. Traditionally, voluntary organizations in Thailand are formed in honor of some outstanding individuals, with an aim of providing relief to the poor in times of disaster or hardship. There are both volunteers and workers in these organizations. Development-oriented organizations rely on full-time workers whereas other organizations such as cremation associations depend on volunteers. A large number of philanthropic organizations were established under royal patronage to receive funds from people's donation through the royal family. There are more than 18,000 third sector organizations in different categories of International Classification of Nonprofit Organizations (ICNPO).

Conclusion

In spite of the phenomenal growth, the third force in East Asia is still troubled by problems (with varying degree of importance in different parts if the region) such as the need for an "enabling environment" because of restrictive government policies and practices, the lack of clarity around sector roles between the government and the NGOs, the absence of a culture of volunteerism and giving, limited organization capacity, reduction in international aid, a lack of strong private sector,

and a lack of media involvement and coverage of NGO initiatives.[45] Locating the third sector as an emergence force in East Asia cooperation is further complicated by the regional diversity in the region. National NGOs often would have their own national agenda and have to operate in very different political, economic and social environment. Nevertheless, a sense of regional identity seemed to have emerged slowly with the establishment of regional associations and networks.

One notable example is the Asia Pacific Philanthropy (APPC) Consortium, established in 1994 and governed by a seventeen-person Executive Committee consisting of members from Australia, Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, and the United States. An incomplete list compiled by the APPC's Information network includes 28 third sector organisations that operate across the whole region or sub-region. (Appendix 3). Other important networks in the region include CODE-NGO in the Philippines, South East Asia Development of Human Resources and Rural Area (SEADHARTA), the Asian NGO Coalition for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ANGOC), the Asian Alliance of Appropriate Technology Practitioners (APPROTECH), the Southeast Asian NGO Consortium for Sustainable Development (SEACON) which brings in three regional networks, namely ANGOC, the Asian Cultural Forum on development (ACFOD) and APPROTECH ASIA.[46]

It is probably pre-mature to early to evaluate the long term impact of such regional networks in generating a sense of regional identity of the third sector in East Asia and whether NGOs in the region could formulate better solutions to manage common problems in the region. Such NGOs networks, however, clearly have an important role to play in strengthening regional cooperation covering a wide range of common developmental problems.

They need to develop new capacities, overcome both conceptual as

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45. See Lori A. Vacek, "Strengthening Philanthropy in Asia Pacific: An Agenda for Action", conference summary paper for the Asia Pacific Philanthropy Consortium conference: "Strengthening Philanthropy in the Asia Pacific: An Agenda for Action", July 16-17, 2001 Bali, Indonesia.
46. Tadashi Yamamoto, "Integrative Report" in Tadashi Yamamoto ed., "Emerging Civil Society in the Asia Pacific Community" (Singapore: ISEAS and Tokyo: JCIE, 1995), p. 19-22.

well as organizational barriers before they can take on a more comprehensive and effective role in managing the more challenging regional security agenda. This paper is a preliminary attempt to map the challenges East Asia has to confront to combat human security concerns such as poverty, labour, and environment. NGO regional mechanism and dialogues in attempting to resolve these issues may prove to be the missing piece in the jigsaw puzzle for addressing a regional security agenda that incorporates human security concerns. The greatest challenge, however, is the fact that civil society development remains highly uneven in East Asia. The China case clearly while the outlook is encouraging, it also demonstrated that more fundamental domestic changes would have to take place before regional networks can become more effective in managing human security in the region.

Appendix 1: World and Regional Military Expenditure Estimates 1993 – 2002

Figures are in US $b., at constant 2000 prices and exchange rates. Figures in italics are percentages.
Figures do not always add up to totals because of the conventions of rounding.

Region [a]	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	% change 1993-2002	
Africa	7.4	7.7	7.2	6.9	7.1	7.6	8.4	8.8	[8.9]	[9.6]	*+ 30*	
North	2.5	2.9	2.7	2.8	3.0	3.1	3.3	3.6	. .	. .	*+ 44*	b
Sub-Saharan	5.0	4.8	4.5	4.1	4.1	4.4	5.1	5.2	. .	. .	*+ 4*	b
Americas	385	365	347	328	328	321	322	333	338	368	*- 4*	
North	365	344	324	306	304	298	299	310	313	344	*- 6*	
Central	2.8	3.4	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.3	*+ 18*	
South	17.6	17.4	20.0	18.3	20.9	20.1	19.6	19.5	21.5	21.1	*+ 20*	
Asia & Oceania	120	121	123	128	128	127	129	134	140	147	*+ 23*	
Central Asia	. .	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	. .	0.5	. .	. .	. .	. .	
East Asia	99.8	101	103	107	107	105	106	111	116	[122]	*+ 22*	
South Asia	12.0	12.0	12.6	12.8	13.4	13.5	14.6	15.2	16.2	17.3	*+ 44*	
Oceania	7.7	7.7	7.4	7.4	7.4	7.7	7.5	7.3	7.4	7.4	*- 4*	
Europe	196	192	178	177	177	175	177	180	181	181	*- 8*	
CEE	25.6	25.9	20.1	18.8	19.6	16.9	17.8	18.9	20.1	21.4	*- 16*	
Western	171	166	158	158	157	158	159	161	161	160	*- 6*	
Middle East	[53.5]	54.1	50.9	51.7	56.5	60.7	60.0	67.3	73.8	. .	*+ 38*	c
World	762	740	707	691	696	690	696	723	741	784	*+ 3*	
Change (%)	. .	*- 2.9*	*- 4.4*	*- 2.3*	*0.7*	*-0.9*	*0.9*	*3.9*	*2.5*	*5.8*		

Source: *SIPRI Yearbook 2003*, appendix 10A, table 10A.1 and table 10A.3.

Note: Sub-regional totals are presented only when based on country data accounting for at least 90% of the sub-regional total.

(a) For the country coverage of the regions, see *Regional coverage*. CEE= Central and Eastern Europe. Due to lack of consistent time-series data, Africa excludes Angola, Benin, Congo (Republic of), Congo (Democratic Republic of, DRC), Eritrea, Liberia, Libya and Somalia; Central America excludes Honduras; Asia excludes Afghanistan; Europe excludes Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); the Middle East excludes Iraq. World totals exclude all these countries.

(b) Change over the period 1993-2000.

(c) Change over the period 1993-2001.

Appendix 2 : The Framework of Regional Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific

	ASEAN	ARF	PMC	APEC	PECC	ASEM	ASEAN+3
Brunei	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Indonesia	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Malaysia	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Philippines	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Singapore	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Thailand	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Vietnam	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Laos	*	*	*				*
Cambodia	*	*	*				*
Myanmar	*	*	*				*
China		*	*	*	*	*	*
Japan		*	*	*	*	*	*
South Korea		*	*	*	*	*	*
India		*	*				
PNG		*		*			
Taiwan				*	*		
Hong Kong				*	*		
Australia		*	*	*	*		
New Zealand		*	*	*	*		
US		*	*	*	*		
Canada		*	*	*	*		
Russia		*	*	*	*		
EU		*	*			*	
Chile				*	*		
Mexico				*	*		
Peru				*	*		
Colombia					*		
Mongolia		*					
North Korea		*					
Pacific Islands					*		

Source: compiled by the author.

Appendix 3: Regional Third Sector Organisations

This list includes some grant making foundations that provide support within the region, with most head quarters outside the region, but most have an office(s) within the region.

Aga Khan Foundation
The Asia Foundation
Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions
Asia Pacific Research Network
Asia Society
Bill & Melinda Gates
Center for Civil Society
Central Asia NGO Network
Charles Stewart Mott Foundation
Civicus
Commonwealth
The David and Lucile Packard Foundation
FOCUS on the Global
Ford
Idealist
Initiative for Social Action and Renewal in Eurasia (ISAR)
The Institute of Cultural
International Center for Economic Growth
International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL)
International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development
International Development Network
International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES)
The International Institute for Sustainable Development
International Society for Third-Sector Research (ISTR)
The NGO Café
NGO Locator
ProPoor
Venture for Fund

Source: Asia Pacific Philanthropy Information Network
http://www.asianphilanthropy.org/about/index.html.