

Singapore Management University

## Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University

---

Research Collection School Of Computing and  
Information Systems

School of Computing and Information Systems

---

2014

### On Empirical Validation of Compactness Measures for Electoral Redistricting and Its Significance for Application of Models in the Social Sciences

Christine CHOU

Steven O. KIMBROUGH

Frederic H. MURPHY

John SULLIVAN-FEDOCK

C. Jason WOODARD

Singapore Management University, [jason.woodard@olin.edu](mailto:jason.woodard@olin.edu)

Follow this and additional works at: [https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis\\_research](https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research)



Part of the [Computer Sciences Commons](#)

---

#### Citation

CHOU, Christine; KIMBROUGH, Steven O.; MURPHY, Frederic H.; SULLIVAN-FEDOCK, John; and WOODARD, C. Jason. On Empirical Validation of Compactness Measures for Electoral Redistricting and Its Significance for Application of Models in the Social Sciences. (2014). *Social Science Computer Review*. 32, (4), 534-543.

Available at: [https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis\\_research/2476](https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2476)

This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Computing and Information Systems at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email [cherylds@smu.edu.sg](mailto:cherylds@smu.edu.sg).

# Social Science Computer Review

<http://ssc.sagepub.com/>

---

## **On Empirical Validation of Compactness Measures for Electoral Redistricting and Its Significance for Application of Models in the Social Sciences**

Christine Chou, Steven O. Kimbrough, Frederic H. Murphy, John Sullivan-Fedock and C. Jason Woodard

*Social Science Computer Review* 2014 32: 534 originally published online 9 April 2013  
DOI: 10.1177/0894439313484262

The online version of this article can be found at:  
<http://ssc.sagepub.com/content/32/4/534>

---

Published by:



<http://www.sagepublications.com>

**Additional services and information for *Social Science Computer Review* can be found at:**

**Email Alerts:** <http://ssc.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts>

**Subscriptions:** <http://ssc.sagepub.com/subscriptions>

**Reprints:** <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav>

**Permissions:** <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav>

**Citations:** <http://ssc.sagepub.com/content/32/4/534.refs.html>

>> [Version of Record](#) - Jul 9, 2014

[OnlineFirst Version of Record](#) - Apr 9, 2013

[What is This?](#)

# On Empirical Validation of Compactness Measures for Electoral Redistricting and Its Significance for Application of Models in the Social Sciences

Social Science Computer Review  
2014, Vol. 32(4) 534-543  
© The Author(s) 2013  
Reprints and permission:  
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav  
DOI: 10.1177/0894439313484262  
sscr.sagepub.com



Christine Chou<sup>1</sup>, Steven O. Kimbrough<sup>2</sup>, Frederic H. Murphy<sup>3</sup>,  
John Sullivan-Fedock<sup>4</sup>, and C. Jason Woodard<sup>5</sup>

## Abstract

Use of optimization models in science and policy applications is often problematic because the best available models are very inaccurate representations of the originating problems. Such is the case with electoral districting models, for which there exist no generally accepted measures of compactness, in spite of many proposals and much analytical study. This article reports on an experimental investigation of subjective judgments of compactness for electoral districts. The experiment draws on a unique database of 116 distinct, legally valid districting plans for the Philadelphia City Council, discovered with evolutionary computation. Subjects in the experiment displayed, in the aggregate, remarkable agreement with several standard measures of compactness, thus providing warrant for use of these measures that has heretofore been unavailable. The exercise also lends support to the underlying methodology on display here, which proposes to use models based on subjective judgments in combination with algorithms that find multiple solutions in order to support application of optimization models in contexts in which they are only very approximate representations.

## Keywords

systems design, evolutionary design, emotive design, genetic algorithms, evolutionary computing, districting, zone design, compactness, redistricting, reapportionment, interactive evolutionary computing

---

<sup>1</sup> Department of International Business, National Dong Hwa University, Hualien, Taiwan

<sup>2</sup> University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA

<sup>3</sup> Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, USA

<sup>4</sup> Operations and Information Management, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA

<sup>5</sup> School of Information Systems, Singapore Management University, Singapore

## Corresponding Author:

Steven O. Kimbrough, University of Pennsylvania, 3730 Walnut Street, Suite 500, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA.  
Email: kimbrough@wharton.upenn.edu

## Introduction

Advances in articulating and solving constrained optimization models often lead to progress in science and progress in solving real-world design problems. Better algorithms for finding optimal solutions, however, can do little to address real-world problems if the models themselves are very inaccurate representations of the originating problems. In the face of model inaccuracies, we have basically three choices, each of which may be appropriate depending upon circumstances:

1. Do the best we can in building the model, obtain an optimal solution for it, act on an optimal solution, and hope for the best.
2. Insist on an accurate model and then wait to decide until one is available and has a solution.
3. Use the admittedly flawed model to support discussion and deliberation, implementing a modification of an optimal solution to the model in response to considerations not fully represented in the model.

Recent work, undertaken in the context of the design of electoral districts, has led to a promising technique in conjunction with the third option, aimed at making the option more attractive in cases where the proposal can be applied (Chou, Kimbrough, Sullivan, Woodard, & Murphy, 2012; Gopalan, Kimbrough, Murphy, & Quintus, 2013, 2012a). The proposal is designed for cases in which it is problematic to define and parameterize an objective function mathematically; yet, human subjective judgments can distinguish better and worse solutions. Such cases are, perhaps surprisingly, common, as the extensive literature in so-called interactive evolutionary computation (IEC) attests. (The IEC idea originated in *The Blind Watchmaker*; Dawkins, 1985. See Chou et al., 2012 and Takagi, 2001 for overview and references on subsequent developments.) Not surprisingly, the downside of relying on human subjective judgments for selecting the good solutions from a large pool of solutions is human fatigue and consequent failures of discrimination. Takagi and Iba (2005) call this “the most pressing problem in IEC systems.”

As a partial remedy to this problem, Chou, Kimbrough, Sullivan, Woodard, and Murphy (2012) propose what they call *validated surrogate fitness* (VSF) functions. The nub of the idea is simple: (a) use human subjective judgment to validate a mathematical function that approximates the choices humans make when confronted with the pool of solutions to be considered; (b) use the mathematical function (as the VSF) during automated search (for optimal solutions); (c) produce by automated search a plurality of good solutions (according to the model); and (d) offer these good solutions as members of a consideration set for subsequent deliberation. (Points (c) and (d) instantiate the more general concept of solution pluralism (Kimbrough, Kuo, Lau, Murphy, & Wood, 2011).)

While we agree that the VSF idea ((a)–(d), sketched above) has much to recommend it, the supporting evidence presented in Chou et al. (2012) was rather modest, as we shall see. The purpose of this article is to report on an experiment that augments the unusual, even unique, data set produced by Chou et al. (2012) and investigates the core idea more thoroughly. The second section, entitled “Essential Background,” succinctly presents necessary background. “Experiment 4,” the third section, then presents the experiment and discusses the results. We conclude in the “Discussion” section with some brief comments.

## Essential Background

Our context is the design of electoral districts. In the United States, after each census it is usually necessary to redraw the boundaries of electoral districts in order to maintain approximately equal populations among them. The process is called districting, redistricting or reapportionment. It is fraught—contentious and consequential—because there are often many legally valid ways to draw the boundaries of the districts, but different designs will favor different interests. Attracting

considerable public attention of late, for example Draper (2012) and Wang (2013a, 2013b), the universal worry is that when it comes to reapportionment those in power will normally attend to their own interests ahead of the public's. The question, "And will elected politicians use redistricting to pick their voters, instead of the other way around?" (Altman & Klass, 2005), voices an often-repeated worry that advances in information technology will serve to work against the public interest. The literature is enormous; see, for example, Altman, MacDonald, and McDonald (2005), Cain (1984), Cox and Katz (2002), and Turner and Lamacchia (1999).

Electoral districts that are oddly shaped for the purpose of benefitting some party, cause, or even individual are said to be *gerrymandered*. There is widespread agreement that gerrymandering is not in the public's interest. Among other things, this has led to efforts to get the public involved by encouraging the development of districting proposals by the general public in hopes that better plans will lead to better outcomes (e.g., Satullo, 2011).

The antidote to interest-based designs is generally seen to be an objective basis for designing electoral districts. But how? Gerrymandered districts are often apparent to the eye; they sprawl and meander in seemingly arbitrary ways. They are not tight and tidy. To use the common term, they are not *compact*. The hope has been to find an objective measure of compactness, which may then be used to assess districting plans (Cox & Katz, 2002; Niemi, Grofman, Carlucci, & Hofeller, 1990; Young, 1988; see also Fryer & Holden, 2011, pp. 497–498; Altman & McDonald, 2012; Niemi, Grofman, Carlucci, & Hofeller, 1990, pp. 1156–1157; and Barabas & Jerit, 2004). Points arising:

1. If an objectively assessable measure of compactness could be agreed upon as the objective in reapportionment, then it would be possible in principle to conduct search and optimization by computer to find good designs. One would minimize the compactness measure (assume smaller is better), subject to legal constraints on contiguity and population size (Cox & Katz, 2002; Kalcsics, Nickel, & Schröder, 2005; Young, 1988; see also Gopalan et al., 2013; Murphy, Hess, & Wong-Martinez, 2012).
2. There is in fact no general agreement regarding measures of compactness for reapportionment. Young (1988) argues in detail that all standard measures of compactness have serious flaws, and hence there can be no mathematical or a priori basis for choosing among them. In a follow-on study, Niemi et al. (1990) extend Young's findings. They conclude that combining multiple measures of compactness should be explored as a possible solution. They do not develop this idea, and, to our knowledge, it remains only as a suggestion. In short, Young's views have been widely accepted. As Fryer and Holden (2011, p. 494) note, "There is no consensus on how to adequately measure compactness."
3. Even if agreement on the definition of compactness for reapportionment purposes could be had, limiting the objective of the optimization to compactness is problematic, since other objectives, such as protection of neighborhood integrity (Fryer & Holden, 2011; Satullo, 2011), are often important.

This last point is addressed in a principled way by point (d) in the VSF concept (above). The first point offers a hope if Points 2 and 3 can be resolved favorably. So, we are left with addressing Point 2: the problem of finding a measure of compactness that can be used in automated search that is sufficiently warranted to serve as a surrogate for human judgment.

Given Young's (1988) analyses, the justification for a compactness measure will have to be an empirical one, yet very little of such work is available. This takes us to the article by Chou et al. (2012). Further points arising:

1. Besides proposing the VSF concept, Chou et al. (2012) succeeded in the technically challenging task of producing 116 good solutions for a difficult districting problem (Point (c),

above). Every design was required to allocate each of the 66 wards to 1 of 10 councilmanic districts for the city of Philadelphia, using data from the 2010 census. In consequence, the raw search space, assuming assignment of at least one ward to each of the 10 districts, is sized as a Stirling number of the second kind,  $S(66, 10) = 2.7 \times 10^{59}$ . They used evolutionary computation to produce this pool of legal solutions by minimizing on a measure of compactness, subject to feasibility on contiguity and population size.

2. The measure of compactness used by Chou et al. (2012) was the *max–max distance*. Their optimization sought to minimize the maximum of the largest intradistrict distance within a plan. This is very much a nonstandard measure of compactness, use of which was necessitated by the information available at the time.
3. Further, Chou et al. (2012) undertook three experiments that gave qualified support from human judgments for use of this compactness measure as a VSF in the context of electoral districting. Using paired comparisons of district plans that were chosen to be well separated in terms of the max–max distance measure, they were able to show, across 3 experiments, a discernible level of agreement between comparative compactness judgments of the subjects and the verdicts of the max–max distance metric.

We conjecture that a main reason why careful empirical studies have not heretofore been done on measures of compactness for electoral districts is that there have not been libraries of alternative plans available for comparison. In fact, reporting of the production of the 116 plans, and how this was achieved, was, with the VSF idea, the main thrust of Chou et al. (2012). Given their quite limited and provisional empirical results—Items (2) and (3) just above—it becomes important to test the VSF idea on standard measures of compactness. That is just what our experiment was designed to do.

## Experiment 4

Chou et al. (2012) report three experiments on human judgment of compactness, using maps (district plans) drawn from the 116 produced by their evolutionary algorithm. Their experiment 2 is not directly comparable to our experiment, and so we will not discuss it further. In their first and third experiments, the same four pairs of district plans were presented to subjects who were asked to yield judgments of comparative compactness. In terms of Table 1, subjects were asked to choose between maps (1 and 2), (3 and 4), (5 and 6), and (7 and 8) with regard to compactness. Most importantly, subjects were asked to choose on the basis of what they judged most *other* people would think with regard to the comparative compactness. Further, subjects were rewarded based on the number of choices they made that agreed with the majority. This is called a *beauty contest* design; it provides incentive for the subjects to report honestly and thoughtfully. Experiment 1 was performed in a laboratory setting; Experiment 3 was conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). The results of the two experiments were in good agreement.

Our Experiment 4 extended Experiment 3 on AMT. We used the same basic setup with these modifications.

1. Subjects were asked to choose between 8 pairs of maps (numbered 1–16), instead of 4, as in Experiment 3 (and Experiment 1). (All 16 maps were drawn without replacement.)
2. Maps 1–8 (and pairings) were as in Experiment 3 (and Experiment 1). Maps 9–16 were paired in the same pattern, now (9 and 10), (11 and 12), (13 and 14), and (15 and 16).
3. Maps 9–16 were randomly drawn anew. Note especially that, unlike Maps 1–8, they were not selected to be far apart in objective values.
4. Subjects were paid US\$0.20 to complete the task, with a bonus of US\$2.00 for 7 or 8 agreements with the group, and US\$1.00 for 5 or 6.


**Table 1.** Summary of Results, Experiments 1, 3, and 4. (Perimeters given in miles)

Map	Exp. 1	Exp. 3	Exp. 4	Total	Obj.	Schwartzb	Dist <sup>2</sup>	Perim
1	19	83	114	216	341.62	1.678	138.840	220.03
2	0	54	86	140	399.34	1.845	176.328	240.28
3	17	73	123	213	346.75	1.761	144.472	231.35
4	3	64	77	144	399.34	1.840	179.943	239.65
5	4	58	65	127	399.34	1.847	179.119	240.50
6	15	79	135	229	346.57	1.666	136.005	218.68
7	13	86	129	228	346.57	1.677	137.253	219.89
8	7	51	71	129	391.26	1.709	153.287	224.81
9			117	117	377.46	1.645	134.742	216.33
10			83	83	365.49	1.706	136.250	224.71
11			79	79	369.43	1.831	170.476	238.10
12			121	121	378.46	1.669	136.141	219.48
13			140	140	367.58	1.757	146.284	230.66
14			60	60	399.34	1.894	191.830	246.67
15			84	84	355.37	1.787	165.173	230.90
16			116	116	377.46	1.705	136.641	223.90

- Maps 1 and 2 were presented paired in random order, Maps 3 and 4 were presented paired in random order, and so on.
- We limited participation to 200 subjects, each of whom recorded judgments on the 8 pairs of maps; 20 made 8 judgments that agreed with the majority vote in each case, 38 judged correctly in 7 of the 8 cases, 30 got 6 of the 8 right, and 22 got 5 of 8 right.

Table 1 presents the key data from the experiment, along with other information, including the results of Experiments 1 and 3. Points arising:

- The column labeled “Exp. 4” presents the votes received by individual maps in the pair comparisons. The column labeled “Obj.” records the max–max distance score of the associated map. Recall that lower scores are (presumably or hypothetically) associated with better compactness, where the max–max distance consists of finding the largest distance between the two points in a district and finding the maximum of those distances over all districts. The votes are all in the “right” direction and consistent with the results of Experiments 1 and 3. The *p* values are significant in each case: .0280 (Map 1–Map 2 pairing), 7.0085e-04 (Maps 3–4), 4.1640e-07 (Maps 5–6), and 2.4865e-05 (Maps 7–8).
- The votes are *not* in the “right” direction for the max–max distance measure of compactness for the pairings Maps 9–10, Maps 11–12, and Maps 15–16. The voting differences, however, *are* significant with *p* values of .0097 (Maps 9–10), .0018 (Maps 11–12), 7.5353e-09 (Maps 13–14), and .0141 (Maps 15–16). Note that in these cases the objective values of the compared maps are much closer together than in the earlier comparisons. This suggests that max–max distance is not salient or “right” for subjects in judging compactness when the compared values are too close together.
- Using manual tracing, assisted by computer, we obtained the perimeters and areas of each of the 10 districts in each of the 16 maps. The perimeter values are reported in Table 1 in the column labeled “Perim.” Both the perimeter and the area values were used in computing the Schwartzberg measure shown in the column labeled “Schwartzb.” Thus, we augmented the data available in Chou et al. (2012).



**Figure 1.** Map 9 (left) and Map 10 (right).

4. The Schwartzberg measure of compactness is the ratio of the perimeter of a district divided by the perimeter of the circle having the same area as the district. Lower values indicate more compact districts on this measure. In the table, in the column labeled “Schwartzb,” we report the sum of the Schwartzberg measures for each district in the corresponding map divided by the number of districts (10 in the case of Philadelphia).
5. There is perfect agreement between the Schwartzberg measure and the majority voting results in Experiments 1, 3, and 4.
6. There is perfect agreement between the perimeter measure and the majority voting in Experiments 1, 3, and 4 (and with Schwartzberg).
7. The column labeled “Dist<sup>2</sup>” in Table 1 records the (square of the) total Euclidean distances in each design/map between the centroids of the districts and the centers of their constituent wards. This is a commonly used compactness metric (often called the center of gravity measure), with smaller numbers indicating better values. (This information was available at the time of writing of Chou et al., 2012 but was not used.)
8. There is perfect agreement between the Dist<sup>2</sup> measure and the majority voting in Experiments 1, 3, and 4 (and with Schwartzberg and perimeter). Of course, distance itself would preserve the agreement as well. The (Pearson) correlation coefficient between the average Schwartzberg measure and distance (square root of Dist<sup>2</sup>) is .9570, suggesting that while these are indeed different measures, they will be largely equivalent for practical purposes.
9. On the basis of these results, we find support for the hypotheses that the Schwartzberg measure, the perimeter measure, and the distance measure can be used as VSFs in districting because they accord well with human subject judgment. Of course, we have no data to rule out possible measures of compactness, other than max–max distance.
10. Interestingly, the favorite map of Chou et al. (2012), shown in Figure 2 of Chou et al., has a Distance<sup>2</sup> score of 132.2226, which is the lowest of the 116 maps we discovered. This is a fact we encountered after Chou et al. selected the map as the best of the bunch.
11. Figure 1 shows gray scale versions of Maps 9 and 10, in which subjects were asked to compare on compactness. Note that on the max–max distance criterion (in the “Obj.” column), Map 10 has a lower score than Map 9 and hence is counted as more compact by this



criterion. The voting, however, is 117 to 83 in favor of Map 9. As noted earlier, the average Schwartzberg, the Dist<sup>2</sup>, and the Perim measures all agree with the voting in counting Map 9 as more compact than Map 10. We find this a remarkable performance by our Mechanical Turk subjects. (The pattern repeats itself for the other pairs of maps, but space limitations prevent their display here.)

## Discussion

The problem of compactness—of defining it, of using it—is central to the problem of avoiding malapportionment in electoral districting. Yet, as we have noted, it is beset with difficulties. In his review of compactness measures for districting, Young (1988) concludes that “compactness is such a hazy and ill-defined concept that it seems impossible to apply it, in any rigorous sense, to matters of law.” This is widely accepted, with the following passage reflecting the received view.

Compactness refers to the shape of a district, but is formally ill-defined. Scholars have proposed over fifty compactness measures, which have not resulted in clarity, since these measures conflict and can be manipulated. (Altman & McDonald, 2012, p. 1190)

The approach we have sketched may well afford keeping the baby without the bath water. Young’s analysis presumes that the standard measures of compactness are to be assessed in an absolute fashion. If so, then we would agree that the contingencies of geography and policy will defeat any attempt to mandate a threshold score for compactness on any known measure. But there is an alternative. The perspective we would urge is to use them in a relative or comparative sense. We should judge a districting plan as (relatively) compact based on some measure *M* if it scores *well compared to relevant alternative plans*, the relevant plans being that plurality of known solutions that are legally valid and have generally good scores for compactness (comparatively). If one or a pool of compactness measures can be empirically validated, then surely the move we have indicated of focusing discussion on the better scoring solutions could be used at the least to shift the burden of argument onto those who would advocate significant departures. Very many extant districting plans are in fact in this category. See the maps in Figure 1 for representative examples, as well as the maps in our project repository (<http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/~sok/phillydistricts/>).

Questions that naturally arise in consequence include (1) how do disinterested human subjects judge compactness of electoral districts and to what extent do these judgments agree with established measures of compactness? And (2) how might pooled judgments regarding compactness be used to improve the reapportionment process? Regarding Question (1), as the following passage attests, the advisability of undertaking empirical assessment of districting plans and methods is becoming recognized.

The development of a new generation of software, such as our DistrictBuilder system [<http://www.districtbuilder.org/>, last visited 2013-03-03], has enabled members of the public to create hundreds of real districting plans—plans based on official census data, and satisfying all of the criteria required by law. The existence of this large corpus of redistricting plans for the first time is beginning to enable an empirical analysis of redistricting plans that both expands our understanding of the range of redistricting outcomes that are feasible in practice, and illuminates the trade-offs that members of the public tend to view as most desirable. (Altman & McDonald, 2012, p. 1197)

The experiment we report here is among the first, if it is not the first, to compare human judgments of compactness for real districting plans with standard measures of compactness for those

plans. Of course, many more experiments are called for. What we have here, however, are encouraging results and a replicable method.

Regarding Question (2), even if an acceptable measure of compactness (or pool of such measures) could be agreed to, there remain severe problems of application.

The ideal data to estimate [compactness] would contain the geographical coordinates of every household in the United States, its political district, some measure of distance between any two households within a state, and a precise definition of communities of interest. This information is not available. (Fryer & Holden, 2011, p. 506)

The passage is correct as far as it goes, but it greatly understates the difficulties. At the least, additional criteria, such as respect for existing political boundaries and geographic features, will often be important. And arriving at “a precise definition of communities of interest” is an enormous undertaking. The upshot is that for the foreseeable future we shall be under the condition described at the outset of having only models that are very inaccurate representations of the underlying problem.

The VSF idea, supported by the empirical findings reported here, affords the third option identified above: Using an admittedly flawed model to support discussion and deliberation, implementing a modification of an optimal solution to the model in response to considerations not fully represented in the model. In a nutshell, the idea is to use the ability to generate a large number of good solutions to constrain the decision process to a suitably characterized pool, each member of which is reasonably compact and meets the legal requirements on contiguity and population size. One might set a loose requirement on compactness, perhaps as measured by several different rules. Evolutionary computation, or indeed any other workable method, could be used to generate a large consideration set of objectively good quality solutions. Let anyone contribute to this pool but limit the consideration set to the pool. This leaves room for a modicum of politics and for incorporation of other features not incorporated into the computational models, and it secures choice among objectively good solutions. A regime on this order (further details are needed, of course) could in fact be implemented by agreement of nonpartisan districting boards, where they exist. Other zone design applications—such as design of sales districts—might follow a similar procedure as well.

In this regard, we note that redistricting problems are normally multiobjective—

Drawing political maps necessarily involves making difficult choices among a number of competing political values. Among these are population equality, representation of minority groups, geographic compactness and contiguity, respect for the boundaries of other political units at different spatial scales, continuity with previous district boundary, and (of course) partisan advantage . . . (Eagles, Katz, & Mark, 1999)

—as are zone design problems generally (Sacks, 2000). Yet, often there is (as in the Philadelphia districting case) a practical impossibility of representing all important aspects of the problem in a single optimization model, if only for lack of data. By producing a plurality of good solutions to a reasonable optimization model, we can hope to provide stakeholders with useful grist for the mill of deliberation.

### Authors' Note

The work reported here is new but part of a larger project; see Gopalan, Kimbrough, Murphy, and Quintus (2012b). Thanks to Ram Gopalan and Nicholas Quintus for optimization work and GIS work. The integer programming aspect of our project, which was submitted to the contest, is described in Gopalan et al. (2013); see also Gopalan, Kimbrough, Murphy, and Quintus (2012a). Thanks to Nicholas Quintus for preparing the maps in the figures of this articles. Thanks to Knowledge@Wharton for a concise, accurate story, <http://>

knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/2850.cfm. Our project repository is at <http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/~sok/phillydistricts/>.

### Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

### Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

### References

- Altman, M., & Klass, G. M. (Fall 2005). Current research in voting, elections, and technology. *Social Science Computer Review*, 23, 269–273.
- Altman, M., MacDonald, K., & McDonald, M. (Fall 2005). From crayons to computers: The evolution of computer use in redistricting. *Social Science Computer Review*, 23, 334–346.
- Altman, M., & McDonald, M. P. (2012). Redistricting principles for the twenty-first century. *Case Western Reserve Law Review*, 62, 1179–1204.
- Barabas, J., & Jerit, J. (2004). Redistricting principles and racial representation. *State Politics and Policy Quarterly*, 4, 415–435.
- Cain, B. E. (1984). *The reapportionment puzzle*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Chou, C., Kimbrough, S. O., Sullivan, J., Woodard, C. J., & Murphy, F. H. (2012). Using interactive evolutionary computation (IEC) with validated surrogate fitness functions for redistricting. In Terence Soule (Ed.), *Proceedings of GECCO 2012 Genetic and Evolutionary Computation Conference* (pp. 1071–1078). New York, USA: ACM. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2330163.2330312>.
- Cox, G. W., & Katz, J. N. (2002). *Elbridge Gerry's Salamander: The electoral consequences of the reapportionment revolution*. Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Dawkins, R. (1985). *The blind watchmaker: Why the evidence of evolution reveals a universe without design*. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Draper, R. (2012). The league of dangerous mapmakers. *The Atlantic*. <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/10/the-league-of/309084/>
- Eagles, M., Katz, R. S., & Mark, D. (Spring 1999). GIS and redistricting: Emergent technologies, social geography, and political sensibilities. *Social Science Computer Review*, 17, 5–9.
- Fryer, R. G., Jr., & Holden, R. (2011). Measuring the compactness of political districting plans. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 54, 493–535.
- Gopalan, R., Kimbrough, S. O., Murphy, F. H., & Quintus, N. (2012a). The Philadelphia districting contest: Designing territories for city council based upon the 2010 census. [https://live.blueskybroadcast.com/bsb/client/CL\\_DEFAULT.asp?Client=569807&PCAT=5277&CAT=5278](https://live.blueskybroadcast.com/bsb/client/CL_DEFAULT.asp?Client=569807&PCAT=5277&CAT=5278)
- Gopalan, R., Kimbrough, S. O., Murphy, F. H., & Quintus, N. (2012b). Team Fred home page. <http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/~sok/phillydistricts/>
- Gopalan, R., Kimbrough, S. O., Murphy, F. H., & Quintus, N. (2013). The Philadelphia districting contest: Designing territories for City Council based upon the 2010 census. *Interfaces*. Forthcoming.
- Kalcsics, J., Nickel, S., & Schröder, M. (2005). Towards a unified territorial design approach—Applications, algorithms and GIS integration. *Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa Top*, 13, 1–74.
- Kimbrough, S. O., Kuo, A., Lau, H. C., Murphy, F. H., & Wood, D. H. (2011). Solution pluralism and metaheuristics. In *MIC 2011: The IX Metaheuristics International Conference*, Udine, Italy.
- Murphy, F. H., Hess, S. W., & Wong-Martinez, C. G. (2012). Politics. In S. Gass & M. Fu (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of operations research*. Berlin, Germany: Springer.

- Niemi, R. G., Grofman, B., Carlucci, C., & Hofeller, T. (1990). Measuring compactness and the role of a compactness standard in a test for partisan and racial gerrymandering. *Journal of Politics*, 52, 1155–1181.
- Sacks, S. R. (2000). Optimal spatial deployment of police patrol cars. *Social Science Computer Review*, 18, 40–55.
- Satullo, C. (2011). Fixphillydistricts: Voters offer winning visions for council. WHYY Web page. <http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/homepage-feature/item/25988-06csmaps>.
- Takagi, H. (2001). Interactive evolutionary computation: Fusion of the capabilities of EC optimization and human evaluation. *Proceedings of the IEEE*, 89, 1275–1296.
- Takagi, H., & Iba, H. (2005). Interactive evolutionary computation. *New Generation Computing*, 23, 113–114.
- Turner, M. L., & Lamacchia, R. A. (Spring 1999). The U.S. census, redistricting, and technology: A 30-year perspective. *Social Science Computer Review*, 17, 16–26.
- Wang, S. (2013a). The great gerrymander of 2012. *The New York Times*. <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/opinion/sunday/the-great-gerrymander-of-2012.html>
- Wang, S. (2013b). Slaying the gerrymander. <http://election.princeton.edu/2013/02/03/slaying-the-gerrymander/>.
- Young, H. P. (1988). Measuring the compactness of legislative districts. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 13, 105–115.

## Author Biographies

**Christine Chou** (PhD, National Taipei University) is an assistant professor in the Department of International Business at National Dong Hwa University in Taiwan. She worked for Taiwan's government for more than 10 years. Her current research interests mainly focus on technological innovation management and new product development and marketing. She may be reached at [chou@mail.ndhu.edu.tw](mailto:chou@mail.ndhu.edu.tw).

**Steven O. Kimbrough** (PhD, University of Wisconsin-Madison) is a professor at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. He is an active researcher in many aspects of computational decision science. In addition, he is the author of *Agents, Games, and Evolution: Strategies at Work and Play* and is continuing to develop results in postclassical game theory. He may be reached at [kimbrough@wharton.upenn.edu](mailto:kimbrough@wharton.upenn.edu).

**Frederic H. Murphy** (PhD, Yale University) is a professor in the Fox School of Business, Temple University. He works mainly in the area of energy market forecasting and energy policy. He has been involved in studying local economic policy issues, including advising the Tax Reform Commission of the City of Philadelphia and analyzing the economic impact of local casinos. He is currently advising the King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Center on building energy/economy models of Saudi Arabia. His publications range from policy analyses to algorithms for computing economic equilibria and solving optimization models. He may be reached at [fmurphy@temple.edu](mailto:fmurphy@temple.edu).

**John Sullivan-Fedock** (MS, University of Pennsylvania) is an architect and a researcher at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, investigating automated design using evolutionary computation. He may be reached at [johnsul@design.upenn.edu](mailto:johnsul@design.upenn.edu).

**C. Jason Woodard** (PhD, Harvard University) is an assistant professor at the School of Information Systems at the Singapore Management University School of Information Systems, Singapore. His research explores the evolution of complex product and system designs, with a focus on the relationship between their architecture and the competitive strategy of their designers. He can be reached at [jwoodard@smu.edu.sg](mailto:jwoodard@smu.edu.sg).