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Appealing to the Masses  
Understanding Ethnic Politics and Elections in Indonesia

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A Dissertation submitted to

The Faculty of  
The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences  
of The George Washington University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

August 31, 2014

Dissertation directed by

Henry E. Hale  
Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs

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The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University certifies that Colm A. Fox has passed the Final Examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy as of June 10, 2014. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation.

Appealing to the Masses  
Understanding Ethnic Politics and Elections in Indonesia

Colm A. Fox

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## Acknowledgements

There are many people I'd like to thank for their help in researching and writing this dissertation. At George Washington University, I would first like to thank my advisor Henry Hale and my committee members, Susan Sell, Bill Liddle, Eric Lawrence, and Nathan Brown. To a large degree my interest in ethnic politics was fostered during Henry's class on ethnicity and ethnic conflict. To date, much of what I know on ethnic politics—and on how to be a scholar—I have learned from Henry. Throughout the dissertation process he gave me ample space to explore, but also gently heralded me back on track when necessary. This dissertation would be far inferior without his experienced guiding hand.

From the very beginning of my studies at George Washington University, Susan Sell has supported me in terms of surviving the rigors of graduate school and in my development as a scholar and teacher. All of this was done with a great sense of humor. While we differ in terms of our topic of study, she has never failed to come up with insightful and constructive comments. Bill Liddle has been an inspiration when it comes to the study of Indonesian politics due to his extensive scholarship, and most important, his selfless dedication to nurturing scholars of Indonesia over five decades. I thank him for his help in guiding this dissertation.

Eric Lawrence was my statistics guru. Through his classes and his advice, he has always been able to make statistics intelligible. He also has a keen eye for design and has helped me understand the importance of using statistics to communicate ideas in a clear and meaningful manner. Finally, I thank Nathan Brown for serving on my committee. His careful read of my dissertation and his insightful comments and critiques have helped

me to look at the bigger picture and find where my dissertation fits in the broader literature.

In addition, while not on my committee, I thank Kimberly Morgan. Her support for comparative field research and her quick response on administrative matters during her years as Director of Graduate Studies in the Political Science department has been invaluable. I was also fortunate to have a remarkable group of supportive friends at George Washington University who have (often unwittingly) served as sounding boards for ideas contained in this dissertation. For their advice and friendship, I thank Davy Banks, Dina Bishara, Enze Han, Michele Jorkovich, Brian Karlson, Inwook Kim, Craig Kaufman, Joey O'Mahoney, Lilian Ting, and Ajay Vergese.

This dissertation would not have been possible without the kindness of many Indonesians who helped me during my travels in Indonesia. My initial trips to Indonesia were for language training. I'd like to thank my home-stay families, Bapak and Ibu Trisoyno, and Bapak and Ibu Sulis Krave. They introduced me to life in Indonesia and gave me a home. I also thank the whole team at the United States-Indonesian Society (USINDO) sponsored language program at Universitas Gadjah Madah and at the Consortium for the Teaching of Indonesian and Malay (COTIM) program at Universitas Kristen Satya Wacana. In particular, I thank my teachers and tutors, Bapak Basuki, Taufik Nur, Ibu Rio Rini, Christian Rudianto, Ibu Sugihastuti, and Toar Sumakul, for their patience and encouragement.

For research assistance in North Sumatra, I thank Ines Cute, Husnul Isa Harahap, and Ibrahim Zafar. Without their help I would not have been able to gather a fraction of the data contained in this dissertation. In addition to the raw data, they also taught me

much about the ethnic geography, culture, and politics of North Sumatra. I also thank J. Anto at the media NGO KIPPAS in North Sumatra. He kindly gave me access to their wonderful archives of North Sumatran papers and helped me understand print media in the province. Over the years, numerous Indonesian candidates, campaign workers, political analysts, journalists, and regular Indonesians carved time out of their busy schedules to help me understand local politics, elections, and campaign materials in North Sumatra, Java, and Maluku. I thank them for their time and generosity in sharing their insights.

A number of Indonesians and foreign researchers helped me gather thousands of election posters from across the country. They include the motorbike drivers who drove me around for hours while I photographed election posters. I was helped immensely by Firman Witoelar and his network of researchers at SurveyMeter, plus a personal network of researchers. They willingly gave up their time to go out and photograph election posters and send them on to me. I thank Dani Alfah, Abdullah Alwazin, Alpha Amirrachman, Colin Cahill, Erica Copeland, Kevin Fogg, Jesse Gerstin, Ruth Hastutiningsih, Bettie Landauer Menchik, Taufiq Nur, Christina Pomianek, Lacey Raak, Jacob Ricks, Megan Ryan, Danau Tanu, Bart Thanhauser, Ibrahim Zafar, and Muslim Zainuddin. Without them, this dissertation would have been far narrower in scope.

During field research, I was fortunate to have a group of wonderful fellow researchers in the field. I thank En-Chieh Chao, Sebastian Dettman, Kevin Fogg, Jeremy Menchik, Sarah Shair-Rosenfield, and Danau Tanu for their companionship. I would particularly like to single out Jeremy Menchik. His insight into the potential of studying election posters proved invaluable for my dissertation topic, and I worked with Jeremy in



gathering and coding the Indonesian election poster dataset. In addition, through our numerous conversations in Jakarta, I was able to hone my dissertation research methodology.

In researching this dissertation, I met with and got advice from a number of Indonesianists. I'd particularly like to thank Edward Aspinall, Michael Buehler, Syarif Hidayat, and Marcus Mietzner. Michael Buehler kindly gave comments on my dissertation proposal and advice on field research. Marcus encouraged me to go to North Sumatra for in-depth research on ethnic politics, which ended up being a fortuitous choice. I thank Syarif Hidayat at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, LIPI) for serving as my Indonesian counterpart and offering advice and introductions during fieldwork. I also thank Edward Aspinall. Over the years he has provided invaluable encouragement and offered the best insights on contemporary ethnic politics in Indonesia.

In the process of researching and writing this dissertation, I have also benefited from comments and advice from Robert Adcock, Nathan Allen, Kuskridho Ambardi, Paddy Barron, Shane Barter, Jacque Bertrand, Robin Bush, Robert Cribb, Jamie Davidson, Greg Fealy, Michele Ford, Jonathan Hanson, Allen Hicken, Paul Hutchcroft, Jae Hyeok Shin, Karl Jackson, Martin Johnson, Sydney Jones, Benjamin Reilly, Blair Palmer, Tom Pepinsky, Sandeep Rae, Saskia Schäfer, Stephen Sherlock, Aim Simpeng, Al Stepan, Sunny Tanuwidjaja, Ross Tapsell, Risa Toha, and Dirk Tomsa.

Over the years, this dissertation has been refined during numerous presentations of early findings and later, more polished findings. I would like to thank attendees for their comments and suggestions during presentations in Jakarta (at the Center for

Strategic and International Studies and the Freedom Institute), Australia (at the Department of Political & Social Change, Australian National University), Canada (at the University of Toronto), and the US (at UCLA and at a number of annual meetings of the Asian Association Studies and the American Political Science Association).

While intellectual stimulation is vital for any in-depth piece of research, so too is funding. I thank the Sigur Center for field research grants in 2008 and 2009 and the Matsushita International foundation for a field research grant from 2009 to 2011. Much of the writing of this dissertation was done as a visiting research scholar at the Institute for Religion, Culture, and Public Life at Columbia University. This provided me with a perfect opportunity to complete the dissertation. I thank Karen Barkey, Al Stepan, and Melissa Van for facilitating my stay. Dr. Mariah at Edit911 edited the final draft of the dissertation. I thank her for a meticulous job in ironing out the inconsistencies and adding clarity to a number of passages, tables, and charts.

I am very sure my parents would never have thought I'd write a dissertation on ethnic politics in Indonesia. However, our family holidays abroad fostered a curiosity of countries beyond our small Irish village. Their support and the independence they instilled in me allowed me to pursue my creative and intellectual interests in places far from home and laid the foundation for my academic work. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Sayaka. We met in the early stage of graduate school at George Washington University and over the years she has made innumerable sacrifices and put up with long periods of being apart. I am quite certain I never would have completed graduate school without her encouragement, support, and love. For Sayaka and our son Zeno I dedicate this dissertation.

# Abstract of Dissertation

## Appealing to the Masses Understanding Ethnic Politics and Elections in Indonesia

The mobilization of ethnic groups during elections is seen by many as one of the greatest threats to democracy in ethnically diverse societies. Two important questions are: Why does ethnicity become politicized in some elections, but not in others? and Why do particular ethnic categories become politicized, while others do not? Two arguments in the literature offer explanations. The first argument posits that groups are mobilized along ethnic lines when voters have strong emotional allegiances to their ethnic group; in effect, the ethnic politicization of elections is viewed as a reflection of societal ethnic cleavages. A second argument focuses on electoral rules and asserts that proportional representation politicizes ethnicity by enabling small ethnic parties to compete. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence to support these arguments is limited. This dissertation takes a more dynamic approach by focusing on individual candidates and their incentives to make ethnic appeals. I argue that under party-centric electoral rules, a candidate's ethnic appeals are influenced from above—by their party's stance on ethnic issues. In contrast, under candidate-centric rules, a candidate's ethnic appeals are influenced from below; in particular, by the size of ethnic groups within the candidate's electoral district.

Indonesia is an ideal country for testing this argument. It is the third largest democracy in the world, and in recent years it has had both party-centric and candidate-centric elections. In addition, ethnicity in Indonesia is diverse and multidimensional, with salient indigenous and religious ethnic categories. For field research, I spent almost two

years in Indonesia attending campaign events and interviewing elites and voters during numerous elections. To gather data on ethnic appeals, I collected election-related newspaper reports from 1997 to 2011, photographed 15,000 election posters, and gathered identity information on over 2,000 candidates across the country. This is the largest collection of election posters ever analyzed and the first time they have been used to analyze patterns of ethnic appeals. I coded the reports and the posters for ethnic appeals and differentiated between ethnic bonding appeals (appeals to one of the candidate's own ethnic groups) or ethnic bridging appeals (appeals to other ethnic groups).

Findings help explain the politicization of ethnicity. They show that as Indonesia's elections have become more candidate-centric, there has been an overall decline in partisan appeals and an increase in appeals to local indigenous and religious groups. In addition, when Indonesian candidates make ethnic appeals in candidate-centric elections, it is the size of ethnic groups that largely determines whether they make ethnic bonding or ethnic bridging appeals. Candidates choose to make ethnic bonding appeals if they are members of an ethnic group that is large enough to secure victory in their electoral district. Otherwise they switch to ethnic bridging appeals. In contrast, candidates competing under party-centric rules are less likely to appeal to local indigenous and religious groups and more prone to appeal to partisan identities. However, when they do appeal to ethnic groups, their choice of ethnic bonding or ethnic bridging appeals is largely determined by their party's official stance on ethnic issues. The argument proves to be superior to the competing explanations; it not only explains

when ethnicity becomes politicized, but is able to predict the particular ethnic category that an individual candidate will politicize in their election campaign.

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# Introduction

This dissertation presents a new theory and original empirical evidence to explain why ethnicity becomes politicized during elections. It is not a study of voters, political parties, or party leaders, though it does relate to these actors. It is also not about ethnic conflict, though some connection may be made. It is a study of the electoral campaign behavior of thousands of local candidates campaigning across one of the largest and most ethnically diverse democracies in the world, Indonesia. It explains when, how, and why candidates choose to appeal to ethnic identity groups.

Democratic elections are a means through which the general will of the people is expressed. They are an institutional mechanism where voters come together to deliberate on how, and by whom, they wish to be governed. While this may be the ideal, it appears that the competitive nature of elections often has adverse effects, particularly on inter-ethnic relations. Newspaper coverage from around the world on the politicization of ethnicity during elections is quite common. It is not hard to find reports on political leaders valorizing their ethnic group, while demonizing other ethnic groups for their discriminatory practices and past wrongdoings. Electoral campaigns can sharpen ethnic divisions and reduce elections to zero-sum struggles for power and

domination between increasingly hostile ethnic groups. Ultimately the electoral results become little more than an ethnic census. Why does this occur? Why do political leaders choose to politicize ethnicity when it can potentially have such adverse effects?

One explanation, common among journalists and scholars, is that the temptation for political leaders to play the ethnic card during elections is just too great. In an effort to obtain support, political leaders benefit greatly by appealing to voters' emotional allegiances to tribe, language, region, and religion. To bind the group even tighter, they can appeal to the group's fears and prejudice against an outgroup. This is often done by presenting a historical narrative of their ethnic group's persecution, economic hardship, and political discrimination at the hands of the outgroup. These kinds of appeals resonate at a far deeper level compared to speeches on the dull details of programmatic policies and platforms. By drawing on emotional ethnic attachments and historical inter-ethnic hostility, political leaders push voters out to the polls and help to ensure their electoral victory. In sum, the common argument is that elections and ethnicity do not mix well. All too often, malicious leaders will exploit ethnic bonds and inherent intergroup prejudice to achieve electoral victory.<sup>1</sup> The problem with this explanation is that it can't explain cases when leaders do not mobilize ethnic groups, or why the politicization of ethnicity can change over the course of election cycles. Strong ethnic attachments and histories of inter-ethnic hostility are common in many countries; however, political leaders often avoid the overt mobilization of ethnicity and instead campaign on national, multi-ethnic platforms.

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<sup>1</sup> See Kaplan (1993; 1994 2/1) for the most well known journalistic accounts on the adverse effects of ethnicity and tribalism. Scholars such as Connor (1993) and Kaufman (2001) have also emphasized the power of ethnic bonds and how politicians can instrumentally manipulate ethnic attachment for their own ends.

Rather than looking at the intent of particular leaders or the emotional bonds of ethnic groups, a large body of academic research has focused on the effect of institutions on the politicization of ethnicity, particularly the electoral rules. The most prominent theory is that proportional representation rules politicize ethnicity while majoritarian rules depoliticize ethnicity.<sup>2</sup> Scholars have argued that proportional representation and multi-seat districts produce a more proportional outcome. This enables small, ethnically oriented parties to form because they can win seats by only appealing to their ethnic kin. In contrast, under majoritarian rules, parties need broader support to win elections. As a result, more nationally oriented parties form. To reach a broad cross-section of voters, they appeal to voters as either a multi-ethnic or non-ethnic party. Ultimately, the politicization of ethnicity is the result of proportional representation rules and its impact on party formation. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence to support this view is mixed.<sup>3</sup>

Overall, explanations for the politicization of ethnicity tend to be either bottom up or top down. Bottom-up explanations focus on ethnic attachment and how it affects voting behavior. To study this phenomenon, scholars have engaged in numerous surveys and experiments probing the psychology of ethnic voting behavior. Meanwhile, top-down approaches focus on broad institutional arrangements, political party systems, and the individual personalities of party leaders and presidents. These top-down forces

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<sup>2</sup> See Reynolds (1998), Reilly and Reynolds (1999), and Huber (2012). The main disagreement has been the effect of proportional representation on governance and conflict. Lijphart (1977) argued that proportional representation is beneficial because it offers ethnic representation in government and promotes general support for the system. Meanwhile, Horowitz (1985) argued that majoritarian systems that encourage vote-pooling are superior because they help diffuse ethnic tensions.

<sup>3</sup> Evidence in support comes from Sisk and Reynolds (1998) and Reilly (2001), while evidence against comes from Suberu and Diamond (2002) and Huber (2012).



have been analyzed through studies on presidents and party leaders and through the analysis of party systems, platforms, ideologies, and ethnic vote shares. From this research we have expanded our knowledge on the psychology of voters and the effect of institutions on parties. However, we know far less about a crucially important actor—the local candidate. How do candidates campaigning for a seat at the local level decide whether to politicize ethnicity? More specifically, how do candidates decide which ethnic appeals to make?

The lack of studies on local candidates is an important omission since local candidates are at the forefront of voter mobilization: going door-to-door, distributing campaign materials, making campaign speeches, and conveying what their election and their party's election means for local communities. The politicization of ethnicity is often a local affair, with candidates politicizing ethnicity in some regions, but not in others. In addition, when ethnic electoral politics does turn violent, it is usually in certain locales, and often instigated by local candidates. Our knowledge regarding these actors is particularly sparse in late-developing countries, where research is limited to individual case studies. The lack of systematic studies on local candidates is an important gap in the literature. Overall, an understanding of these actors and how they campaign is critical if we want to understand the politicization of ethnicity during elections. Accordingly, the ways in which local candidates appeal to ethnic groups will be the central focus of this dissertation.

## Playing the Ethnic Card

Often, when journalists and scholars refer to the use of ethnicity in elections, the practice is cast in a very narrow and negative light. Sensational statements by political leaders who denigrate outgroups make the headlines, and terms such as 'exploiting ethnicity' or 'playing the ethnic card' are freely bandied about. Fears are raised, too, with the expectation that ethnic groups along a given cleavage will respond with hostility and possibly violence. This creates an impression, particularly in regard to late-developing countries, that ethnicity is a fixed, unidimensional, and inherently divisive force in electoral competition. Studies and reports rarely focus on day-to-day uses of ethnicity in electoral politics that do not entail denigrating other ethnic groups, and they rarely question why candidates choose to appeal to a particular ethnic category when there are other ethnic categories to which they could appeal.

In many countries, ethnicity is an important part of social life, and it can influence electoral competition in diverse and subtle ways. Candidates often need to demonstrate that they identify with their constituents' ethnic commitments, and most of the time they do this without denigrating outgroups. However, connecting with constituents in ethnic terms is not an uncomplicated matter. The ethnic identity of candidates (and voters) is multidimensional. Candidates generally belong to various ethnic categories, such as religious, linguistic, and regional, so they have numerous options when deciding to which ethnic category they will appeal. They can choose to appeal to ethnic categories that are narrow or more broadly encompassing, and they can appeal to categories to which they do, or do not, belong. Also, candidates' appeals need not be

limited to just one ethnic category. In sum, candidates have numerous ethnic cards to choose from, and they are not limited to playing a single card.

Given that, and in lieu of a full discussion on ethnic appeals in the next chapter, I will briefly clarify what I mean by a candidate's ethnic appeal. Simply put, ethnic appeals are campaign messages or signals that invoke ethnicity. They can be deployed explicitly through the use of verbal messages that advocate for an ethnic group or in more subtle ways through the use of ethnic signs, symbols, and coded messages. There are two broad varieties of ethnic appeals: ethnic bonding appeals and ethnic bridging appeals.<sup>4</sup>

Ethnic bonding appeals are appeals to ethnic categories to which the candidate belongs. Due to the multidimensional nature of ethnicity, candidates can choose to invoke their religious identity, their linguistic identity, their tribal identity, and so forth. When candidates make ethnic bonding appeals, they tend to contract their potential support, but they are able to tap into ingroup solidarity and the norms of intra-ethnic reciprocity. On the other hand, ethnic bridging appeals are appeals to ethnic categories to which the candidate does not belong and include appeals to broad ethnic identities (such as nationalism in Indonesia) that encompass various religious, indigenous, and regional groups. Bridging appeals usually expand a candidate's potential support, but there is a greater risk of desertion because candidates cannot rely on the binding effect of shared ethnicity. Often, candidates will use a mix of appeals, appealing to different ethnic groups and using combinations of ethnic bonding and ethnic bridging appeals. However, in this dissertation I will show why candidates tend to focus on some kinds of ethnic appeals more than others. Viewing ethnic appeals in this way allows for the

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<sup>4</sup> As I will show, ethnic bonding and ethnic bridging are key concepts in this dissertation. The use of these terms has been inspired by, and adapted from, works by Robert Putnam (2002) and Pippa Norris (2004).

multidimensional nature of ethnicity and the varied appeal options available to candidates. Also, this approach does not assume that ethnic appeals entail negativity towards outgroups.

## The Argument

### A CANDIDATE-CENTERED APPROACH

In seeking to explain why candidates choose to make ethnic appeals, this dissertation places candidates at the center of the analysis. To frame the central argument, I draw on insights from the personal vote literature.<sup>5</sup> This body of literature has shown that the degree to which the electoral system promotes personal vote strategies affects candidate behavior in predictable ways. I will refer to these types of electoral systems as candidate-centric systems Samuels (1999). On the other end of the spectrum, party-centric systems offer candidates incentives to promote the reputation of their party. Under party-centric rules, such as closed-list proportional representation, the success of candidates is dependent on the attractiveness of their political party and the candidate's loyalty to the party. Party leaders can sanction candidates who veer from the party line and can reward faithful party members. What matters most for voters is the reputation, ideology, and platform of the candidate's party. Voters want to know about parties, not candidates. Under candidate-centric rules, such as nonpartisan rules and open-list proportional representation, the success of candidates is dependent on their reputation among voters in their electoral district. Voters are most concerned

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<sup>5</sup> For a seminal article on this topic, see Carey and Shugart (1995, 425). The authors present an ordinal scoring system of electoral systems according to the incentive to cultivate a personal reputation. Also, see Samuels (1999).

with the candidate's character, responsiveness, and ability to meet their interests. At the same time, party leaders lack mechanisms to reward candidates for their loyalty to the party or to sanction candidates who don't toe the party line. These rules offer candidates considerable independence in how they run their campaigns.

Studies have shown that under candidate-centric rules, candidates emphasize their personal attributes, develop close relationships with constituents, pursue particularistic policies, and engage in pork-barrel politics. Meanwhile, under party-centric rules, candidates are less well connected with constituents and they primarily promote their political party and broader programmatic policies.<sup>6</sup> While the personal vote literature has produced a wealth of insights into candidate behavior, surprisingly, I could find no studies that have looked at the effect of candidate-centric rules on ethnic politics or, more specifically, ethnic campaigning. Despite the lack of studies, I will show that the distinction between party-centric and candidate-centric elections provides a valuable conceptual framework through which to view and understand electoral ethnic politics.

Based on the conceptual framework, I will argue that candidate's ethnic appeals can be influenced from above, by their party's ideology and their stance on ethnic issues, or from below, by the ethnic groups in the candidate's electoral district. Critically, the degree to which candidates are more heavily influenced from above (the party) or below (local ethnic groups) is mediated by the electoral rules. Under highly party-centric electoral rules, candidate's ethnic appeals will align with their political

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<sup>6</sup> A large part of the research on personal vote-seeking strategies comes out of American politics (Cain et al. 1987; Fenno 1978; Mayhew 1974). It has been applied to other countries, for example see Anagnoson (1983), Lancaster and Patterson (1990), and Shugart et al. (2005)

party, while under highly candidate-centric rules, candidate's ethnic appeals will align with local ethnic groups. Importantly, electoral rules range along a continuum from highly party-centric to highly candidate-centric, so as the rules become more candidate-centric, the influence of the party decreases while the influence of local ethnic groups increases.

Ultimately, the mediating effect of electoral rules on the impact of the party or local ethnic groups produces predictable ethnic appeal strategies for candidates. In sum, if a researcher wants to know the kinds of ethnic appeals a candidate makes under highly party-centric rules, the analysis should focus on the ideology of the candidate's party. If the rules are highly candidate-centric, the analysis should focus on the ethnic groups in the candidate's electoral district. These factors will affect the candidate's ethnic appeal strategy and, ultimately, their ethnic appeal choice, as illustrated in figure 1.1. This model allows us to answer the two important questions posed in this dissertation.

1. Why do candidates make ethnic, rather than partisan, appeals?
2. When candidates make ethnic appeals, how do they choose between making ethnic bonding appeals or ethnic bridging appeals?




Figure 1.1. Basic model of ethnic appeal choice

#### ETHNIC OR PARTISAN APPEALS?

In formulating a campaign strategy, an important question for candidates is whether to make partisan appeals or ethnic appeals. Partisan appeals draw on voters' allegiance to, and identification with, a political party, while ethnic appeals draw on voters' religious, tribal, and regional loyalties. In this dissertation I argue that the degree to which the electoral rules are party- or candidate-centric affects candidates' choice of partisan appeals or ethnic appeals. Under party-centric rules, candidates have incentives to promote the party's reputation and emphasize their party affiliation. As a result, candidates spend much of their time and resources making partisan appeals. They

promote the party by emphasizing its platform and the quality of leadership, and they emphasize their affiliation with the party.

Under candidate-centric rules, candidates have incentives to promote their personal reputation among voters in the district. To do so, they need to appeal to salient local identity groups. In many multi-ethnic democracies around the world, particular ethnic identities are strong. As a result, candidates spend much of their time appealing directly to local ethnic groups in the district, rather than making partisan appeals. They do this by regularly visiting local ethnic leaders and associations and emphasizing their support for the group. In addition to their ethnic rhetoric, candidates also engage in distributing pork, or patronage, along ethnic lines. This helps establish a reputation for being responsive and builds trust with the group. Of course candidates can, and do, use both types of appeals in their campaign. The argument here, however, is that candidates will put greater emphasis on partisan appeals when the rules are highly party-centric. As the rules become more candidate-centric, candidates de-emphasize the party and begin making more appeals to local ethnic groups.

#### TO BOND OR TO BRIDGE?

When candidates make ethnic appeals, how do they determine whether to make ethnic bonding appeals that target one of their ethnic groups or to make ethnic bridging appeals that reach out across ethnic groups? I argue that candidates' choice of bonding or bridging appeals is affected by their party's ideology and the ethnic groups in their district, but these influences are mediated by the electoral rules. Under party-centric rules, candidate bonding and bridging appeals are in line with the party's ideology. This



is due to the power that the party and its leaders wield over candidates, and because voters want to know what the party stands for. In multi-ethnic countries, party ideologies can be divided into either national or ethnic. National parties have a multi-ethnic stance on ethnic issues, so national party candidates will favor ethnic bridging appeals that reach out across ethnic groups. Meanwhile, ethnic parties define themselves as representatives of a particular ethnic group, so their candidates will favor bonding with the party's favored ethnic group.

Under candidate-centric rules, the ideology of the party is much less important. Candidates in these elections can increase their chance of electoral success by appealing to local ethnic groups. However, they need a critical mass of support in order to win. Consequently, the size of ethnic groups in the electoral district becomes key to understanding whether candidates will bond or bridge. Candidates belong to either a losing ethnic group or a winning ethnic group. By losing, I simply mean that the group is too small to provide enough support to win the election. A winning ethnic group's support is large enough to win the election. I argue that when a candidate belongs to a losing ethnic group, they will use bridging appeals because they must expand their support beyond their ethnic group to have any chance of electoral success. In contrast, when a candidate belongs to a winning ethnic group, they have incentives to bond (see figure 1.2).




Figure 1.2. Basic model of ethnic bonding and ethnic bridging appeal choice. It illustrates how the electoral system mediates the impact of a candidate’s political party and ethnic group. Parties are defined as having either an ethnic or a national multi-ethnic ideology. A losing ethnic group is defined as an ethnic group in the electoral district that is too small to support an electoral victory. A winning ethnic group is large enough to win the election.

Overall, the argument in this dissertation differs considerably from competing arguments that focus on ethnic attachment or party formation. In my argument, the importance of ethnicity and political parties is taken into account; however, the impact of these factors on candidates is mediated by the electoral rules. This offers a more dynamic approach to understanding when, how, and why candidates choose to politicize particular ethnic identity groups in their electoral campaigns.

Before discussing Indonesia, two points are worth noting. First, in my argument, party ideologies and the general prominence of various ethnic identities in a country are accepted as givens. The argument does not try to explain why a country has parties with particular ideologies or how a set of salient ethnic categories has been constructed over

time. Second, the argument focuses on interactions between only a few, albeit critically important, factors. Of course there are other factors that can influence ethnic appeals to some degree, such as the internal structure of a party and the interaction between electoral candidates. These, I argue, are second-level factors, but in the latter part of this dissertation I will show how they can help explain the outliers.

## Why Indonesia?

The argument is tested using electoral campaigns in Indonesia, a tropical archipelago of over 17,000 islands spanning more than 4,000 miles. With a population of 238 million,<sup>7</sup> Indonesia is the largest country in Southeast Asia, the fourth most populated country in the world, the third largest democracy, and the largest Muslim-majority democracy. Aside from the importance of Indonesia due to its sheer size, it is a particularly good country with which to test the argument due to the variation in its electoral rules, ethnic diversity, and party ideologies.

### VARIATION IN ELECTORAL RULES

Indonesia currently has legislative elections at the national, provincial, and district (i.e. subprovincial) level, as well as executive elections for the president, governors, and district heads. In recent years, significant changes in Indonesia's electoral system have moved it from being a highly party-centric system to a more candidate-centric system.

Indonesian's legislative elections employed party-centric rules during the first post-independence democratic elections in 1955. Six more legislative elections were

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<sup>7</sup> 2010 National Census, Central Agency on Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik)

held from 1971 to 1997 under Suharto's authoritarian regime. These elections remained party-centric, but the system ensured that one hegemonic political party, Golkar, would dominate. A major change came in 1998 with the fall of Suharto and a transition to democracy. In the 1999 and 2004 elections, the rules remained party-centric, but they allowed for genuine multiparty competition. In 2009, key changes in the electoral rules made the elections semi-candidate-centric. In addition, Indonesia introduced highly candidate-centric regional head elections for provinces and subprovincial districts in 2005. The introduction of democratic elections, the recent move towards a more candidate-centric electoral formula for legislative elections, and the establishment of highly candidate-centric regional head elections offers multiple points of comparison.

In this dissertation, I will analyze how a transition to democracy and the subsequent move towards a more candidate-centric system has affected candidates' appeals. I will make two main comparisons. First, I will compare campaign appeals over time in the legislative elections from 1997 to 2009. If the argument is correct, I expect to see a major change in campaign appeals in the 2009 election, following the move to semi-candidate-centric rules. Second, I will compare appeals in the legislative elections with appeals in the highly candidate-centric regional head elections. Again, I expect to see differences in appeals that align with the argument. These variations in electoral rules also allow me to test the competing argument that proportional representation politicizes ethnicity more than majoritarianism by comparing candidates' appeals in the legislative elections, which used proportional representation, with appeals in the regional head elections, which used majoritarian rules. In sum, recent changes in

Indonesia's electoral system offer an ideal opportunity to study the impact of electoral rules on candidates' appeals.

## VARIATION IN ETHNICITY

Before providing details on ethnicity in Indonesia, a definition of ethnicity must be established. In this dissertation, I employ the political convention of using ethnicity as an umbrella term, one that "easily embraces groups differentiated by color, language, and religion; it covers 'tribes,' 'races,' 'nationalities,' and 'castes'" (Horowitz 1985, 53). In the context of Indonesia, ethnicity covers religious, indigenous, regional, and national identity groups. This contrasts with the common usage of ethnicity (*suku*) in Indonesia and the Indonesian literature, where the term is more narrowly defined to refer to indigenous identities such as the Javanese and the Indonesian Chinese. For these identities, I will simply use the term indigenous.

The second advantage of testing the argument in Indonesia is its diverse ethnic landscape. In one of the early studies of local ethnic politics in Indonesia, Liddle (1970) wrote that, "Prior to the twentieth century the ethnic group as a self-perceived, coherent social unit did not exist in Simalungun or in North Sumatra as a whole. Individuals had relations with individuals, lineage groups with lineage group, and villages with villages, but few regular patterns of interaction existed above this level and there was little sense of belonging to larger social or political units" (Liddle 1970, 57). He went on to explain how ethnic consciousness developed during the colonial era when modernization—specifically, economic change, improved communications, and missionary activity—brought different ethnic groups into contact with each other for the

first time (Liddle 1970, 59). Indigenous and religious identities intensified, but the supraethnic identities of regionalism and nationalism also emerged.<sup>8</sup>

Today, religion and indigeneity are still prominent forms of ethnic identification in Indonesia. Practically all Indonesians identify with a religious and an indigenous ethnic category (Bowen 2003; Davidson and Henley 2007; Fealy and White 2008). Social life often revolves around ethnic rituals, ceremonies, prayer groups, and festivals. Ethnic relations have not always been harmonious. Between 1997 and 2002 there were unprecedented levels of ethnic violence. During this period, Indonesia went through a turbulent transition to democracy, and at least 10,000 people were killed in various conflicts across the country. These conflicts included urban anti-Chinese riots, clashes between indigenous Dayaks and Madurese in Kalimantan, conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi that fell along Christian and Muslim lines, and separatist conflicts in East Timor, Aceh, and Irian Jaya (Papua). The causes of the violence were diverse and tended to be localized, but in a broad sense they were related to a reconfiguration of Indonesia's institutions and the introduction of a new, competitive political system.<sup>9</sup> While these conflicts have largely been resolved, inter-religious and inter-indigenous tensions still exist, particularly in the postconflict regions. Overall, elections have been relatively peaceful, but they can and have served as triggers for incidences of ethnic and communal violence.

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<sup>8</sup> On the transformation of traditional society in North Sumatra see Liddle (1970, 19-66). He also showed that class-based identities among plantation workers and squatters living in rural regions of Simalugun, North Sumatra emerged during this time.

<sup>9</sup> See Bertrand (2004), Van Klinken (2007) and Sidel (2006) for various analyses of violent conflict during this period.

The size of religious and indigenous groups in Indonesia differs, especially in terms of how fragmented they are. Religious groups are fewer: 88% of the population is Muslim, Christians (Catholics and Protestants) comprise 9.8%, and there are smaller numbers of Buddhists, Hindus, and Confucians.<sup>10</sup> While most electoral districts have a Muslim majority, many others are quite mixed or have Christian or Hindu majorities. Indigenous ethnic groups, on the other hand, are far more numerous. According to the 2000 census, Indonesia has over 1,000 distinct indigenous ethnic groups. Many groups are very small, but there are 15 indigenous groups with over one million members.<sup>11</sup> Most indigenous groups have their own unique language and are concentrated in a regional homeland. However, due to urbanization and transmigration over the years, many regions are inhabited by a variety of indigenous groups.

Indonesians also have broader and relatively strong regional and national identities. Regional identities are usually based on the province or the larger island and encompass multiple ethnic groups. Indonesian national identity is even more encompassing. Under the national motto of “Unity in Diversity,” Indonesian national identity does not exclude groups based on different indigenous languages, religions, or regional ancestry.

The salience of indigenous, religious, regional, and nationalist identities offers candidates various options when it comes to choosing ethnic appeals. Candidates can pursue ethnic bonding strategies by appealing to either their indigenous group or their religious group. Alternatively, they can choose a bridging strategy by appealing to

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<sup>10</sup> 2010 National Census, Central Agency on Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik)

<sup>11</sup> See Suryadinata et al. (2003, 6) for more on the 2000 census. Data on indigenous groups from the 2010 census was unavailable at the time of writing.

indigenous and religious groups to which they do not belong or by appealing to national or regional identities that broadly encompass various ethnic groups.

Elections in Indonesia are vast undertakings and provide plentiful data for comparative analysis. In what one observer called “the world’s largest single day election” (Heryanto 2010, 186), 44 political parties and over 290,000 candidates competed in the 2009 national, provincial, and district legislative elections. Since then, thousands have participated in rolling elections for over 500 provincial and district regional heads. Importantly, the size of religious and indigenous groups varies across hundreds of electoral districts. This diversity provides multiple cases with which to test the predictions of the argument regarding how ethnic group size affects candidate bonding and bridging strategies. Finally, this study would not be possible without data on ethnic demographics, which the Indonesian National Census has gathered since 2000. Moreover, the Census allows individuals to self-identify according to ethnicity, offering a truer picture of Indonesia’s ethnic landscape. The availability of these kind of data is rare in late-developing countries.

#### VARIATION IN POLITICAL PARTIES

The final reason why Indonesia provides a good test of the argument is because it has both national and ethnic parties. Specifically, Indonesian parties have either a nationalist, multi-ethnic ideology or an Islamic ideology. Moreover, the Indonesian party system is primarily defined along these lines. Unlike the West, where parties often split along left-right views on economic ideology, Indonesian parties are centrist when it



comes to economics. Without the complication of economic ideology, we can clearly see if, and when, the party's ideological stance affects candidates' appeals.

Indonesia has many political parties that can be compared. In the 2009 legislative election, 38 political parties competed nationally. This situation allows me to test the impact of party ideology on candidates' bonding and bridging appeals across numerous national and Islamic parties. In sum, the variation in electoral rules, ethnicity, and political parties in Indonesia offer a myriad of cases with which to rigorously test the different aspects of the argument while holding country-level variables constant.

## Research Materials

One of the biggest problems in testing a theory on the politicization of ethnicity during elections is that data on candidates' ethnic appeals is lacking.<sup>12</sup> I have been unable to find even one study in late-developing countries that has systematically collected this kind of data. To date, measures of the politicization of ethnicity have primarily relied on ethnic vote-share data and political parties' stances on ethnic issues coded from party manifestos.<sup>13</sup> Neither of these data sources actually measure the appeals made by candidates; the assumption is that all candidates make appeals that are in line with their party's manifesto and that ethnic voting is neatly correlated with

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<sup>12</sup> The US and European countries are, to some degree, exceptions. In these countries, data and studies on issue-based campaign messages are quite common. For example, see Sulkin (2009) and Druckman (2004). However, even in these countries, aside from the occasional study such as McIlwain and Caliendo (2011), I have been unable to find many studies that systematically quantify candidates' ethnic appeals.

<sup>13</sup> For a recent example on using ethnic voting to study ethnic politicization see Huber (2012) The Manifesto Project's dataset of party Manifestos is the main source for studies on ethnic appeals. It measures for party positions on ethnocultural issues. (Klingemann et al. 2006) It mainly covers western countries, but has recently expanded its coverage to some countries in Asia and Latin America. Its coding of ethnic issues has come in for some criticism however. See Protsyk and Garaz (2013).

ethnic appeals. These assumptions are a bit of a stretch, particularly in large countries with candidate-centric systems and weakly institutionalized parties. To address the lack of data on candidates' appeals, I compiled original datasets of campaign appeals for elections held in Indonesia between 1997 and 2011. Candidates' appeals were drawn from two primary sources: newspaper reports and election posters.

## NEWSPAPER REPORTS

To study changes in campaign appeals over time, I analyzed and coded newspaper reports published in the month before legislative elections in 1997, 1999, and 2009. The reports were drawn from *Waspada*, a provincial newspaper in North Sumatra. In contrast to national newspapers, which are Jakarta-centric and focus on party leaders, provincial newspapers offer a wealth of information on local candidates' campaigns. Often these reports are written by, or in conjunction with, candidates and campaign managers, so they have little editorial voice or political analysis. In this respect, the reports are a good reflection of how candidates appeal to voters from one election cycle to the next.

Newspaper reports were collected from archives in Indonesia and the US and stored in a database. I read and coded each report for issue-related appeals, identity-related appeals, the type of campaign event, candidate's endorsements, and any references to the candidate's identity and qualifications (see chapter 4). This provided me with comparative measures of candidates' appeals before and after Indonesia's democratic transition in 1998 and before and after the system became more candidate-centric in 2009. The analysis from newspaper reports was confined to one geographic

region. A number of the same candidates competed in legislative elections over the years. This provided a tightly controlled test of how changes in the institutions have affected candidates' appeals.

## ELECTION POSTERS

To study the impact of ethnic group size, I needed to broaden the geographic scope to include regions that varied in terms of religious and indigenous diversity. To do so, I used a unique and under-utilized source of campaign appeals: election posters. With the assistance of other researchers, I photographed election posters across the country during the 2009 legislative election and the district head elections held between 2010 and 2011. This dataset contains almost 15,000 campaign posters from over 2,000 candidates competing in almost 200 electoral districts across Indonesia. This is the largest collection of election posters that has ever been systematically gathered in any country.<sup>14</sup>

In Indonesia (and many other countries), election posters are widely used by both major and minor candidates. During elections, there is a massive proliferation of elaborate, colorful posters along the streets in Indonesia. While posters contain some text-message appeals, they are primarily a visual medium, communicating through images of the candidate's clothing, background imagery, signs, and symbols. To quantify various aspects of the campaign appeals from the legislative and district head election posters, I used 27 fields to code the clothing, background imagery, and text messages for each poster (see chapter 5). Based on the indigenous and religious identity of the

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<sup>14</sup> Research by Dumitrescu (2009; 2010; 2012) are the only other works I found that gathered and analyzed a few hundred election posters from elections in France and Belgium.

candidate and the content of their posters, I calculated the degree to which each candidate bonded with their own ethnic groups or bridged across other ethnic groups. I used this appeal data to compare the semi-candidate-centric legislative elections with the candidate-centric district head elections. This allowed me to test the mediating role of party- and candidate-centric rules on party ideologies and ethnic group sizes and, ultimately, their effect on candidates' choice of ethnic bonding or ethnic bridging appeals.

#### OTHER MATERIALS

To fully test the argument of this dissertation and the competing arguments, I also gathered an extensive amount of demographic, social, economic, and political data from across Indonesia. This included measures of religious and indigenous diversity, ethnic attachment, economic development, and election results. During the two years of fieldwork in Indonesia, I attended campaign events and interviewed candidates, campaign managers, journalists, religious and indigenous leaders, and voters during numerous elections in Sumatra, Java, Maluku, and Bali.

Overall, this dissertation is different from other studies that draw on ethnic voting or party manifestos to measure ethnic politicization. Here, I measure and analyze the ethnic appeals of thousands of candidates and how they are affected by electoral rules, party ideology, and ethnic group size. With this methodology, I can hold country-level variables constant and engage in multiple tests to rigorously evaluate the evidence for each part of the argument. Ultimately, I hope this research will help us understand when, how, and why candidates choose to politicize ethnicity in electoral campaigns.

## Organization of Material

This dissertation is organized into four sections. Section 1 contains two chapters and presents the theoretical foundation for the dissertation. In chapter 2, I discuss different approaches to understanding and measuring ethnic politicization. I have found no good guides on how to define or measure ethnic appeals made by candidates. As a result, I define what an ethnic appeal is, how candidates make ethnic appeals, and the bonding and bridging functions of ethnic appeals. In chapter 3, having established these concepts, I present the main argument, which explains why candidates choose to politicize ethnicity in their election campaigns. First, I review three competing arguments: the ethnic attachment thesis, the cultural modernization thesis, and the PR-majoritarian thesis. I then introduce my argument and explain the conditions under which candidates will make ethnic rather than partisan appeals and use ethnic bonding rather than ethnic bridging appeals.

Section 2 provides an introduction to Indonesia and an explanation of how I gathered the ethnic appeal data. In chapter 4, I provide an overview of Indonesia's legislative elections from 1955 to 2009 and the introduction of recent provincial and district head elections. I explain how the electoral rules have changed over time, and I define each set of elections in terms of where they lie on a party-centric/candidate-centric continuum. In chapters 5 and 6, I discuss how candidates use the regional press and election posters in their campaigns, and I detail the methods used to measure ethnic appeals from these types of media.

In section 3, I test the argument that candidate-centric rules lead to higher levels of ethnic politicization by making two comparisons. First, in chapter 7, I compare

campaign appeals in the party-centric elections of 1997 and 1999 with those in the semi-candidate-centric elections of 2009. Using data from newspaper reports, I show that candidates promoted parties and party platforms under the party-centric rules in 1997 and 1999. However, with the move to a semi-candidate-centric system in 2009, candidates increased their efforts to connect with constituents by emphasizing local issues and appealing to local, often ethnic, groups. In chapter 8, I make a second comparison using the semi-candidate-centric legislative elections and the highly candidate-centric district head elections. Using appeals coded from election posters, I show that the frequency of ethnic appeals was significantly higher in the candidate-centric district head elections. The inability of the competing arguments to explain these findings is also discussed.

In section 4, I test the impact of party ideology and ethnic group size on candidates' choice of ethnic bonding and ethnic bridging appeals. In chapter 9, I show that a candidate's party ideology had more influence on their choice of bonding or bridging appeals in the legislative elections. Meanwhile, I present evidence that ethnic group size had a greater impact on appeals in the district head elections. In chapter 10, I engage in a focused test of how ethnic group size affects ethnic bonding and bridging appeals for 63 candidates competing in nine district head elections. Using quantitative and qualitative evidence, I show that my argument was able to predict which candidates would bond with their religious or indigenous group or bridge across religious or indigenous dimensions of ethnicity. Finally, in the concluding chapter, I highlight the theoretical and methodological contributions of this dissertation in terms of our understanding of Indonesian politics specifically, and ethnic politics more generally.

SECTION I

# Theory

# What is an Ethnic Appeal?

Before presenting a theory to explain why candidates make ethnic appeals, a thorough understanding of ethnic appeals is required. This chapter provides a review of the literature on measuring ethnic politicization, defines an ethnic appeal, introduces bonding and bridging as important functions of ethnic appeals, and presents a general approach for quantifying ethnic appeals from campaign materials.

This chapter is divided into five parts. The first part begins with a review of the various ways that scholars have measured the politicization of ethnicity during elections. I argue that most studies measure only official party appeals (e.g., party manifestos, the rhetoric of party leaders) or use proxies such as ethnic vote share or the ethnic composition of party leadership. Measures of ethnic appeals made by candidates below the national level are rare or incomplete. This is surprising given that local candidates are closest to the voters and are often at the front lines of ethnic group mobilization during elections.

In the second part, I develop an approach for measuring ethnic appeals by candidates. First, the structure of ethnicity is described in terms of ethnic dimensions (e.g., religion, indigeneity), ethnic categories (e.g., Islamic, Christian, Javanese), and



ethnic subcategories (e.g., Protestant, Catholic). I then define an ethnic appeal as an explicit or implicit campaign message that invokes an ethnic dimension, category, or subcategory. Finally, I describe seven ways in which candidates can explicitly and implicitly invoke ethnicity in their campaigns.

In part 3, I argue that ethnic appeals have important bonding and bridging functions that enable candidates to expand or delimit their support base. Ethnic appeals that have a bridging function help candidates expand the size of their support, while appeals with an ethnic bonding function tend to restrict their support. I go on to describe the three main bonding and bridging functions of ethnic appeals. Appeals with an ethnic bonding function are appeals to a candidate's ethnic group, appeals with a cross-ethnic bridging function are appeals to an ethnic group (or groups) to which the candidate does not belong, and appeals with a broad ethnic bridging function are appeals to a dimension of ethnicity (e.g., religion) or an ethnic category (e.g., Javanese) that incorporates most or all voters.

The fourth part of this chapter draws on the previous discussions and explains that an individual ethnic appeal can be specified by three components: the ethnic dimension, the ethnic category, and the bonding or bridging function. I then discuss methods for aggregating ethnic appeals and discuss potential sources of ethnic appeal data, such as newspapers and election posters.

The fifth and final part of this chapter deals with critiques of the quantification of ethnic appeals and the usefulness of such a measure. I argue that the specification of ethnic appeals provides valid comparative measures of the many ways that candidates

appeal to ethnic groups and paints a more realistic picture of the complex nature of ethnic campaigning.

## Part I: Measuring Ethnic Politicization

A review of the literature will primarily confine itself to studies that use systematic and quantitative measures to study the politicization of ethnicity during elections. Unfortunately, as will become evident from the brief literature review, there are relatively few studies that can offer guidance on measuring ethnic appeals. Since Campbell et al. (1960) published *The American Voter* in 1960, there has been a shift in scholarly work on US and European elections from a focus on identity attachments to a focus on issues and how voters process information.<sup>1</sup> In late-developing countries, case studies and newspaper reports indicate that the politicization of ethnicity by electoral candidates is still prominent. However, few (if any) studies have employed systematic quantitative measures to study electoral ethnic appeals by individual candidates.

### ETHNIC POLITICIZATION AT THE PARTY LEVEL

A number of systematic studies have measured the politicization of ethnicity by political parties and party leaders. These studies employ one of two main approaches for measuring ethnic politicization. The first approach uses data on ethnic voting and the ethnic composition of political parties as proxies for ethnic politicization. The second

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<sup>1</sup> See Dalton and Wattenberg (2000). A number of scholars in American politics still focus on the politicization of identity groups—in particular minority groups such as Latinos and African Americans. For example, on Latinos see Barreto and Pedraza (2009) and on African Americans see Dawson (1994).

approach draws on reports and campaign materials to measure ethnic appeals by political parties.

Ethnic vote share is often used as a proxy to indicate the degree of ethnic politicization by a party during an election. Horowitz (1985, 293) argued that the best way to understand whether a party is ethnic is to look at its distribution of support. There are, however, two interconnected measures for ethnic vote share (Chandra 2011, 162-64; Huber 2012). The first measure reflects the percentage of an ethnic group that votes for one political party. The second measure reflects the percentage of a party's vote that comes from a specific ethnic group. A political party is defined as an ethnic party if most of an ethnic group votes for that party and if most of the party's vote comes from that ethnic group. When an election is a competition between ethnic parties representing different ethnic groups, the overall degree of ethnic politicization is high. Using ethnic vote shares as a proxy, scholars assume that parties with a large degree of ethnic support make ethnic appeals during their campaigns.

Another proxy for ethnic politicization is the ethnic composition of candidates in a political party. If all or most candidates have the same ethnic background, scholars assume that the party will mobilize that ethnic group for support and serve their interests in government. The Ethnic Power Relations dataset (EPR) uses a version of this method. The dataset draws on expert surveys in multiple countries to identify politically relevant ethnic groups and codes the degree to which representatives hold executive-level state power. This power can range from total control of the government to overt political discrimination (Wimmer et al. 2009).

The two advantages of using ethnic vote share and the ethnic composition of candidates to measure ethnic politicization is that the data is relatively easy to acquire<sup>2</sup> and the measures are reasonably effective for identifying politically salient ethnic groups. However, the two measures do not directly determine whether ethnicity was actively politicized because the kinds of appeals made by parties are not considered. Instead, the assumption that the party appealed to a particular ethnic group is based purely on votes or ethnic composition. Even if the assumption is true, the proxies provide no information regarding the content of campaigns and the types of ethnic appeals made by parties. In addition, such measures fail to identify cases where a party appeals to an ethnic group but is unsuccessful at gaining the ethnic group's vote.

The second approach for measuring ethnic politicization involves the use of manifestos, country reports, newspaper articles, and campaign speeches to identify whether political parties have an ethnic platform and the kinds of appeals they make. For example, the Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR) is a dataset of coded party manifestos from around the world (Klingemann et al. 2006). Over the years, it has become one of the most popular sources for party positions on left/right (and other) ideological and policy dimensions.<sup>3</sup> All aspects of party manifestos are

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<sup>2</sup> This is not meant to make light of the difficulties involved in gathering voting data from late-developing countries. Often, data on voter polling and the ethnic identity of voters is lacking. When unable to directly measure the ethnic vote, more complex methods are required, such as methods of ecological inference.

<sup>3</sup> The project was established by the Manifesto Research Group in 1979 under the guidance of Ian Budge. In 1989, it was renamed the Comparative Manifesto Project under the direction of Hans-Dieter Klingemann. In 2009, the project was renamed the Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR). Over the years, the project has expanded its coverage to political parties in more countries. Most recently, it has begun to cover parties in Asia and Latin America. For more background detail on the project and a number of critiques see Gemenis (2013)

coded,<sup>4</sup> including party positions on ethnocultural issues. Others have built on the Manifesto Project approach by adding more granularity and tackling potential undercounting (Protsyk and Garaz 2013).

Daniel Posner's Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups dataset (PREG) also uses qualitative materials. However, rather than drawing on manifestos, PREG includes country reports and other sources that determine when ethnic categories are used as the basis for political parties. The data was gathered from 42 African countries and coded over time to generate a list of time-sensitive, politically relevant ethnic groups.<sup>5</sup> Finally, the Constructivist Dataset on Ethnicity and Institutions (CDEI), which was created by Kanchan Chandra, draws on the ethnic rhetoric of political parties—what parties actually say to voters during their campaigns. The CDEI covers 100 countries for the election closest to, but not before, 1996. An extensive array of materials are used, such as reference guides, political speeches, and translated news articles for the three months prior to an election. Data for each political party is qualitatively assessed and parties are coded as ethnic, multi-ethnic, or non-ethnic. Measuring political parties according to these criteria allows for the identification of parties that politicize ethnicity in their campaigns.<sup>6</sup>

The methodologies used by MARPOR, PREG, and CDEI go beyond proxies and provide direct measures of ethnic politicization from campaign materials. However, the

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<sup>4</sup> For a recent article on party switching between mainstream and niche issues that uses this dataset, see Meyer and Wagner (2013).

<sup>5</sup> Posner (2004a) used this to create a new ethnic fractionalization index and tested its impact on economic growth in Africa.

<sup>6</sup> See Chandra (2005a; 2009) and Chandra and Wilkinson (2008). The size of the vote for each party is incorporated into the measure and an EVOTE index is developed; this is the aggregate vote obtained by ethnic parties across countries.

data is primarily gathered from political party platforms and appeals made by national party leaders. Political parties are treated as homogenous groups that are unified in their campaign appeals. In addition, the PREG and CDEI datasets are primarily used to define political parties on the basis of whether and how they appeal to ethnic groups. As a result, a certain level of interpretation is needed to fit parties into simple categories such as ethnic, multi-ethnic, or non-ethnic. Overall, the variety of positions and appeals made by individual candidates within a party is not captured in these datasets. In highly institutionalized and disciplined parties this might not be an issue, but in the context of undisciplined internal party structures, candidate-centric electoral rules, and strong regional differences, individual candidates often make appeals that diverge from the official party line. Most importantly, the appeals made by local candidates provide critical information because local candidates are closest to the voters and are often at the front lines of ethnic mobilization.

#### ETHNIC POLITICIZATION AT THE CANDIDATE LEVEL

A number of authors have noted that local factors may offer incentives for candidates to politicize ethnicity in some areas, but not others. A brief review of prominent research on ethnic politicization in India helps illustrate the importance of factors at the local level. To explain Hindu-Muslim religious riots in India, Brass (1997; 2003) argued that conflict is more likely to occur when politicians can avail themselves of local institutionalized riot specialists. Conversely, Varshney (2002) argued that local associations with institutionalized inter-religious interactions and civic engagement can mitigate ethnic violence and prevent politicians from mobilizing religious groups. Finally,

Wilkinson (2004) argued that local factors can explain when and where candidates politicize ethnicity. For example, ethnic politicization can occur during a close election in electoral districts where the ethnic population is evenly split between two ethnic groups. In these times and places, candidates organize more ethnic events to politicize ethnicity and mobilize their ethnic supporters. In the case of India, Wilkinson found that religious events such as Hindu processions through Muslim neighborhoods can descend into a riot when Muslim residents mobilize in defense. Ultimately, Wilkinson argued that ethnic violence can be prevented when the government has an electoral interest in protecting vulnerable minorities. While these arguments have important differences, each highlighted the important role of local candidates, who have a vested interest in politicizing and mobilizing ethnic groups.

Beyond India, Posner (2005) emphasized the role of candidates in politicizing ethnic groups in Zambia. He argued that candidates seek to win elections with the minimum level of support in order to reduce the amount of patronage that they need to distribute. In their campaigns, candidates consider the size of ethnic groups and mobilize voters along a specific ethnic category to form a minimum winning coalition. Formal institutions such as the party system, electoral rules, and the size of electoral districts are important because they set political boundaries and thereby affect the size of different ethnic categories. In the case of Zambia, Posner argued that candidates under the previous one-party system were motivated to politicize tribal categories in order to form minimum winning coalitions based on tribal groups. Zambia's move to a multiparty system caused a shift in the political boundaries. As a result, in order to form minimum winning coalitions, candidates had to politicize linguistic categories. To

support the argument, Posner used changes in the ethnic composition of elected candidates as a proxy for ethnic appeals. He also presented some illustrative evidence on changes in ethnic campaign appeals. However, he was unable to systematically gather data on ethnic appeals because, as he explained, “The available evidence on the ethnic appeals that politicians make is scattered and incomplete” (Posner 2005, 181).

Overall, the evidence from India and Africa—presented by some of the most well-known authors working on ethnic politics—indicates that local candidates play an important role in ethnic politicization. Accordingly, to better understand ethnic politicization, the various types of ethnic appeals should be studied at the candidate level. Unfortunately, none of these studies offer an approach for systematically gathering and measuring variation in ethnic appeals. Gathering this kind of detailed data is challenging, particularly for scholars studying late-developing countries. Nevertheless, data on variation in ethnic appeals is critically important and offers a number of advantages. Candidate-level data helps identify regional-specific factors that affect ethnic politicization, offers numerous points of comparison, and allows scholars to aggregate measures of ethnic politicization up to the level of electoral district, province, or country. Finally, data on candidate’s ethnic appeals can help identify whether and when their appeals veer from their political party’s official platform. Compared to using party manifestos, aggregations of candidates’ ethnic appeals are a more realistic measure of how parties actually appeal to ethnic groups. Given the importance of this research, the rest of this chapter presents a method to define and measure ethnic appeals at the candidate level.



## Part II: Ethnicity - Groups, Structure, and Appeals

### WHAT IS AN ETHNIC GROUP?

Before presenting a definition of ethnic appeal, ethnic identity must be defined. Here, an important distinction is made between ethnic structure (the full range of ethnic identities) and ethnic activation (the attachment to, or mobilization of, a particular ethnic identity). The following discussion draws on insights from recent constructivism scholarship to offer a clear, yet realistic, conceptualization of ethnicity that lends itself to measurement and comparative analysis.<sup>7</sup>

There is general agreement within the field of political science on the use of ethnicity as a broad term. Horowitz stated that ethnicity “easily embraces groups differentiated by color, language, and religion; it covers ‘tribes,’ ‘races,’ ‘nationalities,’ and ‘castes’” (Horowitz 1985, 53). In this dissertation, I use the term ethnic group as an umbrella term and draw on a modified version of Kanchan Chandra’s definition. While Chandra defines an ethnic group as “a subset of categories in which descent-based attributes are necessary for membership” (Chandra 2011, 154), I define an ethnic group as an identity category in which descent-based attributes are necessary for membership. In addition, an ethnic group should be large enough that all members of the group cannot personally know each other.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> This approach builds on recent constructivist scholarship in ethnic politics. See Posner (2005), Chandra (2006), and Chandra and Wilkinson (2008). The approach is also in line with recent scholarship in sociology that argues against ‘groupism’. See Brubaker (2004).

<sup>8</sup> In the vast majority of cases this will apply, however in some incidences where an ethnic group dwindles in size due to war, famine etc., they may personally know each other. But even in these cases, at some previous point, all members of the ethnic group did not know each other personally.

The important part of both definitions is the emphasis on descent-based attributes. These attributes include skin color, language, and religion; they are given at birth for most group members and are relatively difficult to change. The different types of ethnicities include “region, religion, sect, language family, language, dialect, caste, clan, tribe or nationality of one’s parents or ancestors, or one’s own physical features” (Chandra 2011, 154). This is a minimalist definition; other definitions add features beyond descent-based attributes. For example, Fearon (2003) included features such as a shared group consciousness, cultural features valued by members, a real or imagined homeland, and a shared history.<sup>9</sup>

The one difference between my definition and that of Chandra is that she restricts her definition to a subset of a country’s population. As she explains, the term American is not an ethnic category in the US, but it is in other countries. While this restriction is useful for the purposes of Chandra’s paper, which focuses on the coding of parties based on national boundaries, it is somewhat arbitrary for other studies. There is no special reason that national boundaries are more relevant than, for example, continental, regional, or electoral district boundaries. As a result, I drop this restriction and use the term identity category in my definition rather than a subset of categories.

Scholars have recently begun to differentiate between the structure and activation of ethnicity (Fearon 2003; Posner 2004b; Chandra and Wilkinson 2008). Ethnic structure is the distribution of populations in different categories, such as religions, tribes, and clans. The structure is similar to the kinds of demographic data contained in census

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<sup>9</sup> A more elaborate discussion on the debates over how to define an ethnic group is beyond the scope of this chapter. See Chandra and Wilkinson (2008) for a more detail.

datasets. From the perspective of individuals, ethnic structure represents the full repertoire of ethnic categories to which they belong (e.g., Christian, Javanese, Asian).

While ethnic categories can be used to sort individuals, they bear no relation to how strongly an individual is attached to a particular ethnic category. In contrast, an activated ethnic category provokes attachments from individuals. The activated category is a subset of an individual's repertoire of ethnic categories and is often referred to as a salient, mobilized, or politicized ethnicity. The activation of ethnic categories is strictly contextual. A religious ethnic category, such as Christian, might be activated in private life; for example, in choosing a marriage partner or through participation in religious rituals. In political life, indigenous ethnic categories might be activated, especially in societies where employment, political discourse, electoral campaigning, and voting are driven by indigeneity. Importantly, the activated ethnic categories can quickly change over time and in different contexts, while ethnic structure is relatively fixed. This clear separation between ethnic structure and activation allows us to analyze how structural aspects of ethnicity, such as the size of the ethnic group, can impact the activation of various ethnic categories. Drawing on this conceptualization, ethnic appeals by candidates may be viewed as a way to activate particular ethnic categories. This situation is similar to what social psychologists refer to as priming.

Mapping out the structure of ethnic identity is helpful for understanding the range of ethnicities that can be activated. Figure 2.1 illustrates the structure of ethnic identity, showing the hierarchy of dimensions, categories, and subcategories using examples from Indonesia. Ethnic dimensions are the broadest classification and include examples

such as religion and indigeneity. The number and types of dimensions can vary from country to country; for example, religion, national, and regional are prominent dimensions in the US, Thailand, and Indonesia. However, race is more prominent in the US, language is an important ethnic dimension in Thailand, and indigeneity is very prominent in Indonesia.




Figure 2.1. Ethnic dimensions, categories, and nested sub-categories. The ethnic categories used are for illustration purposes. Not all ethnic dimensions and categories are fully mapped out into the various ethnic sub-categories.

\* The most direct translation of the Indonesian term 'marga' is clan.

Under each ethnic dimension there are a number of ethnic categories; examples from the religion dimension are Islamic and Christian. These macro-level ethnic categories often contain nested subcategories. For example, the Christian category includes Protestant and Catholic subcategories, and the Protestant subcategory can be

further divided into Methodist or Baptist subcategories. An individual's identity is multi-dimensional; he/she can be classified as belonging to an ethnic category under multiple ethnic dimensions. In looking at a population of individuals, the ethnic categories that individuals belong to can overlap. There is perfect overlap when, for example, all individuals who belong to the Islamic religious category also belong to the Javanese indigenous category. There is partial overlap, or cross-cutting, when members of the Islamic religious category come from two or more indigenous groups. This presentation of ethnic structure is not new;<sup>10</sup> however, it helps to clarify the range of ethnic dimensions and categories to which candidates appeal in their election campaigns.

#### WHAT IS AN ETHNIC APPEAL?

For the purposes of the present research, an ethnic appeal is defined as an explicit or implicit message that invokes an ethnic dimension, ethnic category, or ethnic subcategory. This definition requires some explanation. First, appeals to an ethnic dimension are inclusive and cover a broad range of individuals. For example, an appeal to the religion dimension is an appeal to religion, religiosity, or religious people without specifying a religious category. Ethnic appeals can also be made to an ethnic category or subcategory. These appeals tend to be more exclusive, particularly when they invoke ethnic subcategories on the micro level. Second, ethnic appeals can be exclusive to a specific ethnic group (ingroups), but may not necessarily involve or invoke hostility towards other ethnic groups (outgroups). While the prevailing wisdom on the ethnic politicization of elections is that positive sentiments towards an ethnic ingroup are

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<sup>10</sup> See Chandra's (2012) edited volume for a more detailed discussion of ethnic structure.

directly correlated with prejudice towards ethnic outgroups, cross-cultural research and laboratory experiments on intergroup prejudice do not support this assumption. For example, Brewer (1999) reported that an individual's positive ingroup identification is independent of outgroup negativity. While ethnic slurs or derogatory remarks by candidates regarding other ethnic groups garner more publicity, ethnic appeals in run-of-the mill politics are usually positive and serve to bind groups together through "ingroup love" rather than "outgroup hate." Third, an ethnic appeal can be an explicit or implicit message and candidates can make such appeals in a number of ways. Explicit ethnic appeals are clear, direct, and usually verbal. However, many ethnic appeals are implicit in nature; these can be somewhat ambiguous and are often nonverbal. The following sections describe two kinds of explicit ethnic appeals and five kinds of implicit ethnic appeals commonly used by candidates during elections.<sup>11</sup>

### Explicit Ethnic Appeals

**1. Engaging in ethnic advocacy and valorization:** Candidates can explicitly advocate for an ethnic category without directly referring to any specific issue or policy. Consider the following example: "If elected, I will support the interests of the Christian population." Here, the Christian ethnic category is identified, but no issue or policy is mentioned. Through ethnic advocacy, candidates can appeal to ethnic groups without making specific promises regarding future action. Candidates can also valorize groups by praising their art, history, or other accomplishments.

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<sup>11</sup> In developing this list of explicit and implicit appeals, I drew on insights from Chandra (2011).

**2. Making a stance on ethnic issues:** Candidates can advocate explicitly for issues that directly relate to an ethnic category. Examples include supporting the use of an ethnic language in schools and more political autonomy for the ethnic group's homeland. In this case, the candidate emphasizes the specific ethnic issue they will support.

#### Implicit Ethnic Appeals

**1. Making coded ethnic statements:** Candidates can use coded messages that have multiple interpretations to appeal to one group without arousing hostility in another group. Coded statements also offer candidates a certain amount of leeway or deniability, particularly if their remarks can be interpreted as disparaging by another ethnic group. If a candidate is called on it, they can claim that a particular interpretation was not intended. These statements can be difficult to identify, particularly for outsiders, and they may be open to ambiguous interpretation.

**2. Invoking the candidate's ethnic identity:** Candidates can strategically refer to their own ethnic identity as a way to appeal to an ethnic group. Some references are very clear, such as references to the candidate's religion, birthplace, or clan name. They can also indicate their ethnic identity by mentioning their former or current leadership roles in particular ethnic organizations. There are, however, many more subtle ways in which candidates can invoke their ethnic identity, such as the use of particular phrases, emphasizing an accent, or the use of certain hand gestures.

**3. Using ethnic signs and symbols:** Candidates can use nonverbal signs and symbols to make ethnic appeals. These include using ethnic-related imagery in their

campaign materials, such as the image of a mosque or an indigenous dwelling, wearing traditional ethnic clothing while campaigning, or including words and phrases from an ethnic language or dialect in their campaign messages. In this case, the use of language acts as an important signal, while the content of the message is less important.

**4. Campaigning in ethnic arenas:** Here, the term arena refers to geographic locations and the use of particular media outlets. A candidate's choice of campaign venue can send a powerful signal that a candidate is appealing to a particular ethnic group. This may include holding a rally in a region populated by a particular ethnic group, making appearances at ethnic events, and putting up election posters in particular ethnic neighborhoods. To some extent, candidates can also choose the media outlets used to spread their message. For example, candidates can appeal to a particular ethnic group by choosing to advertise through a local radio station or a newspaper that primarily serves that ethnic group.

**5. Securing ethnic endorsements:** Candidates can appeal to an ethnic group by securing endorsements by prominent ethnic elites such as religious clerics or tribal leaders. In this way, candidates can capitalize on the moral authority of the leaders and the respect held for them by the ethnic community. Such tactics help to legitimize candidates' appeals to particular ethnic groups.

Whether candidates use explicit and implicit messages to invoke ethnicity, the question of intent remains. In other words, do candidates intend to invoke ethnicity with these appeals? Unfortunately, it is not always possible to know the intention of candidates. The best available option is to record candidate appeals and attempt to



determine how these appeals are interpreted by voters. Candidates are in the business of being elected and, on the whole, they have a good idea of how their appeals will be received. Therefore, if voters understand an appeal as one that invokes their ethnicity, it is reasonable to assume that their interpretation reflects the candidate's intentions.

As evident from the discussion so far, candidates appeal to ethnic groups in many ways. However, the politicization of ethnicity is often framed in very simple terms, such as the politicization of Hindu versus Muslim voters or black versus white voters.

Gathering more detailed data on ethnic appeals helps to reveal the complexity of ethnic politicization in terms of the ethnic categories to which candidates appeal and the kinds of explicit and implicit appeals that candidates deploy. Specifically, data reflecting the number of times candidates explicitly or implicitly invoke an ethnic category can be used to map the range of politically salient macro- and micro-level ethnic categories. These data also indicate the degree to which each ethnic category is politicized and whether these politicized ethnic categories change over time. With this approach, important ethnic categories are not identified a priori; instead, politically salient ethnic categories become evident from the distribution of ethnic appeals made by candidates.

## Part III: What is the Function of Ethnic Appeals?

### DELIMITATION OF GROUP SIZE

What is the function of ethnic appeals? The obvious answer is: to get votes. Without a doubt, candidates and parties who employ ethnic appeals believe they will effectively secure ethnic support. The effectiveness of ethnic appeals lies in their emotional component. Ethnic rhetoric, signs, symbols, and imagery stir deeply held

emotional bonds among ethnic groups; they draw on an individual's psychological attachment to a group and the sense of ingroup solidarity. Walker Connor explained it eloquently:

Political leaders of the most diverse ideological strains have been mindful of the common blood component of ethnonational psychology and have not hesitated to appeal to it when seeking popular support. Both the frequency and the record of success of such appeals attest to the fact that nations are indeed characterized by a sense, a feeling, of consanguinity. (Connor 1993, 382)

However, while ethnic appeals draw on the emotional depth of ethnic identity, candidates have choices regarding the ethnic dimensions and categories to which they appeal. The choice of ethnic appeal allows candidates to mobilize some groups, but not others. As such, ethnic appeals have a delimiting function on the size of a candidate's support base.<sup>12</sup> At the most basic level, candidates may use ethnic appeals to mobilize support from their own ethnic group, defining themselves as a champion of their ethnic kin through exclusive ethnic appeals. Alternatively, candidates may reach out beyond their ethnic group and define themselves as a pluralist candidate by using more inclusive, though still ethnic, appeals.<sup>13</sup> In this dissertation, I draw on two intuitive terms that capture the inclusive and exclusive functions of ethnic appeals: bonding and bridging. Bonding involves exclusive appeals while bridging is inclusive.

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<sup>12</sup> Posner (2005) in particular emphasized the importance of delimiting the size of a candidate's support base. He argued that candidates (and voters) want to constrain their support in order to share the spoils of victory with the smallest possible group or coalition of groups.

<sup>13</sup> There are several studies on how candidates target core supporters or swing voters in advanced democracies (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Dixit and Londregan 1996; Stokes 2005). However, they do not specifically identify ethnicity as an important defining feature of being a core or swing group. Recently, more work has been done on the effect of targeted appeals (Hersh and Schaner 2012).

## BONDING AND BRIDGING: GROUPS, PARTIES, AND CANDIDATES

Bonding and bridging are important terms within the social capital literature. Robert Putnam (2002) considered bonding and bridging social capital as the most important lines along which social capital varies. He defined bridging social capital in terms of outward-looking networks that have connections to different kinds of people from diverse backgrounds, while bonding social capital is equated with inward-looking networks that contain similar individuals. Bonding reinforces homogenous groups and exclusive identities. As Putnam explained,

Bridging social capital refers to social networks that bring together people of different sorts, and bonding social capital brings together people of a similar sort. This is an important distinction because the externalities of groups that are bridging are likely to be positive, while networks that are bonding (limited within particular social niches) are at greater risk of producing externalities that are negative. (Putnam 2002, 32)

While Putnam measured social capital in various ways (e.g., political participation, group membership, religious participation, informal socializing), he never explicitly explained how these measures of social capital relate to bonding or bridging. This is because, as Putnam explained, he could not find reliable, comprehensive, and nationwide measures that distinguish between bonding and bridging. Ultimately, he concluded that social networks could not be neatly divided into either bridging or bonding but, instead, are either more or less one or the other.

Norris (2004) used the concepts of bonding and bridging to describe the campaign strategies of political parties around the world. Drawing on Norris's work, Reilly (2006) specifically related bonding and bridging to parties and party systems in the Asia Pacific region. Both begin by distinguishing between centripetal and consociational political systems. Centripetal political systems, which use majoritarian institutional rules, lead to centrist governments and large catch-all parties. These parties engage in bridging campaign strategies. They depoliticize identity groups by reaching out across social cleavages and appealing to multiple identity groups. Norris defined the bridging campaign strategies of these parties as "designed to gather votes promiscuously and indiscriminately wherever campaign support can be found among diverse sectors of the electorate." These strategies involve building "broad coalitions across diverse social and ideological groups...linking different generations, faiths and ethnic identities, thereby aggregating interests and creating crosscutting allegiances" (Norris 2004, 10).

In contrast, consociational political systems, which use multiparty proportional and consensual institutional rules, lead to greater minority representation and smaller parties that often have an ethnic support base. These parties engage in bonding campaign strategies, mobilizing narrower and more homogenous social groups such as farmers, ethnic minorities, and environmentalists. These groups are homogenous in that they belong to the same social category—they share the same faith, tribe, class, or ideological beliefs. Bonding strategies use targeted appeals that speak to their own group's interests and values while disregarding other groups or broader kinds of appeals (Norris 2004, 10).

Norris (2004) and Reilly (2006) used voting and survey data to measure the extent to which parties bond or bridge. While anecdotal evidence on bonding and bridging appeals is presented, neither author systematically measured appeals. To my knowledge, no study has tried to systematically measure bonding and bridging campaign strategies. In addition, both authors focus on parties rather than local candidates. The broad definitions of bonding and bridging in their work make it difficult to measure bonding and bridging in a fine-grained, systematic way. To overcome these challenges, I narrow the focus of bonding and bridging to ethnic bonding and bridging and specify how candidates (rather than parties) bond with or bridge across ethnic groups.

One important difference between parties and candidates is that candidates have nominal ethnic identities, such as being Muslim or Javanese. The nominal ethnic categories to which a candidate belongs are relatively fixed and separate from their campaign platform and campaign appeals. In contrast, a party's identity is usually defined by the party's platform and the kinds of appeals they make. For example, a party that primarily appeals to an ethnic group is invariably defined as an ethnic party. Thus, it is impossible to define a single ethnic appeal by a party as an ethnic bonding or bridging appeal. Instead, ethnic bonding or bridging is determined by the distribution of ethnic appeals made by a party. In contrast, each ethnic appeal made by a candidate can be defined as having an ethnic bonding or bridging function.

In this dissertation, I apply the concepts of bonding and bridging to individual ethnic appeals made by candidates. In general, an ethnic bonding appeal is an appeal to the candidate's ethnic group that is used to secure their political support, while an

ethnic bridging appeal is an appeal to ethnic groups to which the candidate does not belong in order to achieve broader ethnic support. A system for classifying ethnic appeals according to their bridging or bonding functions is presented in figure 2.2 and described in the following sections.<sup>14</sup>

#### THE THREE FUNCTIONS OF ETHNIC APPEALS

Figure 2.2 illustrates the logical progression of steps in identifying the bonding and bridging functions of ethnic appeals using questions asked by the researcher. In this scheme, an individual ethnic appeal by a candidate can be defined as a non-ethnic appeal, broad ethnic bridging appeal, cross-ethnic bridging appeal, or ethnic bonding appeal. Importantly, each appeal can be defined as only one of these four functional types.

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<sup>14</sup> It should be noted that ethnic bonding and bridging concepts are only relevant for ethnically diverse countries. In a country with just one ethnic group, candidates can choose to appeal to the ethnic group or not. There is no distinction between ethnic bonding and bridging because there are no other ethnic groups to bridge across.




Figure 2.2. Classifying appeals in terms of bonding or bridging functions

### 1. Broad Ethnic Bridging

A broad ethnic bridging appeal is an appeal that invokes an entire ethnic dimension or an ethnic category in which all or most of the voters are included. For example, if an electorate is relatively religious but includes a number of different religions, candidates can bridge across religious groups by appealing to the dimension of

religion. Such appeals invoke a general sense of religiosity or godliness without specifying a religious category. For example, politicians in the US frequently invoke God at the end of political speeches without referring to specific religions. Similarly, during field research in Indonesia, I found that candidates often made broad appeals to religion without specifying a category such as Islam, Christianity, or Hinduism. In the context of Indonesia, where religious identity is strong across all religious groups, such an appeal represents a broad ethnic bridging appeal. However, in countries where large sections of the electorate are not religious, an appeal to religiosity is not a broad ethnic bridging appeal because it excludes a large number of voters.

In multi-ethnic countries, an appeal to national identity can have a broad ethnic bridging function. This is particularly true in countries where nation building emphasizes national identity as a new identity category that includes, but does not try to assimilate, existing ethnic categories. Wimmer (2013, 51) referred to this as a “frequent variant of nation-building [that] proceeds by emphasizing a higher layer of ethnic differentiation that corresponds to the population of a state and thus superposes existing ethnic, regional, or racial divisions.” Examples of multi-ethnic countries with an encompassing national identity include the three largest democracies in the world: the US, India, and Indonesia. In these countries, candidates can reach out across a diverse electorate of multiple races, religions, language groups, and indigenous groups by appealing to their one commonality: a shared national identity. In the US, this concept is commonly referred to as patriotism, but in Indonesia the term nationalism has similar positive connotations. The Indonesian national motto is “Unity in Diversity,” and national holidays are reserved for all the major religions. In this context, where the vast majority



of voters have a strong national identity<sup>15</sup> but can still maintain separate religious and indigenous ethnic identities, Indonesian candidates can use nationalist appeals to bridge religious and indigenous divides in their electoral districts. Nation building can also transpire through incorporation, where “state elites redefine an existing ethnic group as the nation into which everybody should fuse” (Wimmer 2013, 50). As a result, the nation is defined in terms of a common identity such as a single religion, territorial ancestry, or a common language. In this context, candidates are unable to reach out across other ethnic identity groups using nationalist appeals because national identity does not overlap with, or superimpose upon, a diverse set of ethnic identities.

Regional appeals constitute broad ethnic bridging when all or most voters in the region share a regional ethnic identity. In electoral districts that include voters from different religious, linguistic, or indigenous groups, candidates can appeal to a commonly shared regional identity. Unless there has been recent large-scale regional migration, most of the voters in the electoral district will tend to share the regional identity. Regionalist appeals allow candidates to make broad appeals that bridge across other ethnic identity divides. In sum, broad ethnic bridging appeals are appeals to ethnic dimensions or categories that are widely held and shared by voters within the electoral district. These kinds of appeals are relatively safe for risk-averse candidates; they can draw support from multiple ethnic groups without running the risk of antagonizing any particular group. In contrast, cross-ethnic bridging is a more risky tactic.

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<sup>15</sup> In some of the separatist regions, such as Aceh and Papua, national identity is, unsurprisingly, lower.

## 2. Cross-Ethnic Bridging

A cross-ethnic bridging appeal is an appeal that invokes an ethnic category or subcategory that is a subset of the electorate and to which the candidate does not belong (i.e., is not a nominal member). Cross-ethnic bridging appeals are a way for candidates to reach beyond their ethnic groups. Candidates can engage in cross-ethnic bridging by, for example, campaigning in the neighborhoods of other ethnic groups, placing advertisements in newspapers primarily read by other ethnicities, or seeking endorsements from other ethnic leaders. Cross-ethnic bridging can be a difficult campaign strategy because there is a danger that appeals to other ethnic groups might reduce support from the candidate's own ethnic group. Accordingly, this tactic is more common among ethnic minority candidates who, out of necessity, must appeal to the majority and to multi-ethnic electoral districts.

## 3. Ethnic Bonding

Ethnic bonding appeals are commonly considered to be the stuff of ethnic politics. An ethnic bonding appeal is an appeal that invokes an ethnic category or subcategory that is a subset of the electorate and of which the candidate is a member. Ethnic bonding appeals are beneficial because they draw on ingroup solidarity. Ethnic bonding appeals tap into a ready-made support base, particularly when candidates have grown up in a relatively homogenous ethnic region and have strong personal ties with the community. Candidates also have a sense of legitimacy in bonding with their ethnic group and perhaps an inner sense of obligation to represent the group in government. However, there are some potential risks to bonding appeals. Other ethnic groups (or

members of the candidate's ethnic group who disapprove of their ethnicity being used for political purposes) may be antagonized by ethnic bonding appeals.

Candidates have two choices when they make ethnic bonding appeals. First, they choose the ethnic dimension to which they will appeal. In Indonesia, the primary choice is between the ethnic dimensions of religion and indigeneity. Second, they choose an ethnic category to which they will appeal (e.g., Christian, Islamic). While candidates can make narrow ethnic appeals to their own micro-level ethnic subcategory (e.g., Methodist), it is often more advantageous to broaden the appeal to a macro-level ethnic category (e.g., Christian) as these appeals unite subgroups under a larger shared ethnic category. In particular, candidates tend to appeal to macro-level ethnic categories when electoral districts are enlarged, when the electoral rules require broad support, and when ethnic categories and subcategories under a dimension are deeply nested.

#### NAMING CONVENTION FOR ETHNIC APPEALS

Drawing on the previous discussion, each ethnic appeal made by a candidate can be characterized (and coded) by the ethnic dimension and category to which it is directed and the function of the appeal. This hyphenated naming convention captures the three important ethnic components of an ethnic appeal. Examples of ethnic appeal types are as follows:

**Ethnic Dimension—Ethnic Category—Ethnic Function**

Religion—Islamic—Ethnic Bonding

Religion—Islamic—Cross-Ethnic Bridging

National—Indonesian—Broad Ethnic Bridging

Indigeneity—Batak—Cross-Ethnic Bridging

Religion—NA—Broad Ethnic Bridging

In the first two examples, whether a Religious-Islamic appeal functions as ethnic bonding or ethnic bridging depends on the candidate's ethnicity. If the candidate is Islamic, the function is bonding. If the candidate is Hindu, for example, the function is bridging. The example without an ethnic category is an example of broad ethnic bridging where the candidate appeals to an ethnic dimension (in this case religion) without specifying an ethnic category (e.g., Christian). In this case, the lack of an ethnic category is represented by NA (not applicable).

## Part IV: Aggregation of Ethnic Appeals

After identifying and classifying ethnic appeals according to their three components, the next step is to aggregate numerous ethnic appeals into meaningful summary measures. This process involves three steps: (a) identify each ethnic appeal and code the ethnic dimension and ethnic category to which each appeal is directed, (b) use the ethnic identity of the candidate to code the bonding or bridging function of each ethnic appeal, and (c) quantify ethnic appeal types as percentages of the total number of ethnic appeals. To use a straightforward example, suppose we want to measure the degree to which a candidate makes ethnic appeals in a campaign speech. After following the above procedure for each ethnic appeal in the speech, the results may appear as follows:

50% Religious—Islamic—Ethnic Bonding

30% Religious—Christian—Cross-Ethnic Bridging

20% Nationalist—Indonesian—Broad Ethnic Bridging

To broaden the example, this procedure may be used with a collection of speeches by a candidate in different contexts or over time to note any changes under these conditions. The analysis could be extended even further by coding and comparing ethnic appeals made by multiple candidates. Appeals by candidates from different regions could be analyzed for regional comparisons. Similarly, appeals can be compared across political parties or within parties—comparing the appeals of local candidates with appeals made by party elites, for example.

One disadvantage to this method is that using three components to define ethnic appeals may result in an unwieldy number of ethnic appeal types when the ethnic appeals of hundreds of candidates are aggregated. However, ethnic appeal types can be simplified depending on the component that is of particular interest to the researcher. In this dissertation, the analysis focuses primarily on ethnic dimension and the bonding or bridging function. As I will show, the main ethnic dimensions in Indonesia are religion, indigeneity, and national.

#### ETHNIC APPEAL SOURCES

Beyond campaign speeches, there are a number of other sources of data for ethnic appeals by candidates, such as newspaper election reports, transcripts from election debates, candidate websites and blogs, election posters, and advertisements in print, online, and on television. In order to obtain a representative sample of ethnic

appeals made by major and minor candidates, some care is needed in choosing sources. Usually, minor candidates lack coverage in the national press and, particularly in late-developing countries, cannot afford the expense of television advertisements or an online presence. Studying national press and television advertisements tends to bias the data toward major candidates. In order to obtain a more representative sample of ethnic appeals by major and minor candidates, this dissertation draws extensively on two sources: election-related regional newspaper articles and election posters. Both sources are relatively cheap and readily accessible in Indonesia.

With regard to sources of ethnic appeals data, two points are noteworthy. First, the kinds of appeals candidates make are often influenced by context. In public situations, candidates are more likely to make broader appeals. For example, election posters that are displayed in a town's main shopping area will be seen by voters from various ethnic groups. In this context, candidates have incentives to avoid narrow ethnic appeals, which might antagonize some ethnic groups. In more private situations, such as a campaign speech at a meeting of a particular ethnic association, candidates are more likely to narrowly tailor their appeals to the immediate audience. Few studies have examined the effects of targeting particular groups of voters. However, some evidence from US elections suggests that voters penalize candidates who mistarget their audience. These findings suggest that broad appeals are a safer strategy in extensive public venues. However, more targeted appeals in private venues may be beneficial when the candidate can quietly offer specific benefits (Hersh and Schaner 2012).

The second point about sources of ethnic appeal data is that some media may capture certain kinds of appeals, but not others. For example, transcripts of campaign

speeches don't capture nonverbal visual cues that might be important, such as whether certain ethnic or political elites are standing with the candidate, how the candidate is dressed, gestures used during the speech, and the venue and location of the speech. Election posters, on the other hand, are particularly good at relaying nonverbal visual cues such as the candidate's choice of clothing (in photos) and use of imagery and symbols. However, posters are usually limited in the amount of verbal information they contain. In contrast, election-related newspaper articles contain more verbal information and more detail on campaign venues, issues, and endorsements. Overall, in any analysis, attention must be given to the source of data. For sources of ethnic appeals data, considerations include the demographic composition of the audience, important details about the event that may not be reflected in the data, and whether the medium lends itself to verbal or nonverbal messages. Finally, given the potential bias of certain source materials, it is important for systematic studies to use the same types of sources when comparing ethnic appeals across candidates, parties, regions, or time.

## Part V: Are Ethnic Appeals Quantifiable and Persuasive?

Before concluding, there are two important critiques that need to be addressed. Some scholars believe that ethnic politicization does not lend itself to stylized quantitative analysis, but is better suited to discursive analysis and thick descriptions (i.e., definitions that include elements of context; (Varshney 2002, 21)). Studies employing such approaches have offered tremendous insights into ethnic politics using narrative formats and multiple interpretations that draw on stories of heroes and

villains, national monuments, history, past battles, engagement in rituals, and so forth (Brass 1997; Kaufman 2001). However, different methods can be used and combined to help us understand ethnic politicization. For example, David Laitin used a combination of content and discursive analysis to study changes in identity terms used in newspapers (Laitin 1998, 163-300). More generally, a recent edited volume on measuring identity (Abdelal et al. 2009) makes the case that we can effectively engage in quantification through diverse methods. The book contains chapters on a number of different approaches that hold great promise, including surveys, content analysis, discursive analysis, cognitive mapping, and experiments.

Various authors cited in this chapter, such as Kanchan Chandra, have employed qualitative content analysis of campaign materials to measure the ethnic, multi-ethnic, or non-ethnic identities of political parties around the world (Chandra 2005a; Chandra and Wilkinson 2008). Many studies on US politics have involved quantification of different aspects of electoral campaigns. Drawing on newspapers and television advertisements, Sulkin (2009) and Druckman (2004) measured issue-based appeals by candidates, while McIlwain and Caliendo (2011) and Soto and Merolla (2006) quantified racial and ethnic appeals.

Part of the reason for the more extensive number of studies in the US is because of the availability of data on campaigns. There are more provincial and local newspapers available online. In addition, campaign TV advertisements have been gathered, transcribed, and made available to scholars by initiatives such as The Wisconsin Advertising Project. In late-developing countries, researchers must painstakingly gather this data themselves, which is not always feasible, so they rely on voting data or



illustrative evidence of campaign appeals. Overall, the problem is not that we are unable to quantifiably measure ethnic appeals, rather, we usually lack comprehensive data from which to make measurements.

The second potential critique of the present research suggests that that even if ethnic appeals can be quantified, such measures are worthless because campaign appeals are merely empty rhetoric with little persuasive effect. If appeals are ineffective, then data on bonding and bridging is equally irrelevant and such functions have little impact on voters.<sup>16</sup> However, given that candidates continue to spend considerable time and resources crafting and communicating ethnic appeals, the suggestion that ethnic appeals have no persuasive effect is difficult to support. On the whole, candidates know their audience; therefore, it is not unreasonable to assume that ethnic appeals have some persuasive value. As Riker explained, “We assume that experienced rhetors know something about how persuasion works. ... If they then use a particular technique frequently, we can infer that this technique is believed to be persuasive. Furthermore if many rhetors use the technique, it is then widely believed to be persuasive” (Riker 1990, 57). A number of laboratory and real world experiments have confirmed that campaign messages have pervasive effects and can mobilize voters (Brader 2005; Grimmer et al. 2012). Moreover, the importance of campaign rhetoric can go beyond influencing voting behavior to long-term and far-reaching effects. To pick one example, a recent study by Helbling et al. (2013) found that party rhetoric regarding cultural diversity had an effect on generalized trust between a nation’s native-born and immigrant populations.

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<sup>16</sup> As one scholar put it, “Studying electoral behavior is like counting pimples on the bottom of the body politic.”

## Conclusions

To conclude, the information presented in this chapter offers three broad contributions to our understanding of, and ability to measure, electoral ethnic appeals. First, the discussion highlights the need to gather more detailed data on ethnic appeals at the candidate level. While gathering fine-grained data is challenging, such data have many uses and benefits. For example, candidate-level data can be used to aggregate measures of ethnic politicization up to different geographic levels, to show when candidates' appeals veer from the party platform, to identify and clarify various factors that may affect ethnic politicization, and to reveal how the politicization of particular ethnic groups can change over time.

Second, this chapter presents a clear definition of an ethnic group, lays out the nested structure of ethnicity, defines an ethnic appeal, and lists the explicit or implicit messages candidates can use to invoke ethnicity. This information reveals the complex nature of ethnic politicization, the numerous ethnic appeal options open to candidates, and the various ways they can invoke ethnicity in their campaigns.

Third, the information in this chapter goes beyond that of other studies by introducing the important bonding and bridging functions of ethnic appeals. A lengthy discussion explains how to identify ethnic bonding, broad ethnic bridging, and cross-ethnic bridging appeals and why these functions are important. Bonding and bridging functions allow us to summarize and compare ethnic appeal strategies, regardless of the particular ethnic categories to which candidates appeal. A naming convention allows an individual ethnic appeal to be specified in terms of three components: ethnic dimension, ethnic category, and appeal function. Finally, this chapter presents a method for

aggregating ethnic appeals into meaningful summary measures for comparative work and discusses various sources of ethnic appeal data.

In contrast to studies that use simplistic measures or anecdotal evidence to describe the ethnicization of electoral politics, in this dissertation I have attempted to clearly define an ethnic appeal and how it can be specified in terms of different components. The measurement of ethnic appeals as described provides fine-grained, continuous measures of the degree to which candidates appeal to different ethnic dimensions and categories in order to bond with, and bridge across, ethnic groups. These measures allow us to summarize and compare candidates' ethnic appeals in different contexts, across regions, by political party, and over time. Such analyses paint a more realistic picture of the variation in ethnic appeals by candidates. Furthermore, they enable us to answer important questions about the kinds of ethnic appeals candidates use to mobilize ethnic groups in particular times and places and why candidates choose to politicize some ethnic categories, but not others.

# The Logic of Ethnic Appeals

This chapter lays out the theoretical argument that explains why candidates choose to politicize ethnicity in their election campaigns. Part 1 reviews the three competing arguments—the ethnic attachment thesis, the cultural modernization thesis, and the PR-majoritarian thesis. First, the ethnic attachment thesis argues that ethnic politicization is a direct result of deeply held forms of ethnic identification. From this point of view, ethnic groups have different historically rooted ethnic forms of identification and these social divisions become the basis for the organization of political competition. While candidates may take advantage of these divisions by playing the ethnic card, the divisions are primarily propelled by historic inter-ethnic hostilities emerging from below. This view represents a commonly held understanding of ethnic politicization that is prominent in newspaper election reports. Second, the cultural modernization thesis focuses on the impact of broad structural change on ethnic politicization. According to this perspective the process of modernization slowly changes ethnic attachments, weakening ethnic and religious identities and strengthening class-based and nationalist identities. Thus, the salience and politicization of ethnic and

religious identities is high in less developed countries, but declines with economic development. This view is common among cultural modernization theorists.

Third, the PR-majoritarian thesis explains that the politicization of ethnicity in terms of institutional arrangements. Ethnic politicization is driven by electoral incentives, specifically the impact of proportional representation and majoritarian electoral rules on party formation. The logic is straightforward; in contrast to majoritarianism, proportional representation creates a more proportional outcome, which, in turn, fosters ethnic parties and the mobilization of groups along ethnic lines. This view is common among rational choice institutionalists. While each of these competing arguments present us with theoretically coherent arguments, the supporting empirical evidence for all three explanations is weak or incomplete. This, I argue, is mainly because they don't seriously consider electoral candidates—the individuals who are making the ethnic appeals. In contrast, this dissertation employs a candidate-centered approach to understand why some candidates politicize ethnicity while others do not.

In Part 2, I introduce the personal vote literature, which I will use to frame my argument. The personal vote literature puts candidates at the center of the analysis and differentiates between electoral systems that range from highly party-centric to highly candidate-centric. In this literature, scholars have found that under candidate-centric rules, candidates pursue personal campaign strategies and have closer connections with their constituents. In contrast, under party-centric rules, candidates run on the political party platform and maintain good connections with party leaders. A wealth of research shows that candidate-centric rules have a number of important effects on how

individual candidates campaign. Yet surprisingly, I have been unable to identify a single study that investigates whether candidate-centric rules affect ethnic appeals by candidates or, more generally, the ethnic politicization of elections. This is a particularly important omission considering the general move towards candidate-centric rules around the world and, at the same time, concern that the politicization of ethnicity during elections has detrimental effects on inter-ethnic relations and political stability.

Having laid the theoretical foundation for the argument, I present this dissertation's two main arguments. In Part 3, I explain why candidate-centric rules increase ethnic politicization, arguing that these rules offer strong incentives for candidates to forgo partisan appeals and, instead, appeal directly to local ethnic groups. In Part 4, I explain how candidates choose between appealing to their own ethnic group (ethnic bonding) and appealing to other ethnic groups (ethnic bridging). Under party-centric rules, the choice is simple. Ethnic appeals by candidates tend to align with the ideology of their party; ethnic party members bond and national party members bridge. In candidate-centric elections, candidate appeals must resonate with a critical mass of supporters in the electoral district. As a result, candidates survey the size of ethnic groups to determine their ethnic campaign strategy. If the candidate is a member of an ethnic group that is large enough to win the election, the optimal strategy is a bonding approach. However, if their own ethnic group is too small, a bridging approach makes more sense. When candidates are members of multiple ethnic groups (e.g., a religious group and an indigenous group), they may employ both bonding and bridging strategies, but invariably, bonding will be the dominant strategy. Bonding, I argue, trumps bridging due to ingroup solidarity and the norms of intra-ethnic reciprocity.

## Part I: Competing Arguments

The first two competing arguments employ a bottom-up approach, where the politicization of ethnicity is viewed as a reflection of strong underlying cultural and social forces. Political behavior is driven by cultural values, psychological attachments, and the impact of large structural economic changes on political culture. Candidates and voters are embedded in their cultural practices and attached to ethnic groups through shared values, norms, economic interests, and policy preferences. Accordingly, these explanations argue that political behavior is not easily altered by changes in formal institutions. Institutional change may affect political behavior over time by changing political culture, but the pace of change is glacial. Part of the appeal of these arguments is that they explain the divergent effects of electoral rules within and across different countries depending on variations in political culture and levels of economic development.

These bottom-up explanations have been put forward by a diverse range of authors in political sociology, psychology, and political economy. For brevity, I will distinguish between two groups of scholars who differ in their views on the connection between culture and politics and the potential for cultural change. The first group of scholars envisions a fusion between the cultural and the political sphere, where ethnic politicization is driven by deeply rooted psychological attachments to ethnicity. I call this the ethnic attachment thesis. The second group of scholars, writing in the modernization literature, emphasizes that structural economic shifts change political culture and forms of identification. They posit that the politicization of ethnicity (and

non-ethnic identities) is dependent on the kind of society—traditional, industrial, or postindustrial. I call this the cultural modernization thesis.

## 1. THE ETHNIC ATTACHMENT THESIS

In the political sociological work of Weber and Geertz, ethnic identities are seen as reflections of traditional loyalties. Ethnic identities are always culturally relevant and this naturally flows into being politically relevant. From this perspective, culture and politics are inherently interconnected.<sup>1</sup> For example, according to Geertz (Geertz 1957, 51), the polarized politics in Indonesia during the 1950s were more than just a political competition over which party would rule; they were a direct consequence of a battle over basic cultural values and symbols of meaning.

A number of authors who take a psychological approach also see a close connection between culture and politics. They argue that cultural forms of ethnic identification get passed down through a process of socialization in early childhood. The process is driven by the inherent need of individuals to identify with ethnic and social groups (Elliott 1986; Volkan 1988). Connor (1993) argued that the essence of ethnicity is a psychological bond that joins and differentiates groups of people. Ethnicity has deep historical roots; it is a subconscious conviction of its members and an intrinsic part of our makeup. Connor pointed out that ethnonationalist leaders know this and elicit support by appealing to these emotional attachments through ethnic symbols, music, and poetry. Coming from a similar perspective, Kaufman (2001) presented a symbolic approach to understanding ethnic conflict. He argues that ethnic symbols are potent

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<sup>1</sup> See Laitin (1986) for a review of Weber and Geertz's primordialist view of ethnicity and a social-systems theory on the politicization of ethnicity.



because their meaning stems from deeply held, emotionally laden myths.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, people respond to the most emotionally potent ethnic symbol that politicians evoke.<sup>3</sup>


One problem with these theories is that they draw a direct line from the social salience of ethnicity to the political salience of ethnicity, as illustrated in figure 3.1A. As a result, they have difficulty explaining why some socially salient ethnic identities become politicized while others do not. Authors tend to focus on particular ethnic identities that are politicized rather than the full spectrum of ethnic identities that can be politicized. Laitin (1986) highlighted an example where ethnic salience does not translate into political salience. In his study of Yorubaland in Nigeria, he reported that the religious orientations of the Yoruba are socially salient. Attachments to Christianity and Islam are strong among the Yoruba, and church and mosque attendance is high. Given the social salience of religion, it was expected that a contentious religious wedge issue (a parliamentary debate on a proposal for a Sharia Court of Appeal) would politicize religion among the Yoruba. However, a religious divide among the Yoruba did not occur. This outcome casts doubt on arguments that draw a direct line between social salience and political salience.

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<sup>2</sup> Petersen (2002) has attempted to differentiate between the activation of certain kinds of mass emotions—such as fear, hatred, resentment, and rage—and the different kinds of political behavior they motivate. He argued that large structural changes activate particular emotions that create compulsions to meet an environmental demand (safety, wealth, status, or self-esteem). Different emotions call for different kinds of political action. It is unclear, however, if these intense emotions are triggered during run-of-the-mill elections. The large structural changes Peterson highlights, such as world wars, occupation, and the collapse of empires, are rare events.

<sup>3</sup> In addition to having strong attachments to one's own group, social identity theory argues that there are strong tendencies to compare one's group to other groups in order to find a favorable bias and raise self-esteem (Tajfel 1982). Drawing on these insights, scholars have argued that groups are inherently competitive and that political behavior is driven by efforts to raise group self-esteem (Horowitz 1985).

**A. The ethnic attachment thesis**



**B. The cultural modernization thesis**




Figure 3.1. The ethnic attachment thesis and the cultural modernization thesis

Arguments in the political economy literature make similar direct connections between ethnicity and political competition, but focus less on emotional attachment to an ethnic identity and more on deeply held policy preferences among ethnic group members. The main argument is that divergent policy preferences among ethnic groups foster political competition along ethnic lines. In one example of this approach, Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) argued that ethnic groups have enduring common preferences on public policy.<sup>4</sup> In ethnically diverse societies, ethnic groups become polarized due to differences in these preferences and are unwilling to share power. Electoral contests tend to spiral out of control as leaders woo ethnic groups through a process of “ethnic outbidding.” Rabushka and Shepsle argue that this ultimately results in ethnic conflict and the demise of democratic governance. It is unlikely, however, that ethnic groups are always highly polarized in terms of their policy interests. Certain

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<sup>4</sup> Alesina (1999) also saw ethnic groups as having different preferences over public policy that can hinder economic development.

public goods such as schools, healthcare, roads, and education are universally valued across ethnic groups, suggesting that ethnic competition is less about policy differences and more about attaining a greater share of common goods (Fearon 2008, 859).

In sum, despite contrary evidence, the view that socially salient ethnic identities become politicized is an intuitive one. Journalistic accounts of inter-ethnic conflict have popularized the notion of a seamless connection between ethnic attachment and violence.<sup>5</sup> While cases of ethnic politicization are commonly determined, in hindsight, to reflect ethnic group divisions in the social sphere, a better test of the argument is to determine whether candidates appeal to ethnic identities that are more socially salient than others. The social salience of ethnicity can be measured in various ways, such as attendance at ethnic events, engagement in ethnic rituals, and opinion surveys on levels of ethnic attachment.

## 2. THE CULTURAL MODERNIZATION THESIS

Cultural modernization theorists allow for changes in the politicization of ethnicity and offer explanations for such changes. Early modernists include Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Émile Durkheim. In the 1950s and 1960s, authors such as Karl Deutsch, Martin Lipset, and Walt W. Rostow revived and wrote extensively on modernization.<sup>6</sup> These ideas were extended by Ernest Gellner (1983), Eric Hobsbawm (1990), and Benedict Anderson (1983) in the 1980s. While modernization arguments vary in their emphasis on particular aspects of economic change (e.g., industrialization, the spread of

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<sup>5</sup> For the most notable journalistic example of the detrimental aspects of ethnic attachments and past hostilities, see Kaplan (1993; 1994 2/1).

<sup>6</sup> For some of these seminal works, see Deutsch (1953; 1964), Lipset (1959; 1981), and Rostow (1960).

capitalism, the rise of mass print media), they are rooted in the impact of structural economic change on culture. This transformation of culture, in turn, affects forms of identification and has a profound affect on political competition and electoral behavior. The main structural economic change is a shift from a traditional agrarian society to an industrial society.<sup>7</sup>

Traditional agrarian societies survive primarily on farming, fishing, and unskilled work; literacy rates are low and few opportunities exist for social mobility. Individuals are closely connected to their family and local community and have strong ethnic and religious identity attachments. A shift toward capitalism and the manufacture of industrial goods results in migration to cities, urbanization, social mobility, an expansion of the middle class, an increase in prosperity, higher levels of literacy, and growth in mass media. As workers move to the cities, they mix and work with other workers from different backgrounds. This leads to the development of a common language and a common national identity that unites the workforce. Modernization theorists posit that these experiences gradually change forms of identification, as illustrated in figure 3.1B. Traditional ethnic identities, such as local indigenous, religious, and linguistic identities, weaken and are replaced by class, occupational, and national identities.

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<sup>7</sup> While it is less relevant for this dissertation, which is focused on new and consolidating democracies, scholarly attention has shifted to a potentially new stage of modernization—postindustrial societies. Daniel Bell (1999) argued that the postindustrial stage occurs when a work force moves from manufacturing to the service sector. This shift entails increases in education, geographic mobility, and technological advancement. More recent authors writing on modernization include Russell Dalton, and Ronald Inglehart. Inglehart (1990; 1997) is the most notable scholar to focus on how these changes have affected political culture in the West. He argued that in postindustrial societies, party loyalties that are rooted in religion and class have eroded. Today, support for parties is more contingent on particular leaders, issues, and events. Society and politics have become more fragmented and individualized, and social identities have eroded.

One critique of modernization theory is that the slow rate of change in forms of identification cannot explain rapid changes in the politicization of ethnicity. In particular, the gradual move from indigenous and religious identities to class-based and national identities is not consistent with the experiences of postcolonial countries. After successful wars of independence and withdrawal of the colonial power, many independence movements split along ethnic and religious lines. Despite these examples, most scholars who study the rise of nationalism agree that national identities emerge during the process of modernization. In addition, the belief that workers living and working in modern sectors in cities have weaker ethnic and religious identities than those in the rural hinterland seems intuitive.

However, a number of scholars have challenged this point. Writing on Indonesia in the 1960s, Liddle found that modernization (particularly urbanization) resulted in a politicization of ethnic loyalties. His research indicated that the politicization of religious and indigenous identities was heightened in the modern urban areas of Pematang Siantar compared to the surrounding rural regions of Simalungun where class and economic interests prevailed (Liddle 1970, 124). This echoed findings in Bruner's (1961) study on ethnicity in Indonesia around the same time. He found that ethnic identification and practices did not decline among the Toba Batak ethnic group who moved from their rural homeland to the urban area of Medan—if anything, they intensified.

Beyond Indonesia, other scholars, including Melson and Wolpe (1970), Young (1976), Bates (1983), and, more recently, Posner (2010) have also critiqued modernization theory. These new modernists argued that modernization strengthens

and politicizes ethnic identities. They claimed that urbanization and industrialization entail more competition for jobs. As a result, workers and leaders engaged in urban modern sectors have incentives to exploit ethnic group membership to attain economic resources and political power. Given the continued debate on the impact of modernization, further research is needed to understand how identity attachment and ethnic politicization are affected.

If the older modernization arguments are correct, differences in the politicization of ethnicity across regions should coincide with different levels of development. Based on the assumption that indigenous ethnic and religious identification is strongest in rural areas, candidates competing in rural districts are expected to invoke these identities in their campaigns. In contrast, drawing on the assumption that individuals in urban areas have stronger national identities because they are more exposed to modern culture, candidates are expected to make fewer appeals to indigenous ethnic and religious identities and more appeals to nationalism. Generally speaking, if these bottom-up approaches are correct, then changes in electoral rules will have little impact on the politicization of ethnicity, at least in the short term. Instead, ethnic appeals by candidates will be driven by forms of identity attachment arising from below.

### 3. THE PR-MAJORITARIAN THESIS

A large body of literature focuses on the impact of electoral rules on the politicization of ethnicity during elections. Ethnic politicization is viewed by some scholars as the result of a strategic calculation of electoral incentives rather than a reflection of strong underlying cultural and social forces. The most prominent view is

that proportional representation politicizes identities along exclusive ethnic lines while majoritarian rules help to depoliticize ethnicity. These relationships are based on one of the most prominent theories in comparative politics—Arend Lijphart’s theory of consociational democracy.<sup>8</sup> Lijphart argued that consociational systems, which are characterized by institutions that facilitate compromise and cooperation, help maintain stable governments in deeply divided plural societies. Over the last three decades, this theory has had a strong influence on NGOs and other organizations involved in institutional engineering in new democracies.

One of the most important aspects of Lijphart’s argument is the choice of electoral systems. He recommends a proportional representation system because it has an important impact on party formation, government coalitions, and overall support for the system. The argument is that proportional representation and multi-seat districts result in a more proportional outcome compared to majoritarian single-seat districts especially in cases of low voting threshold and high district magnitude. Specifically, proportional representation is more proportional in turning votes into seats. Proportionality, in turn, offers incentives for smaller parties to form because even with a small percentage of the vote they can win seats in the legislature. This offers opportunities for ethnic minorities to form their own ethnic party and achieve representation in the legislature. These ethnic parties can win seats and solely based on the support of the loyalty of their ethnic kin, so they use ethnic bonding appeals in their campaigns (see figure 3.2).

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<sup>8</sup> See Grofman and Lijphart (1986) Lijphart et al. (1993) and Lijphart (1999; 2002; 2004).

From Lijphart's point of view, the politicization of ethnicity through the formation of ethnic parties has a positive impact on democracy. Increased ethnic minority representation means that ethnic parties have opportunities to join government coalitions and affect policy as representatives of their ethnic groups. Minority representation, in turn, creates broad support for the political system. While other scholars agree that proportional representation politicizes ethnicity in the same way, they are not as positive about its impact on political stability and inter-ethnic relations as is Lijphart.

Horowitz (1991; 2002) emphasized that, in deeply divided plural societies, electoral systems should work towards depoliticizing ethnicity. The argument is that majoritarian systems achieve this by providing incentives for parties to broaden their appeal among constituents. In a majoritarian single member district a party's candidate needs to win at least a plurality of the vote. The translation of votes into seats is disproportional because it is a winner-takes-all formula. In order to secure a plurality or an absolute majority of the vote, candidates need to secure the support of a variety of social and ethnic groups with diverse interests. This creates barriers for parties that rely exclusively on ethnic minority support. In the main, only large national parties can survive in this system. To appeal for the majority of the vote in electoral districts, they become more centrist. They appeal broadly to the working-class and middle-class sectors, promoting common interests such as economic growth, government services, and infrastructure development. In terms of ethnic appeals, instead of making narrow appeals to one ethnic group, they make ethnic bridging appeals, reaching out to voters with various religious, linguistic, and regional backgrounds (see figure 3.2). By avoiding



the exclusive mobilization of groups along ethnic lines, this system helps sustain political stability and reduces the potential for ethnic conflict.




Figure 3.2. The PR-majoritarian thesis

A number of scholars have engaged in empirical research to determine the impact of proportional representation and majoritarian rules on political competition. Considerable evidence suggests that proportional representation results in more proportionality and an increased number of small parties with a wide range of ideological perspectives.<sup>9</sup> However, evidence that proportional representation politicizes exclusive ethnic identities is limited and mixed. One problem is that much of

<sup>9</sup> See Katz (1997) and Mozaffar (1998). Also, Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994) found that proportional representation can offset the tendency for parties to multiply in ethnically heterogeneous societies.

the research on the impact of proportional representation on ethnic politicization comes out of studies in western Europe. However, electoral rules may have a different impact in new and consolidating democracies that are coping with rapid social and economic changes and exposure to global markets. Among scholars studying these countries, the impact of proportional representation and majoritarian rules on the politicization of ethnicity remains a topic of considerable debate.

Some scholars have found empirical support for the argument that proportional representation mobilizes groups along ethnic lines. Studies of African politics by Sisk and Reynolds (1998) generally showed that proportional representation systems politicized ethnicity and facilitated the inclusion of ethnic minorities in the legislature. Ethnic representation, in turn, helped reduce ethnic conflict. In a study of five southern African countries, Reynolds (1998) reported that proportional representation led to the inclusion of ethnic parties and lower levels of ethnic conflict. Other authors, such as Reilly (2001), lend support to this finding by arguing that majoritarian rules, such as the Ranked Alternative Vote, reduced the mobilization of ethnic groups along ethnic lines. In his study of Papua New Guinea (one of the world's most ethnically diverse countries), Reilly reported that the introduction of the Alternative Vote system resulted in more moderate ethnic appeals by parties (Reilly 1997).

In contrast, some empirical evidence contradicts these findings. For example, studies have shown that majoritarian rules politicize exclusive ethnic identities above and beyond that by proportional representation. Barken's (1998) study of elections in Southern Africa offered evidence that majoritarian systems do not necessarily inhibit the growth of ethnic parties. Suberu and Diamond (2002) reported on a majoritarian

electoral system in Nigeria that resulted in the politicization of competitive ethnic groups, which fueled ethnic tensions. Finally, Huber's (2012) recent study of over 40 countries showed that majoritarian rules result in more voting along ethnic lines compared to proportional representation rules. Given these mixed findings, more research is needed to confirm, rule out, or qualify the relationship between electoral rules and the politicization of identity along ethnic lines.

One problem with the available evidence is that the politicization of ethnicity is measured in different ways, using the prevalence of ethnic parties, the degree of ethnic representation in the legislature, or levels of ethnic voting, for example.<sup>10</sup> This makes it difficult to compare and contrast the results. In addition, while studies seek to explain correlations between electoral rules and various outcomes (e.g., party formation, votes, representation, conflict), they fail to systematically study the process in between—in other words, the messages that actually politicize ethnicity. Surprisingly, to my knowledge, no work has systematically studied the variation in candidates' ethnic appeals in new and consolidating democracies. Moreover, there is a lack of systematic research studying when candidates appeal to their own ethnic group (bonding) or appeal to other ethnic groups (bridging). One of the main innovations of this dissertation is the development of an approach to identify when candidates politicize ethnicity and quantify the bonding and bridging variations in their ethnic appeals. In

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<sup>10</sup> According to Lijphart (1999), ethnic minority representation in parliament has a critical impact on the emergence of broad support for the political system. However, due to problems with measuring ethnic representation, he used the proportion of women elected to office as a proxy for ethnic minority representation. In his study of 36 countries, Lijphart showed that women were better represented under proportional representation than under majoritarian systems. However, these findings might not extend to ethnic minority representation. Unlike women, ethnic groups are often geographically clustered. Under majoritarian rules, ethnic minority parties can thrive in these regions by politicizing ethnicity. See Huber (2012) for empirical support.

many ways, this represents an important missing piece of the puzzle—the when and how of ethnic politicization.

Beyond the problem of measuring ethnic politicization, defining electoral institutions primarily in terms of district magnitude (e.g., multi-seat proportional representation, single-seat majoritarian) may be too narrow and simplistic. Studies have shown that other aspects of electoral systems affect candidate campaigns, such as how candidates are nominated, how seats are allocated, and how ballots are structured (Carey and Shugart 1995). Finally, much of the evidence for and against the PR-majoritarian thesis does not adequately incorporate constructivist insights on ethnic identity into the analysis. This includes the multiplicity and fluidity of ethnic identities, the overlapping and cross-cutting nature of ethnic groups, and the geographic concentration or dispersal of ethnic groups.

One final, general critique of the scholarly work on ethnic politicization is that the topic is studied at a very high level of abstraction. Most scholars study individual countries over time or make cross-country comparisons. In single-country studies, scholars try to identify changes in the politicization of ethnicity when, for example, the electoral rules change. In multicountry studies, scholars look for correlations between measures of ethnic politicization and levels of economic development, ethnic diversity, or electoral systems. In both types of studies, the unit of analysis is the country. This dissertation takes a different approach, employing individual candidates as the unit of analysis and thus establishing a tighter connection between specific appeals made by candidates and the contexts in which they are made.

## Part II: Party-Centric and Candidate-Centric Electoral Rules

To discuss the incentives and constraints faced by candidates in deciding whether to make ethnic appeals, this dissertation draws on insights from the personal vote literature. This literature specifically focuses on the effect of electoral rules on candidate behavior. Electoral rules that offer incentives for candidates to seek a personal vote can be regarded as candidate-centric because they tend to “push candidates toward self-promotion rather than toward promoting the party’s collective identity” (Samuels 1999, 490-91).

### WHAT RULES MAKE AN ELECTION CANDIDATE-CENTRIC?

Electoral rules range along a continuum from highly party-centric to highly candidate-centric. The degree to which elections are party- or candidate-centric is defined by a number of electoral rules that affect how candidates are nominated, how voters vote, and how seats are allocated. Carey and Shugart (1995) ranked legislative electoral systems along a continuum in terms of the degree to which they offer incentives for candidates to invest in their personal reputation (i.e., the degree to which they are candidate-centric). To do so, the authors used a discrete number of variables to create an ordinal ranking system.

Each of these variables affect the degree to which an electoral system is party-centric or candidate-centric. Elections are more party-centric when party leaders control the endorsement of candidates and the ranking of candidates in electoral list systems. In contrast, elections are more candidate-centric when independent candidates can get on the ballot by, for example, collecting signatures and party leaders do not control the

ranking. The second variable concerns how votes are counted and how seats are allocated. If the votes for a candidate or party are first pooled across parties to determine who wins seats, the system is more party-centric. In contrast, when all candidates win seats based entirely on their own votes, the system is more candidate-centric. The third variable focuses on how voters vote. When voters can cast their vote only for a political party, the electoral system is more party-centric, but when voters can vote for a specific candidate, the electoral system is more candidate-centric. An increase in district magnitude has an unusual effect in that it makes candidate-centric electoral rules more candidate-centric and party-centric rules more party-centric.<sup>11</sup>

It should be noted that measuring the degree to which the rules are candidate-centric is not an exact science. For example, Samuels (1999) identified similar rules as Carey and Shugart, as well as additional ones, in his study of candidate-centric elections in Brazil. Meanwhile, Norris (2004) put more emphasis on the structure of the ballot and the voting options available to voters. Despite these differences, there is general agreement among scholars regarding which rules make a system more candidate-centric. These include nonpartisan rules, because they allow independents to run and reduce the ability of party leaders to control candidate entry; preference ballots, because voters can choose a candidate name (rather than a party name) when they cast their vote; open lists (rather than closed lists), because voters can reject candidates

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<sup>11</sup> Candidate-centric rules become more candidate-centric as district magnitude increases because under candidate-centric systems, candidates in the same party must compete with each other for votes. As the number of fellow party candidates grows, more pressure is placed on candidates to establish a unique reputation in order to stand out from the crowd. In contrast, under party-centric systems, as district magnitude increases, the importance of individual candidates and their personal ability to secure votes for the party declines. With many candidates campaigning, any one candidate will have less of an impact on the party's overall vote.

avored by party leaders and pick a candidate of their own choosing; and lack of vote pooling, because candidates are elected based solely on their votes and not on party votes or votes for other party candidates. Overall, candidate-centric rules offer candidates more independence in terms of their campaigns by reducing the ability of party leaders to reward or sanction candidate behavior.

#### IMPACT OF RULES ON VOTER & CANDIDATE BEHAVIOR

Electoral rules structure competition in a way that also affects the attractiveness of parties and candidates in the eyes of voters. Under party-centric rules, what matters most to voters is the party's reputation, symbols, ideology, program, and platform. In this context, voters want to know about parties, not candidates, so there is less electoral benefit to having candidates promote their personal attributes and experience (Fiorina and Noll 1979). Ultimately, the success of candidates in getting elected and advancing their political careers is dependent on the performance of the party and the candidate's loyalty to party leaders. In contrast, under candidate-centric rules, the success of a candidate is more dependent on the candidate's individual characteristics, personal reputation, and responsiveness to constituents. Voters do not prize party affiliation or the reputation of the party; instead, they look at the individual qualities of the candidate (Shugart 1995; Shugart et al. 2005).

Ultimately, the campaign behavior of candidates is affected by their level of independence and the expectations of voters. Evidence in the personal vote literature shows that the degree to which rules are party- or candidate-centric can affect candidate behavior in predictable ways. Under party-centric rules, candidates seek party

votes by cultivating a party reputation. They promote the party's collective identity, the successes of the party, and the quality of the party's leadership. Under candidate-centric rules, candidates use various strategies to cultivate a personal reputation among constituents, such as solving a constituents' problems with government bureaucracy, providing pork-barrel funding for projects in specific districts, and campaigning with a home-style approach (Anagnoson 1983; Cain et al. 1987; Fenno 1978). These strategies resonate with voters, who look for candidates who are connected to their district, are responsive to constituents' needs, and can deliver pork or patronage. Through this process, candidates develop highly personalistic relationships with their constituency. In sum, under candidate-centric rules, candidates appeal to the voters (i.e., below), but in party-centric systems, candidates appeal to party leaders (i.e., above).

### Part III: Appealing to Partisan or Ethnic Identities

While much has been written on the impact of candidate-centric rules on pork-barrel politics, very little has been written on its impact on identity appeals by candidates.<sup>12</sup> I argue that the extent to which the rules are candidate-centric has important and predictable effects on candidates' identity appeals. In addition, I argue that electoral rules can be used to explain whether candidates are inclined to make partisan or ethnic identity appeals. Briefly, party-centric rules foster partisan appeals, while candidate-centric rules foster ethnic appeals.

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<sup>12</sup> Some studies have looked at the impact of candidate-centric rules on gender politics and women's representation. In a study of 57 countries between 1980 and 2005, Thames and Williams (2010) found that candidate-centric systems decrease women's representation in parliament.



## PARTISAN OR ETHNIC APPEALS?

Drawing on what we know about party-centric elections, candidates are more likely to be elected and to advance their political careers if they promote the party and emphasize their party affiliation. As a result, I argue that candidates have strong incentives to spend much of their time and resources making partisan appeals. Appeals to the party come in various forms; for example, candidates may emphasize the party platform, the quality of leadership, and their loyalty as a party member; they can prominently display the party's logo, color, and symbols in their campaign literature; they can dress in party clothing while they campaign; they can reiterate the successes of the party in their political speeches or newspaper interviews; and they can appeal to party leadership by reproducing the leader's image and statements in their campaign materials or by participating in party rallies alongside high-ranking party officials.

In contrast, under candidate-centric rules, candidates are more successful if they enhance their personal reputation among voters in the district. To do so, they need to appeal to salient identity groups at the district level. In many countries around the world, ethnic identity groups (e.g., indigenous, tribal, linguistic, religious) are particularly salient. These groups often have deep networks and a vibrant associational life. As a result, candidates have strong incentives to spend their time and resources appealing directly to these local ethnic groups rather than making partisan appeals. Voters want to know about the candidate—his or her ethnic identity, place of birth, local reputation, and responsiveness to the needs of their group and the region in general. To target these voters, candidates focus on their own personal characteristics—their ethnic identity, character, work experience, community service, and personal connections with

local groups and institutions. Grassroots campaigning, for example, involves regular visits to local ethnic leaders and associations, political speeches that emphasize the candidate's support of the group, and the use of ethnic symbols to invoke the group's psychological sense of group attachment.

While candidates use rhetoric to demonstrate their personal connections with ethnic groups, they can also use patronage to establish a reputation for being responsive. This helps build trust with the group. Evidence in the literature shows that candidate-centric elections offer strong incentives for pork-barrel politics in the West. A number of scholars have also argued that in many developing countries, pork-barrel spending often gets distributed down ethnic lines. As a result, pork-barrel politics can increase the salience and politicization of ethnic identities. Caselli and Coleman (2001) and Fearon (1999) argue that the politics of pork and patronage are well suited to ethnic politics and the organization of electoral competition along ethnic lines. Laitin and Van Der Veen (2012) use an agent-based model to support the theoretical connection between pork politics and the politicization of ethnicity. Simply put, they find that "if pork is up for grabs, ethnic identities become more politically salient" (Laitin and Van Der Veen 2012, 341). Overall, candidate-centric elections have higher levels of ethnicization because they tend to foster both ethnic rhetoric and patronage along ethnic lines. While ethnic rhetoric, signs, and symbols act on the psychological attachments of local ethnic groups, patronage acts on their material interests.

In sum, I expect that under party-centric rules, candidates are more likely to target political party supporters by making partisan appeals. Meanwhile, under candidate-

centric rules, candidates have a greater incentive to target ethnic groups at the local electoral district level by making local ethnic appeals (see figure 3.3).




Figure 3.3. Partisan and ethnic appeal choice

### Part III: To Bond or to Bridge?

Electoral rules can be used to explain not only whether candidates make partisan or ethnic appeals, but also the types of ethnic appeals that candidates make, specifically bonding or bridging appeals. I argue that under party-centric rules, the party's ideology is key to understanding whether candidates bond or bridge. In this context, candidates have incentives to make appeals that are in line with the party, so the party's ideology,

its ethnic or multi-ethnic orientation, and its stance on ethnic issues have a strong effect on candidate's appeals. I argue that candidates in parties with a multi-ethnic ideology can be expected to make bridging appeals, while candidates from parties with a more exclusive, ethnically oriented ideology will make bonding appeals with the favored ethnic group. Overall, under party-centric rules, the choice of ethnic bonding or bridging appeals is heavily influenced from above—in other words, by the ideology of the party.

Under candidate-centric rules, the ideology of the party is much less important. Candidates are less constrained by their political party and more focused on whether their appeals will resonate with a critical mass of voters within the electoral district. In deciding whether to make bonding or bridging appeals, candidates are particularly sensitive to the size of ethnic groups within the district and any other social constraints on the politicization of particular ethnic groups. On the whole, candidates will bond with one of their ethnic groups if it is large enough to support an electoral victory; otherwise, they will bridge. Under candidate-centric rules, the choice of ethnic bonding or bridging is heavily influenced from below—in other words, by the size of ethnic groups in the electoral district and any social constraints on ethnic appeals.

#### BONDING AND BRIDGING IN PARTY-CENTRIC SYSTEMS

A party's ethnic ideology can be one of two main types: national or ethnic. Parties with a national orientation (often referred to as catch-all parties) seek votes from across the country. They tend to be centrist and to promote middle-of-the-road, programmatic policies such as economic growth, health, education, and the development of infrastructure. In ethnically diverse countries, nationally oriented parties are inclusive

when it comes to ethnic groups, incorporating politicians from ethnic minorities into the party and campaigning on multi-ethnic platforms. In multi-ethnic countries that have civic forms of nationalism, such parties often promote nationalism or patriotism in order to reach out and foster support across a wide range of ethnic groups. Scholars generally have a positive view of national parties; evidence shows that they foster inter-ethnic peace and are the glue that holds ethnically diverse countries together (Filippov et al. 2004; Riker 1964; Stepan 2001).

I argue that under party-centric rules, candidates in national parties have strong incentives to draw on the party's national multi-ethnic ideology in their campaigns. As a result, they promote programmatic policies and make ethnic bridging appeals to foster support from multiple ethnic groups. In ethnically diverse societies, celebration of the country's ethnic diversity is often a cornerstone of national party ideology and is commonly used by candidates as a campaign appeal. In diverse countries like Indonesia, where nationalism has broad positive connotations, national parties and their candidates use nationalist appeals to bridge across multiple ethnic groups. By using nationalist symbols (e.g., the flag, a map of the country, national monuments) and nationalist rhetoric, and by emphasizing a national identity, national parties and candidates can expand their potential support base.<sup>13</sup>

In contrast, parties with an ethnic orientation primarily seek support from their ethnic group and are more ethnically exclusive. This narrows their potential support base but allows them to draw on a shared ethnic identity, which can potentially foster a more loyal following. Such parties act as representatives of the group in government

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<sup>13</sup> In a similar vein, Norris (2004) defined national parties as bridging parties.

and pursue policies that cater to the ethnic group's cultural, political, and economic interests. They promote an ethnic ideology and invariably nominate candidates with the same ethnic background. The symbols associated with the party (such as the party's color and logo) often have ethnic connotations.<sup>14</sup> In addition, ethnically oriented parties advocate for their ethnic group in campaigns, emphasize group-specific issues, and often use the group's language in their campaign messages. I argue that under party-centric rules, candidates in ethnic parties have strong incentives to draw on ethnic ideology and to make appeals to the favored ethnic group. These ethnic appeals have a bonding function, targeting members of the same ethnic group and playing on their sense of attachment to the group. Candidates incorporate ethnic appeals by reiterating the party's ethnic slogans, repeating the party's stance on ethnic issues, and replicating the party's ethnic symbols and use of ethnic language in their campaign materials.

The ethnocentricity of parties varies to some degree. Regionally based ethnic parties tend to be more ethnocentric, while ethnic parties who compete nationally tend to be less ethnocentric. Regionally based ethnic parties are particularly common in federal and decentralized systems. In these systems, power gained from the control of regional government can be significant. Regionally based ethnic parties tend to be supported by smaller ethnic groups, compete in more ethnically homogenous regions, craft a staunch ethnic image, and strongly favor ethnic appeals. Brancati (2006) reported that regionally based parties have a higher tendency to reinforce regional identities, mobilize ethnic groups, and produce legislation in favor of certain ethnic groups

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<sup>14</sup> Chandra (2011) highlights a range of indicators that can be used to classify a party as ethnic. They include: the party's name, campaign messages that explicitly and implicitly advocate for an ethnic group, ethnic voting patterns, ethnic representation within the party, and venues where the party seeks votes.

compared to national parties. In contrast, ethnic parties that compete nationally often represent a majority or a large ethnic minority. Because they may compete in regions where their ethnic group is a minority, their ethnic appeals are more variable across the country and, overall, tend to be more moderate. They might also incorporate some bridging appeals, such as nationalism. This helps them compete in regions where they are not the majority and offers more legitimacy as a nationally (as opposed to regionally) representative party.<sup>15</sup>

In sum, I argue that under party-centric rules, candidates' ethnic appeals are guided by the ideology of their political party. Candidates in national parties will make appeals that bridge across ethnic groups. Meanwhile, candidates in ethnic parties will make appeals that bond with the favored ethnic group. Regionally based ethnic parties will tend to be more forthright in their ethnic appeals, while ethnic parties that compete nationally will tend to be more moderate and inclined to incorporate a certain amount of bridging strategies in their campaigns.

#### BONDING AND BRIDGING IN CANDIDATE-CENTRIC SYSTEMS

Under candidate-centric rules, party leaders are less able to sanction and reward candidates. In addition, voters care more about the candidate's personal attributes and their responsiveness to voters' needs than the party's platform. As a result, candidates are less constrained by the ideology of the political party and have strong incentives to

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<sup>15</sup> Scholars disagree on the effect of ethnic parties on political stability and conflict. Some argue that ethnic parties lead to instability and conflict, while others argue that they stabilize elections. Brancati (2006) presented evidence that regionally-based ethnic parties contribute to conflict and instability. In contrast, Birnir (2007b; 2007a) found that ethnic parties help stabilize elections in emerging democracies. Finally, Chandra (2005b) argued that ethnic party competition does not have to descend into conflict (via ethnic outbidding) when numerous identity cleavages are institutionalized.

craft an image that will resonate with voters in the electoral district. As outlined above, candidates can enhance their personal reputation by appealing to local ethnic groups. However, they need a critical mass of support in order to win. Because of this, I argue that the size of ethnic groups in the district becomes the key to understanding when candidates bond with, or bridge across, ethnic groups.

Recent studies on ethnic politics have shown that the size of ethnic groups is a particularly important factor in understanding which ethnic groups become politicized (Chandra 2012; Horowitz 1985; Posner 2005; Wilkinson 2004). Findings indicate that candidates choose to politicize ethnicity and mobilize ethnic groups when the groups are large enough to serve as a viable political coalition. In addition, evidence suggests that the politicization of dominant ethnic groups can lead to increased levels of instability and ethnic conflict. Collier (2001, 150) found that countries with an ethnically dominant group (i.e., 45-90% of the country's population) are twice as likely to experience civil war. Hale (2004) showed that ethnofederal states are more prone to collapse if they contain a core ethnic region (i.e., a single ethnic federal region that is dominant in terms of its population size). These authors argue that in situations where there is ethnic dominance, the government and the ethnic majority cannot credibly commit to protecting ethnic minorities and may have incentives to exploit them.

Consistent with these findings, scholarly research has shown that candidates tend to avoid politicizing ethnic categories that are not politically viable, specifically when they are small or when there are cross-cutting cleavages.<sup>16</sup> Several authors have shown that relatively small ethnic groups do not become politicized (Dickson and Scheve 2006;

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<sup>16</sup> The positive aspects of cross-cutting cleavages have been long noted in the literature. See Simmel (1955), Coser (1956), Dahl (1982a; 1982b), Lipset (1959), and Lipset and Rokkan (1967).



Posner 2004b; Reilly 1997; 2000). Dunning and Harrison (2010) found that cross-cutting cleavages (e.g., when individuals are members of one religious group but different indigenous groups) reduced ethnic voting and the politicization of ethnicity. Countries with numerous small ethnic groups or cross-cutting ethnic cleavages tend to be more stable and experience less ethnic conflict. Scholars have found that high levels of ethnic fractionalization and cross-cutting cleavages have a moderating effect on inter-ethnic conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Collier 2001; Gubler and Selway 2012).<sup>17</sup> Meanwhile, Hale (Hale 2004) found no cases of ethnofederal collapse when the ethnic majority was dispersed across federal regions.

Changes in the size of ethnic groups may explain shifts in the politicization of ethnicity over time when candidates switch from politicizing religious groups to politicizing tribal groups (for example). Changes in electoral rules, the introduction of local elections, and the redrawing of district boundaries can cause shifts in political boundaries. Chandra (2004) and Posner (2005) have found that these shifts can change the size and viability of ethnic groups for electoral competition, resulting in a change in ethnic cleavages and the particular ethnic groups that become politicized.

In sum, there is compelling evidence in the literature that large, politically viable ethnic groups are particularly prone to ethnic politicization. This politicization, in turn, creates a more fertile ground for instability and conflict. In contrast, the level of ethnic politicization is lower among small or cross-cut ethnic groups, making instability and conflict less likely. Furthermore, ethnic politicization can change with shifts in political boundaries.

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<sup>17</sup> Bates (2000) also found evidence of a switch from protest to violent action in Africa when the size of the largest ethnic group reached 50% or more of the population.

Drawing on these findings, I explain the conditions under which candidates bond with their ethnic group or bridge across other ethnic groups in their electoral district, as illustrated in figure 3.4. Candidates in an electoral district may belong to a winning ethnic group or a losing ethnic group. By losing, I simply mean that the group is too small and their support is not enough to enable the candidate to win the election. In contrast, a winning ethnic group is large enough that its support can secure the candidate's victory. Winning ethnic groups constitute a politically viable support base. The size of winning ethnic groups (as a percentage of the population) primarily depends on district magnitude. In single-seat elections, the ethnic group should ideally constitute over 50% of the population.<sup>18</sup> In multi-seat elections, this percentage can be much lower, as candidates do not need a majority of the vote to secure a seat. Overall, as district magnitude increases, smaller ethnic groups become viable support bases.

When candidates belong to a losing ethnic group they have strong incentives to seek support from other ethnic groups. Because their ethnic group is too small to deliver a victory, candidates expand their potential support by making ethnic bridging appeals. In contrast, when a candidate belongs to a winning ethnic group, they have less need to rely on other ethnic groups for support. Instead they have incentives to appeal to their own ethnic group through ethnic bonding appeals.

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<sup>18</sup> This figure can be lower in first-past-the-post systems, where an absolute majority is not needed.




Figure 3.4. Ethnic bonding and ethnic bridging appeal choice

In some instances, candidates from a winning ethnic group will favor bridging over bonding. This occurs when social constraints restrict the politicization of their ethnic group. Scholars have recently begun to study the different kinds of restrictions that block the politicization of ethnicity.<sup>19</sup> These restrictions can be rooted in history, psychology, or social norms. For example, Laitin (1986) showed how colonial discourse restricted the politicization of religious identities among the Yoruba in Nigeria, while

<sup>19</sup> Chandra (2012) referred to these as restrictions on the operative repertoire of political identities. In this edited volume, scholars present various restrictions on the politicization of ethnic categories and various combinations and coalitions thereof.

Petersen (2012) argued that social stigmas and negative emotional content attached to the identity group can prevent ethnic identities from becoming politicized.

### Candidates with Multiple Ethnic Identities

The scheme presented in figure 3.4 assumes only one ethnic dimension. In reality, candidates belong to multiple ethnic categories (e.g., religious, linguistic, regional, tribal). This presents more options for candidates—they can choose to bond within, or bridge across, different ethnic dimensions. However, as candidates have a limited amount of time and resources, they will choose the appeal strategy that provides the highest probability of success.

When candidates belong to multiple ethnic categories, I argue that they are guided by a simple heuristic: bonding trumps bridging. When, for example, a candidate is from a winning religious group and a losing indigenous group, their energies will be directed toward bonding with their religious group. Less time is spent bridging across indigenous groups because bridging is a difficult and more demanding strategy that invariably takes more time, effort, resources, and skill. Bridging is also a risky strategy. Candidates can't rely on shared ethnic attachments, so the chances of desertion are greater. In addition, an appeal to one group may antagonize another group from whom the candidate is also seeking support.

To illustrate how bonding and bridging appeals vary depending on the size of ethnic groups, consider an example where candidates have two prominent ethnic identities—religion and indigeneity. The example is that of a Muslim Javanese candidate who is competing in a single-seat election where candidates need a majority of the vote

to win. In this context, ethnic groups that represent over 50% of the population are politically viable support bases. In addition, the example includes no restrictions on the ethnic categories that can be politicized in campaigns. Depending on the size of the Javanese and Muslim populations, the candidate can choose a bonding or bridging strategy for the religious and indigenous dimensions of ethnicity. Varying the group size provides four potential scenarios. These scenarios and the corresponding appeal strategies are presented in table 3.1.

**Table 3.1. Candidates’ ethnic group size and appeal strategies**

<b>Scenario*</b>	<b>Ethnic dimension- Ethnic category**</b>	<b>Ethnic group size (% of population)</b>	<b>Ethnic appeal</b>
<b>A. Religious and indigenous majority</b>	Religious-Muslim	Over 50%	Bond
	Indigenous-Javanese	Over 50%	Bond
<b>B. Religious majority and indigenous minority</b>	Religious-Muslim	Over 50%	Bond
	Indigenous-Javanese	Under 50%	Bridge
<b>C. Religious minority and indigenous majority</b>	Religious-Muslim	Under 50%	Bridge
	Indigenous-Javanese	Over 50%	Bond
<b>D. Religious and indigenous minority</b>	Religious-Muslim	Under 50%	Bridge
	Indigenous-Javanese	Under 50%	Bridge

*Note:* \*Hypothetical scenarios to illustrate four possible combinations of religious and indigenous group size in a district.

\*\*Hypothetical candidate identities for the purposes of illustrating the relationship between a candidate’s ethnic group size and his or her appeal strategy.

In the first scenario (table 3.1A), the candidate’s Muslim and Javanese ethnic groups are each a majority and provide viable support bases. The candidate has the option to bond with either group. This often happens when there is considerable

overlap between ethnic dimensions (e.g., when all Muslims are also Javanese). Whether a candidate makes Islamic and/or Javanese bonding appeals is dependent on factors outside the model and is rooted in other regional factors, strategic interactions among candidates, the political salience of the ethnic categories, and the candidate's personal networks, beliefs, and sense of attachment. Overall, the candidate will have strong tendencies to bond with one or both of their ethnic categories.

In the second scenario (table 3.1B), the candidate's Muslim group is a viable support base, but the Javanese group is not. The dominant strategy is to bond with the Muslim category and bridge across the indigenous category. Using the bonding-trumps-bridging rule, the candidate is more likely to devote most of their time and resources to bonding with the Muslim category. In the third scenario (table 3.1C), the size of the Muslim and Javanese groups are reversed. In this case, candidates will tend to bond with the Javanese category. In the final scenario (table 3.1D), neither the Muslim or Javanese category is a viable support base. The candidate has incentives to avoid bonding appeals altogether and favor bridging strategies across indigenous and religious categories. These four scenarios are summarized using a two-by-two table as shown in table 3.2, which also specifies the dominant and secondary (if applicable) appeal strategies for each scenario.

**Table 3.2. Viability of groups and candidate appeal strategies**

	<b>Religion viable</b>	<b>Religion not viable</b>
<b>Indigeneity viable</b>	Dominant: Religious bonding and indigenous bonding	Dominant: Indigenous bonding Secondary: Religious bridging
<b>Indigeneity not viable</b>	Dominant: Religious bonding Secondary: Indigenous bridging	Dominant: Religious bridging and indigenous bridging

*Note:* Dominant and secondary pertain to the choice of ethnic appeal strategies.

The above example is a relatively simple illustration of the concept. However, it demonstrates how group size can be used to predict not only whether candidates will make ethnic bonding or bridging appeals, but also with which particular ethnic groups they will bond with or bridge across. The scheme can be modified to reflect different electoral and ethnic group parameters such as adding important social constraints on particular ethnic groups, changes in the estimated percentage of the population that constitutes a winning group, and additional ethnic dimensions to which candidates belong. Under candidate-centric rules, whether candidates use bonding or bridging appeals can be summarized in three statements.

1. When a candidate belongs to a losing ethnic group, they will favor bridging appeals.
2. When a candidate belongs to a winning ethnic group, and when there are no social constraints on appealing to that group, they will favor bonding appeals.
3. When candidates have options to bond within, and bridge across, multiple ethnic dimensions, they will use the bonding-trumps-bridging rule and bond with the winning ethnic group.

## Conclusions

The arguments presented in this chapter explain the conditions under which candidates will appeal to political party supporters, their own ethnic groups, or other ethnic groups. Beyond the variation in particular kinds of appeals, electoral rules have a broad impact on how candidates campaign; they affect the rhetoric that candidates use, the choice of campaign events, and the activities that candidates engage in during election season. Under party-centric rules, the party label provides a great deal of information to voters. This lessens the need for candidates to explain to voters who they are, who they represent, and what they stand for. In addition, party-centric candidates have a ready-made campaign template to work from—they can draw on the party's slogans, the achievements of the party, the party's emphasis on particular issues, party leadership, and the party's policy platform. Furthermore, such candidates have an institutionalized system of campaign support on which to rely. They can attend rallies organized by the party and work with the party's cadre in mobilizing support in the media and through door-to-door campaigns.

In contrast, campaigning in candidate-centric elections is, in many ways, more demanding. Candidates need to impart more information to voters with regard to who they are, who they represent, and the nature of their platform. In addition, their campaigns need to be tailored to the electoral district. As a result, their appeals, campaign events, and activities tend to be more varied and more creative. Candidates often craft their own slogans and campaign materials, emphasizing issues and policies that resonate with constituents. They emphasize their personal characteristics (including their ethnic identity) and use nonverbal cues such as ethnic language,



imagery, symbols, and clothing to impart more information to voters. To explain what they stand for, and to establish and maintain good personal relationships with local leaders, candidates must engage in more intensive grassroots campaigning. In terms of campaign events, they tend to favor smaller, more intimate events with particular ethnic groups and ethnic group leaders to help mobilize co-ethnic and cross-ethnic support.<sup>20</sup> Invariably, because they are in competition with fellow party candidates, they organize and participate in solo campaign events. Finally, candidates make use of the regional press to publicize their campaign events and endorsements from ethnic group leaders. In conclusion, candidate campaign strategies and rhetoric vary widely depending on whether elections are party-centric or candidate-centric.

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<sup>20</sup> Particularly in new and consolidating democracies, the role of intermediaries can be crucial. For example, see Kasara (2007) on African elections. In addition, Koter (2013) shows how African candidates create cross-ethnic electorates by drawing on intermediaries from other ethnic groups.

SECTION II

# Indonesian Elections and Campaigns

# Indonesian Elections 1955-2011

This chapter provides a brief overview of elections in Indonesia from the first election in 1955 until the 2009 legislative elections. It describes the electoral rules for each election and the degree to which each election was party-centric or candidate-centric. Particular attention is paid to changes in the structure of the ballot and the allocation of seats. The structure of the ballot is important because it determines whether voters can vote for a party, a candidate, or both. Meanwhile, the way in which seats are allocated—from a fixed party list or from personal votes—affects which candidates get allocated seats. These two factors have an important impact on the degree to which an election is party-centric or candidate-centric.

In part 1, I provide background information on the legislative elections and how the electoral rules and regulations have changed over time. I begin with Indonesia's first election in 1955, which, according to the rules, can be defined as party-centric with multiple parties. Next, I discuss the six elections held during the authoritarian era from 1971-1997. During this period I explain the elaborate political system of electoral rules, regulations, and campaign restrictions that were put in place to ensure Suharto's electoral vehicle, the Golkar political party, would win. The political system empowered

Golkar and put insurmountable restrictions on the opposition parties. This system is party-centric with a hegemonic ruling party. In the final section of part 1, I discuss the democratic electoral systems after the fall of Suharto. Elections were held in 1999, 2004, and 2009. These elections allowed for genuine multiparty competition. However, while the 1999 and 2004 elections operated under party-centric rules, a change in the rules made the elections more candidate-centric in 2009. I define the 1999 and 2004 elections as party-centric with multiple parties, and I define the 2009 election as semi-candidate-centric with multiple parties.

In part 2, I discuss the introduction of direct regional head elections in 2005 and explain the reason why these elections can be defined more purely as candidate-centric with multiple parties. In part 3, I clarify how I will compare these elections to test this dissertation's main theoretical argument. In the conclusion, I argue that analysis of election campaigns in Indonesia's contemporary candidate-centric system requires an understanding of how individual candidates, rather than parties, appeal to voters.

## Part I: National Legislative Elections

Indonesia was a Dutch colony known as the Dutch East Indies before the outbreak of World War II. In the two decades before the war, the colonial regime established a national legislature called the Volksraad, or 'People's Council.' It was not, however, a democratic institution. It included many appointees, substantial representation by Dutch officials and planters, and had no real power. A version of the Volksraad was kept in place during the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, but it had even less power (Anderson 1996, 26-27). With the surrender of the Japanese in August 1945, Indonesian

nationalists declared independence and a war with the returning Dutch ensued. During the war, President Sukarno and Vice President Hatta appointed a revolutionary parliament with representatives from all the major Indonesian political groups (Anderson 1996, 28). The Indonesian army and various militias and youth groups finally prevailed in what had turned into a guerrilla war by 1948. A settlement with the Dutch was signed in 1949 and preparations for Indonesia's first election began.<sup>1</sup>

## INDONESIA'S FIRST DEMOCRATIC ELECTION

### 1955: Party-Centric with Multiple Parties

There was little debate surrounding the choice of proportional representation for the 1955 election. It was seen as the appropriate choice given the diversity of Indonesia (i.e., multiple parties and regional groups) and because of the highly decentralized way in which the war of independence was fought. In addition, Indonesian nationalists had more exposure to proportional representation from their experiences in the Netherlands (King 2003, 16). After a number of delays, elections to replace the provisional national legislature were set for September 29, 1955. On the ballot, voters were presented with a list of parties and their logos, plus the names of any candidates who had nominated themselves. In addition, voters could nominate and vote for a candidate by writing in their name (King 2003, 29). Effectively, it was a closed list system because when voters chose a party (which the vast majority did) they could not express a preference for individual candidates. To accommodate both the size and diversity of Indonesia, there were 15 districts. Each district had their own ballot, and parties drew

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<sup>1</sup> See Kahin (2003) for what is widely regarded as the classic work on the Indonesian revolution.

up a fixed list of candidates for each district (King 2003, 16). Dozens of parties with nationalist, Islamic, and communist ideologies competed in the election<sup>2</sup> and campaigned intensely between 1954 and 1955.

During the campaign, political parties began to extend their reach into the villages across Indonesia. They promoted their leaders and ideologies and posted party logos in large numbers across Indonesian villages, cities, and towns. Virtually every public event was an opportunity for campaigning. Campaigners promoted their parties at national and Islamic holiday celebrations, protest rallies, scout parades, and meetings of unions, peasant, and students (Feith 1962, 353). As Feith (1962, 361) explained, parties “stimulated the creation of new collective entities, new units of social integration consisting of parties and their associated youth and women’s organizations, and religious, cultural, and educational bodies, all based on the ideology of the particular party.” At the time, Indonesian social life was largely centered on organizations and, in the run up to the election, all were tied to one party or another (Feith 1962, 362).

Overall, the 1955 election was very party-centric, both in terms of the electoral rules and how the campaigns unfolded. In Liddle’s research on the role of ethnicity and political parties in the 1955 election he found that candidates from the nationalist multiethnic parties (PNI and PKI) drew on the party platforms to make broad appeals to nationalism and class in order to reach out across ethnic groups. Meanwhile, the Islamic (and Christian) party candidates did not cast as wide a net. They drew on their party’s religious ideology and more narrowly appealed to their religious communities by mobilizing their religious networks (Liddle 1970, 67-97).

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<sup>2</sup> By some estimates, there were at least 172 parties or individuals (King 2003, 16).

In the end, 27 parties and one individual won seats in the 257-seat national legislature (the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat).<sup>3</sup> There were four main winners: two Islamic parties (Masyumi and the Nahdatul Ulama), the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI) and the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI). Scholars have pointed out that the results reflected the deep divides in Indonesian society at that time based on religion, class, and region.<sup>4</sup> Broadly speaking, the main divide in Indonesia was between what Clifford Geertz labeled the *abangan* and the *santri*. The *abangan* were more secular, had nationalist or communist orientations, and many were influenced by their Javanese indigeneity. They primarily supported the nationalist and communist parties. The *santri* were more devoutly Islamic, either modernist or traditional. The modernist Muslims primarily supported Masyumi, while the traditionalists supported Nahdatul Ulama.

#### AUTHORITARIANISM AND THE NEW ORDER

The 1955 electoral results did not produce a clear winner, and divisive ideological inter-party competition continued. Following Martial Law in 1957 and regional rebellions in 1958, President Sukarno and the army leaders instituted a semi-authoritarian system they called Guided Democracy. However, political instability persisted, ultimately culminating in a coup, a counter-coup by Major General Suharto,

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<sup>3</sup> See King (2003, 16). In addition to the 1955 legislative election, an election for the Indonesian Constituent Assembly to draw up a permanent constitution was held on December 15, 1955. Elections for provincial legislatures were held in 1957.

<sup>4</sup> In the specific case of Simalungun, North Sumatra, Liddle (1970) found that “three factors...[stood] out as the most critical determinants of party choice: ethnicity, religious affiliation, and the impact of the plantation environment. A fourth factor, Indonesian nationalism, seems also to have played an independent role of some importance” (Liddle 1970, 121).

the extermination of the PKI, and the massacre of hundreds of thousands of suspected communists in 1965 and 1966. Sukarno was forced to transfer power and Suharto was appointed president in 1967.

#### Elections (1971-1997): Party-Centric with a Hegemonic Party

Suharto's authoritarian government ruled Indonesia from 1966 to 1998 and was called the New Order. During this time, legislative elections for the national legislature were held in 1971, 1977, and every 5 years until 1997. The formal electoral rules were party-centric, using proportional representation and closed lists. Indonesia was divided into 27 multimember districts (which were based on the provinces)<sup>5</sup> and parties drew up fixed lists of candidates for each district.<sup>6</sup> Voters chose one party name on the ballot and seats were allocated to parties through proportional representation and assigned to candidates beginning at the top of the list. Elections for the provincial legislatures (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah) and district-level legislatures (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Kabupaten/Kota) were also held concurrent with the national legislative election and using the same rules.<sup>7</sup> Under normal democratic circumstances, proportional representation with closed lists would likely foster multiple parties representing a diverse range of group interests and give party leaders a high degree of control over candidates. However, in Indonesia, regulations on political parties and

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<sup>5</sup> East Timor became the 27th province when it was annexed in 1976.

<sup>6</sup> Candidates did not have to reside in the district.

<sup>7</sup> For more on the electoral rules and brief summaries of voting patterns in 1955 and during the New Order elections see King (2003, 27-38). For a detailed report on the 1992 election, see King (1994). See the National Democratic Institute (1997) appendix for a summary of the rules for the 1997 election.



restrictions on campaigning put severe constraints on the opposition parties while empowering the ruling party, Golkar.

Golkar was not a political party in the traditional sense.<sup>8</sup> It was founded in 1964 by the military as an umbrella organization for various anticommunist groups. The party then became the government's electoral vehicle for the 1971 election (Eklöf 1997, 1183). As Liddle (1996a, 44-45) writes, "Golkar is not a political party at all, in the sense of an organization in society that competes electorally with similar organizations for control of the government. It is rather the electoral face of the civilian bureaucracy and the armed forces, mobilized every five years to get out the vote for the ruling group led by Suharto."

To elicit support during elections, Golkar used a combination of carrots and sticks. Unlike the opposition parties, Golkar could offer state resources and patronage in exchange for votes. A common tactic was to promise to build a mosque or a road in a village if the village delivered 90% of the vote to Golkar.<sup>9</sup> More broadly, its legitimacy was built on its ability to improve the economy. As Liddle (1996a, 34-35) observed, "[The New Order's] primary or first-line claim is that it is a developmental regime, dedicated to the achievement of a modern industrial economy, including a high standard of living for all Indonesians." Liddle goes on to explain that while few believed the regime was democratic, Golkar was successful in convincing many Indonesians that it was responsible for economic development and stability.

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<sup>8</sup> Its full name, *Golongan Karya*, literally means 'functional groups' and it is defined as a social-political group (Antlöv 2004a, 7).

<sup>9</sup> Antlov (2004b, 114) gives an example of a Cilembur hamlet in Sariendah, West Java. They were promised a new mosque if Golkar obtained more than 90% of the votes in the hamlet.

Golkar could also mobilize state officials and use the state's powers of coercion. Most important, it could tap into the state's administrative structure, which stretched from Jakarta right down to the village and neighborhood level. This provided Golkar with a permanent presence at the local level that could influence voters at any time. All civil servants and local officials were required to be members of Golkar, to vote for Golkar, and to mobilize support during elections. These officials had power over ordinary Indonesians in that they issued permits and clearances that were important for everyday life (Schiller 1999, 4). In addition, Golkar could draw on its connections with the army and on loyal youth groups, such as Pemuda Pancasila, to intimidate reluctant voters.<sup>10</sup> Anyone who questioned the legitimacy of the election process could be detained and threatened with a trial (Schiller 1999, 4). Given that many did not believe that votes were secret, a vote against Golkar entailed high risks. In sum, Golkar recruited support through co-opting, patronage, mass mobilization, intimidation, and messages of economic development and political stability.

The political system at the time was designed to severely constrain the development of opposition parties. In 1973, all opposition parties were forced to combine into two parties. The Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI) was formed out of five nationalist and Christian parties, and the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) was a fusion of four Islamic parties (Liddle 1996a, 45). This merger forced the two new opposition parties to host some very diverse and often antagonistic groups. But the government did not envision that these parties would act as a traditional opposition. Their official role was to seek

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<sup>10</sup> Antlov (2004b, 115) recounts how Pemuda Pancasila members accompanied the Golkar cadre during visits to hesitant households.

solutions to the country's development problems and support a broad national consensus on the government's policies (Eklöf 1997, 1182).

To prevent the opposition parties from challenging Golkar in elections, the government intervened in internal party affairs, restricted their growth at the local level, and made them dependent on the benevolence of the government. All opposition leaders needed to be approved, and all candidates on their party lists had to be screened for their formal qualifications and ideological correctness.<sup>11</sup> Unlike Golkar, which had a permanent presence in villages (via the government bureaucracy), the opposition parties were not allowed to maintain organizations below the district level (i.e., at the subdistrict and village levels). Lacking a support base, the parties were dependent on direct grants from the government to survive (Liddle 1996a, 45).

Restrictions on election campaigns by opposition parties increased over the years. The period for campaigning was reduced (from 60 days in 1971 to 25 days in 1997), and each party could campaign only every third day (King 2003, 26). Compared to Golkar, the opposition parties' campaign efforts were severely disadvantaged due to shallow party infrastructure, limited resources, and a lack of media access.<sup>12</sup> In addition, there were regulations against criticizing the government and president during election campaigns. This effectively meant they were not allowed to criticize Golkar. Finally, the process of counting and tallying votes was primarily done in private by government officials with little or no oversight from the opposition or independent monitors. In each of the six elections between 1971 and 1997, Golkar won between 62.1% and 74.5% of

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<sup>11</sup> See Eklof (Eklöf 1997, 1183) and King (King 2003, 26). Candidates could not be members of the long-banned Indonesian Communist Party nor directly or indirectly involved in the 1965 coup attempt (National Democratic Institute 1997, 15).

<sup>12</sup> The state or the president's children controlled all television stations (Schiller 1999, 4).

the vote. Given the elaborate political system the government had constructed, the only surprise was that they didn't win by an even wider margin. Ultimately, the number of seats won by the two opposition parties had no effect on the election of the executive and little impact on government policy (King 2003, 33).

Overall, the New Order elections operated under highly party-centric rules that ensured a win for the hegemonic party, Golkar. For Golkar candidates, while it didn't hurt to be liked by voters, what really mattered was being on good terms with Golkar party leaders. Voters did not pick the candidates, the party leaders did, and these leaders completely controlled the allocation of party seats. Party lists were often changed after the fact, particularly in the case of Golkar. Many candidates on the initial lists were there to reflect the image of the party, but were not the ones who actually got the seats.<sup>13</sup>

## DEMOCRACY RETURNS

In the second half of 1997, the Asian Financial Crisis hit Indonesia. With capital flight, a plummeting rupiah, and panic setting in, vocal criticism of Suharto and the government increased. Student demonstrations, counter violence by the security forces, and extensive rioting in Jakarta and other cities around Indonesia followed. Having lost the support of the military, Suharto resigned on May 21st and was replaced by his vice president, B.J. Habibie. Accounts of the fall of Suharto regime claim it was the result of a

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<sup>13</sup> See Gaffar (1992, 70), as cited in King (2003, 29).

corrupt system that collapsed due to internal pressures and external pressures from a democracy movement led by students and professionals.<sup>14</sup>

### The 1999 Election: Party-Centric with Multiple Parties

In preparation for new democratic elections, electoral reforms were rushed through.<sup>15</sup> The new system created a multiparty democracy and used proportional representation and closed lists. Under the new rules, political parties were free to form around any principle or aspiration so long as it did not conflict with the national ideology, Pancasila. Pancasila is the state's philosophical foundation and it is based on five principles: religiosity, internationalism, nationalism, representative democracy, social justice.<sup>16</sup> Parties could extend their organization down to the village level and were protected against government interference (King 2003, 50-55). In addition, Golkar's monopoly on support by the civil service was ended. Civil servants were no longer allowed to join political parties (including Golkar), but they could vote.<sup>17</sup> The Law on General Elections did, however, require that parties establish governing boards in half of the provinces and in half of the districts within those provinces.<sup>18</sup> The primary

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<sup>14</sup> For two prominent accounts, see Robinson and Hadiz (2004) and Aspinall (2005).

<sup>15</sup> For details on the debates over the 1999 electoral reforms and the rules of the new system, see King (2003, 47-74) and Horowitz (2013). The Ministry of Home Affairs prepared the original drafts of the political laws that were debated by the DPR committees. A major source of input came from a team of professionals, popularly known as the Team of Seven.

<sup>16</sup> The national ideology of Pancasila (five principles) was first presented by Sukarno in a speech in June 1945. These principles were: belief in the one and only God, just and civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy guided by the inner wisdom of deliberations of representatives, and social justice for all Indonesian people. Courses on Pancasila were compulsory for students and public servants.

<sup>17</sup> See King (2003, 53) and Antlov (2004a, 10). In addition, military representation in the national and regional legislatures was cut in half. Legislatures were given additional standing commissions and had the power to revise and draft legislation (King 2003, 57-58).

<sup>18</sup> Law No. 3/1999 on General Elections, article 39 [1]

goal of this requirement was to prevent ethnoregional parties from forming (Aspinall 2011, 296; Horowitz 2013, 68-70).

Consistent with the previous election, elections for the national legislature used proportional representation with seats allocated to each party in proportion to the party's overall votes in each province. Fixed candidate lists were drawn up for each district (below the provincial level). Voters could only vote for a party, not a candidate. A new rule stipulated that each party's seats were to be filled by candidates assigned to the districts where that party fared best (National Democratic Institute 1999). Regional legislatures were also elected using the same system. The election was administered by a semi-independent election commission and supervised by domestic and international independent election monitors (Antlöv 2004a, 10; King 2003, 53).

While the new political system allowed for multiple parties and genuine democratic competition, it was still highly party-centric. As in the old system, voters voted for parties, and party leaders had considerable discretion in selecting the candidates that would fill the seats. Parties largely ignored the new district element of seat allocations and gave the seats to their favored candidates. Of the 462 national legislature seats, 97 were given to candidates from districts other than the districts to which they were originally assigned (King 2003, 91).

#### The 2004 Election: Party-Centric with Multiple Parties

The next set of legislative elections was held in 2004. Changes in the electoral rules, including a reduction in the maximum number of seats per district, an increase in the number of electoral districts, and an increase in the number of branches parties

were required to have, benefited large parties.<sup>19</sup> Voters could vote for a candidate; however, in order to win a seat, candidates needed enough personal votes to fill 100% of the seat quota.<sup>20</sup> Because this number was so high, the vast majority of candidates won seats based on their position on the party list. Effectively, the election remained a proportional representation, closed list, party-centric system.

### The 2009 Election: Semi-Candidate-Centric with Multiple Parties

In the 2009 elections, changes in the electoral rules made it even more difficult for small parties to survive.<sup>21</sup> More importantly, the introduction of a full open list system made these elections more candidate-centric. Following a Constitutional Court decision in December 2008, voters could vote for a party or a candidate.<sup>22</sup> Parties that won seats in a district had to assign them to the candidate on the list that won the most personal votes. This change undermined the ability of party leaders to control candidates, introduced competition between candidates in the same party, and provided candidates with incentives to have more control over their personal campaigns. As Aspinall (2010, 108) explained, “This decision radically altered the nature of campaigning, with

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<sup>19</sup> Parties were required to have branches in two-thirds of the provinces and in two-thirds of the districts in those provinces. For more detail on the regulations governing new party entries, see Mietzner (2013, Kindle Location 1488-1530). Also, the number of seats per district was reduced to a maximum of 12 in 2004. As a result, the number of electoral districts was increased.

<sup>20</sup> The number of votes needed was calculated by taking the total valid votes gained by all political parties in one district and dividing it by the number of seats available in the district.

<sup>21</sup> These changes included an increase in the number of electoral districts and a legislative threshold of 2.5%.

<sup>22</sup> See, Sherlock (2009) for an explanation of the changes in the electoral rules for 2009, particularly the reasoning and implications of moving from a closed list to an open list.

legislative candidates now pouring their resources and efforts into promoting their own individual candidacies, rather than those of their parties.”

The candidate-centric nature of these elections should not be overstated though. Candidates still had to belong to a party in order to compete in the legislative elections, and they needed their party to perform well in the district. Personalistic parties, such as the Democrat Party (Partai Demokrat, PD) and its charismatic leader and sitting Indonesian president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, could mobilize sizable support on election day. In addition, parties with more ideological and historical roots, such as the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDIP) could also rely on the support of loyal followers. The ability of these parties to get party votes greatly increased a candidate’s chance of winning a seat. In addition, the Constitutional Court decision on full open lists was announced only six months before the election, which offered very little time for candidates to develop and implement a strategy to boost their personal votes.

Drawing on Carey and Shugart’s ordinal ranking of electoral systems, Indonesia’s elections before 2009 rank as highly party-centric.<sup>23</sup> In contrast, the open list proportional representation system of 2009 lies between party-centric and candidate-centric on the spectrum. As a result, I use the term semi-candidate-centric to describe the 2009 electoral system.<sup>24</sup> This contrasts with the highly candidate-centric rules for district head elections, which will be discussed next.

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<sup>23</sup> See Carey and Shugart (1995, 425). Specifically they term it as “An ordinal scoring system of electoral systems according to the incentive to cultivate a personal reputation.”

<sup>24</sup> The term semi-party-centric could also have been used for these elections, however since scholars often refer to proportional representation open-list systems as candidate-centric, I felt semi-candidate-centric was more appropriate.



## Part II: Decentralization and Regional Head Elections

### POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION

After the transition to democracy, Indonesia began to implement one of the most extensive financial and political decentralization programs in the world. This program devolved a significant amount of fiscal and political power to the subprovincial level.<sup>25</sup> A key component was the introduction of direct elections for regional heads (Kepala Daerah) at the provincial and subprovincial levels in 2005. These elections are commonly referred to as pilkada<sup>26</sup> and are held on a rolling basis every 5 years. Governors (Gubernur) are elected into office at the provincial level. At the subprovincial level, regents and mayors (bupati and walikota,) are elected in regencies and municipalities (kabupaten and kota).

Before 2005, district heads were appointed by the district legislature; however, it was widely known that legislative members and their political parties were bribed for these appointments. The introduction of directly elected district heads was part of a broader move towards economic and political decentralization within Indonesia. The aim was to deepen democracy, reduce corruption, bring government closer to the people, and make district heads more responsive to constituents.

During the first round of elections, a number of scholars feared that religious and indigenous ethnic competition might intensify at the local level and lead to violent conflict (Davidson 2005). While some of the most dire predictions did not transpire, low-level conflict has become quite common during regional head elections. The Habibie

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<sup>25</sup> As of this writing, there are approximately 500 subprovincial regencies and municipalities in Indonesia.

<sup>26</sup> The term pilkada is derived from pemilihan kepala daerah langsung (direct elections for regional heads).

institute has reported 585 cases of conflict since 2005 in the nine provinces they monitor. Most of these cases involve property damage, destructive demonstrations, and clashes between supporters, but they are serious enough that Home Minister Gamawan Fauzi stated that he would recommend a return to the indirect system of election if the violence continued (Jakarta Post 2013 9/2).

To date, most of the published scholarly work on regional head elections has offered insights from individual case studies. These studies indicate a prevalence of identity appeals, vote buying, and intensive grassroots campaigning during election time. Scholars have also noted the emergence of local indigenous and religious leaders and the influence (or lack thereof) of political parties.<sup>27</sup>

#### District Head Elections Since 2005: Candidate-Centric with Multiple Parties

While the electoral rules for the election of provincial and sub-provincial regional heads are the same, the data for this dissertation comes from the sub-provincial regency and municipal elections (for regents and mayors, respectively). They will be referred to herein as district head elections. District head elections are single-seat elections that employ a two-round system, where candidates run for election in pairs: a head and a deputy. In order to be elected in the first round, a candidate must win a plurality of the vote that is over 30% of the total votes. If no candidate is elected in the first round, the top two candidates compete in a runoff election. The design of the district head electoral rules was part of the effort to bring government closer to the

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<sup>27</sup> An edited volume on decentralization by Erb et al. (2005), and another on the first round of district head elections by Erb and Sulistiyanto (2009), offers many insights. The online journal *Inside Indonesia* has also run some thoughtful pieces on these elections.

people. In contrast to the national legislative elections, district head elections can be viewed as highly candidate-centric.

The means by which candidates are nominated, financed, and elected all contribute to the highly candidate-centric nature of district head elections. First, the power of parties to nominate and support candidates is weak. Candidates can run as independents or be supported by one or more parties.<sup>28</sup> Obviously, independent candidates must campaign on their personal qualities, but most candidates pay parties for their support because the nomination threshold is relatively high (Mietzner 2013, Kindle Locations 3747-3748). When candidates are supported by a coalition of parties (which most are) it is unclear to voters what the parties stand for.<sup>29</sup> Party ideologies become diluted and less relevant (Mietzner 2010). In addition, Indonesia has a fragmented party system with many small political parties. In most cases, the larger parties or coalitions struggle to mobilize the majority of the vote in a district or province. Thus, candidates have incentives to distance themselves from their supporting party, as exclusively promoting affiliation with a small or relatively unpopular party can cost more votes than it gains.

Most of the money to finance campaigns comes from the candidates' personal funds or their personal backers, not their political party.<sup>30</sup> In mobilizing support,

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<sup>28</sup> Candidates can run for election if they are nominated by a political party or coalition of parties that have at least 15% of the seats (or attained 15% of the vote) in the previous legislative election at the respective level of government (Law on Regional Government 32/2004 Art. 59). Candidates can also register as independents after receiving signatures from 1% of the total number of registered voters.

<sup>29</sup> Presidential elections use the same rules and often result in candidates being backed by a mix of parties with different ideological commitments.

<sup>30</sup> See Ufen (2011). Mietzner (2011) discussed the lack of financial support for political parties from the state and the high level of unreported donations by lobbyists and entrepreneurs. Rinakit (2005, 2) estimated that the average cost of a provincial governor's election campaign is \$10 million, while a district head's election campaign costs between \$180,000 and \$1.6 million.

candidates actively draw on their local personal networks and name recognition, rather than relying on their political party. The party's ability to finance campaigns, mobilize support, and generate excitement during general and presidential elections is undermined because district head elections are held on a rolling basis and are not concurrent with legislative or presidential elections. The importance of personal finance, name recognition, and personal networks in these elections has resulted in particular types of candidates entering these races. For example, scholars have noted that many prominent bureaucrats and local business leaders compete in district head elections (Buehler 2010; Buehler and Tan 2007; Mietzner 2006; Ufen 2008). In a survey of 90 regional head elections,<sup>31</sup> Rinakit (2005) found that bureaucrats and businessmen were frequent winners. These candidates fund their campaigns by drawing on their personal wealth or strong business connections. Local ethnic leaders have also become more prominent in these elections. They keep campaign costs down by drawing on their local connections and moral authority. In addition, celebrity candidates have become increasingly common because they can draw on their name recognition and celebrity status (Buehler 2013). Importantly, bureaucrats, local business leaders, ethnic leaders, and celebrities rarely come from the party cadre system.<sup>32</sup> They have weak party affiliations and increasingly rely on the expertise of independent campaign consultants to design their campaigns (Qodari 2010; Ufen 2011). On the whole, district head candidates have a lot of independence and control in directing their campaign, while political parties largely sit on the sidelines.

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<sup>31</sup> Of these, 86 were district head elections and four were provincial governor elections.

<sup>32</sup> By law, bureaucrats are not allowed to be party members.

Finally, constituents can only vote for candidates. Voters are presented with a short list of candidates and choose a candidate name, not a party name. Candidates receive all the votes so, unlike legislative elections, candidates are not dependent on votes for other party members. For candidates, this raises the importance of name recognition above party affiliation. Overall, candidates in district head elections operate under highly candidate-centric rules.

### Part III: Comparing Elections

Drawing on the discussion above, table 4.1 summarizes the ballot structure and seat allocations for all legislative and regional head elections. Legislative elections from 1955 are defined as party-centric, the 2009 legislative elections as semi-candidate-centric, and the regional head elections as candidate-centric.

The changes in the electoral system in Indonesia provide the opportunity to test arguments concerning the impact of candidate-centric rules on campaigning and, specifically, on ethnic appeals. Systematically gathering and analyzing large quantities of data on campaign appeals is time consuming. Accordingly, this dissertation limits itself to the legislative elections of 1997, 1999, and 2009 and a number of district head elections held between 2010 and 2011. The advantage of looking at these elections is that their rules cover a range of positions on the party-centric/candidate-centric continuum. In addition, they were conducted over a relatively short period of time, which helps control for broader changes relating to culture and modernization. This information will provide insight into the trajectory of election campaigning in contemporary Indonesia.

**Table 4.1. Electoral rules for Indonesian elections (1955-2011)**

<b>Election</b>	<b>Ballot structure and seat allocations</b>	<b>Definition of system</b>
1955 Legislative	<b>Type:</b> PR closed and open list <b>Ballots:</b> Voters vote for: a. a party, b. a self-nominated candidate, or c. a candidate they add to the ballot. <b>Seats:</b> Party seats are allocated to candidates in the order of the fixed list. Nominated candidates need a full seat quota.	<b>Party-centric</b> with multiple parties
1971-1997 Legislative	<b>Type:</b> PR closed list <b>Ballots:</b> Voters can only vote for a party. <b>Seats:</b> Party seats are allocated to candidates in the order of the fixed list.	<b>Party-centric</b> with a hegemonic party
1999 Legislative	<b>Type:</b> PR closed list <b>Ballots:</b> Voters can only vote for a party. <b>Seats:</b> Party seats are allocated to candidates in the order of the fixed list.	<b>Party-centric</b> with multiple parties
2004 Legislative	<b>Type:</b> PR semi-open list <b>Ballots:</b> Voters vote for: a. a party, or b. a candidate and the candidate's party.* <b>Seats:</b> A candidate needs 100% of the seat quota to win a seat, otherwise all seats are allocated to candidates in the order of the fixed list.	<b>Party-centric</b> with multiple parties
2009 Legislative	<b>Type:</b> PR fully open list <b>Ballots:</b> Voters vote for: a. a party, or b. a candidate. <b>Seats:</b> Party seats are allocated to candidates with the most personal votes.	<b>Semi-candidate-centric</b> with multiple parties
From 2005 Regional head	<b>Type:</b> Two round system <b>Ballots:</b> Voters vote for a candidate. <b>Seats:</b> A candidate wins the seat in round 1 with a plurality, and over 30% of the total vote. If there is no winner, the top two candidates compete in run off.	<b>Candidate-centric</b> with multiple parties

*Note:* PR = proportional representation.

\*Voters also needed to vote for the same party as the candidate so as not to invalidate their vote.

Figure 4.1 shows the positions of the elections examined in this dissertation on the party-centric/candidate-centric continuum. This chart is mainly for illustrative purposes as there is no precise method for positioning rules on the continuum. The 1997 election is the most party-centric primarily due to constrained party competition and the high degree of centralized control by Golkar. While the electoral rules in 1999 were practically the same, the system involved a multiple-party democracy and candidates and parties had more freedom in how they campaigned. As a result, I define them as slightly less party-centric. Other countries that have a similar electoral system using closed lists include Italy, South Africa, Spain, and Argentina. Indonesia made a major leap in 2009 with the introduction of open lists and the shift to a semi-candidate-centric system. Brazil, Peru, Switzerland, and Iraq have similar electoral systems with proportional representation and open lists. Finally, the highly candidate-centric regional head elections are positioned near the candidate-centric end of the continuum.




Figure 4.1. Indonesian elections on the party-centric/candidate-centric continuum

To test the main theoretical argument of this dissertation, various tests will be performed to compare campaign appeals across these elections and across electoral districts that vary in their levels of ethnic diversity. First, I will draw on campaign appeals made in newspaper election reports in 1997, 1999, and 2009 (see chapter 7). If the

argument is correct, I expect to find more partisan appeals in the party-centric elections of 1997 and 1999. With the move to a semi-candidate-centric system in 2009, I expect a decrease in partisan appeals and an increase in appeals to more local, often ethnic, groups.

Next, I use campaign appeals coded from election posters that were photographed across Indonesia during the 2009 legislative elections and district head elections between 2010 and 2011 (see chapter 8). The campaign posters come from candidates campaigning across 188 electoral districts and from all 44 political parties. District head elections are more candidate-centric compared to legislative elections. As a result, district head elections are expected to involve more ethnic appeals and less partisan appeals.

Following that, I will compare the impact of party ideology and ethnic group size on legislative and district head candidates' appeals (see chapter 9). Party ideology is expected to have a greater impact on legislative candidates' ethnic bonding and bridging appeals. Meanwhile, the size of ethnic groups is expected to have a stronger impact on the choice of bonding or bridging appeals by district head candidates. Finally, using the candidate-centric district head elections, and holding the electoral rules constant, more elaborate tests of the impact of ethnic group size on bonding and bridging appeals will be performed (see chapter 10).

A great advantage of doing numerous comparisons in the same country is that many country-level variables remain constant. Overall, these multiple tests will help to rigorously evaluate the validity of each part of the argument presented in this dissertation. Before proceeding with testing, the means by which candidates



incorporate the regional press and election posters into their campaigns will be described, as well as the methods used in this dissertation for gathering and coding data on campaign appeals from these sources (see chapters 5 and 6).

## Conclusions

This chapter presented a brief overview of elections in Indonesia and how the electoral rules have changed over time. The main focus is the important shift in national and local elections in Indonesia from a tradition of party-centric rules to a new era of candidate-centric rules. This change, I argue, has broad implications for political competition in Indonesia and how it should be studied. Dating back to the writings of Clifford Geertz and the 1955 election, there is a long tradition in Indonesian politics of studying political parties—their ideologies, their vote shares, and their social bases of support. This made sense when voters could only choose a political party in elections. Today, however, the rules have changed. Voters are very often voting for individual candidates, not parties. To understand elections in contemporary Indonesia, we need to understand how individual candidates appeal to voters and how voters decide between candidates. In sum, the move from a party-centric system to a candidate-centric system requires a new candidate-centered lens through which to view (and better understand) campaign strategies and voting behavior in Indonesia.

# Campaigning in the Press

Two prominent scholars of Indonesian media, Sen and Hill (2000, 51), wrote that the Indonesian press has had a long and influential history. In their book, published right after Indonesia's transition to democracy, Sen and Hill argued that the Indonesian press employed more journalists and spent more time gathering and disseminating news than any other medium. Despite the fact that the press reached a smaller audience than television,<sup>1</sup> the press has largely determined what constitutes news in Indonesia. Today, while television remains the most popular source of political information for Indonesians, and while Internet use has expanded, some research finds that newspapers still set the political agenda.<sup>2</sup>

Due to the size of Indonesia, the regional press (i.e., newspapers printed outside the capital city of Jakarta) has always played an important role in delivering news on local politics. Their role has become even more important in recent years with the

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<sup>1</sup> According to Indonesia's statistics department, in 2009, the percentage of Indonesians who watched television during the previous week was 90%, while only 19% read a newspaper or a magazine (Statistik 2009, 31).

<sup>2</sup> See <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/12/01/online-users-unfriend-politics.html>. Television is the most popular source of political information for Indonesians. This comes mostly from news programs on entertainment and current affairs stations, not the news channels. This is followed by radio, newspapers, and the internet (Ambardi et al. 2014, 18-23).

introduction of decentralization and a less Jakarta-centric media space. Since the introduction of democracy, the number of regional papers has grown exponentially and they operate in a more free and competitive media environment offering voters extensive coverage of local politics and elections.

Democratic competition and a general move toward a candidate-centric system has also made media exposure in the regional press a critical part of candidate election campaigns. This dissertation employs information from the regional press to understand how campaign appeals have changed over time, specifically before and after the introduction of democracy. Changes in campaign appeals are captured by engaging in a content analysis of election-related reports in the regional press between 1997 and 2009. Within this chapter, I provide a brief history of the regional press in Indonesia, explain how the press covers elections, and describe how newspaper reports were selected and coded for campaign appeals.

Part 1 provides an overview of the regional press and its role in elections. It begins with an explanation of the role of the Indonesian press, its relationship with the state, and the challenges faced by the press before and after democratization. Part 1 then presents an examination of the importance of the regional press in relation to elections and the four main ways that candidates can gain press exposure: paying for advertisements and advertorials, inviting journalists to write campaign reports, bribing journalists for positive reports, and writing opinion pieces. Part 1 concludes with a discussion of how candidates incorporate positive press reports into their campaigns.

In part 2, previous studies are cited to show that newspaper content analysis provides an excellent source of information on electoral campaigns. It goes on to explain

the reasons for choosing Waspada, a regional newspaper in North Sumatra, for a detailed content analysis of campaign appeals. Waspada is an appropriate newspaper because it serves a multi-ethnic community, has a large distribution, has extensive political coverage, and has been in existence since before Indonesia's transition to democracy. Part 2 concludes with a discussion on the different types of reports that constitute election coverage in Waspada, and explains how reports were gathered and selected for coding.

Finally, in part 3, I describe the coding procedure for each report. I explain how each report was coded for candidate, party, and election information; the type of campaign event; the candidate's endorsements; the candidate's verbal appeals; and any references to the candidates' identity or qualifications.

## Part I: The Indonesian Press

### INDEPENDENCE AND A FREE PRESS

After Indonesia became independent, the number of Indonesian-language daily newspapers grew, from 45 in 1949 to 76 in 1953.<sup>3</sup> Most of the newspapers were owned by the editors, who survived on a meager income from small circulation revenues. In addition, some newspapers were subsidized by the government. Feith (1962, 323-24) described the press at the time as lively, informative, and free. Even those who were subsidized by the government could offer stern criticism of the government.<sup>4</sup> The

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<sup>3</sup> See Feith (1962, 324). There were also Chinese-language and Dutch-language newspapers printed in Indonesia. In 1950, there were 67 Indonesian-language newspapers, 15 Chinese-language papers, and 11 Dutch-language papers, according to Feith (1962, 111-12).

<sup>4</sup> Feith (1962, 323) notes some exceptions where army commanders would make newspapers cease publication and a few occasions of youth groups attacking newspaper offices.

content of the press was largely political, and every newspaper had an informal link with a political party. However very few were direct party organs. As Feith (1962, 323) explained, “They were free to embellish the specific positions of their parties in their own way,” and they did not engage in “slavish adherence to party viewpoints.” In the runup and aftermath of the 1955 election, there were no real changes in press freedom, but as politics became more polarized, the press became party organs to a greater extent (Feith 1962, 576). By 1959, with Indonesia turning to authoritarianism, severe constraints were placed on the press. Journalists were arrested, temporary and permanent bans were placed on papers, and print establishments were seized (Feith 1962, 593).

#### THE PRESS UNDER SUHARTO

When Suharto came to power, the press was assigned important cultural, ideological, economic, and security roles within the new regime. The press was tasked with helping the government bring Indonesia’s diverse indigenous and religious groups together into one nation by serving as a vehicle for the creation of a national culture and as the guardian of the state ideology, Pancasila. In addition, the press was to support the implementation of the government’s economic development policies and help safeguard national security against internal and external threats. Overall, the press existed to support the authoritarian regime. The government did not foresee it being liberal in any western sense, defining it instead as “free, but responsible.”<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> This draws on Sen and Hill’s analysis of the media during the New Order. In particular, see Sen and Hill (2000), specifically the introduction and chapter 2, “The Press: Industry and Ideology.”

Hill and Sen (2000, 51-79) highlighted a number of formal and informal mechanisms that the government used to control the press from 1965 through to the 1990s. Soon after taking control, Suharto banned 43 of Indonesia's 163 newspapers. In 1973, opposition parties were forcefully amalgamated into two parties: the nationalist parties became the PDI and the Islamic parties became the PPP. This move disconnected the opposition parties from their partisan newspapers. Only the government party, Golkar, continued to operate its own newspaper (Suara Karya), although it was not widely read.

To regulate the press, the government empowered the Department of Information to implement strict permit regulations for the production and distribution of printed materials. Multiple supporting letters and preliminary permits were required to get a printing permit, making it very difficult to start a new publication (Steele 2012, 2). Press reports were censored, both explicitly and through self-censorship arising out of fear of losing a printing permit. In the rare cases where newspapers or magazines published stories that were even mildly critical of the government, their permits were revoked, often under the pretext that they were a threat to security and order.

The government also used regulations to control press reports of social tensions. Any reports that might inflame ethnic, religious, racial, or class tensions were covered under the SARA restrictions, which placed limits on the reporting of ethnoreligious tensions and restricted the use of indigenous languages in the media.<sup>6</sup> Individual journalists were closely monitored and required to become members of a tightly

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<sup>6</sup> SARA stands for ethnic (suku), religious (agama), racial (ras), and class (antara-golongan). The more literal translation of antara-golongan is 'group', but class is inferred. There were also unwritten rules that writing on religious issues could result in a paper's license being revoked (Ambardi et al. 2014, 49).

regulated, government-authorized journalist organization. Finally, many of the major media press groups were directly controlled by Suharto's family members and friends or by Golkar through the 1980s.<sup>7</sup>

During the 1990s, the government began losing control of the media. Sen and Hill (2000, 51-52) argued that, during this time, the press became politicized, largely due to rising resentment of the government among the middle class. In addition, the press was no longer as dependent on the government; having grown in size and prosperity, it began testing the boundaries. While three very successful weekly publications were shut down in 1994,<sup>8</sup> Sen and Hill saw this more as a sign that the press had become the site of a significant political struggle.<sup>9</sup>

#### DEMOCRATIZATION AND A FREE PRESS

A major break for press freedom came after the fall of Suharto and Indonesia's democratic transition. In September 1999, Interim President Habibie signed into law Press Law No. 40. An unprecedented piece of legislation, the law effectively ended state control of print media by eliminating licensing and removing the government's ability to ban publications. It also guaranteed the rights of journalists to work free of restrictions

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<sup>7</sup> See Romano (2003) for more on the impact of the authoritarian state and how it constrained the day-to-day work of journalists.

<sup>8</sup> The three publications that were banned were Tempo Magazine, Editor Magazine, and DeTik tabloid. The situation began over a Tempo cover story focusing on the dispute between Habibie and the minister of finance over an agreement to buy 39 used war ships from the former East Germany.

<sup>9</sup> See Hill (1994, 173-75) for a list of English-language sources on the Indonesian press before the democratic transition.

and censorship. Moreover, those who attempted to restrict the press could now be fined or imprisoned. Finally, it established an independent Press Council.<sup>10</sup>

The passing of the Press Law created an institutional framework for an independent free media and generated an air of optimism among journalists. However, while the ranking of Indonesian press freedom initially rose from one of the worst in the world to a middle ranking, there has been little change in these rankings since 2003. From a comparative perspective, Indonesia's ranking is unspectacular. In their 2014 report, Freedom House ranked the Indonesian press 98th out of 197 countries (Freedom House 2014). Meanwhile, the 2014 Reporters Without Borders report was more pessimistic, ranking it 132nd out of 180 countries (Reporters Without Borders 2014).

Scholars, journalists, and analysts have identified three factors that have led to a stagnation of press freedom over the last decade: intimidation of the press by offended societal groups, defamation lawsuits by wealthy and politically connected individuals, and interference from media owners with other business and political interests. With regard to the first factor, journalists are prone to intimidation and attacks by offended mobs and societal groups and receive little protection from law enforcement. For example, the group Front of Islamic Defenders (Front Pembela Islam) has used protest, attacks, and the courts to intimidate Playboy Indonesia, and Tempo journalists have been intimidated by members of the indigenous Betawi association, Forum Betawi Rempug. There have also been a rising number of attacks on journalists in recent years: 27 in 2008, 37 in 2009, and 47 in 2010 (House 2012).

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<sup>10</sup> For an analysis of the negotiations leading up to the passing of the 1999 Press Law, see Steele (2012).



The second factor that affects press freedom is that journalists are highly vulnerable to defamation lawsuits by the government and wealthy private individuals. These players increasingly bypass the independent Press Council (which has a mandate to adjudicate media disputes) and draw on more than 40 provisions in the criminal code to sue journalists.<sup>11</sup> In one of the more extreme cases, Tommy Suharto, son of the former president, was awarded \$1.46 million in damages for a report in Garuda Magazine that described him as a convicted murderer. This was in reference to his 2002 conviction for ordering the murder of a Supreme Court judge. The ruling stated that the report had “damaged the plaintiff’s credibility as a local and international businessman.” The threat of lawsuits has led to a certain level of self-censorship, particularly on sensitive subjects and reports that involve senior government officials or powerful business interests.

Finally, the choice and framing of news stories are sometimes influenced by the owners of the press. A large degree of media power is concentrated in a small number of media groups whose owners have other business and political interests.<sup>12</sup> Some owners have used their media outlets to support their political ambitions. For example,

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<sup>11</sup> In addition to being regulated by the Criminal Code (Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana, KUHP), journalists must abide by the Law on Information and Electronic Transaction (Undang-undang tentang Informasi dan Transaksi Elektronik, ITE). This law prohibits journalists from printing “information aimed to evoke hatred or animosity between individuals and/or community groups based on ethnicity, race, religion and group.” Also, there is the Indonesian Journalists’ Code of Ethics (Kode Etik Jurnalistik, KEJ), which cautions journalists not to “write or broadcast news based on prejudice or discrimination” or on differences of ethnicity, race, and religion (Ambardi et al. 2014, 48-49).

<sup>12</sup> Haryanto (2011, 106-07) listed details on nine of the largest media groups in 2010 and the media businesses they own. They were: Kompas Gramedia Group, MNC (Media Nusantara Citra), Jawa Pos Group, Mugi Reka Aditama (MRA), Bali Post Group, Mahaka Media Group, Femina Group Alisjahbana, Bakrie Group, and Lippo Group.

two senior Golkar party members, Surya Paloh<sup>13</sup> and Aburizal Bakrie,<sup>14</sup> used their media companies to support their 2004 and 2009 presidential campaigns (Ida 2011, 22). In other cases, owners instruct journalists (or journalists automatically self-censor their work) to avoid certain stories that would have a negative impact on their business interests. Tapsell (2012) and Haryanto (2011), drew on interviews with journalists in Jakarta and Surabaya to illustrate these types of interference from media owners.

## RISE OF THE REGIONAL PRESS

Despite continuing challenges for Indonesian journalists, the 1999 Press Law created more competition among newspapers and helped foster a more vibrant press with diverse perspectives. According to the World Association of Newspapers, there were 167 newspapers in 1998; after the Press Law was passed, this jumped to 597 in 1999.<sup>15</sup> The numbers from the Association of Newspaper Publishers are higher. Drawing on these numbers, figure 5.1 shows a steep rise in the number of print media outlets after the introduction of Press Law No. 40 in 1999. From the beginning of 1998 to the end of 2001, the number of press media outlets increased from 289 to 1,881. Many of these print outlets quickly died out and, by 2006, there were 900 in operation. Since

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<sup>13</sup> Surya Paloh is a former member of Golkar and the founder of National Democrat mass organization, which later gave birth to the Nasdem Party (Partai Nasional Demokrat). He owns Media Indonesia (a large national daily newspaper) and Metro TV.

<sup>14</sup> Aburizal Bakrie has been the Chairman of the Golkar Party since June 2012 and he was the party's presidential candidate for 2014. He is the founder of the Bakrie group, which has interests in media, mining, telecommunications, and other industries.

<sup>15</sup> According to the World Association of Newspapers (2001), between 1998 and 1999, the number of daily newspapers went from 79 to 172. The number of nondaily newspapers went from 88 to 425. In the first 6 months of the Press Law being passed, Sen and Hill (2000, 70) reported that 500 new permits were issued. In addition, many other publications and radio and television stations began operating without a license (Sen and Hill 2011, 5).

then, the rate of growth has remained low. Importantly, just five newspapers command half of Indonesia's readership.<sup>16</sup>




Figure 5.1. Number of media outlets between 1997 and 2010. Line graph created from figures in Ambardi et al. (2014). Original source, Association of Newspaper Publishers, Media Directory 2009/2010, 2011. Points on the x-axis represent the end of the year indicated.

Most of the new newspapers that took advantage of the revised permit regulations were regional papers. Since then, the rise of the regional press has been further aided by the implementation of regional autonomy (Ida 2011; Haryanto 2011). The devolution of power to the regions has enhanced the position of local business owners and the importance of the regional media. Local commercial interests and individuals with prior interests in the local media have been the main investors in regional media. Two prime examples of a new breed of regional media group are the

<sup>16</sup> The big five newspapers (with their percent of readership in 2010 in brackets) are: Kompas (18.4%), Jawa Pos (16.2%), Pos Kota (12.2%), Suara Merdeka (7.3%), Warta Kota (7.2%), and Pikiran Rakyat (6.8%). Data from Mars Indonesia (2011), cited in Nugroho et al. (2012, 67).

Jawa Pos Group and the Bali Pos Group. Since Indonesia's democratic transition, both have grown into highly profitable media organizations by buying up smaller regional papers and revitalizing them. In addition to these big players, numerous other small-scale daily and weekly papers have sprouted up across the archipelago. This new regional press caters to diverse perspectives and publishes in a range of indigenous and foreign languages. Overall, there has been a decentralization of print news and a decline in Jakarta's influence in setting the news agenda for the whole country (Ambardi et al. 2014, 7).

The regional press has become particularly important during elections, acting as a campaign instrument for candidates and a source of information for voters. Since Indonesia's democratic transition and the introduction of directly elected district heads, the number of regional papers covering elections has grown and the amount of space dedicated to election reports has increased overall. This has been driven by a more open media environment, more numerous and competitive elections, greater participation by candidates, and an increased interest from the public and local business interests regarding who wins and who loses.

Operating in a more competitive environment, successful regional papers have capitalized on the public's interest in elections and the scramble for election coverage by candidates. As part of my research, I interviewed journalists in Sumatra, Java, and Maluku. They spoke of the importance of elections in terms of generating extra advertising revenue and increasing distribution. Candidates were also interviewed; they emphasized the importance of local media for their campaigns—particularly in the candidate-centric district head elections. Before 2005, members of the district

legislature nominated district heads. At that time, candidates often needed to bribe parties and party members to get nominated. As one politician in the district head election in North Sumatra explained, “Under an indirect system you had to pay the parties...but with the turn to direct elections the media has become more important.”<sup>17</sup>

## CANDIDATES AND THE REGIONAL PRESS

To understand how candidates use the regional press in their campaigns, I interviewed journalists, activists, candidates, and members of campaign teams in Sumatra, Java, and Maluku. Interviews with J. Anto, the executive director of a local media NGO in Medan (Kajian Informasi, Pendidikan dan Penerbitan Sumatera, or KIPPAS), were particularly informative. In addition, I spent a number of months reviewing regional newspaper archives in North Sumatra, Central Java, Maluku, and Bali. Based on my research, I identified four main ways in which candidates get exposure in the regional press: paid advertisements and advertorials, inviting reporters to cover their campaign events, bribing journalists to print glowing stories, and writing opinion pieces.

First, candidates can pay for advertisements or advertorials. Advertisements range from small ads inserted on a page to a full-page spread. They usually feature a color image of the candidate, an embedded campaign slogan, and some imagery.

Advertisements are often printed in color and placed on the front or back of the newspaper or within a section dedicated to election coverage. In contrast, advertorials

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<sup>17</sup> Personal interview with Sigit Pramono (12/8/2009). At the time he was a politician in the provincial legislature and candidate in Medan’s 2010 district head election. Beyond these regions, other scholars have noted the importance of the regional press in district head elections (Buehler 2007).

mimic regular reports. They consist of a single report or a number of reports that extend over multiple pages. They are usually placed in the election section of the paper. The copy promoting a candidate in advertorials is particularly glowing and invariably accompanied by images of a candidate's recent rally or meeting with a local group or association. The candidate pays for these reports and the images and copy are usually provided by the candidate or created in conjunction with a reporter from the paper. Advertorials are often not labeled as such, so the line between advertorials and real reports is blurred.

Second, candidates can promote themselves in news spots and reports. Candidates regularly invite journalists to interview them and attend their campaign events. In most cases, these reports focus on one candidate or party event and provide details about the event such as where it took place, who was in attendance, what the candidate and other elites said, and occasionally a response from members of the audience. Various kinds of events are reported, including campaign rallies, visits to hospitals or other venues, door-to-door campaigns, and meetings with religious, indigenous, and social groups.

The third way candidates get press coverage is by surreptitiously paying journalists to write glowing stories about them and their campaigns. This often involves inviting journalists to campaign events and providing them with "travel money." Members of the campaign team meet with the journalist and discuss the content of the report and what pictures should be included. For more direct access to the media, some candidates include journalists in their campaign teams. The final way candidates can get coverage in the press is by writing opinion pieces for the regional press. Based on information

from a number of newspapers during election time in Sumatra, Java, and Maluku, I found that this was not a common tactic, particularly among the more minor candidates.

Adverts, advertorials, reports, and opinion pieces that cast candidates in a positive light are actively used by candidates in their campaigns. Campaign members and journalists explained that when positive stories appear in the press, the candidate buys numerous copies and passes them out for free. The number of papers purchased depended on the size of the election and the distribution of the newspaper. In larger elections, such as the district head election in the provincial city of Medan, a figure of approximately 3,000 was quoted, while in a smaller, more rural elections like in Karo, the figure was closer to 500.

In the more rural towns, traditional Indonesian coffeehouses are a particularly popular venue for papers to be distributed and discussed. These coffeehouses are mainly frequented by men, but they are also quite egalitarian places—local elites mix with the lower classes. Studying the elections in North Sumatra in 2005, Simandjuntak (2012) noted, “The function of Karo coffee-houses as a space in which elites and common people meet each other, as well as their function as a space in which political preferences are formed, almost fulfills a Habermasian notion of public sphere.”<sup>18</sup> During my own research in Karo and other regions of Indonesia, I found that campaign members commonly distributed free copies of regional papers that contained reports on their candidate to patrons in coffeehouses. These regional press reports introduced candidates to voters and laid out an agenda for further one-on-one discussions with

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<sup>18</sup> See Simandjuntak (2012, 121). For more detail on Karo coffeehouses, see Simandjuntak (2009).

campaign members and candidates. After distributing the free copies, the campaign members would follow up with a discussion on the report and the candidate's platform. Occasionally, the candidate would make an appearance to speak with voters, and the campaign members would foot the bill for any coffees and snacks.

## Part II: Electoral Coverage in the Regional Press

### NEWSPAPER ANALYSIS

Scholars who have employed newspaper content analysis in other countries have found that they provide one of the best measures for the level and type of information provided by campaigns.<sup>19</sup> The content analysis of election-related reports has been used to measure the prevalence of particular issues (Druckman 2004; Jerit 2004; Sulkin 2009), the salience of candidate attributes (Balmas and Sheafer 2010; Druckman 2004; Stevens and Karp 2012), appeals to ethnic groups (Chandra 2005a; Chandra and Wilkinson 2008), candidate endorsements (Kahn and Kenney 2002), and the location of campaign events (Horowitz 2009).

A number of scholars have used content analysis to examine various political issues in the Indonesian press, including the news coverage of political parties (Tomsa 2007); issues of war, defense, and diplomacy (Flournoy 1992); the content of the national news (Steele 2003); news coverage of development issues (Hermant and Gati 1994); incidences of ethnic conflict across Indonesia (Barron et al. 2009); and media bias

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<sup>19</sup> Beyond election campaigns, newspaper content analysis has been used effectively to study identity politics. Herrera (2007) coded regional newspapers to understanding regional economic conditions in Russia, while Laitin (1998) coded newspapers in the former Soviet states to study changes in the terms used to describe Russian speakers.



during ethnic conflict (Ariyanto et al. 2008). Voionmaa (2004) uses discourse analysis, rather than content analysis, to study election campaign rhetoric in election-related reports.

Given the importance of Indonesian regional papers in local campaigns and the wealth of information they contain, content analysis of election-related reports is useful for understanding changes in campaigns since democratization. To engage in this research, regional papers must be selected for analysis. One approach is to gather digital issues of regional papers in the months preceding the elections. With digital copy, machine coding can be used to capture changes in campaign appeals. Unfortunately, Indonesia's regional papers have only recently begun to maintain digital archives.

A second approach, and the one used in this study, is to engage in an in-depth quantitative and qualitative analysis of one newspaper by coding and summarizing election-related reports by hand. This method is well suited to one of the main goals of this dissertation—to get a broad understanding of the various ways in which election campaigns have changed over time. In coding the newspaper reports by hand, the analysis is not limited to frequency counts of keywords and categories of words, which comprise the usual output from computer coding. Various aspects of campaigns can be coded by hand, such as the types of events, verbal appeals, endorsements, and references to candidates' attributes. This broad range of elements would be difficult to code by machine and the results would be prone to error.

While the quantification of campaign elements helps to verify important changes in campaigns, such information does not tell the whole story. To understand the narratives that candidates use to frame their appeals, a more qualitative approach is

necessary. Accordingly, I read, summarized, and analyzed each report. This allowed me to present an informed interpretation of the newspaper text in conjunction with the quantitative analysis. The advantage of coding one newspaper over time is that it offers a controlled comparison; however, the information is geographically limited. To broaden the geographic scope, other case studies and reports on the election campaigns from across the country will supplement the analysis. In sum, reading, hand coding, and summarizing a limited set of reports allow me to engage in a controlled comparison. These methods allow me to quantitatively verify changes in different aspects of campaigns, and to qualitatively interpret changes in how appeals are framed, over time.

Four criteria guided the choice of newspaper for this research. First, the paper needed to serve a multi-ethnic community. Examining how candidates campaign in a multi-ethnic environment can shed light on the main question for this dissertation—the conditions under which candidates make ethnic appeals and how they choose the ethnic identities to which they appeal. Second, the newspaper needed to have extensive political coverage and to be broadly popular within the community. Rather than appealing to a niche group or nonpolitical interests, the paper needed to have a large readership and be popular among different ethnic groups interested in local politics. Third, the newspaper needed to be in existence before Indonesia's transition to democracy and, ideally, have had little change in ownership since that time. Finally, the availability of print archives of the newspaper from 1997-2009 was a practical concern.

## NORTH SUMATRA

While a number of newspapers fit the criteria described above, I chose to narrow down the choice by investigating the regional press in North Sumatra.<sup>20</sup> North Sumatra was chosen primarily because it is an ethnically diverse region in terms of indigenous and religious groups and has traditionally had a strong regional press. The province is located in western Indonesia, as shown in figure 5.2. With the Strait of Malacca to the west and the Indian Ocean to the east, North Sumatra is sandwiched between the provinces of Aceh, Western Sumatra, and Riau. It is a large province (approximately the size of South Carolina or Ireland), and the most populous province outside of Java, with a population of 13 million. North Sumatra is also one of Indonesia's more ethnically diverse provinces: 66% are Muslim, 31% are Christian, and a small number are Hindu and Buddhist followers (2010 National Census). Indigeneity is more fragmented: the Javanese are the largest single indigenous group (33% of the population) and a number of Batak indigenous groups together comprise 42% of the population. There are also smaller numbers of ethnic Chinese and other indigenous groups, including Mandailing, Nias/Kono Niha, Malay, and Minangkabau (2000 National Census). Medan, the capital of North Sumatra, is the fifth largest city in Indonesia, with a population of over 2 million. Religious and indigenous demographics in the city reflect those of the overall province, though Medan has a higher percentage of ethnic Chinese (approximately 11%). This rich array of ethnic groups offers candidates many options in their choice of ethnic appeals.

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<sup>20</sup> For some local history on North Sumatra, particularly the capital, Medan, see Anderson (2013). For an analysis of local ethnic politics in the North Sumatran districts of Simalungun and Pematang Siantar in the 1950s and 60s, see Liddle (1970).



Figure 5.2. Map of Indonesia with North Sumatra highlighted

Like other parts of Indonesia, North Sumatra has a vibrant regional press that has grown exponentially since the transition to democracy. Under Suharto, five to ten regional newspapers operated in the province, and they were tightly controlled by the military and police, who had the power to approve or censor individual reports. However, with the freeing up of the press, sources estimated that 120 daily and weekly newspapers were being published in the province by 2010.<sup>21</sup>

While papers no longer need to seek approval for publishing stories, they do engage in self-censorship to some degree. For example, the newspaper *Analisa*, among others, avoids mentioning the religious or indigenous identity of groups involved in acts of violence.<sup>22</sup> This policy was put in place to avoid inflaming social tensions by framing conflicts in terms of identity groups. While the intentions are good, the practice is reminiscent of Suharto's SARA restrictions on reporting on religious, ethnic, and group conflicts. With the freeing up of the media, there has also been a rise in publications

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<sup>21</sup> Personal interview with Ali Murthado, Editor of *Analisa*, 12/7/2009. Data on the exact number of publications is unavailable.

<sup>22</sup> Personal interview with Ali Murthado, Editor of *Analisa*, 12/7/2009.

published in indigenous languages. For example, two magazines, Sora Mido and Maranata (a local Batak Karo Church newsletter), began publishing in the Karo language soon after Indonesia's transition to democracy. Beyond using the national language, Bahasa Indonesia, many newspapers in North Sumatra publish sections of the paper in indigenous languages and Chinese.

To study election coverage in North Sumatra's regional press, I gathered and reviewed election-related reports in various regional papers from 1955 to the present day. Newspaper archives were obtained from the Library of Congress in Washington, DC, the Indonesian National Library in Jakarta, and the National Library of Australia in Canberra. More contemporary newspaper archives were reviewed at KIPPAS, a media NGO in Medan. The regional papers reviewed included Mestika, Mimbar Umum, Sinar Baru, Waspada, Sinar Indonesia Baru, Analisa, and Sumut Pos. This review, plus interviews with journalists and constituents in North Sumatra, helped me choose the newspaper Waspada for detailed content analysis.

## WASPADA

Waspada is a long-running daily paper with a consistent editorial team and extensive election coverage. In addition, it is broadly popular across indigenous and religious groups in North Sumatra. It was founded by journalists H. Mohammad Said and H. Ani Idrus and began publishing in January 1947. This makes it the oldest daily newspaper in North Sumatra and one of the oldest in Indonesia. The paper is a family business, led by the Said family, and has strong editorial continuity. It is published in Medan, serving that city and the province of North Sumatra. According to the paper's

own statistics, in 2010, 50% of its distribution was in Medan, 25% was in North Sumatra, and the rest was in Aceh, Jakarta, and other regions. Its readership is relatively young and educated; over 70% are under 40 and over 60% have a college education.<sup>23</sup> While these are the paper's official figures, my own observations suggest that it is the most popular paper among lower class, Becak (pedicab) drivers in Medan. While journalists and constituents indicated that the paper is particularly popular among Medan's Muslim population, it is also widely read by other religious and indigenous groups in North Sumatra. After reviewing all the main daily newspapers in North Sumatra, Waspada also proved to have the most extensive coverage of local elections between 1997 and 2009. The constituents I interviewed also emphasized Waspada's comprehensive coverage of local politics. Finally, on a more practical level, archives of Waspada issues were available from before and after Indonesia's transition.

Election coverage in Waspada (and the regional press, more generally) can be divided into national and regional election news. National election coverage relays reports on national politicians and party leaders in Jakarta, while regional coverage focuses on local candidates and their campaigns. Election coverage on local elections and campaigns comes in various forms, such as reports on the organization and implementation of elections, paid advertisements and advertorials by candidates, interviews with candidates, reports from campaign events, opinion pieces, and editorials.

Reports on the organization and implementation of elections cover issues such as the registration of voters, the location of voting venues, details on voting ballots, lists of

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<sup>23</sup> Figures come from Waspada's media kit brochure, distributed in 2010. Figures on the ethnic identity of its readership were not available.

candidates, election results, and investigations into voter fraud. In recent elections in particular, the Indonesian local press has extended their coverage of these types of reports, keeping the public more informed about upcoming elections. This is partly due to the increased number and complexity of elections. Opinion pieces and editorials related to elections are written by reporters, candidates, local elites, and constituents. These types of reports constitute only a small share of election coverage. In sampling reports for content analysis, I excluded reports on national politicians and party heads, reports on the organization and implementation of elections, opinion pieces, and editorials. These reports are not a significant source of information about how local candidates campaign. Candidates' newspaper advertisements were also excluded. While advertisements do contain campaign appeals, they require a different coding scheme than reports and have only become popular in the last few years.

The content analysis in this dissertation focuses on three types of reports: interviews with candidates, reports on campaign events, and advertorials. These reports form the bulk of election coverage and provide a great amount of detail on candidates and their campaigns, including candidates' policy preferences, attributes and qualifications, ties to different social and ethnic groups, and campaign events. Studying these types of reports over time offers very good measures of changes in electoral campaigns through Indonesia's democratic transition. Overall, this is not meant to be a study of the press and how it selects and frames news reports. Instead, media reports of elections are used as a proxy for candidates' campaigns, providing valuable information on how candidates appeal to the masses.

To gather reports for coding and analysis, I photographed entire issues of Waspada's print edition<sup>24</sup> for the four weeks prior to, and the two weeks after, the elections in 1997, 1999, and 2009. Archives for the 2009 election were photographed at the NGO, KIPPAS, and at Waspada's office in Medan. Archives for the 1997 and 1999 election were scanned at the Library of Congress. In total, 126 newspapers were photographed. Next, I selected all the reports that featured interviews with candidates, reports on campaigns, and advertorials. These reports were digitally clipped and stored in a database for coding and analysis.



Photo 5.1: 2009 Newspaper Reports. Left: Front page of Waspada on the day after the 2009 election. Right: Campaign article. A candidate meets a Muslim women's group.

<sup>24</sup> Waspada also currently has an online version of the paper. While versions of Waspada reports from the last few years are available online, at the time of research, their online archive did not stretch back to 1997. In addition, it was hard to be sure that the online versions were not shortened, modified, or incomplete. Overall, it was more representative to use the print version for each election year as that was the version that campaign members distribute and constituents more frequently read.





Photo 5.2: 1999 Newspaper Reports. Left: Campaign article on PPP's campaign in Medan. Right: Campaign article on PAN's rally in the district of Mandailing Natal, North Sumatra.



Photo 5.3: 1997 Newspaper Reports. Left: Article on Golkar helping the poor during a campaign event. Right: Articles on Golkar promising to help teachers and build a mosque if they win.

The public campaign period varied slightly for each election: 24 days in 1997, 17 days in 1999, and 21 days in 2009. In each election, there was a cooling off period for a few days before the election. While the public campaign periods were relatively short, in actuality, candidates and parties began campaigning much earlier, and reports on their visits with groups, interviews with reporters, and profile pieces appeared in the press well before the public campaign period began. To get a sense of any political party bias in Waspada, I reviewed all the reports in the four weeks before each election and coded

each by the party it covered. The reports published during the public campaign period for each election were then selected for detailed coding. From these reports, I read, summarized, and coded every second report in each election, as described below.

## Part III: Coding Newspaper Reports

### DESCRIPTIVELY CODING REPORTS FOR CONTENT

A comprehensive codebook for coding the reports was developed during the course of eight months of field research in Medan. While I performed the coding, every effort was made to minimize the two main disadvantages of coding one's own work— inconsistent coding and misinterpretation. To minimize the risk of inconsistent coding, a number of months were spent analyzing reports and finalizing the codebook. During this time, I drafted the codebook a number of times, devising various coding fields and testing them on multiple sample reports. In initial codebooks, I attempted to code an extensive array of content. However, through testing, this was narrowed down to a smaller and more meaningful set of coding fields. Once the codebook was finalized, I created a graphical user interface for consistent data entry. The interface contained an image of the report alongside all possible coding options. Predefined drop-down options were built to maximize consistency. For each report, summaries of the important points were written and I transcribed each verbal appeal that was coded. This allowed me to easily review reports and appeals that I had previously coded to check for consistency during the coding process.

Beyond inconsistent coding, there is also the potential for misinterpreting verbal appeals and references to ethnic groups. One great advantage of doing much of the

work on this project in Medan was that I was able to consult with research assistants, experts on the local media, constituents, campaign managers, and journalists on issues regarding interpretation of the reports and the use of ethnic campaign appeals. These conversations also enhanced my overall understanding of election campaigns in North Sumatra. Overall, by reading each and every report and discussing them with informed individuals, I was able to get a much deeper understanding of campaigns compared to just looking at outputted quantitative levels of appeals provided by coders. This approach leveraged the advantages of qualitative analysis and quantitative content analysis.

In the final version of the codebook, I deconstructed the content of each report into six different categories of information. They are:

1. Report information
2. Candidate, party, and election information
3. Events
4. Elite support and endorsement
5. Verbal appeals
6. Candidate identity, experience, and character

Each category of information has a number of data entry fields. A wireframe of the data entry interface used to code the reports is in appendix A. Explanations of the categories and descriptions of each data entry field are described as follows.

### 1. Report Information

Data entry fields were created to code the report information. The fields identified title, page, date, and where the report was from. Space was given to provide a summary of the report, including how appeals were framed. An input box for any coding issues was also included.

### 2. Candidate, Party, and Election Information

Most reports focused specifically on one candidate, while a few focused on two or three. For each report, I coded the name of each candidate, their party, the election in which they were running (district legislature, provincial legislature, national lower house, or national upper house), their electoral district,<sup>25</sup> and their rank number on the party list. This data was later checked with data from the electoral commission. Some reports, particularly in the 1997 election, did not focus on or identify a particular candidate. Instead they reported on a party campaign, such as a party rally. In these cases, only the party name was coded and no candidate information was entered.

### 3. Events

Articles in Waspada often reported on candidates' participation in various campaign events. Each report with an event was coded for the type of event, the district where it was held, the venue, any estimates of attendance, and whether the event was related to any religious, indigenous, occupational, or other social groups. I initially tried to code the various kinds of activities that occur during campaign events. These include

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<sup>25</sup> The local legislative elections (district legislatures) also needed to be coded for the name of the administrative district.

different types of gift giving, praying, singing, music, and so forth. Summarizing these activities into meaningful categories proved difficult and added too much complexity to the coding. Also, I got the sense from the reports that references to these activities were somewhat arbitrary. Simply coding the event and, in the final analysis, adding descriptions of the kinds of activities that occurred in each of these events, added more clarity to the findings.

There were five main categories of events—political, community, occupational, religious, and indigenous—associated with 13 specific types of events, as shown in table 5.1. While political rallies were one of the main types of events, candidates also met with political office holders (often district heads), attended religious and indigenous ceremonies, and met with occupational groups (e.g., transportation workers). Community events involved visits to neighborhoods, participation in community service events (e.g., mosquito eradication events, referred to as fogging events), and attending local sports events. An event qualified as a community event if it was not framed in ethnic terms in the report. However, given the concentration of ethnic groups in particular neighborhoods, it is likely that many of these events had an ethnic component. As a result, the coding errs on the side of conservative estimates of ethnic events. Importantly, this cautious approach was applied consistently across elections. Reports that took the form of an interview with the reporter or a statement from the candidate had no events and the event fields were left blank. If the report contained information on more than one event, details on the other events were added. The majority of reports had just one event.

**Table 5.1. Types of events coded in campaign-related reports**

<b>Event type</b>	<b>Options</b>
Political	Political rally, party leader or party cadre visit, office holder visit, forum or debate, political protest
Community	Group Visit, service event, sports event
Occupational	Group visit
Religious	Ceremony or festival, group visit
Indigenous	Ceremony or festival, group visit

Each event was also coded for all identity groups to which they related, as shown in table 5.2. For example, a visit to a Protestant Church’s congregation would be coded with Protestant, while a visit to an Islamic youth group would be coded with Islamic and Youth. Identity groups were divided into four categories: religious, indigenous, occupational, and other. Under the religious and indigenous group categories are lists of all the possible groups in North Sumatra. The occupational group category is divided into occupations relating to agricultural workers, urban workers, and civil servants. The other category includes the marginalized and poor, women, youth, and nationalist identities. The marginalized and poor group includes disaster victims, child orphans, the poor, and so forth.

**Table 5.2. Types of identity groups coded in campaign-related reports**

<b>Group type</b>	<b>Options</b>
Religious	Examples of options: Protestant, Catholic, Hindu, Islamic, etc.
Indigenous	Examples of options: Javanese, Batak Toba, Malay, etc.
Occupational	Agriculture workers (farmers, fishermen), urban workers (transportation workers, kaki lima etc.), civil servants (bureaucrats, teachers etc.)
Other	Marginalized and poor (disaster victims, the sick, the poor etc.), women, youth, nationalist

#### 4. Elite Support and Endorsement

Reports often contained endorsements from elites and representatives of institutions. Endorsements were defined broadly for coding purposes and included explicit and implicit forms of candidate support. The explicit examples include official institutional endorsements and verbal statements of support from elites and institutional leaders. Implicit examples include the attendance of elites and institutional leaders at a campaign event. In these cases, their mere presence offered tacit support; official or verbal support was not a necessity for coding endorsers. Each report was coded for the type of support, the name of the institution and/or the name of the elite, and any group-related categories. There were 17 possible types of support categorized under five headings (political, community, occupational, religious, and indigenous), as shown in table 5.3. Multiple endorsements could be coded for each report; particularly in campaign rally reports, there were usually a number of elites in attendance who were referenced in name or in terms of their affiliation.

**Table 5.3. Types of elite support/endorsement in campaign-related reports**

<b>Support type</b>	<b>Options</b>
Political	Party (regional and national leaders), local government leaders
Community	Community association or leader, educational institute or NGO, social and sports association
Occupational	Business association or leader, workers and civil Servants association or leader
Religious	House of worship, organization, educational institution, youth group, women's Group, religious leader
Indigenous	Association, youth group, indigenous leader
Other	Examples of options: Youth and student associations, nationalist association, etc.

## 5. Verbal Appeals

Reports were coded for verbal appeals made by candidates in interviews and at campaign events. Verbal appeals by candidates came in two basic forms—appeals to issues or policy, and appeals to identity groups. The coding system allowed for each verbal appeal to be coded as an issue appeal, an identity group appeal, or both.

Candidates appealed to issues when, for example, they emphasized their plans to boost the economy, policies on poverty reduction, support for local markets, programs to promote education, or concern over voter fraud. Issue politics is the main focus of these campaign messages and no specific identity group is mentioned. In contrast, candidates appealed to a particular identity group (ethnic and non-ethnic) when they made statements of support or admiration for a particular religious, indigenous, or occupational group, but made no reference to any particular issue. In order for the appeal to count as an identity group appeal, the identity group needed to be mentioned by name, or the candidate needed to use a term closely related to a particular identity group. Some verbal appeals were both an appeal to an issue and an identity group. In these cases the appeal was coded both as an issue appeal and an identity group appeal. For example, if a candidate made an appeal to increase teachers salaries to help improve the quality of education it was coded as an issue appeal (Government Services > Education) and an identity group appeal (Occupational > Teachers).

For each appeal, the message was transcribed from the report and the issue and/or identity group was selected from a list of options. The same system for coding identity groups described above (religious, indigenous, occupational, and other; see table 5.2) was used to code verbal appeals to identity groups. For verbal appeals to



issues, the list of issues was adapted from Sulkin (2009) and Druckman (2004) and modified for prevalent issues identified during the development of the codebook. There were 11 main issue categories and 106 particular issues that candidates raised in the reports. The main issue categories and examples of specific issues are shown in table 5.4.

**Table 5.4. Types of issues coded in campaign-related reports**

<b>Issue type</b>	<b>Options</b>
Agriculture	Farming, fishing, loans and investment
Business	International, local markets and business, loans and investment
Consumer	Good and utilities, housing
Corruption	General corruption
Economy	Budgets and debt, economic development, financial crisis
Government services	Bureaucracy, education, health, sports
Infrastructure	Environmental protection, natural disasters, transportation, other
Jobs and welfare	Inequality and poverty, jobs and income, social welfare, tax
Reform and democracy	Government reform, economic reform, land reform, democratic development
Ethnic	Indigenous, religious
Security and social order	Crime, group conflict, national defense, social issues (i.e. drugs, alcohol, nightlife)

## 6. Candidate Identity, Experience, and Character

Candidates and supporters often highlight the candidate's identity, work experience, and character traits in reports. A number of different fields captured these forms of promotion. Data fields were created to code identity references to the candidate's religion, indigeneity, place of birth, gender, and youth, as shown in table 5.5. References to a candidate's work experience were coded for the main sector in

which they worked and their specific job. Very often, references were made to the candidate's leadership role in government, politics, and in religious and indigenous organizations. The main work sectors and examples of specific jobs are shown in table 5.6. Reports also contained references to candidates' personal character traits; candidates were often defined as honest, hardworking, polite, and so forth. The words used to define a candidate's character were transcribed directly into an input box for analysis later.

**Table 5.5: Types of candidate identity references coded in campaign-related reports**

<b>Identity type</b>	<b>Options</b>
Religious	Examples of options: Protestant, Catholic, Hindu, Islamic, etc.
Indigenous	Examples of options: Javanese, Batak Toba, Malay, etc.
Other	Born in region, gender, youth

**Table 5.6: Types of candidate work experience references coded in campaign-related reports**

<b>Work experience type</b>	<b>Options</b>
The state	Bureaucrat, military, appointed government leaders
Politician	Examples of options: Provincial legislature member, district head etc.
Religious organization	Examples of options: Islamic organization leader, Christian youth group leader etc.
Indigenous organization	Examples of options: indigenous organization leader etc.
Educational institution	Examples of options: professor, pesantren teacher, etc.
Youth organization	Students organization
Other organization	Examples of options: nationalist organization, activist NGO, etc.
Business	Examples of options: business leader, company director etc.
Other professions	Doctor, lawyer, laborer, housewife etc.

## VALIDITY

There are three main advantages to the method presented here for studying campaign appeals from Indonesia's regional press. First, in contrast to other traditional media (i.e., television and radio), the regional press is a much more comprehensive source of information on campaign messages that candidates wish to communicate. In contrast to television sound bites, the report-length format offers more detail on how candidates present themselves and how they appeal to voters. Using the coding protocol above, each report can be coded in detail with regard to index information, events in which candidates participated, elites and institutions who endorsed the candidate, issue- and group-based verbal appeals, and any references to a candidate's identity, work experience, and character traits. This provides a very comprehensive quantification of report content that is suitable for comparative analysis. While this method for coding reports is used for reports in Indonesia's regional press, it is not meant to be country specific; the same coding approach could be used for newspapers in other countries.

The second advantage of this method is that reports in the regional press are a very good reflection of what the candidate wants to say and how they want to be seen by voters. Often these reports are written by, or in conjunction with, candidates and campaign managers. There is very little editorial voice, political analysis, or criticism. To a large extent, these reports capture the uninterrupted voice of the candidate, making it a valuable source of information on their appeals. Finally, newspaper content analysis helps us understand changes over time. Available archives, particularly from the same local newspapers, can reveal changes in how candidates campaign from one election

cycle to the next. This is particularly important for this dissertation, which focuses on understanding how democracy and changes in the electoral rules have affected election campaigns.

## Conclusions

The introduction of competitive elections and a more competitive media sphere has had an important impact on candidates' campaigns and election coverage in the Indonesian regional press. In terms of candidates' campaigns, the voter has become more important. Indonesia's political system has moved from a dominant-party system with party-centric electoral rules to a multiparty system with more candidate-centric rules. As a result, candidates have shifted their attention from appeasing party bosses and government elites to vigorously competing for votes from the electorate. In this chapter, I argued that the regional press has become an extremely important part of candidates' efforts to appeal to voters. Regional papers introduce candidates to constituents, create interest in their campaigns, and help create an image of a viable candidate.<sup>26</sup> Candidates can get press coverage in four main ways: paying for advertisements and advertorials, inviting journalists to cover campaign events, bribing candidates for positive stories, and publishing opinion pieces in the regional press.

Interviews in Indonesia and a review of election coverage in a number of different regional papers across Indonesia indicate that wealthy candidates get far more coverage because of their financial resources and the regional press's need for revenues.

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<sup>26</sup> To be a successful candidate, Simandjuntak (2009) emphasizes the importance of keeping the candidate's image in the public eye, which fosters discussion and gossip concerning the candidate's merits and reputation.

Institutional changes stemming from the 1999 Press Law have led to the growth of new regional papers, the expansion of election coverage, and a dramatic increase in competition among papers. In today's press environment, the survival of a publication is less dependent on currying favor with the government and more on the ability to generate revenues. In this chapter, I showed how elections can boost revenues through candidate advertising and increased distribution. In such a competitive environment, papers are very willing to accept advertising and to print positive reports from any candidate with financial resources, regardless of the paper's indigenous, religious, or partisan leanings or readership.

On the positive side, I found that this openness provides avenues for candidates in North Sumatra and Maluku to reach out to other ethnic groups. Candidates can easily pay for coverage in a paper that appeals to an ethnic group to which the candidate does not belong. This can help ease social tensions and may have a positive impact on intergroup relations over the long term. On the negative side, candidates who lack campaign funds have difficulty getting their campaigns covered in the press. After reviewing a number of newspapers, it was very clear that candidates who were commonly believed to be the wealthiest were getting the most election coverage, a phenomenon that is hardly surprising and not uncommon in other countries. I interviewed candidates with small budgets who could not afford press coverage; they tended to rely on election posters, door-to-door campaigns, and mobilizing their personal networks.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Initially there was a blind belief that anyone could become a politician. Various candidates from all stratas attempted to compete in some of the initial elections (Buehler 2010; Heryanto 2010). However, the costs of competing in elections soon became apparent. Campaigns bankrupted many candidates. Faced with bankruptcy, some candidates (usually young women) committed suicide (Buehler 2009).

Finally, in reviewing the regional press, I found a general lack of critical or investigative reports on candidates.<sup>28</sup> Regional papers have economic incentives to print positive stories on candidates because they increase distribution (through candidate purchases). The press also has incentives to avoid negative stories<sup>29</sup> or critical analyses of candidates because they run a risk of defamation lawsuits. This lack of critical journalism makes it difficult for voters to distinguish between candidates. Accordingly, voters often seek out information through rumor and gossip.<sup>30</sup> Some notable exceptions exist; for example, the regional press provides extensive coverage of local politicians charged with corruption by the anticorruption commission. However, in these cases, the press is following investigations rather than engaging in investigative journalism. While the functioning of democracy relies on a free and critical media, the regional press in Indonesia currently tends to operate more as a campaign instrument for wealthy candidates during elections, rather than as a watchdog for the public.

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<sup>28</sup> Ambardi et al. (2014, 45) explained that, for the most part, Indonesian journalists do not engage in investigative journalism. Only a few of the larger media outlets have the time, resources, and print space (or time slots) to accommodate investigative journalism.

<sup>29</sup> The general lack of negative reports was explained to me in cultural terms, that candidates needed to be seen as santun (courtesy). Personal interview with Ahmad Ibrahim, director of Radar Ambon, 5/10/2011.

<sup>30</sup> Simandjuntak (2009) emphasized the importance of gossip and rumor for voters in choosing candidates.

# Campaigning in the Streets

This chapter introduces a novel data source for the study of election campaigns, election posters. In it, I argue that posters are an important source of information about how candidates appeal to voters, particularly in late-developing countries and emerging democracies. The importance of election posters and their potential to shed light on election campaigns has largely been ignored in the literature. The significance of election posters has not, however, been lost on commentators, journalists, and political consultants. One Malaysian commentator observed the stark difference between poster campaigns on Malaysian streets during election time compared to Australia and the US. Without access to newspapers, television, or the Internet, you would barely notice an election was occurring in the US or Australia. In contrast, the atmosphere on the streets in Malaysia is carnival-like, with a massive proliferation of colorful election posters decorating the streets (Shams 2010). Meanwhile, journalists reporting on Egypt's 2012 presidential campaign wrote that the country became awash with posters pasted thick on walls and hanging from trees. One Egyptian candidate (who was later disqualified) reportedly spent 40 million Egyptian pounds (\$6.4 million) on 10 million posters. This

was in addition to posters printed and paid for by supporters.<sup>1</sup> American political consultants returning from working on elections abroad have also been surprised by the importance of poster and billboard campaigns outside the US. In the 2010 presidential election in Ukraine, they reported that nearly every billboard had a political message, and outdoor posters and billboards rivaled television advertising as the most popular medium for candidates.<sup>2</sup>

Posters usually contain a large, stylized image of the candidate and incorporate a range of images and slogans. While the brevity of elements on a poster might give the impression of a simple message, the visual and nonverbal messages used to communicate with voters can be very complex.<sup>3</sup> The careful use of powerful signs, symbols, imagery, and emotive messages can define a candidate's campaign and mobilize voters around a central idea, theme, or core set of values. In many ways, the design of election posters cuts to the heart of candidates' appeals. Posters can also range in size and can be distributed across a wide or narrow geographic area. The scalability of poster campaigns means that they can be low cost, particularly compared to television. Even minor candidates competing in local elections in late-developing

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<sup>1</sup> On the election campaign, see Kirkpatrick and Sheikh (2012). The candidate was Hazem Salah Abu Ismail (Cairo 2012). For photos of Egyptian presidential election posters, see Cassel (2012).

<sup>2</sup> For a collection of short reports on American political consultants' experiences working abroad, see D'aprile and Jacobs (2010). In one of the reports, an American consultant, relating his experience working on campaigns in the Ukraine to US election campaigns, commented, "I actually don't know why we don't do more outdoor here. If you have powerful imagery and use it in a creative way, you can get a lot of bang for your buck".

<sup>3</sup> While some scholars have labeled election posters as a premodern method of electoral campaigning (Norris 2000), advances in printing technology and the use of digital billboards mean that posters are still an important means of political advertising around the world. Even in the US, poster campaigns are being revived in the form of digital billboards. They can cycle through different messages, be quickly updated, and help candidates target particular groups due to their geographic location (Ankario 2011; Nyczepir 2012; 2013).



countries can afford some kind of poster campaign.<sup>4</sup> Overall, the ability of posters to appeal to voters at a low cost helps explain the popularity and abundance of election posters during elections.

Given that posters are an abundant source of candidates' campaign appeals, it is surprising that we currently lack any large systematic studies that use election posters as a source of information on campaigns. The few systematic studies in the literature primarily look at whether posters have an impact on voters. In addition, all of these studies are on advanced democracies.<sup>5</sup> As a first step in addressing this oversight in the literature, I gathered 15,000 election posters from recent elections in Indonesia and coded them for campaign appeals. The poster dataset contains multiple election posters from over 2,000 candidates competing in national and local elections between 2009 and 2011. This is the largest collection of election posters gathered for content analysis, and represents the first time they have been used to provide a detailed systematic analysis of campaign appeals across thousands of candidates.

The first part of this chapter provides a brief overview of election posters in Indonesia's first election in 1955 and in elections during the authoritarian era (1971-1997). Part 1 concludes with the changes in poster campaigns brought on by Indonesia's democratic transition. In part 2, I explain how I gathered contemporary Indonesian election posters and describe the two poster datasets used in this dissertation. The first dataset is the National Poster Dataset. It contains over 4,000

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<sup>4</sup> While there is a lack of studies on posters in emerging democracies, Dumitrescu (2010) found that posters were popular among both major and minor candidates in France and Belgium.

<sup>5</sup> In probably the most extensive study of election posters, Dumitrescu (2009; 2010; 2012) studied election posters in France and Belgium and argued that posters signal to voters the competitiveness of candidates. In Ireland, Marsh (2004) made a similar argument. In the US, Panagopoulos (2009) and Kam and Zechmeister (2013) looked at the effect of posters on turnout and voter choice.

posters that were photographed by a team of researchers across Indonesia during the national election in 2009 and district head elections held between 2010 and 2012. The second dataset is the Nine Cases Poster Dataset. For this dataset, I photographed over 10,000 geocoded posters used in nine district head elections held between 2010 and 2011. These photos provide detailed data on the poster campaigns of 64 candidates competing in districts with varying degrees of ethnic diversity. While random sampling of posters was not feasible, I argue that the way in which posters were gathered inspires a high degree of confidence in the representative accuracy of the samples.

In part 3, I describe how the visual and textual elements of each election poster were descriptively coded and how posters were classified according to the identity appeals they contained. Posters were deconstructed into four parts (index information, candidate clothing, background imagery, and textual content) and 28 fields were used to descriptively capture all aspects of each poster. Ethnic appeals were interpreted from the content of posters. First, the posters were classified according to the specific ethnic dimensions and categories they invoked (e.g., Religion-Islamic, Indigeneity-Javanese) and whether they invoked a political party. Next, the ethnic dimensions and categories were related to the candidate's ethnic identity. From this, each poster was classified according to whether it served to bond with a candidate's ethnic group or bridge across other ethnic groups. Finally, ethnic appeals were aggregated across each candidate's poster campaign to determine the degree to which each candidate bonded with, or bridged across, ethnic groups and engaged in appeals to the party label. While posters were primarily used as a data source for campaign appeals, part 4 presents evidence—drawn from a small collection of studies and surveys from Indonesia and other parts of

the world—that posters can have a pervasive effect on voters and an impact on electoral outcomes.

Before continuing, I offer a brief clarification on the meaning of the term election poster. I use this term to refer to the range of political advertisements posted by candidates and parties (and occasionally their supporters) in the public space to promote an electoral campaign. An election poster can take the form of a small placard, a banner (spanduk), or a billboard (baliho). While they are sometimes free standing, they are often secured to posts, trees, or buildings. Contemporary posters are usually printed in color on laminated cardstock, vinyl, polyester, or PVC.

## Part I: Indonesian Campaigns and Posters since 1955

### THE 1955 GENERAL ELECTION

There have been various changes in the design, content, and production of election posters since Indonesia's first general election in 1955. In the 1955 election, election posters were a prominent means of campaigning in cities, towns, and villages across Indonesia. With limitations in technology, the posters contained replicas of party symbols printed in black and white. Posters were simple in layout, containing just a party logo and the party name. However, the logos integrated powerful symbols representing alternative ideologies and forms of identification. Photo 6.1 shows a number of posters from the 1955 campaign. Practically all the party logos drew on some religious, nationalist, or socialist symbols: the star and crescent for Islam; the cross and

rosary beads for Catholicism; the buffalo and rice for nationalism; and the wheel, hammer, and sickle for socialism.<sup>6</sup>



Photo 6.1: Posters from Indonesia's 1955 Election. Top Left: The Socialist Party's poster with a star and a Hindu god of plenty in the center. Photo taken in a Hindu temple in Bali. Top Right: The star and crescent for the Masjumi Party in front of a Batak house in North Sumatra. Bottom: Various posters in Jakarta. From left, the posters contain the Labor Party's wheel and bull (the bull, a symbol connected with Sukarno and his proletarian ideology, Marhaenisme, was also used by the Indonesian National Party and the Republic of Indonesia's Independence Party), the Patriot Party's fist, the Socialist

<sup>6</sup> See Dienaputra (2010, 99) for multiple images of party logos from 1955. Other elements used in posters included a globe, pine tree, house, knife, cotton, torch, and smear (figure of a puppet show play).

Party's star, the Islamic Association Party's star and crescent, the Catholic Party's cross and rosary beads, and the Communist Party's hammer and sickle. Source: Life Magazine, p.48 (October 17th 1955).

In his seminal work on Indonesia's postcolonial period, Feith (1962, 354-56) describes the 1955 election as a conflict over major symbols representing alternative ideologies. These symbols were particularly important in village areas where issues played no part in the campaign. To appeal to voters in these areas, candidates interpreted their parties' ideologies and symbols in terms of local myths and values. The election was deeply divisive at the social level, and there were numerous reports of election posters being torn down by opposing groups. The contentious politics during the election were partly fueled by the use of these powerful symbols. While the symbols were used for political competition, they originated from the social arena. In observing the election in Java, Geertz explains, "Because the same symbols were used in both political and religious contexts people often regarded party struggle as involving not merely the usual ebb and flow of party maneuver, the necessary factional give and take of democratic government, but involving as well decisions on basic values and ultimates" (Geertz 1957, 51).

#### ELECTIONS DURING AUTHORITARIAN RULE (1971-1997)

Political instability and the decline of democracy followed the 1955 election. The next election was held in 1971 under Suharto's authoritarian New Order regime. The two opposition parties (forcefully created from all the opposition parties) created new party logos for the election that were explicitly based on their Islamic and nationalist

ideologies. The Islamic party used the symbol of the Ka'bah and the nationalist party used the buffalo.

During the authoritarian era, written and unwritten restrictions were placed on the use of party symbols. After outlawing the Communist Party, unwritten rules forbade the use of visual elements considered to represent Communism, such as the hammer and sickle. Also, in the 1987 election, the PPP had to change its potent Islamic logo, the Ka'bah, to a simple star due to new regulations requiring all visual elements in a logo to be drawn from the symbol of the Republic of Indonesia.<sup>7</sup> In addition, parties were only allowed to print their logos in black and white (Dienaputra 2010, 96).

Despite these restrictions, between 1971 and 1997, election posters became more visually sophisticated and varied. A collection of over 300 election poster photographs, *Pemilu Dalam Poster (The General Election in Posters)*, illustrates the variety among election posters in Central Java during the 1982 election (Suwondo et al. 1987). The posters contained printed illustrations and homemade, hand-drawn imagery, as shown in photo 6.2. Many posters contained imagery or messages invoking Islam or nationalism and issue-based themes such as education, development, and anticorruption. Photographed in Java, the posters occasionally featured local visual elements, including Javanese words, figures from Java's traditional Wayang puppetry, and Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono (the monarch of Yogyakarta's historic Sultanate in Java). While images of Suharto featured in some posters, images of any other leaders or candidates were rare. In 1987, the PDI did, however, employ a new and very successful strategy of exploiting the image and symbolism of former president Sukarno in their

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<sup>7</sup> Out of all the elements in the symbol of the Republic of Indonesia—the star, chain, pine tree, buffalo head, and rice—the star was seen as the most closely related Islamic symbol (2010, 102).

posters and campaign materials. Reacting to the success of this strategy, new campaign rules in 1992 prohibited the use of pictures and slogans reflecting individual persons and works (Eklöf 2004, 150).



Photo 6.2: Posters and political graffiti from Indonesia's 1987 Election in Central Java. Top Left: Golkar poster with a campaign message on improving education coupled with imagery of a school, school children, and teachers. Top Right: PPP's Ka'bah logo with the message "the choice of the Islamic community." Bottom Left: Handmade poster supporting PDI. It calls on the younger generation not to be provoked by emotion, to stay united, and to vote for PDI. Bottom Right: Hand painted message saying that Bung Karno's (Sukarno's) instruction is to vote for PDI. Source: Suwondo et al. (1987). Photos from p. 103, fig. 4.41; p. 28, fig. 2.14; p. 49, fig. 2.34; p. 64, fig. 3.19.

While the election results during the New Order were a foregone conclusion, under the pretense of a real election, the authoritarian government allowed space for political expression during these elections (Heryanto 2010). The creativity that went into creating election posters and the destruction of party posters (including Golkar posters) were some of the ways that voters took advantage of this opportunity for political expression and contestation. Election posters and the color of a political party were also important means through which parties could symbolically their mark territory. Up until 1997 it was primarily Golkar's yellow color which was painted over road markers, street fences, and curbs in towns and villages during election time. But in the 1997 election, the opposition fought back against this kuningisasi (yellowization) by painting property in the colors of their party (green for the PPP and red for the PDI). This resulted in a number of cases where "color wars" between supporters of the PPP and Golkar erupted in violence (National Democratic Institute 1997, 12).

#### DEMOCRACY (1999-present)

Since the democratic transition, a number of institutional and technological changes have affected poster campaigns in Indonesia. First, the introduction of democracy has allowed candidates and parties to more freely express themselves. More options have opened up in terms of the colors, signs, symbols, and imagery that candidates and parties may use in their logos and posters.

Second, there has been a massive increase in the number of candidates and parties competing in legislative elections and in the newly instituted presidential and regional head elections. Since 1999, 24 to 48 parties have compete in the three



legislative elections. In any one of these elections up to half a million candidates have stood for election.<sup>8</sup> The heightened competition has led to candidates and parties increasingly availing themselves of professional services from political consultants and survey companies. Attempts to stand out have also inspired a great deal of creativity in poster designs. Candidates have dressed up as mythical and historical characters, boxers, rat exterminators, Superman, and James Bond in their posters. Posters have also featured candidates' children, Barak Obama (frequently), Osama Bin Laden, Mr. Bean, Ronaldo, David Beckham, Po the Panda (from the movie Kung Fu Panda), Gandalf (from the book and movie, Lord of the Rings), and Sylvester Stallone as well as monkeys, tigers, goats, and a kangaroo.

The third change since democratization is technological. Advances in digital photography, digital design, and print production have allowed professional designers to produce more visually complex election posters. Decreases in the cost of production coupled with the strain of competition have enabled and necessitated the mass production of posters. The cost of posters varies by size and region, but a standard 1x1 meter poster costs approximately \$4 to produce and a 5x1 meter poster banner (hung high across the streets) costs approximately \$20. Billboards are usually rented by the top candidates. Depending on their size, the rental fee may be \$200 or more per month. In district head elections, I was quoted campaign expenditures of \$100,000 or more on posters for reasonably competitive district head candidates. Overall, during elections,

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<sup>8</sup> Ananta et al. (Ananta et al. 2005, 4-5) reported that 48 parties competed in the 1999 election, 24 competed in the 2004 election, and 44 (including 6 regional parties in Aceh) competed in the 2009 election.

the production and posting of posters is a major business with cities, towns, and villages across Indonesia blanketed with mass-produced posters.

As will be evident from the analysis in this dissertation, election posters in Indonesia today employ a complex mix of imagery and emotive messaging. The posters with unadorned party logos common in the 1955 election and the posters with hand drawn illustrations from the authoritarian era are all gone. They have been replaced with more professionally produced posters containing images of larger-than-life airbrushed candidates and a mix of signs, symbols, and slogans. To visually demonstrate how election posters have changed, photo 6.3 contains images of election posters that I photographed in the 2011 district head election in Salatiga, Java. This is the same place where the 1987 election posters shown in photo 6.2 were photographed.

While it is clear that posters have become more professional and visually complex, some things have not changed as much. Symbols representing deeply held ideological commitments and forms of self-identification (particularly Islam and nationalism) remain prominent elements in contemporary Indonesian posters. In the next part of this chapter, I explain how I gathered and coded campaign appeals from posters used in recent elections.



Photo 6.3: Posters from the 2011 District Head Election in Salatiga, Central Java. District head election posters photographed in Salatiga, Central Java, on April 4, 2011. Source: Author.

## Part II: Photographing Election Posters

Photographing election posters in Indonesia is challenging. Campaign periods are short, candidates are numerous, and the country is large, consisting of islands stretching across an expanse of over 4,000 miles. Traveling around the country to photograph election posters is time consuming and election posters are only posted for a few weeks before an election. Given these challenges, gathering a random sample of posters was not feasible. Instead, a convenience sample of election posters was gathered for this dissertation. As will be explained below, a number of steps were taken to reduce the possibility of systematic bias in the sampling of posters.

Two unique datasets of posters were gathered. The first dataset, the National Poster Dataset, contains over 4,000 election posters photographed by a team of

researchers during the legislative elections in 2009 and district head elections that took place between 2010 and 2012. These posters represent over 2,000 candidates competing in elections across the country. This dataset was used to study the impact of different electoral rules and ethnic diversity on the kinds of appeals candidates make in their posters (see chapter 8 and 9). The second dataset, the Nine Cases Dataset, contains over 10,000 geocoded posters that I photographed, covering nine district head elections. Coupled with field research in each district, this dataset was used to provide a fine-grained analysis of candidates' appeals and a tightly controlled test of how appeals vary across and within districts (see chapter 10).

#### THE NATIONAL POSTER DATASET POSTERS FROM LEGISLATIVE AND DISTRICT HEAD ELECTIONS

Posters from candidates competing in Indonesia's legislative elections were photographed in 2009. In April of that year, elections were held for national and local legislatures, including the national upper house, the national lower house, the provincial legislature, and the district legislatures. To obtain a geographically diverse sample of posters, a colleague (Jeremy Menchik) and I recruited researchers working for an Indonesian survey company, SurveyMETER.<sup>9</sup> SurveyMETER researchers gather data for nationally representative samples, so they are spread out across Indonesia, in urban and rural areas. In the weeks before the election, an email was sent to them asking if they would photograph as many election posters as they could in the areas where they lived.

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<sup>9</sup> SurveyMETER is an Indonesian NGO research institution that, over the last 15 years, has provided data collection, analysis, and research services. They have been responsible for gathering data for several iterations of Rand's longitudinal household surveys, known as the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS).

They were instructed to photograph the entire poster. These poster photographs were gathered and stored in a database.

Posters from candidates competing in district head elections were photographed between 2010 and 2012. During this time, a number of district head elections were being held on a rolling basis. District head elections are executive elections for mayors and regents for the third tier of government (just below the provincial level).<sup>10</sup> During 2010, the same email was again sent to SurveyMETER researchers to photograph election posters. The National Poster Dataset needed to be supplemented however, because elections were not being held in all districts where SurveyMETER researchers lived. My colleague and I drew on a personal network of researchers to photograph district head election posters in regions where they were working between 2010 and 2012.<sup>11</sup> I also photographed posters during a number of regional head elections over the same time period. All of these photographs were added to the National Poster Dataset.<sup>12</sup>

Before coding, duplicate posters and posters featuring multiple candidates were excluded from the database. Duplicate posters were posters with the same design and posted by the same candidate in different places in the electoral district. While some

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<sup>10</sup> Regional head elections (which include provincial governors and district heads) were introduced on a rolling basis across districts in 2005. By 2010, the first five-year term for many regional heads expired and new elections began in various provinces and districts.

<sup>11</sup> I thank Firman Witoelar for helping connect my colleague, Jeremy Menchik, and I with the SurveyMETER researchers. Aside from posters photographed by myself and Jeremy Menchik, researchers from our personal networks and from SurveyMETER who contributed posters to this project include: Dani Alfah, Abdullah Alwazin, Alpha Amirrachman, Colin Cahill, Erica Copeland, Kevin Fogg, Jesse Gerstin, Ruth Hastutiningsih, Bettie Landauer Menchik, Taufiq Nur, Christina Pomianek, Lacey Raak, Jacob Ricks, Megan Ryan, Danau Tanu, Bart Thanhauser, Ibrahim Zafar, and Muslim Zainuddin.

<sup>12</sup> Posters were gathered in only one governor election (West Sumatra). These posters were dropped from the analysis in order to more clearly focus on the district head elections.

researchers included duplicate posters in the photographs they sent in, other researchers did not. To avoid any potential bias in the sample, it was decided to drop all duplicate posters. All posters in the National Poster Dataset are therefore unique in terms of their design. Posters promoting groups of candidates from a political party competing in different legislative elections were also removed from the dataset to establish a tighter connection between the appeals on a poster and an individual candidate competing in a specific legislative election (e.g., national lower house, provincial legislature).<sup>13</sup> Group election posters were very rare, so their removal had little impact on the size of the dataset.<sup>14</sup> The completed National Poster Dataset contains unique poster designs from individual candidates competing in specific legislative and district head elections.

### Validity

While the regions, neighborhoods, or streets where posters were photographed were not randomly preselected, there is little reason to believe that the posters photographed were systematically different from those that were not. This is due to the manner in which the posters were photographed and the large number of posters gathered widely across Indonesia. First, there is no reason to believe that researchers were cherry-picking particular types of election posters. Researchers were asked to

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<sup>13</sup> This was particularly important for the analysis because the electoral districts for district, provincial, and national legislatures are of different sizes. As a result, they have different ethnic demographics. So, for example, a candidate competing for a district legislative seat might be competing in a small and ethnically homogenous electoral district. Meanwhile, a candidate in the same town competing for a national legislative seat could be competing in a larger and more ethnically diverse electoral district.

<sup>14</sup> Interestingly, group posters were most common among the arguably most disciplined political parties—the Islamic party, the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), and the Acehnese regional party, Party Aceh (Partai Aceh, PA). But even among these parties, group election posters were rare.

photograph any and all posters in their area. They were not told to photograph any specific type of election poster and no indication was made that the study concerned campaign appeals or ethnic politics. In addition, they were encouraged to photograph as many as they could and paid a small fee per poster. Overall, they had no incentives to pick and choose particular posters.

Second, the sample of posters covers all parties and a large number of candidates. To my knowledge, it is the largest dataset of election posters ever gathered. All of Indonesia's 44 political parties were represented among the posters photographed during the 2009 legislative elections. This included the 38 parties that were competing nationally and the six parties that competed only in provincial and district legislative elections in Aceh.<sup>15</sup> The dataset contains over 4,000 posters; 62% of the posters are from legislative elections and 38% from district head elections. The dataset contains posters from 2,138 candidates, 1,872 competed in the legislative elections and 266 competing in the district head election.<sup>16</sup>

Third, the posters were gathered widely across Indonesia. They came from almost 200 electoral districts in 20 of Indonesia's 33 provinces. Approximately half of the posters came from Java (where half of the population resides) and the other half from the peripheral islands. In addition, the number of rural and urban electoral districts for

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<sup>15</sup> The six Aceh parties were: Aceh Party (Partai Aceh, PA), Aceh Sovereignty Party (Partai Daulat Atjeh, PDA), Independent Voice of the Acehnese Party (Partai Suara Independen Rakyat Aceh, SIRA), Aceh People's Party (Partai Rakyat Aceh, PRA), Aceh Unity Party (Partai Bersatu Aceh, PBA), and the Prosperous and Safe Aceh Party (Partai Aceh Aman Sejahtera, PAAS).

<sup>16</sup> The number of district head candidates is lower because it is a single-seat election and generally only 2 to 10 candidates compete in these elections. They do however tend to produce more uniquely designed posters. In contrast, there are many more seats available in legislative elections that use proportional representation and multi-seat electoral districts. However, legislative candidates often operate on tighter budgets and produce fewer unique posters designs.

legislative and regional head elections in the National Poster Dataset is largely proportional to the national average. The posters came from electoral districts that ranged widely in terms of their religious and indigenous diversity. The map in figure 6.1 shows the considerable geographic spread of election posters gathered from legislative and district head elections. This spread can be attributed to SurveyMETER researchers and a personal network of researchers that were dispersed across the country during election time.




Figure 6.1. Map indicating the 20 provinces where posters were gathered for the National Poster Dataset



Table 6.1 summarizes the five kinds of elections. For each type of election, it includes figures on the number of posters photographed, the number of candidates to which the posters belong, and the number of electoral districts where posters were photographed. In sum, there is no reason to believe that the regions from which posters were gathered or the way in which researchers photographed posters produced any kind of systematic bias in the dataset.

**Table 6.1. Number of posters, candidates, and electoral districts in the National Poster Dataset**

	Posters	Candidates	Electoral districts
District legislature	1,184	970	74
Provincial legislature	647	493	37
National lower house	596	409	27
District head	1,502	266	50
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,929</b>	<b>2,138</b>	<b>188</b>

*Note:* A small number of posters were photographed for candidates competing in the national upper house legislative elections. This body is similar to, though not as powerful as, the Senate in the US. The elections use the single non-transferable vote electoral system and four candidates are elected in each province. All candidates compete as independents. There were relatively fewer posters and candidates in this set (152 posters from 114 candidates competing in 15 provinces) so they were not used in the analysis.

#### THE NINE CASES POSTER DATASET POSTERS FROM NINE DISTRICT HEAD ELECTIONS

The National Poster Dataset, described above, was used to make broad comparisons of appeals across different types of electoral rules (legislative and district head) and across districts that range in ethnic diversity. For a more intensive study of how candidates use posters to appeal to the masses, I also gathered and coded a more comprehensive dataset of election posters (the Nine Cases Poster Dataset) from nine

district head elections held at different times between 2010 and 2011 (see chapter 10). A total of 63 candidates competed in these elections.

These nine districts were primarily chosen because they varied widely in terms of their ethnic diversity. Seven of the nine districts were in North Sumatra: Medan, Karo, Serdang Bedagai, Toba Samosir, Samosir, Pematang Siantar, and Simalungun. Elections in Ambon, Maluku, and Salatiga (Central Java) were also included. The locations of the nine districts are shown in figure 6.2. The gathering of posters was thorough; in the weeks before each district head election, I went to the district and hired motorbike drivers. A number of days or weeks, depending on the size of the district, were spent criss-crossing each district photographing posters. Riding on the back of the bike, I photographed each and every poster along the streets. The photographs of each poster were stamped with a digital geocode so that the precise location of the poster could be identified.




Figure 6.2. Map indicating the nine districts where posters were gathered for the Nine Cases Poster Dataset.

In total, almost 10,000 posters were photographed for the Nine Cases Poster Dataset. The numbers ranged from a few hundred in the smaller, more rural districts, where posters were more scattered, to a few thousand in the more urban districts, where posters lined the streets side by side (see table 6.2). A large number of posters were photographed in the city of Medan. As the fifth largest city in Indonesia (population 2.1 million), it is substantially larger than the other districts, had a much higher number of posters on display, and had a wider variety of election poster designs.

**Table 6.2. Number of posters and candidates in the Nine Cases Poster Dataset**

District	Province	Posters	Candidates
Karo	North Sumatra	738	10
Kota Medan	North Sumatra	4,624	10
Kota Pematang Siantar	North Sumatra	476	10
Samosir	North Sumatra	372	6
Serdang Bedagai	North Sumatra	101	4
Simalungun	North Sumatra	887	5
Toba Samosir	North Sumatra	128	5
Kota Salatiga	Central Java	1,125	4
Kota Ambon	Maluku	1,024	8
<b>Total</b>		<b>9,475</b>	<b>63</b>

Many posters had the same design, but were unique in terms of their geographic position and geocode. Often, candidates had particular poster designs that they favored and posted more frequently than others. Unlike poster the National Poster Dataset, all posters in the Nine Cases Poster Dataset, including duplicate designs, were selected for coding. By coding all posters, the campaign appeals in the favored posters have a

stronger impact on the overall measures of the candidate's campaign appeals and, as a result, yield a more precise measurement of the kinds of appeals that candidates believe are important.

The Nine Cases Poster Dataset was primarily used for a fine-grained study of how the level of indigenous and religious diversity affects candidates' ethnic appeals. I chose to cover elections in North Sumatra because there is significant variation in religious and indigenous diversity across districts in this part of Indonesia. In addition, some of the ethnic groups in North Sumatra are a majority in one district, but not others. In the comparative analysis, this allowed me to hold the region, the electoral rules, and often the ethnic groups constant, while comparing how candidates appealed to their ethnic group when it was the majority or a minority. To test the validity of the findings outside North Sumatra, I included elections in Ambon, Maluku and Salatiga, Central Java that took place in 2011.

In addition to collecting extensive poster data, I spent months in these nine districts observing the elections, doing interviews, and gathering supplementary data on candidates, campaigns, and the elections. This data, plus hundreds of posters from each candidate, provided a detailed picture of the variety of appeals made by each candidate. In addition, geocoded posters allowed me to investigate whether appeals varied by neighborhood within a district. Overall, the poster dataset and field research in each district produced a more focused analysis of individual candidates' campaigns and how they bonded with, or bridged across, ethnic groups.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> To prepare posters for coding, they were color corrected, sharpened, and cropped in the software package Adobe Lightroom.

## Part III: Coding and Classifying Election Posters

### DESCRIPTIVELY CODING POSTERS FOR CONTENT

All posters in the National Poster Dataset and the Nine Cases Poster Dataset were coded in the same way. First, the posters were descriptively coded for their content. Second, the content was interpreted and each poster was classified in various ways by the types of identity appeals they contained. A codebook to guide the descriptive coding process was developed during fieldwork in Indonesia. In developing the codebook I identified 28 fields to fully describe the content of each election poster. Posters were deconstructed into four parts—index information, candidate clothing, background imagery, and textual content—each containing a number of fields. The fields for index information and candidate clothing allowed for coding in situations where two candidates (e.g., the main candidate and the vice candidate) appeared on the same poster. Each poster was coded using Extensis Portfolio professional photo archiving software, which has extensive meta-tagging functions and allows the user to create custom fields with constrained drop-down options. This helped to streamline the process and ensure consistent data entry. A wireframe of the data entry interface used to code the election posters is in appendix B. The four deconstructed parts of the posters are described in detail in the following sections.

#### 1. Index Information

Each poster was indexed with the name and gender of candidates, the party, the province, the district number, and the election, as shown in table 6.3. Candidates competed in four different types of legislative elections (national upper house, national

lower house, provincial, and district) and district head elections. The name of the district was also indexed for candidates competing in district legislature and district head elections.

**Table 6.3. Index information fields for coding election posters**

<b>Field</b>	<b>Options</b>
Candidate 1 name	Name of candidate first candidate
Candidate 2 name	Name of candidate second candidate
Candidate 1 sex	Male or female of first candidate
Candidate 2 sex	Male or female of second candidate
Political party	Name of party or parties
Election type	Upper national legislature, lower national legislature, provincial legislature, district legislature, provincial governor, district head
Province name	Name of province
District name	Name of district used for district legislature and district head elections
Electoral district number	Electoral district number

*Note:* With the exception of electoral district number, references to district, district legislature, and district head refer to municipalities and regencies.

## 2. Candidate Clothing

Four fields were created to code candidate clothing: the type of clothing, headdress, cloth accessory, and whether clothing was in the party color or used the party logo (see table 6.4). Each field contained a fixed set of options and only one option could be selected for each field. In the clothing field, choices included options for various types of traditional indigenous clothing (e.g., Indigenous Javanese, Indigenous Karo), religious clothing, and secular clothing (e.g., suit and tie, dress, casual jacket, government uniform). The list under the headdress field contained options for anything

that could be worn on the candidate’s head, such as a peci, skullcap, or jilbab (women’s Islamic headdress, often referred to as a hejab outside Indonesia), and an other category for secular headdress items such as a baseball cap. The cloth accessory field refers to any type of cloth held by a candidate or slung over the shoulder—indigenous groups in Indonesia often accessorize their clothing with a long piece of indigenous material. For example, in North Sumatra, a number of ethnic Batak candidates draped a traditional cloth (an ulos) over the shoulder. An option for a prayer cloth sometimes held by Islamic candidates was also included in this field. Finally, the field for party clothing was used to indicate whether the candidate wore official party clothing (such as party jackets), used the party logo on their clothing, or used the party color prominently in their clothing.

**Table 6.4. Candidate clothing fields for coding election posters**

Field	Options
Clothing	Examples of options: suit, government, islamic, indigenous Javanese, etc.
Headdress	Examples of options: <i>jilbab</i> , <i>songkok</i> , indigenous Javanese, etc.
Cloth accessory	Examples of options: Islamic prayer cloth, Batak Toba ulos, etc.
Party clothing	Examples of options: clothing in party color, or use of party logo in clothing

*Note:* The clothing fields above were duplicated to capture the clothing of two candidates.

Descriptive fields for these four aspects of clothing capture a myriad of clothing options evident in the posters. For example, in North Sumatra, a number of indigenous Batak candidates wore suits with the traditional ulos over the shoulder; in Java, many

Indonesian female candidates wore business attire with a jilbab (Islamic headdress); in Aceh, many candidates wore a traditional indigenous Acehnese dress and headdress; and candidates from the political party Golkar were often seen wearing smart business suits colored in the bright canary yellow of the party.

### 3. Background Imagery

Seven fields were created for background imagery in the election posters: elite images, buildings and monuments, symbols and patterns, landscapes, events, maps, endorsements, and other. Endorsements (often using logos) from a range of groups and actors, including local businesses and associations representing indigenous, religious, occupational, and youth groups, appeared on posters. Posters often contained images of a number of elites, various background symbols, or multiple buildings. Because of this variety, multiple options could be selected for each field. Examples of options for each of the seven fields are provided in table 6.5.

**Table 6.5. Background imagery fields for coding election posters**

<b>Field</b>	<b>Options</b>
Elite image	Examples of options: Megawati, Islamic leader, Christian leader, Javanese leader, etc.
Buildings and monuments	Examples of options: government building, bank, regional monument, mosque, church, indigenous Batak Toba house, etc.
Symbols and patterns	Examples of options: Indonesian flag, national symbol, Christian cross, Islamic pattern, Javanese drum, etc.
Landscape	Examples of options: City view, beaches, mountains, fields, etc.
Event	Examples of options: party rally, Islamic prayer event, indigenous Batak event, etc.
Map	Examples of options: national map, regional map, etc.
Endorsement	Logo or name of institution, logo or name of business
Other	Typed in examples: Ambulance, animals, etc.



#### 4. Textual Content

Two fields and two input boxes were created to code and transcribe the textual content. The common text elements field had options for items such as the candidate's website address or a slogan asking for prayers, blessings, and support. The non-Indonesian language field had options for all possible non-Indonesian languages, including indigenous languages, used in the poster (e.g., Arabic, Javanese, English). The non-Indonesian transcription field contained an input box for transcribing the text of all non-Indonesian-language messages on the poster. Similarly, the Indonesian transcription field contained an input box for transcribing the text of all Indonesian-language messages on the poster.

**Table 6.6. Textual content fields for coding election posters**

<b>Field</b>	<b>Options</b>
Common text elements	Candidate's phone number, website, email; asking for prayers, blessings, and support.
Non-Indonesian language	Examples of options: Arabic, Javanese, English, etc.
Non-Indonesian transcription	Transcription of Non-Indonesian language text
Indonesian transcription	Transcription of Indonesian-language text

Overall, the 28 fields used to code information on the election posters provide a very detailed description of the content of each poster. A sample poster image, highlighting the coding for textual and visual elements, is shown in figure 6.3.



Figure 6.3. Illustration of elements coded in a poster

## CLASSIFYING POSTERS BY ETHNIC APPEALS

### Ethnic Dimensions and Categories

The visual elements in the posters (i.e., clothing and background imagery) were classified according to the specific dimension and category that they represented (e.g., Religion-Islamic, Indigeneity-Javanese, National-Indonesian). The abbreviation NA (not

applicable) was used for element categories that invoked an ethnic dimension, but no specific ethnic category. For example, general religious appeals were classified as Religion-NA.

Visual elements that represented regional identities were also classified. These elements, including regional maps, local monuments, and landscapes, were not tied to any specific indigenous or religious group. All cases of regional imagery, unsurprisingly, referred to the region where the candidate was campaigning, but it was not possible to distinguish between imagery that invoked a very local regional identity versus a broader, provincial or island identity (e.g., Sumatra, Java). As a result, regional images were classified as Regional-NA.

The text in posters was also classified according to ethnic dimension and ethnic category. This was done in two ways. First, textual messages in indigenous or foreign languages, regardless of the meaning of the message, were classified by an ethnic dimension and ethnic category. For example, the use of Arabic was classified as Religion-Islamic and the use of Javanese was classified as Indigeneity-Javanese. The logic behind coding language without considering the content is that the mere use of a language represents an appeal to speakers of that language. Second, all Indonesian language text elements were classified according to the meaning of the words used by candidates. This was done by gathering word counts on all the words used in the election posters. Each ethnic word in the posters was identified, put into a custom dictionary of ethnic words, and classified by their particular ethnic dimension and category. Examples include:

suku (ethnic group): Indigeneity-NA

Yesus (Jesus): Religion-Christian

Sholat (Islamic prayer): Religion-Islamic

agama (religion): Religion-NA

nasionalis (nationalist): National-Indonesian

The dictionary was used to machine code and classify the text of every poster.

Machine coding the textual messages allowed for consistency in coding the ethnic content of text in the posters.<sup>18</sup>

### Ethnic Bonding and Bridging Functions

After the posters were coded and classified for their ethnic content, the ethnic bonding and bridging functions of each poster were derived using the ethnic identity of the candidate.<sup>19</sup> Classifying an entire poster in terms of the ethnic bonding or bridging function reflects the combination of visual and textual elements in an election poster. Overall, it offers a good indication of the candidate's intended use of multiple, juxtaposed visual and textual elements. Each poster's religious bonding and bridging, and indigenous bonding and bridging functions were analyzed separately. First, focusing

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<sup>18</sup> A combination of the Yoshi Coder and Stata was used to gather word counts and machine code those words. The content of the posters was also classified for other identities (women, youth, and class) and for policy appeals, but these were not used in the main analysis.

<sup>19</sup> The indigenous and religious identity of all candidates who made ethnic appeals was gathered from the electoral commission and local informants. Religious identity was easier to find because the electoral commission gathers information on candidates' religious affiliations. Indigenous information, however, required the help of local informants. To gather this information, I employed research assistants to help gather identity information. I also gathered identity information from newspapers and interviews with journalists and other informants across Indonesia. I was unable to gather identity information for 4 candidates who made indigenous appeals in their posters. In the analysis in chapter eight I assumed the appeals were bonding appeals and again, as bridging appeals. Either way it had virtually no effect on the results, so they were dropped from the sample.

on religious appeals and drawing on the method presented in chapter 2, the posters were classified according to one of four mutually exclusive religious bonding or bridging functions. The logic behind the classification of each poster is laid out in figure 6.4. To summarize, three simple successive questions are asked: (1) do any elements in the poster invoke religion? (2) do any elements invoke a specific religious category? and (3) do the religious elements invoke only the candidate's religion? Answering these questions allows us to classify each poster into one of the following four categories:

**1. No Religious Appeal:** A poster that does not contain any elements that invoke a dimension or specific religious category.

**2. Broad Religious Bridging Appeal:** A poster that does not invoke a specific religious category, but does contain some general religious appeal; for example, the use of the word agama (religion).

**3. Cross-Religious Bridging Appeal:** A poster that contains elements that invoke a religious category (or categories) of which the candidate is not a member.

**4. Religious Bonding Appeal:** A poster that invokes the candidate's religion, but no other religious categories.




Figure 6.4. Classifying posters in terms of religious bonding or bridging functions

Using the same logic, the posters were then classified according to the four categories of indigenous bonding and bridging functions: no indigenous appeal, broad indigenous bridging appeal, cross-indigenous bridging appeal, and indigenous bonding appeal. To conserve space I will not list out these categories or illustrate the logic using a

chart. If I did, it would simply be a copy of the list above and figure 6.4, except with the terms indigenous and indigeneity replacing religious and religion.

Two other types of broad ethnic bridging appeals were identified in the election posters: nationalist appeals and regionalist appeals. Posters were categorized as having a nationalist appeal if they contained at least one element that invoked nationalism. For example, the Indonesian flag was frequently used to make nationalist appeals. Posters were categorized as having a regionalist appeal if there was at least one regional element that did not relate to any specific indigenous or religious group. Regionalist appeals usually took the form of regional-specific words or imagery such as regional maps, monuments, or local landscapes. Both nationalist and regionalist appeals were interpreted as bridging appeals because they appeal to all or almost all of the voters in the electoral district.

Posters were also classified in terms of whether they contained non-ethnic appeals. The most important of these were partisan appeals. Posters were classified as having a partisan appeal if at least one element invoked the candidate's political party. Candidates often made partisan appeals by wearing party clothing, using party logos in the background, or including images of party leaders.<sup>20</sup> Posters also contained appeals to women, youth, class, and policy, and were classified as such—though these were not central to the analysis. Ultimately, this detailed coding scheme allows us to classify each poster by the type of religious, indigenous, nationalist, regionalist, and partisan content.

During fieldwork in Indonesia, I developed the codebook and engaged in the coding and classification of the election posters. Content analysis of campaign materials

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<sup>20</sup> Candidates were legally required to put the party logo on posters. Since it was not a choice, it was not coded as a partisan appeal.

often requires a certain level of expertise to interpret identity-related content.<sup>21</sup> While the 28 fields used to code the Indonesian posters were primarily descriptive, some interpretation was involved in classifying the ethnic dimensions and categories that they represented (e.g., Religion-Islamic, Indigeneity-Batak Karo). This presented some challenges, as a number of posters contained elements specific to particular identity groups and regions that were difficult to identify. These included specific types of clothing, regional buildings, monuments, symbols, and patterns. Over the course of a year, Indonesian informants in Sumatra, Java, and Maluku were consulted to help identify unknown elements in the posters. Online resources, encyclopedias, and scholarly works on ethnic and religious clothing and architecture supplemented the identification of poster elements. Assistance with interpretation was provided by research assistants, informants, and Indonesian voters residing in the electoral districts. In addition, the coding protocol, interpretation issues, and some preliminary results were presented on two occasions in Jakarta: to a general audience at the Freedom Institute and to a panel of experts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Their feedback also contributed to final revisions.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> For example, Chandra (2005a) used a qualitative approach in her content analysis of campaign materials. Drawing on available newspaper reports and other references, an expert decision was made as to whether a party was ethnic or not. McIlwain and Caliendo (2011) used their expertise to code racial appeals in television advertisements. In both cases, the scholars provided details about their definitions of ethnic or racial appeals.

<sup>22</sup> Thanks to all the participants for attending and offering feedback, particularly Kuskridho Ambardi (at the Freedom Institute) and Sunny Tanuwidjaja (at CSIS) for helping organize these events and for providing comments.



## POSTER CAMPAIGNS

While gathering election posters in Indonesia, it soon became apparent that candidates produced multiple election poster designs and often appealed to different ethnic groups in different posters. To test the theory I needed to get measures of appeals for each candidate's entire poster campaign. This enabled me to use the candidate as the unit of analysis. To do so, I aggregated all posters from each candidate's poster campaign. This involved calculating the average percentage of posters that contained each of the 14 main types of appeals for every candidate. Table 6.7 presents the full list of appeal types and a sample distribution for the appeals made in a hypothetical candidate's poster campaign.

**Table 6.7. Ethnic and partisan appeals for a hypothetical candidate's poster campaign**

<b>Identity dimension</b>	<b>Appeal category</b>	<b>% of posters</b>
Religion	1. No religious appeal	0
	2. Broad religious bridging appeal	10
	3. Cross-religious bridging appeal	5
	4. Religious bonding appeal	85
Indigeneity	1. No indigenous appeal	90
	2. Broad indigenous bridging appeal	10
	3. Cross-indigenous bridging appeal	0
	4. Indigenous bonding appeal	0
National	1. No nationalist bridging appeal	15
	2. Nationalist bridging appeal	85
Regional	1. No regionalist bridging appeal	98
	2. Regionalist bridging appeal	2
Partisan	1. No partisan appeal	90
	2. Partisan appeal	10

In this example, the candidate primarily bonds with his/her religious group (rather than his/her indigenous group) and bridges across groups through the use of nationalist appeals. Bridging appeals to indigenous, regional, and partisan groups are very low.

## Part IV: Do Poster Campaigns Affect Voter Choice?

Posters are primarily used in this dissertation to gather information on campaign appeals and to understand how candidates appeal to ethnic groups. However, there is evidence that posters can affect voting behavior. Evidence from Indonesia and other countries indicates that election posters are a highly visible form of advertising that has an impact on electoral outcomes. Drawing on survey data from 12 western European countries, Norris (2000) found that 22% of respondents had read an election poster in the two or three weeks before an election. This was only slightly less than the number who had read a newspaper article on the election. In a study of a 2002 national election in Ireland, Marsh (2004) found that 83% of respondents reported seeing election posters, a figure that was much higher than the percentage that saw newspaper campaign advertisements or election-related information on the Internet. There is no data on the numbers of Indonesians that see or read election posters. However, from observing the abundance of posters in Indonesia compared to western countries, it is highly likely that the figures are higher than those reported by Norris (2000) or Marsh (2004).

Beyond the visibility of posters, evidence suggests that they also affect voter behavior. Scholars have shown that candidates invest in election poster campaigns because they increase political participation (Panagopoulos 2009), generate name

recognition (Kam and Zechmeister 2013), and signal to voters the competitiveness, viability, and popularity of candidates (Dumitrescu 2012; Marsh 2004). In a survey of politicians and an analysis of hundreds of election posters from France and Belgium, Dumitrescu (2009; 2012) found that election posters were an important way for candidates to signal their competitiveness to voters, supporters, and opponents. In Ireland, Marsh (2004) also found evidence for election posters as a signaling mechanism. Irish candidates reported that having numerous posters gave the impression that they were credible.

Aside from signaling the competitiveness of candidates, posters also appeal to voters on an emotional level through the heavy use of visuals and emotive slogans. Scholars have found that visual cues, images, and emotive words can trigger emotional responses and have a particularly persuasive effect on voting behavior (Brader 2005; Huddy and Gunthorsdottir 2000; Masters and Sullivan 1983; Roseman et al. 1986). Political consultants have learned not to underestimate the importance of nonverbal forms of communication, particularly in countries where illiteracy is high. Working on election campaigns in Africa, consultants have emphasized that the choice of colors and symbols used in a campaign can have an important impact on voters (D'apile and Jacobs 2010).

The brief review in this chapter of the use of election posters in Indonesia shows that candidates have relied heavily on the use of visuals and emotive slogans in their poster campaigns throughout the years. Furthermore, survey evidence from Indonesia has shown that posters have an impact on voting behavior. Hill (2009) collected and analyzed opinion surveys on the impact of the media on regional head elections in

which voters are asked what communication medium was the most influential in their choice of candidate. Table 6.8 shows responses from voters who voted for the winning candidates in a governor election in Sulawesi and in district head elections in Manado and Surabaya. Out of numerous options, 11% of respondents (average for the three elections) identified candidate's brochures and posters as having the most influence on their decision to vote for the winning candidate. This figure was on par with newspapers (12%), higher than television commercials (7%), and far higher than money politics (i.e., vote buying; 2%).<sup>23</sup>

In the results presented in table 6.8, direct contact with campaign teams had the strongest impact on voters who chose winning candidates (18% reported it was the main influence on their vote). This result is echoed in election surveys by one of Indonesia's largest survey institutes, Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI). The executive director of LSI, Kuskridho Ambardi, explains "If respondents are asked which mode of communication is most persuasive, in many surveys, a majority say that face-to-face meetings with the candidate are far more persuasive."<sup>24</sup> While direct communication with voters is a critical part of a successful campaign, the figures here suggest that the media as a whole (television, radio, newspapers, and posters) has a larger impact on voter choice and that, among media types, posters have a significant effect.

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<sup>23</sup> While much is made of vote buying in election reports and case studies, the figure here is very low. However, it is likely that due to political correctness among respondents, this figure is underestimated. Also, the extent and impact of vote buying can vary widely across candidates and regions.

<sup>24</sup> Personal correspondence with Kuskridho Ambardi, executive director of Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI).

**Table 6.8. Influence of campaign methods on voters of winning candidates in three regional head elections**

Most influential method*	Percentage of respondents			
	North Sulawesi Governor election	Manado District head election	Surabaya District head election	Average
TV ad	4	6	10	7
TV news	11	10	13	11
TV debate shows	6	9	10	8
Radio	3	3	1	2
Newspaper	13	10	12	12
Brochure, poster or banner	12	10	11	11
Direct communication with campaign team	24	19	11	18
Money politics	0	5	1	2
Others	6	4	6	5
No influence	15	15	20	17
No Answer	5	8	6	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

*Note:* Winning tickets were Sarundanjung and Sualang in North Sulawesi, Rimba and Buchari in Manado, and Bambang and Arif in Surabaya. Source: Table adapted from data in Hill (2009).

\* As chosen by survey respondents.

In line with these findings, candidates, campaign managers, and journalists who I spoke with in Indonesia believed that posters were an important part of a successful campaign and they spent a considerable portion of their budget on their poster campaigns. They explained that numerous posters lent credibility to a candidate's electoral bid and sent a signal to the public that the candidate had money. Posters also offered face recognition, which was particularly important for candidates who were not very well known. However, some limitations of posters were noted by candidates. With limited space, posters cannot offer much detail on a candidate's vision and mission, and they are just one of number of campaign activities that are critical for electoral success.

## Conclusions

In this chapter, I explained how to quantify campaign appeals from election posters. While the content analysis of textual campaign messages is common in the literature, the content analysis of campaign visuals is not. The methodology presented in this chapter adds to the literature by explaining how to perform a content analysis of election posters, which are primarily a visual medium.

There are many advantages to using election posters as a source of campaign appeals (particularly ethnic appeals). First, evidence from LSI's opinion surveys indicates that election posters are an important source of information for Indonesian voters. As Kuskridho Ambardi explained, "According to LSI, surveys, posters, billboards, and banners provide the most information concerning who the candidates are in regional executive elections."<sup>25</sup> Second, posters are a low-cost form of advertising and, as a result, they are an abundant source of data on how major and minor candidates appeal to voters. Campaign appeals on posters are also quite focused. With limited space on a poster canvas, candidates must carefully choose the visual and verbal elements that will resonate with voters. This brevity has advantages for researchers; it makes it feasible to perform content analysis on posters and to compare content across multiple regions and thousands of candidates.

Finally, election posters are a particularly good medium for studying identity appeals due to their heavy use of evocative imagery and emotive messages. In 1955, posters contained stark, but powerful, party logos representing alternative ideologies and forms of self-identification. During the authoritarian era, the creative use of

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<sup>25</sup> Personal correspondence with Kuskridho Ambardi, executive director of Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI).

nationalist and religious visual symbols continued to be prominent in posters. While there is continuity in the use of identity symbols in contemporary elections, posters have become more professional and contain a more complex mix of identity-related imagery. They feature candidates dressed in Islamic, ethnic, or political party clothing and images of mosques, traditional-style houses, party leaders, regional monuments, and the Indonesian flag. Posters also use short emotive messages and identity-related words. For research on identity politics, the visuals in election posters are an ideal source of data regarding the kinds of identity appeals made by candidates. Overall, using election posters to analyze campaign appeals has many advantages. They are an important and plentiful source of data that is focused, comparable, and commonly used by both major and minor candidates to appeal to identity groups.

SECTION III

# The Politicization of Ethnicity



# Democratization and the Legislative Elections

This chapter presents results from the first empirical test of the main argument in this dissertation. In chapter 2, I argued that under party-centric rules, the political party, its ideology, and partisan appeals will be a major part of candidates' campaigns. In contrast, under candidate-centric rules, local issues and local ethnic groups will feature more prominently. In this chapter, I test this thesis by comparing Indonesian legislative campaigns between 1997 and 2009. During this period, the electoral rules evolved from party-centric to more candidate-centric (see figure 4.1). The 1997 election was party-centric and had additional regulations and procedures that empowered the ruling hegemonic party, Golkar. The 1999 election was also party-centric, but allowed for genuine multiparty democratic competition. The major shift came before the 2009 election. With the introduction of open lists, Indonesian legislative elections became more candidate-centric. If my argument is correct, the importance of the political party and its platform should be evident in campaigns for the 1997 and 1999 elections. The 2009 election campaign, however, should feature more local issues and appeals to local ethnic groups.

This chapter has three parts. Part 1 presents an overview of the campaign data, which was gathered from newspaper reports (see chapter 5), and presents figures on the number of reports, by political party, for each election. Part 2 focuses on the campaign issues cited in the reports. For each election, I describe the context and present the quantitative findings, highlighting the issues that were most prevalent. This is supplemented with examples, discussions, and interpretations of how the campaign issues were framed. Findings show that issues shifted from broad national economic development in 1997, to reform in 1999, and to a more diverse range of local issues in 2009.

In part 3, I compare four indicators of identity politics in the campaigns. For each, a presentation of the quantitative findings is followed by a discussion of changes over time. First, I discuss changes in the types of social groups to which candidates appealed. Findings show that appeals to class and youth declined and appeals to ethnic groups and women increased. Second, I show a change in the types of campaign events. Mass party rallies declined, while smaller gatherings with community-based groups and ethnic groups increased. Third, I discuss the emergence of a diverse range of local elites and associations (both ethnic and non-ethnic) as prominent supporters of candidates in 2009. Finally, the most substantial change was that candidates spoke more about themselves—their ethnic identities, their leadership roles, and their character traits.

In the conclusion for this chapter, I argue that the main protagonist in newspaper election reports has shifted dramatically from the political party to the candidate. This has affected campaign issues, group appeals, campaign events, elite supporters, and the importance of the candidate's persona. Overall, the move to candidate-centric rules in

Indonesian legislative elections has resulted in broad changes to campaigns that are consistent with the argument of this dissertation. In contrast to 1997 and 1999, parties and party platforms became less central in 2009. Candidates increased their efforts to connect with constituents by emphasizing local issues and appealing to local, often ethnic, groups.

## Part I: Overview of Newspaper Report Data

To study the changes in campaigns, I engaged in a quantitative and qualitative analysis of a North Sumatran provincial newspaper, *Waspada*. Reports from the 1997, 1999, and 2009 legislative elections were chosen because there were important changes in the electoral rules between elections. In each of these years elections were held for the district, provincial, and national legislatures.<sup>1</sup> Every newspaper report for the last four weeks prior to each election was coded for the type of election and the political party. For each year, there were approximately 200 reports.

Table 7.1 shows the percentage of reports on each of Indonesia's main political parties. With the introduction of democracy, there was a large increase in the number of parties—48 parties competed in the 1999 election and 38 competed in 2009.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> In 2009 elections were also held for a national upper house legislature (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD). They were excluded from the final analysis for two reasons. First, because there were no elections for this legislative body in 1997 and 1999, and second, because they used different electoral rules—candidates ran independents in each province and they are elected using the single nontransferable vote instead of open list proportional representation.

<sup>2</sup> An additional six parties also competed in Aceh's regional legislative elections in 2009.

**Table 7.1. Distribution of political parties in campaign-related newspaper reports**

Political party	% of reports		
	1997	1999	2009
Golkar	65	27	22
PPP	22	7	7
PDI or PDI-P*	13	7	4
PAN	-	12	22
PKB	-	2	3
PK or PKS*	-	0	3
PD	-	-	12
Gerindra	-	-	2
Hanura	-	-	5
PDS	-	-	3
Other Parties	-	42	19
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

*Note:* Percentages are based on the total number of campaign-related reports in *Waspada* printed in the final four weeks of campaigning for each election year ( $N = 195, 197,$  and  $200$  for 1997, 1999, and 2009, respectively). Refer to List of Abbreviations for full party names. A dash means the party did not compete in the election.

\* Some party names changed between the 1999 and 2009 elections; PDI became PDI-P and PK became PKS.

The campaign coverage in *Waspada* reveals some bias in the reporting.

Unsurprisingly, under authoritarian rule, reports on Golkar's campaigns were the most common. In the four-week period prior to the 1997 election, 65% of the reports were on Golkar candidates and campaigns. The Islamic party, PPP, was covered in 22% of the reports, and only 13% of the reports were about PDI. This was likely due to formal and informal government controls on the media and the decline in popularity of PDI after Megawati was ousted. Nevertheless, in 1999 and 2009 the PDI-P (Megawati's faction that split from PDI) received minimal coverage, despite its relative popularity in parts of

North Sumatra. At the same time, Golkar and the Islamic modernist party, PAN, received more extensive coverage. Outside the main parties, there were many reports on small parties in 1999; over 40% of the coverage was on parties that won less than 5% of the vote. However, as it became clear who the main parties were, coverage of the smaller parties declined in 2009.

All campaign-related reports were scanned and stored in a digital database. After coding for the type of election and political party, I went through the reports chronologically and coded every second report for campaign issues and identity appeals. In total, 79 reports were coded for the 1997 election, 80 for the 1999 election, and 107 for the 2009 election (for information on the regional press, the newspaper *Waspada*, and more details on how I selected and coded the reports, see chapter 4).<sup>3</sup>

## Part II: Issue Politics

The distribution of campaign issues mentioned in the reports is shown in table 7.2. There are 11 main issue categories (e.g., agriculture, business) and 33 subcategories (e.g., farming, fishing). For example, in 1997 13% of the reports referred to farming, 3% referred to fishing, and 0% referred to agricultural loans and investment issues. I also calculated the percentage of reports that mentioned any of the issue categories. For example, 14% of the reports mentioned farming, fishing, or agricultural loans and investment. (This figure is lower than the sum of the agricultural issues because farming and fishing were both mentioned in many of the same articles.) These numbers reveal

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<sup>3</sup> I also coded half of the 72 reports for the DPD candidates. However, they were excluded for reasons stated in footnote 1.

the campaign issues that parties and candidates emphasized most in each election. Overall, there has been some shift in campaign issues that corresponds with Indonesia's move towards a more candidate-centric electoral system. Issues shifted from an emphasis on broad national economic development in 1997, to reform in 1999, and to a more diverse range of local issues in 2009. Beginning with the 1997 election, I will discuss the broader political context in which each election was held and then discuss the issues candidates raised based on the newspaper reports from each election.

**Table 7.2. Distribution of campaign issues in campaign-related newspaper reports**

Issue	Type of issue	% of reports		
		1997	1999	2009
<b>Agriculture</b>	Farming	13	3	8
	Fishing	3	-	1
	Loans and investment	-	1	-
	<b>Any agricultural issue</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Business</b>	International	3	1	1
	Local markets and business	5	5	7
	Loans and investment	-	1	2
	<b>Any business issue</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Consumer</b>	Goods and utilities	4	1	5
	Housing	-	-	1
	<b>Any consumer issue</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Corruption</b>	<b>Any corruption issue</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>Economy</b>	Budgets and debt	-	4	3
	Economic development	30	12	11
	Financial crisis	-	5	2
	<b>Any economic issue</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Government services</b>	Bureaucracy	-	1	2
	Education	34	15	18
	Health	13	6	12
	Sports	-	1	2
	<b>Any government services issue</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>26</b>

**Table 7.2. Distribution of campaign issues in campaign-related newspaper reports**

Issue	Type of issue	% of reports		
		1997	1999	2009
<b>Infrastructure</b>	Environmental protection	1	-	7
	Natural disasters	1	-	5
	Transportation	9	3	9
	Other infrastructure	-	-	3
	<b>Any infrastructure issue</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>Jobs and welfare</b>	Inequality and poverty	24	5	2
	Jobs and income	16	11	7
	Social welfare	1	1	1
	Tax	1	-	-
	<b>Any jobs and social welfare issue</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Reform and democracy</b>	Government reform	4	57	8
	Economic reform	3	16	2
	Land reform	-	9	1
	Democratic development	3	12	16
	<b>Any reform and democracy issue</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>Ethnic</b>	Indigenous	-	-	1
	Religious	9	1	4
	<b>Any Ethnic issue</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Security and social order</b>	Crime	9	10	4
	Group conflict	1	7	2
	National defense	1	1	1
	Social issues	3	1	2
	<b>Any security and social order issue</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Any issue</b>		<b>77</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>68</b>

*Note:* Percentages are based on the number of coded reports for each election year. 79, 80, and 107 reports in *Waspada* printed in during the campaign period were coded for campaign issues for 1997, 1999, and 2009, respectively (total = 266). The percentage of reports for the 'Any issue' entries are lower than the sum of the issues in cases where multiple issues were mentioned in the same article. A dash means 0%.

#### 1997: ECONOMIC ISSUES

The 1997 election took place in an environment of violence and increased political tensions. Megawati Sukarnoputri, the head of PDI (and daughter of Indonesia's first

president, Sukarno), had become a threat to the regime because of her genuine popularity. In June 1996, she was removed from her position as head of PDI by the government and replaced with a more compliant figure, Suryadi. Her treatment appalled many, and there were increasing calls for more democracy from a small but vocal group of students, intellectuals, and academics. The following month, Megawati's supporters refused to leave PDI's headquarters in Jakarta. They were subsequently attacked by men claiming to be Suryadi supporters, backed by the military and police. The ensuing riot was the worst outbreak of violence in the capital in more than 20 years (Eklöf 1997, 1183-84). More broadly, there was widespread sectarian and communal violence in East Timor, Aceh, Java, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan leading up to the election (Schiller 1999, 8). Worried about the potential for violence and instability during the election, the government placed additional restrictions on campaigning, including a ban on street rallies.<sup>4</sup>

#### Golkar's Economic Platform

The majority of campaign-related reports in *Waspada* for the 1997 election covered Golkar's campaigns, and economic issues were prevalent. Three categories of issues—jobs and welfare, government services, and the economy—accounted for 55% of all campaign issue appeals. Within these categories, three subcategories comprised 40% of all issue appeals—economic development, education, and inequality and poverty. Emphasis on these campaign issues came primarily from Golkar candidates. In most cases, these issue appeals were vague and lacked specifics—the standard,

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<sup>4</sup> See National Democratic Institute (1997, 9) for details on the additional campaign regulations.



repetitive script used by Golkar candidates.<sup>5</sup> However, Golkar candidates made a point of highlighting the impressive levels of economic growth as a means to support their arguments. Golkar must win, they argued, in order for this economic development to continue (Waspada 1997 5/16). Economic development was the basis for the government's legitimacy and the core argument for their continued rule. To a large extent, Golkar's ownership of this issue resonated with many Indonesians who viewed Golkar as the party of economic development. Liddle (1996a, 35) pointed out that many believed the government was pro-development and accorded it legitimacy for that reason. However, accepting the government's claim of democratic legitimacy was merely a "useful fiction" (Liddle 1996a, 35).

#### The Opposition Responds

The opposition parties raised economic issues that were similar to Golkar's in their content and lack of specifics. With no track record in government, the opposition parties spent more time attempting to undermine Golkar's inventory of economic achievements. Scholars and observers commented that the PPP was far more reform-oriented and critical of the government in 1997 compared to previous elections. With Megawati sidelined for the election, the PPP took on the mantle of "defender of the little people" and drew large crowds (Eklöf 1997, 1186; National Democratic Institute 1997, 11-12). They presented three stinging critiques of Golkar in the Waspada reports.

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<sup>5</sup> In one of the more specific examples, a Golkar candidate detailed high levels of economic growth, increases in rice production, nine years of mandatory education, increases in literacy and life expectancy, and a decrease in poverty. All of these economic improvements in livelihood were cast as the sole work of Golkar. See Waspada (1997a 5/10). In other ethnographic studies of village-level campaigns at the time, scholars have pointed out that Golkar candidates highlighted specific infrastructure-related projects (such as roads, water, and electricity) provided by Golkar in the village. See Cederroth (2004).

First, while they could not deny that there were economic advances during the New Order, they argued that such development was the result of the hard work and taxes paid by the Indonesian people, not Golkar (Waspada 1997b 5/10). Second, they focused on rising levels of inequality, framing Golkar as a group of self-interested elites who did not care about the little people (*rakyat kecil*). They argued that 10% had benefited from Indonesia's development while 90% were still poor, and 20 million people had an annual income of \$1,500 or more, while 168 million lived on less than \$390 a year (Waspada 1997 5/13; Waspada 1997 5/19). Furthermore, they criticized conglomerates and large commercial fishing companies, which were owned by Suharto's family and close associates.

The third and most prevalent way the opposition attacked Golkar was on the issue of corruption and intimidation. In over 50% of reports on the PPP's campaign PPP candidates either directly or indirectly accused Golkar of being corrupt and engaging in intimidation. The PPP candidates suggested that the ruling party was involved in ongoing corruption and collusion and used force and fraud to win the last election. They argued that the legal system was owned by one group, that there was one person in charge, and that corruption went unpunished.<sup>6</sup> The PPP vowed that if they were elected, they would eradicate all forms of corruption and intimidation.

The vigorous campaign by PPP and the issue of Golkar's corrupt practices were replicated across the country and had the effect of forcing Golkar to respond and put forth a plan to combat corruption (National Democratic Institute 1997). In the end, the 1997 election turned out to be the most violent of the New Order elections. There were

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<sup>6</sup> For these critiques, see Waspada (1997b 5/10; 1997 5/13; 1997b 5/22; 1997 5/24)

frequent clashes between PPP and Golkar supporters and between Megawati and Suryadi supporters. According to official figures, at least 273 people were killed (Eklöf 1997, 1187). In addition, it was Golkar's most intensive campaign effort in terms of mobilizing the bureaucracy, buying off voters, intimidation, and vote-rigging (Schiller 1999, 9-13). Predictably, Golkar won the election with 74.5% of the national vote; PPP improved on previous performances with 22.4% of the vote, while PDI fell to a dismal 3.1%. Overall, the issues raised by candidates were broad and national. Golkar candidates promoted national economic development, while candidates from the main opposition party, PPP, emphasized inequality and corruption.

#### 1999: REFORM ISSUES

With the freedom to form political parties, the 1999 election saw the formation of 45 new parties that competed along with Golkar, PDI, and PPP.<sup>7</sup> Fearing clashes between party supporters, a number of restrictions were placed on campaigns: the campaign period was reduced to 17 days, large parties had to campaign on alternating days, and motorized parades were banned (King 2003, 88). In the Waspada reports, the campaign rhetoric centered on issues of reform, democracy, and corruption.

Specifically, 64% of reports contained references to reform and democracy, the bulk of which addressed the issue of government reform, and 30% of reports raised the issue of corruption. There were very few references to other issues.

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<sup>7</sup> 140 parties registered, but most did not pass the screening process. See King (2003, 82).

## The Opposition's Reformist Platform

In the reports, the opposition parties (i.e., all but Golkar) unanimously blamed the New Order regime and its corrupt practices for the problems faced by Indonesia. The reports singled out Suharto, B. J. Habibie (Suharto's vice president), Golkar, the Indonesian military, and local leaders connected to the regime. Candidates engaged in scathing attacks on the New Order, blaming it for 32 years of rampant corruption that went unchecked by the courts. These abuses of power, they argued, eventually led to the economic crisis and a massive national debt. In particular, candidates pointed out that Suharto, his family, and those closely connected to the regime had become rich by controlling large conglomerates. Their self-interested and corrupt business practices had destroyed the nation.<sup>8</sup> The New Order was also accused of being an unfair and cruel regime, a regime that used its strength to intimidate the people and take away their free speech and individual rights.

The solution, the opposition argued, was to remove Suharto, Golkar, and the military from power and put anyone who engaged in corruption on trial, including Suharto. There were a number of calls for Suharto's property to be confiscated. In addition, candidates called for the removal of the governor of North Sumatra, Rizal Nurdin, and for the dismissal of Asahan's district head, H. R. Sihotang, who was facing allegations of corruption.<sup>9</sup> All of the opposition parties defined themselves as pro-reformasi (reform) and anti-status quo. Each argued that their pro-reform agenda would

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<sup>8</sup> For examples of these scathing attacks, see Waspada (1999b 5/17; 1999 5/20; 1999a 5/29; 1999 5/31). The Indonesian military was singled out in one report for engaging in torture and killings in Aceh and Papua. See Waspada (1999b 5/22).

<sup>9</sup> On criticism of Suharto, see Waspada (1999b 5/17; 1999b 5/22; 1999a 5/30). On criticism of other elites, see Waspada (1999a 5/26).

put the country on the right course. In particular, PAN defined itself as “the real reformasi party,” arguing that they did not have any leaders from the New Order (Waspada 1999a 6/4). In contrast, PPP—who had benefited to some degree from their institutionalized position during the New Order—had to work harder to get the message across that they were not a status quo party. They came out strongly in favor of putting Suharto on trial (Waspada 1999a 5/26). In terms of policy, most of the opposition parties argued that the eradication of corruption was the solution to Indonesia’s problems.

Parties with more of a leftist leaning went even further. They critiqued the capitalist system, particularly the unfair distribution of capital and the ownership of plantation land by large conglomerates. While some of these parties presented specific policy goals relating to labor rights, social security, and the taxation of businesses, others promoted the vague concept of a “people’s economic system,” an economy based on farmers, labor and fishermen.<sup>10</sup>

### Golkar Responds

This new campaign environment was, to say the least, challenging for Golkar candidates. As Antlöv (2004a, 10) explains, “If in 1997 Golkar was identified with the New Order and portrayed as the source of all development, in 1999 the party was portrayed by the opposition as the root of all evil in the country.” The devastation caused by the economic crisis destroyed Golkar’s legitimacy as a party that delivers

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<sup>10</sup> For examples of leftist reform messages, see Waspada (1999c 5/22; 1999b 5/29).

economic growth. The removal of Golkar was now the main issue. Golkar candidates scrambled to defend themselves in the reports with two arguments.

First, while Golkar candidates made some apologies for past mistakes, they primarily spent their time refashioning themselves as supporters of democracy and an anti-status quo party. Half of their reports had a pro-reformasi message. They explained that they welcomed the new era of democracy, that there was an internal plan to reform the party, that they had already rid themselves of corrupt politicians, and that they were now an independent party, separate from the government. The term Golkar Baru (New Golkar) was banded about by a number of Golkar candidates.<sup>11</sup>

Second, Golkar drew on an interpretation of history that cast itself as the protector of Indonesia's nationalist Pancasila ideology. They argued that they were the nation's savior because they defeated communism and had served as a bulwark against the communist threat since the mid 1960s. This may have had some resonance. After years of anticommunist rhetoric by the New Order, communists were the most hated and feared group in Indonesia (Antara 2004). Playing on these fears, Golkar candidates argued that a dangerous latent communist movement was re-emerging. To protect against this evil, a continuation of Golkar's rule was necessary (Waspada 1999c 5/30). In sum, Golkar argued that they were pro-reformasi and were not the enemy—the communists were. In the end, Megawati's PDI-P was the big winner, with 34% of the vote. Golkar did surprisingly well with 22%, and a number of the Islam-inspired parties received between 1 and 22%.<sup>12</sup> Overall, while there was a shift from economic appeals

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<sup>11</sup> On Golkar recasting themselves as reformist, see Waspada (1999a 5/22; 1999b 5/26; 1999a 6/3).

<sup>12</sup> For more detail on the results, see, Liddle (1999)

to democratic reform issues between 1997 and 1999, campaign rhetoric remained broad and national. Candidates spent most of their time defining and promoting the pro-reformasi credentials of their political party.

#### 2009: REGIONAL AND PARTICULARISTIC ISSUES

Compared to the economic issues in 1997 and the reform issues in 1999, the types of issues raised in the 2009 reports were more diverse. The open list system attracted many candidates who were not ordinarily involved in politics, including celebrities who could draw on their name recognition, professionals, and ordinary citizens such as housewives, motorcycle taxi drivers, street vendors, and laborers who ran in the regional legislative elections.<sup>13</sup> Coming from a diverse range of backgrounds, they tended to promote specific issues related to their experience working in local sectors such as business, tourism, agriculture, education, and sports.

Overall, candidates in 2009 emphasized issues that were more focused and more local. Reports increasingly contained information about specific local issues instead of repetitive slogans for national development or government reform, which were common in previous elections. The most prominent issue categories in 2009 were government services, reform and democracy, and infrastructure. These issues were often framed in a local or regional context.

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<sup>13</sup> See, Heryanto (2010, 186-87) for some colorful examples.

## Local Economic Issues

Government services issues appeared in 26% of reports and were framed in regional rather than national terms. Numerous candidates emphasized the development of local educational and health services and the need for funding to be distributed locally to support these government services.<sup>14</sup> Appeals for radical reform (government, economic, and land) and the eradication of corruption declined considerably. In addition, explicitly negative attacks on other parties or candidates were rare. The new system had created a new playing field in which there was no longer a clear enemy. Multiple parties were in competition with each other, and within each party, candidates had to compete for personal votes. With so many players, candidates were better off spending their time and resources raising their name recognition and their image among voters rather than engaging in negative attacks on others.

The reform and democracy category of issues was relatively prominent (24% of reports). However, instead of promoting radical reform, candidates promoted softer and more positive issues of local democratic development. This included educating voters on how to vote for a candidate name, local efforts to get out the vote, and issues of voting procedures and irregularities.<sup>15</sup> Overall, it suggests there was a general consensus on the economic and democratic system at the time, which is consistent with survey reports showing that Indonesians are supportive of democracy.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> For examples see, Waspada (2009 3/23; 2009a 3/27; 2009b 3/27)

<sup>15</sup> Addressing the issue of non-voters (Golput), a PAN candidate emphasized that Indonesia's top Muslim clerical body, the Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI), had a fatwa against not voting, and he appealed to the youth to vote. See Waspada (2009a 4/4).

<sup>16</sup> 77% of Indonesians believe that democracy is the best system. See Mietzner (2013, Kindle Locations 466-467).



Candidates regularly raised the issue of developing local infrastructure, and did so far more often than in previous elections. Infrastructure issues appeared in 20% of reports, and close to half of these issue appeals involved promises to improve local roads in Medan and the outlying areas, such as Labuhan Batu, Langkat, Karo, and Dairi. There was also an emphasis on new local infrastructure issues, such as protection of the local environment. A number of candidates promoted planting trees and stressed the need to clean up rivers and fumigate against mosquitos to prevent the spread of dengue fever. Other new issues included flood protection and the building of a new airport in Medan.<sup>17</sup>

#### Candidate-Centric Rules and Financial Decentralization

The move towards a more candidate-centric system (coupled with an extensive decentralization program) was accompanied by a shift from national issues to local issues. Under a more candidate-centric system, candidates had more incentives to find out what their constituents expect. To do so, they increasingly hired professional survey companies and political consultants. These professionals use surveys to determine the name recognition and likeability of candidates among different demographics. They also identify key issues that constituents care about.<sup>18</sup> Survey companies and consultants became major actors in the 2009 election and often directed their clients to focus on local issues (such as infrastructure, education, and health) to improve their likeability among constituents.

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<sup>17</sup> For examples on environmental protection issues, see Waspada (2009 3/13; 2009 3/19), and on developing roads see Waspada (2009 3/28).

<sup>18</sup> For more detail and discussion on the work of survey companies and political consultants, see Qodari (2010) and Mietzner (2013, Kindle Locations 3960-3961).

In addition to constituents' attraction to local projects, decentralization provided candidates with an avenue to funnel money into local health, educational, and infrastructure projects.<sup>19</sup> This helps explain the shift from broad programmatic (though vague) issue politics in previous elections, to more regionally specific issue politics in 2009.<sup>20</sup> The rhetoric of individual candidates reflected these changes. For example, in campaign speeches in 1997, Golkar's Serta Ginting made broad statements about how his party looks after the welfare of poor people. In contrast, in his campaign speeches in 2009, he made more specific regional statements, framing himself as a candidate who could channel more funds into the development of education, health, roads, and agriculture in North Sumatra (Waspada 2009b 4/5; Waspada 2009 4/6). While issue politics became more local, the overall emphasis on campaign issues declined. The number of reports that discussed campaign issues fell from 77% in previous elections to 69% in 2009. The primary reason for this decrease was that candidates spent more time talking about themselves in order to increase their name recognition. Rather than issue politics, identity politics became the larger focus.

### Part III: Identity Politics

While part 2 discussed campaign issues raised in the elections, more central to this dissertation is how candidates appealed to identity groups. I analyzed four ways in which candidates appealed to ethnic and non-ethnic identity groups in the newspaper

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<sup>19</sup> A candidate from PAN touted the idea of splitting Medan into two districts in order to get more regional funding for infrastructure Waspada (2009b 3/27). The practice of district splitting has become a prominent phenomenon in Indonesia since democratization.

<sup>20</sup> A number of candidates promoted regional interests by lauding North Sumatra's tourist attractions and promising to develop them. See Waspada (2009a 3/14; 2009a 4/1).

reports covering the 1997, 1999, and 2009 elections. Candidates appealed to identity groups using (a) direct appeals that invoked a social group, (b) specific types of campaign events, (c) the names of supporting elites and associations, and (d) references to the candidate's identity.

#### DIRECT APPEALS TO ETHNIC AND NON-ETHNIC GROUPS

In each of the elections, candidates regularly appealed directly to social groups (both ethnic and non-ethnic) in newspaper reports. To be coded as a direct group appeal, the candidate needed to invoke the group by name or use terms closely associated with an identity group, and the appeals needed to be positive. Table 7.3 shows the percentage of reports that contained appeals to different social groups. Social group appeals were categorized as occupational, ethnic, and other. Between 1997 and 2009, appeals to class, youth, and nationalist groups declined. Appeals to religious groups (primarily Islam) stayed relatively constant, while appeals to indigenous groups, regional groups, and women increased.

#### Decline in Appeals to Class, Youth, and Nationalist Groups

The biggest change in the 2009 election was a decline in appeals to the lower class. Appeals to agricultural workers, urban workers, and the marginalized and poor all plummeted. In 1997, appeals to the lower class were common among the three political parties, although the tone of the appeals was somewhat different. Golkar often appealed to class-based groups on the basis of past, present, or future distributions of material benefits. For example, they provided motorbikes to street traders (*kaki lima*)

and passed out rice and cash payments to motorbike taxi (becak) drivers. They also regularly proclaimed themselves as a champion of the underclass (Waspada 1997 5/1; Waspada 1997 5/21). In contrast, the opposition parties appealed to class-based groups on issues of social injustice. They emphasized the problems faced by these groups, such as inequality, pollution, lack of fertilizer, and the dwindling fish population (Waspada 1997 5/18; Waspada 1997a 5/22).

**Table 7.3. Distribution of appeals to social groups in campaign-related newspaper reports**

Group	Type of social group	% of reports		
		1997	1999	2009
Occupational	Agricultural workers	25	20	8
	Urban workers	18	16	5
	Civil servants	13	3	4
	<b>Any occupational group appeal</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>14</b>
Ethnic	Religious	39	31	37
	Indigenous	5	5	9
	<b>Any ethnic group appeal</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>45</b>
Other	Marginalized and poor	19	25	15
	Women	5	5	11
	Youth	29	16	14
	Nationalist	20	10	11
	<b>Any other group appeal</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>Any group appeal</b>		<b>0.84</b>	<b>0.82</b>	<b>0.71</b>

*Note:* Percentages are based on the number of coded reports for each election year. 79, 80, and 107 reports in *Waspada* printed in during the campaign period were coded for social groups for 1997, 1999, and 2009, respectively (total = 266). The percentage of reports for the 'Any group appeal' entries are lower than the sum of the group appeals in cases where multiple group appeals were mentioned in the same article. A dash means 0%.

In 1999, amid a devastating financial crisis and rising levels of unemployment, the opposition parties made more radical appeals to the lower classes. They particularly

targeted the marginalized and poor. At the same time, they distanced themselves from the government, and appeals to the civil service declined. Candidates appealed to farmers and fishermen, criticizing the large fishing companies and proposing land reform. They appealed to labor, arguing that wages were too low and that workers had been continuously ignored by a government that had denied them their rights.<sup>21</sup> Amid a devastating financial crisis, class was an important social group. Candidates promised to build new factories, make bank loans available to the poor, and provide care for orphans.

In 2009, appeals to these class-based groups became far more muted and took on a different tone.<sup>22</sup> Candidates tended to promote their personal efforts to help the poor and the marginalized, rather than their party's pro-poor platform. One candidate spoke of his efforts to help earthquake and flood victims, another spoke of using her legal background to help the poor, while others highlighted their personal efforts to provide medical attention to those in need.<sup>23</sup>

In addition to the decline in appeals to class-based groups, the percentage of reports that invoked youth was cut in half after 1997. In 1997, Golkar targeted youth more than any other social group. They made numerous references about their concern for the younger generation and how they were prioritizing education and jobs for young people. Golkar's effort to appeal to youth can be interpreted in terms of Golkar's fear of

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<sup>21</sup> For examples of appeals to farmers and fishermen, see Waspada (1999c 5/29; 1999 5/31). For appeals to labor, see Waspada (1999b 5/22; 1999b 6/3). Industrial workers in Medan were a particularly volatile group. With low wages and bad working conditions, labor demands had increased in recent years, resulting in a suppression of labor protests in Medan in 1994. See Liddle (1996b).

<sup>22</sup> A few candidates argued that the regional government needed to do more for farmers and the poor and make more of an effort to educate urban workers.

<sup>23</sup> See Waspada (2009a 3/17; 2009 3/25; 2009b 3/26).

the younger generation, many of whom were part of a more vocal opposition. Golkar attempted to craft a narrative of having the full support of youth. Following a meeting with students, Golkar candidates reported that they had the full, uncritical support of students. The students, they said, were rational when it came to politics, not emotional (Waspada 1997a 5/23). One year later, emotion-filled student protests brought Golkar's 32-year rule to an end. Golkar's appeals to youth dropped off in the 1999 election and youth appeals by other parties also declined. In 2009, youth appeals remained at a low level, though some candidates proposed creating workshops and co-ops run by youth while others appealed to more pious youth by promising more religious activities for young people (Waspada 2009b 3/14; Waspada 2009 3/20).

Finally, nationalist appeals declined after 1997. Previously, almost all nationalist appeals were from Golkar and invoked a nationalist ideology. Nationalist appeals were limited in 1999 because issues of democratization and decentralization had come to the forefront. With candidates focusing on a more diverse range of regional groups in 2009, nationalist appeals remained limited.

#### Increase in Appeals to Ethnic Groups and Women

In 1997, 39% of campaign-related reports in Waspada contained direct appeals targeting religious—primarily Islamic—groups. While appeals to religious groups declined in 1999 (31%), they increased in 2009 (37%). Two reasons can explain the relatively high figure for 1997. First, there were very few reports on PDI, the most secular of the three parties. Second, with the rise of Islam in Indonesia during the late 1980s and 1990s (in particular, the growing numbers of modernist Muslims), Golkar's

leadership began to consciously project a more Islamic image in an attempt to co-opt Muslims and maintain its dominant position.<sup>24</sup> In the reports, Golkar candidates said that Islam was playing a larger role in the party and they emphasized the importance of Islamic clerics in supporting the state. In keeping with the party's national platform, they added that Golkar allowed freedom of worship for all religious groups.<sup>25</sup>

In 1999, it was mainly the religious parties that appealed to religious groups. Some parties (like PKB) were more moderate, while others (such as Partai Umat Muslimin Indonesia) were more staunch in their Islamic appeals.<sup>26</sup> Meanwhile, the nationalist parties primarily appealed to class-based groups. In 2009, there was an increase in appeals to the Muslim population that came primarily from nationalist party candidates.<sup>27</sup> In 1999, 24% of nationalist party campaign reports contained direct appeals targeting the Muslim population. This figure rose by almost a third in the 2009 election. In addition, there was a modest decline in appeals to Muslim groups by Islamic parties—from 75% of articles in 1999 to 68% in 2009. Overall, the reports suggest that the gap between Islamic and nationalist parties in regard to the number of appeals to Islam narrowed during this time. Scholars have highlighted this move to the center by

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<sup>24</sup> Beginning in the mid-1980s, the government made a number of concessions, including allowing female students to wear the jilbab in state schools and establishing a new Islamic organization, the The All-Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) under the leadership of Habibie. In addition, Suharto made the pilgrimage to Mecca. See Liddle (1996b; 1996a). For more on politics and the rise of Islam, see Hefner (1993; 1996c).

<sup>25</sup> See Waspada (1997 5/17; 1997b 5/23; 1997 5/8).

<sup>26</sup> In the reports, PKB candidates emphasized their support by the Ulama, but also added that the party did not have a formal set of Islamic principles. See Waspada (1999a 5/21). In contrast, Partai Umat Muslimin Indonesia said it was haram to choose a party that had a mix of candidates that were Muslim and non-Muslim. See Waspada (1999b 6/4). Meanwhile the PPP celebrated the fact that it could officially define itself as an Islamic party and return to their former Islamic symbol, the Kasbah. See Waspada (1999b 5/30).

<sup>27</sup> In one example, a Partai Patriot candidate appealed to youth to improve scientific knowledge under the banner of Islam (Waspada 2009 3/31).

parties, referring to it as the “mainstreaming of Islam” (Platzdasch 2009; Tanuwidjaja 2010). It should be noted that while there were many appeals to Islam in the newspaper reports, appeals to other religious groups (e.g., Christian, Buddhist) were rare or absent. This suggests that social restrictions existed on the politicization of minority religious groups. I will return to this point in the following chapters.

In 2009, the percentage of reports that invoked indigenous groups almost doubled. There were a few mentions of the Karo indigenous group and the Indonesian Chinese in 1999, however the diversity of indigenous groups increased in 2009. Candidates appealed to the Minangkabau, Javanese, Malay, Toba Batak, Karo, and the Indonesian Chinese.<sup>28</sup> Candidates usually invoked these groups while emphasizing their personal connection with the group or highlighting the importance of preserving the group’s culture. In one report, a candidate talked about how close he felt to the Minangkabau people. In another, a Golkar candidate said that traditional art, such as Kuda Lumping, is one of Indonesia’s treasures and must be preserved (Waspada 2009c 3/27; Waspada 2009a 3/30). With the decline in class-based and youth appeals, appeals to ethnic groups has increased. Overall, the percentage of reports that contained appeals to ethnic groups went from 41% in 1997, down to 36% in 1999, and up to 45% in 2009.

The other group that rose in importance in the 2009 election campaign was women. Candidates often appealed to women during campaign trips to local women’s

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<sup>28</sup> A few reports in 1999 highlighted how PAN held the Barongsay (Chinese Dragon Dance) in various cities in North Sumatra for the first time. Chinese cultural performances were restricted under Suharto so this event was a novelty. In Pematang Siantar, the crowd got so excited that they left the campaign arena to follow the dragon around the town in a festive procession. The Minangkabau musicians who subsequently got up to play in front of an empty arena were none too pleased. See Waspada (1999a 5/17; 1999b 5/21).



groups and these meetings became more common in 2009. In addition, there were more female candidates in 2009 due to the introduction of quotas. These new candidates often emphasized the importance of voting for a female leader, the struggle for gender equality, and efforts to empower women and help female entrepreneurs.<sup>29</sup>

This section has highlighted changes in the frequency of direct appeals to ethnic and non-ethnic groups in campaign-related newspaper reports from 1997, 1999, and 2009. Overall, it shows that the move from a party-centric system to a semi-candidate-centric system was accompanied by a change in the kinds of social groups to which candidates appealed. Appeals to broad-based groups such as class, youth, and nationalism declined, while appeals to ethnic groups and women increased.<sup>30</sup> In addition, candidates appealed to a greater variety of indigenous groups in the 2009 campaigns. The following sections discuss changes in other ways in which candidates appeal to identity groups: specific kinds of campaign events, identifying supporters, and making references to their own identity.

## CAMPAIGN EVENTS

Campaign events have changed considerably in recent years. Table 7.4 shows the distribution of campaign events mentioned in campaign-related newspaper reports

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<sup>29</sup> Waspada introduced a special section of interviews with women candidates in 2009, entitled *Kasih Caleg Perempuan* (Affection for Female Candidates) See Waspada (2009 3/18; 2009b 4/1) for examples of pro-women messages from female candidates from this section of the paper. On the introduction of quotas for women, see Mietzner (2013, Kindle Locations 2174-2196). For an explanation on the increase in elected female legislators between 1999 and 2009, see Shair-Rosenfield (2012).

<sup>30</sup> While it proved too difficult to quantify systematically, there was evidence from the reports of an increase in appeals to regional identities (i.e., provincial, district, and neighborhood identities).

from *Waspada* for the 1997, 1999, and 2009 elections. The categories of events include political, community, occupational, religious, and indigenous.

**Table 7.4. Distribution of campaign event types in campaign-related newspaper reports**

Event	Type of event	% of reports		
		1997	1999	2009
<b>Political</b>	Political rally	65	46	13
	Party leader or cadre visit	5	6	3
	Officeholder visit	1	-	1
	Forum or debate	-	4	3
	Political protest	-	1	-
	<b>Any political event</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>Community</b>	Group visit	3	6	18
	Service event	-	4	7
	Sports event	-	1	3
	<b>Any community event</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>Occupational</b>	<b>Any group visit</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Religious</b>	Ceremony or festival	4	-	-
	Group visit	3	6	12
	<b>Any religious event</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Indigenous</b>	Ceremony or festival	-	-	6
	Group visit	3	-	5
	<b>Any indigenous event</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Any event</b>		<b>0.76</b>	<b>0.71</b>	<b>0.64</b>

*Note:* Percentages are based on the number of coded reports for each election year. 79, 80, and 107 reports in *Waspada* printed in during the campaign period were coded for campaign events for 1997, 1999, and 2009, respectively (total = 266). The percentage of reports for the 'Any event' entries are lower than the sum of the events in cases where multiple events were mentioned in the same article. A dash means 0%.

### The Era of Mass Political Rallies

One of the biggest change over the three election years has been a move from large party rallies in 1997 and 1999 to smaller campaign events with community-based,

indigenous, and religious groups in 2009. In 1997, 65% of reports mentioned party rallies compared to 13% in 2009.<sup>31</sup> Large political rallies, in conjunction with street rallies and parades (*pawai*), were a very important part of campaigns during the New Order. Tens of thousands of people draped in party colors paraded through the streets to and from the rallies in trucks, cars, and motorcycles. During election time, mass rallies took on a festival atmosphere. They provided a moment of freedom, a time when supporters could paint their faces in party colors, dance in the middle of the street, and flout traffic laws.

In 1997, despite new restrictions on street rallies, PPP supporters took to the streets in droves, forcing Golkar to follow suit (National Democratic Institute 1997, 12). The *Waspada* reports were full of descriptions of these large rallies. Golkar spared no expense: they brought in well-known singers and bands from Jakarta who entertained the crowd with popular music and *dangdut* (a genre of Indonesian music) and they gave out jackets, pens, umbrellas, hoes, volleyballs, rice, sugar, cooking oil, and free food. At one rally a Golkar candidate reportedly threw cash out into the crowd.<sup>32</sup> At Golkar and PPP rallies, religious leaders occasionally read from the Koran or recited prayers and then the national and regional party leaders would take to the stage and voice the party platform. In a display of their dominance, Golkar also brought onstage former PDI and PPP cadre who had “converted” to Golkar.<sup>33</sup> In one report, the converted party

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<sup>31</sup> Furthermore, out of the 93 campaign events coded in 1997, 83% were party rallies. Only 17% of the events in 2009 were party rallies.

<sup>32</sup> See *Waspada* (1997 5/14). PDI and PPP were less ostentatious. PDI reportedly gave out 7,000 boxes of matches. See *Waspada* (1997 5/12). Scholars also highlighted how Golkar mobilized the civil service to attend rallies, paid participants, and offered them transportation, meals, and t-shirts. See Haris (2004, 29).

<sup>33</sup> Other scholars have noted Golkar’s party-switching ritual. See Cederroth (2004, 90).

members symbolically switched from their PDI t-shirts to the Golkar's yellow t-shirt emblazoned with Golkar's banyan tree symbol (Waspada 1997 5/5).

A substantial part of campaigning in the New Order elections (and in 1955) was demonstrating your support through mass rallies. Lacking media access and the ability to distribute patronage, the only way the opposition could demonstrate its strength was by holding impressive rallies. Also, because the vote was not free and fair, the public act of participating in the rallies was more important than the act of voting (Schiller 1999, 13). As Antlöv (2004b, 117) noted while observing an election in 1997 in West Java, discussions centered on the quality of the parties' rallies, not the quality of their programs. In the 1999 elections, party rallies were still the main type of campaign event, but the numbers attending Golkar rallies had dwindled; PAN and PDI-P were the main attractions, fired up with a message of reform.<sup>34</sup>

#### Community and Ethnic Group Events in 2009

In the 2009 election, mass party rallies were largely replaced by smaller campaign events that targeted particular communities and indigenous and religious groups.<sup>35</sup> The numbers of constituents attending these events tended to range from 20 up to a few hundred. Community group visits were the most common type of event in 2009.<sup>36</sup> These events involved candidates visiting a neighborhood and speaking with a small group of

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<sup>34</sup> In 1999, parties often inaugurated new candidates into the party at rallies.

<sup>35</sup> Visits to occupational groups—such as market workers, local farmers, or becak drivers (motorbike taxis)—stayed relatively constant.

<sup>36</sup> Often community visits had an indigenous or religious dimension because particular ethnic groups are frequently concentrated in different neighborhoods. However, if it was not specifically reported that the candidate was visiting an ethnic group, it was coded simply as a community group visit.

residents. Candidates also frequently used community-service and sports events as campaign events. There were many reports of candidates providing free mobile medical care to poor neighborhoods, hosting sports events, and working with residents to fumigate for mosquitos, clean ditches, and plant trees.<sup>37</sup>

Beyond community events, campaign trips to meet local religious and indigenous groups rose substantially in 2009.<sup>38</sup> Candidates attended indigenous ceremonies, dances, and music events; engaged in rituals such as receiving the traditional cloth (ulos); and, occasionally, were accepted into the indigenous group by receiving a clan name (marga). Candidates also met with religious groups. They paid visits to women's Islamic groups, religious youth groups, Islamic schools, mosques, and church congregations. Activities involved prayers, readings from the Koran, speeches, discussions on the groups' needs, and promises of financial support.<sup>39</sup> The reports on indigenous and religious events were often accompanied by photos of the candidate meeting the group while dressed in their indigenous or religious clothing.<sup>40</sup>

The change from large centralized rallies to smaller events within communities had a symbolic component—candidates went out and met local groups rather than drawing constituents to a party event. Operating within a competitive, multi-party candidate-centric system, candidates needed personal votes. They could not afford to

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<sup>37</sup> For examples, see Waspada (2009 3/13; 2009 3/19; 2009 3/21).

<sup>38</sup> They constituted one third of all campaign events coded in 2009. This contrasts with 7% and 8% in 1999 and 1997.

<sup>39</sup> For examples of indigenous and religious events and group meetings, see Waspada (2009a 3/30; 2009b 3/30) and Waspada (2009 3/24; 2009a 4/2).

<sup>40</sup> For example, the high profile Golkar candidate Burhanuddin Napitupulu had full-page spreads that included numerous photographs of him meeting with religious and indigenous groups. See Waspada (2009b 3/17; 2009a 4/5).

stand in the shadows at a large party rally while national and regional leaders promoted the party platform. Instead, they needed to build tighter connections with local groups in order to increase their name recognition, show that they were sympathetic to constituents, and persuade local groups that they could personally deliver on the local issues that mattered. As a result, candidates more frequently organized their own events, identifying particular groups and tailoring their campaign speeches to the needs of those groups.

#### SUPPORTERS

With the change in types of campaign events, the kinds of elites that formally or informally endorsed candidates and parties also changed. Table 7.5 shows the types of elite supporters mentioned in campaign-related newspaper reports during the 1997, 1999, and 2009 elections. They are categorized as political, community, occupational, religious, indigenous, and other.

**Table 7.5. Distribution of elite supporters in campaign-related newspaper reports**

Elite	Type of elite	% of reports		
		1997	1999	2009
<b>Political</b>	Political party (leader)	29	30	6
	Local government	10	1	7
	<b>Any political supporter</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>Community</b>	Community association or leader	4	1	6
	Educational institute or NGO	-	1	2
	Social and sports association	-	-	5
	<b>Any community supporter</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Occupational</b>	Business association or leader	4	-	2
	Workers and civil servants Association or leader	4	-	3
	<b>Any occupational supporter</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Religious</b>	House of worship	-	1	4
	Organization	1	1	2
	Educational institution	-	-	2
	Youth group	3	1	2
	Women's group	-	-	6
	Religious leader	4	1	4
	<b>Any religious supporter</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>Indigenous</b>	Association	1	-	7
	Youth group	-	-	1
	Indigenous leader	3	-	1
	<b>Any indigenous supporter</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Other</b>	Youth and student association	8	1	3
	Nationalist association	4	3	4
	<b>Any other supporter</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>7</b>
	<b>Any supporter</b>	<b>0.54</b>	<b>0.36</b>	<b>0.44</b>

*Note:* Percentages are based on the number of coded reports for each election year. 79, 80, and 107 reports in *Waspada* printed in during the campaign period were coded for elite supporters for 1997, 1999, and 2009, respectively (total = 266). The percentage of reports for the 'Any supporter' entries are lower than the sum of the supporter in cases where multiple supporters were mentioned in the same article. A dash means 0%.

### Party Leaders and Entrenched Elites in 1997

In 1997, party leaders at the national and provincial level were the most prominent elites mentioned in the newspaper reports and were frequently quoted. All other elites that were quoted in the press made statements in support of Golkar. Invariably they had a vested interest in the government and close connections with the party. These elites included local leaders who were appointed by the government, nationalist organizations that had tight connections with Golkar, and leaders from civil-servant organizations that were mobilized by Golkar in each election.<sup>41</sup>

In 1999, Golkar's monopoly on the state's administration was broken, and Golkar support from government leaders and the civil service disappeared from campaign-related newspaper reports.<sup>42</sup> Only the nationalist youth association elites continued to support Golkar. For the other parties, almost all of the supporting elites were party leaders from the national and provincial level.

### Local Elites, Associations, and Regular Indonesians in 2009

In 2009, the elites and associations that came out in support of candidates represented a far more diverse range of political, community, occupational, religious, and indigenous groups. With decentralization, local government office holders became more empowered, and legislative candidates actively sought their support by inviting

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<sup>41</sup> Nationalist organizations mentioned included Ikatan Pemuda Karya (Association of Youth Work) and Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Youth). In an interview, the well-known Pancasila youth leader, Effendy Nasution (more commonly known as Efdi Boy) praised Golkar's performance in government. See *Waspada* (1997 5/8). Civil servant organizations included Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia (Organization of Indonesian Civil Servants) and Dharma Wanita, a women's civil servants organization.

<sup>42</sup> Some local government officials made statements distancing themselves from Golkar. See *Waspada* (1999 5/24).



them to rallies, community service events, and campaign trips to different ethnic groups.<sup>43</sup> Support from occupational groups was no longer confined to civil service associations, but came from leaders of various other occupational groups, including pensioners, teachers, agricultural workers, and transportation workers.

The percentage of reports that mentioned candidate support from community associations and leaders increased from 4% in 1999 to 12% in 2009. These groups were involved in various aspects of local development, including the environment, health, education, and sports.<sup>44</sup> Candidates also reached out to local social associations. In particular, they drew on their alumni groups from local high schools and universities in Medan.

The percentage of reports that mentioned support from local religious and indigenous leaders and associations more than doubled in 2009. To secure their support, candidates visited local religious and indigenous leaders, Muslim and indigenous youth associations, Islamic schools and foundations, and local mosques. Unlike previous elections, there were a number of reports of campaign visits to Islamic women's groups—small groups of local women who often meet for Islamic recitation. Notably, it was primarily the nationalist party candidates who met with them to get their support.<sup>45</sup> Compared to previous years, indigenous elite support was much more

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<sup>43</sup> For example, the deputy Bupati of Deli Serdang attended a community service event by a candidate and praised his efforts. See Waspada (2009c 4/4)

<sup>44</sup> Examples include Gerakan Deli Serdang Membangun (Movement to develop Deli Serdang), a local group involved in development of the district; Pusat Studi Lingkungan Hidup, literally, a center for environmental studies; and Yayasan Mandiri Bina, an NGO involved in children's education. See, Waspada (2009 3/19; 2009a 3/27; 2009c 4/4)

<sup>45</sup> For examples of Golkar and PDIP candidates' visits to Islamic women's groups, see, Waspada (2009b 3/12; 2009c 3/30; 2009a 4/2).

diverse, with elites representing Gayo, Batak Pakpak, Batak Mandailing, Batak Karo, Minangkabau, Javanese, and the ethnic Chinese.

Overall, the 2009 reports were quite specific in naming the elites and their associations. This contrasted with Golkar's 1997 election reports, where elites were usually identified simply as community, youth, religious, or indigenous leaders, and no names were given.<sup>46</sup> This change had less to do with better journalism and more to do with candidates wanting it to be known that a particular elite or association supported them. In addition, candidates in 2009 visited the homes of elites and headquarters of associations, and they joined elites at community service events. This gave the candidates the opportunity to discuss their interests, give a campaign speech, and pose for a photo opportunity. In contrast, in 1997, the elites were more like passive bystanders, appearing on stage at rallies or in the audience.

Beyond elites, candidates and parties in 2009 emphasized listening to the problems and issues of regular Indonesians. For example, one candidate visited marginalized groups living by a railway to hear their issues, while PKNU had an event called "PKNU Listens" where they sought feedback (Waspada 2009c 4/5). In addition to developing stronger connections with the community, these events provided information for candidates, parties, and their political consultants regarding the issues that constituents cared about. This contrasted with the 1997 election, where regular Indonesians formed a depoliticized floating mass. At that time, the individual voices of regular Indonesians were never heard in the reports. Instead they were quoted at rallies

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<sup>46</sup> Supporting local government leaders were invariably named in the 1997 reports.

only by their chants, such as, “Hidup Golkar. Hidup Pak Harto” (Long live Golkar. Long live Suharto).

In sum, in addition to organizing smaller campaign events with local groups, candidates sought the support of a diverse range of local elites and associations. They relied less on provincial and national leaders and more on local leaders and associations. This helped candidates draw on the moral authority of local leaders and increase their name recognition and personal appeal among association members.

#### CANDIDATE ATTRIBUTES

In reading the newspaper reports from all three elections, it became clear that by 2009, individual candidates, rather than parties, had become the main protagonist. This occurred with the shift from reporting on party rallies (attended by multiple candidates) to reporting on candidates’ solo campaign events. One very noticeable effect was a change in how reports were titled. The party name—commonly used in titles in 1997 and 1999—was replaced with an individual candidate’s name in 2009. In addition, more column inches were dedicated to describing the candidate. This was probably the most dramatic change in the 2009 election. Readers were now hearing more about individual candidates and they were exposed to an increased number of profile pieces on both major and minor candidates.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> The few profile pieces in 1997 were reserved for national and provincial Golkar party leaders.

**Table 7.6. Distribution of candidate attributes in campaign-related newspaper reports**

Attribute	Type of attribute	% of reports		
		1997	1999	2009
Identity	Religious	3	-	8
	Indigenous	1	-	6
	Regional	5	-	14
	National	-	1	1
	Woman	-	1	7
	Youth	-	-	5
	<b>Any candidate identity</b>		<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>
Work experience	The state	1	-	2
	Politician	-	-	22
	Religious organization	-	-	6
	Indigenous organization	-	-	3
	Educational organization	3	-	5
	Youth organization	1	-	2
	Other organization	-	-	5
	Business	-	-	5
	Other professions	-	-	8
<b>Any candidate experience</b>		<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>40</b>
Trait	Strong leader	1	5	7
	Compassionate and empathetic	1	3	18
	Honest, loyal, and hardworking	3	-	18
	Intelligent	1	-	2
	Moral	3	-	5
	Other	-	-	2
	<b>Any candidate trait</b>		<b>4</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Any candidate attribute</b>		<b>0.1</b>	<b>0.1</b>	<b>0.7</b>

*Note:* Percentages are based on the number of coded reports for each election year. 79, 80, and 107 reports in *Waspada* printed in during the campaign period were coded for candidate attributes for 1997, 1999, and 2009, respectively (total = 266). The percentage of reports for the 'Any attribute' entries are lower than the sum of the attributes in cases where multiple attributes were mentioned in the same article. A dash means 0%.

To capture the prevalence of biographical information on candidates in the newspaper reports, I coded references to candidates' identity, work experience, and character traits. In the reports, this information was provided by candidates, their

supporters, and reporters. In regular campaign reports, this information usually appeared at the end of the article. As shown in table 7.6, references to candidates' identity, experience, and character constituted only 10% of reports in 1997 and 6% in 1999; but by 2009, almost 70% of reports made references to candidates' personal characteristics.

References to candidates' identity (ethnic and non-ethnic) appeared in only 6% of reports in 1997 and 1% of reports in 1999 reports. In 2009, that number had risen to 22% of reports. Candidates and supporters often invoked a shared ethnic identity in campaign events with religious, indigenous, and regionally based groups. For example, at an indigenous campaign event, a leader from the Karo group said that the people should be proud to have a Karo representative (the candidate) in the national legislature. Following that, the candidate gave a speech promising to obtain funds from the central government to build a road between Karo and a neighboring district.<sup>48</sup>

While examples like this, which invoked the candidate's Islamic and indigenous identity, were quite common, candidates drew on their regional identity to an even greater extent.<sup>49</sup> They often referred to themselves as Putra Daerah (Son of the Region) or specifically said that they were born in the electoral district. For example, one candidate proclaimed he was Putra Melayu (Native Son of Malay) and followed up by saying that it was necessary to have a Putra Daerah in the national legislature in order to

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<sup>48</sup> See Waspada (2009b 4/5). In addition, during a visit to the Minangkabau indigenous group, the candidate spoke of how he was from a big family of Minangkabau. See Waspada (2009c 3/27).

<sup>49</sup> Overall, the open list system offers advantages for candidates that are from, and live in, the region. Compared to the 'Jakarta drop-ins' (candidates who primarily live in Jakarta), these candidates can develop stronger local connections, which can help increase their personal votes.

get their fair share of revenues.<sup>50</sup> In emphasizing a shared ethnic identity, the subtext is, “I am one of you, and you can trust me with your vote to deliver material benefits to the group or region.” This underlying message draws on psychological sources of ingroup solidarity and makes the candidate’s promise of materialist rewards more persuasive due to the norms of ingroup reciprocity.

References to candidates’ work experience were rare in 1997, and totally absent in 1999. However, in 2009, 40% of campaign-related reports in *Waspada* made references to candidates’ previous work experience. Candidates attempted to persuade voters that they were qualified to lead because of their previous leadership roles in the government and the local community.<sup>51</sup> A few candidates drew on their experience working in the state bureaucracy, and a number of high profile candidates appealed for votes based on their political experience in government and in their political party.<sup>52</sup> Candidates also played up their leadership roles in religious and indigenous organizations. In addition to showing leadership experience, such references provided voters with information on the candidate’s ethnic identity and showed that they had a commitment to their ethnic group. There were some differences in how Islamic and nationalist party candidates referred to themselves in the reports. Islamic party candidates were more likely to emphasize their Islamic identity and their leadership roles in Islamic organizations and Islamic schools (*Waspada* 2009a 3/12; *Waspada* 2009a

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<sup>50</sup> See *Waspada* (2009b 4/2). In addition, candidates more frequently dressed up in religious or indigenous clothing in photo-ops in 2009. However, while relevant information in photo captions was coded, the photos themselves were not.

<sup>51</sup> Candidates also frequently provided information on their academic qualifications in 2009, though this was not coded.

<sup>52</sup> Examples include Serta Ginting, Hasrul Azwar, and Panda Nababan. See *Waspada* (2009b 4/5; 2009d 4/5).

3/26). Meanwhile, nationalist party candidates tended to highlight their experience as leaders in nonreligious educational institutions (Waspada 2009a 4/1; Waspada 2009b 4/4).

Finally, references to positive character traits changed and increased in 2009. In 1997, a few Golkar candidates made references to being responsible, moral, and loyal to the party. In 1999, a couple of candidates defined themselves as strong leaders: a reformist and a crusader against communism. However, in 2009, candidates regularly emphasized their character traits. They frequently portrayed themselves as humble individuals who were compassionate and empathetic or honest, loyal, and hardworking. Specifically, they described themselves as candidates who care, never lie, and have never engaged in corruption. While it is easy to call into question the validity of these statements for many candidates, the emphasis on these particular traits indicates the kind of character traits that candidates thought voters were looking for in a political leader. Almost one third of all reports contained some reference to the candidate's character traits, compared to 4% in 1997 and 9% in 1999.

Overall, the emphasis on candidates' identity, work experience, and character traits in 2009 was expected given the move from a party-centric to a semi-candidate centric system. Candidates used personal characteristics to connect with local groups and to persuade voters that they were not only qualified for the job, but also had the correct identity and character to lead.

## Conclusions

The analysis of campaign-related newspaper reports in North Sumatra for the 1997, 1999, and 2009 elections indicates that campaigns changed in a number of important ways. With a shift from party-centric rules to candidate-centric rules, nationally-oriented campaigns that centered on party platforms became more locally-oriented and more personal. Reports increasingly mentioned regional issues—notably, local health and education services, roads, and the local environment—and reflected an increased politicization of ethnicity. Campaigns involved more appeals to ethnic groups, more ethnic campaign events, more support from ethnic elites and associations, and more references to candidates' ethnic identities. In addition, appeals to community groups (not framed in ethnic terms) and women also became more common. The increase in ethnic and non-ethnic appeals was accompanied by a decline in appeals to youth, class, and nationalism.

Competing arguments cannot explain these changes. The PR-majoritarian thesis is not very helpful in this case, since all of these elections used proportional representation. Similarly, the ethnic attachment thesis and the cultural modernization thesis provide little insight as the data is drawn from campaigns in the same region over a relatively short period of time and there is little reason to believe that there were any major cultural shifts. Overall, this chapter offers empirical evidence that changes in the electoral rules provide incentives for candidates to engage in more personal campaigns that appeal to local ethnic and community groups.

To conclude, it is important not to understate the role of parties in the legislative elections in 2009. A number of Indonesian parties had relatively large followings and a



loyal cadre supporting them. This was particularly true for parties with an ideological basis and deeper historical roots, such as PKS and PDI-P. In addition, other parties in 2009, such as Partai Demokrat, had a charismatic leader who could draw party votes. All of the major parties had big rallies near the end of the campaign period in Medan, attended by their national leaders and large crowds waving party flags. For candidates, getting on the party list of a popular party boosted their chance of success. Also, it was common for candidates to wear party clothing while campaigning, draw on party leaders in their campaign materials, and attend party rallies. In sum, electoral campaigns in 2009 were consistent with what would be expected from a semi-candidate-centric electoral system.

The next chapter presents the results of analyses comparing the semi-candidate-centric legislative elections with the highly candidate-centric regional head elections. While political parties no longer figure centrally in legislative campaigns, the results in the next chapter show that they are largely absent in regional head election campaigns.

# Decentralization and the District Head Elections

The previous chapter analyzed changes in campaigns and campaign appeals in legislative elections over time. The results showed that as the electoral rules became more candidate-centric, the politicization of local ethnic groups increased, while party rallies and appeals to the party platform declined. To further test the the argument, this chapter compares appeals in the semi-candidate-centric legislative elections of 2009 and the highly candidate-centric district head elections held in 2010 and 2011. If my argument is correct, the highly candidate-centric district head elections should have higher levels of ethnic appeals and the lower levels of partisan appeals compared to the semi-candidate-centric legislative elections. To test this thesis I run regression analysis on appeals in election posters gathered from from the two types of elections. This allows me to determine whether there was a statistically significant relationship between electoral rules and candidate appeals. Competing arguments will be tested using the same approach. While the empirical data in the previous chapter came primarily from North Sumatra, the present chapter presents data from a larger geographic scope. It draws on campaign appeals from the posters of thousands of candidates competing in elections across the country.

In part 1, I present the data and methods used to test the dissertation argument and competing arguments. I begin by providing an overview of ethnic and partisan appeals in posters from the legislative and district head elections. I highlight the range of appeals to multiple indigenous groups and the lack of appeals to religious minorities. I explain how institutions, a sense of vulnerability, and career incentives constrained candidates from appealing to religious minorities. I then present a number of testable hypotheses and end the section by explaining the model and variables used to test my argument and the three competing arguments.

Part 2 presents the findings. Regression results show that the candidate-centric district head elections were associated with more ethnic appeals, while the semi-candidate-centric legislative elections were associated with more partisan appeals. In addition, ethnic group size had a significant impact on ethnic appeals. These findings support the dissertation's argument.

In part 3, I show that the three competing arguments—the PR-majoritarian thesis, the ethnic attachment thesis, and the cultural modernization thesis—all fail to explain the observed politicization of ethnicity in Indonesian elections. To conclude, I use survey evidence to show that a shift towards a candidate-centric system not only affects candidate's appeals, but also undermines partisan identification among Indonesians.

# Part I: Data and Methods

## OVERVIEW OF THE DATA

To test my argument and competing arguments, I used data from the National Poster Dataset. This dataset contains almost 4,000 posters from over 2,000 candidates competing in legislative and district head elections (for more detail on how posters were gathered and coded see chapter 6).<sup>1</sup> I used six dependent variables from this dataset to study variations in ethnic bonding, ethnic bridging, and partisan appeals across the semi-candidate-centric and candidate-centric elections. Table 8.1 provides a brief description of each dependent variable.

**Table 8.1: Description of dependent variables coded from election posters**

<b>Variable (appeal type)</b>	<b>Description</b>
Indigenous bonding	% of candidate's posters that invoke the candidate's indigenous group and no other indigenous group
Religious bonding	% of candidate's posters that invoke the candidate's religious group and no other religious group
Indigenous bridging	% of candidate's posters that Invoke either an indigenous group the candidate does not belong to, or general indigeneity
Religious bridging	% of candidate's posters that invoke either a religious group the candidate does not belong to, or general religiosity
Nationalist bridging	% of candidate's posters that invoke nationalism
Partisan	% of candidate's posters that invoke the candidate's political party

For each type of appeal, I calculated the percentage of each candidate's total posters that contained that appeal. The candidate formed the unit of analysis, and

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<sup>1</sup> Table 6.1 in chapter 6 contains figures on the number of posters, candidates, and electoral districts in the dataset.

measures of each type of appeal ranged from 0 to 100. For example, if 65% of a candidate's posters contained indigenous bonding appeals then their measure of indigenous bonding appeals was 65. If they had zero posters with indigenous bonding appeals, their measure of indigenous bonding appeals was 0.

To get an overview of the data, I calculated the frequency of bonding, bridging, and partisan appeals in the entire dataset. As shown in figure 8.1, partisan and nationalist appeals were the most common. Religious and indigenous bonding appeals came next, followed by religious and indigenous bridging appeals. I measured two types of bridging: broad ethnic bridging appeals and cross-ethnic bridging appeals. However bridging appeals were low overall, so I combined broad ethnic bridging and cross-ethnic bridging for indigenous and religious appeals. So, for example, indigenous bridging includes appeals to general indigeneity (broad ethnic bridging) and appeals to indigenous groups to which the candidate does not belong (cross-ethnic bridging).<sup>2</sup>

In terms of indigenous bonding there was great variety in the indigenous categories to which candidates made bonding appeals. Over 30 indigenous groups are represented in the dataset. Indigenous groups in Indonesia tend to be regionally concentrated, so indigenous bonding appeals varied depending on the region where the posters were photographed. In contrast, with regard to religious bonding appeals, candidates primarily appealed to Muslim groups and avoided appealing to other religious groups in their election posters. Almost all religious bonding appeals were to

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<sup>2</sup> As per chapter 2, a broad ethnic bridging appeal is an appeal that invokes a whole dimension of ethnicity, or an ethnic category in which all or most of the voters are included. A cross-ethnic bridging appeal is an appeal that invokes an ethnic category or subcategory that is a subset of the electorate and of which the candidate is not a nominal member. See chapter 4 for details on how these appeals were measured from election posters.

Muslims and a tiny remainder were to Christians (23.9% versus 0.46%, respectively). This is surprising considering that posters came from a number of Christian-majority districts in provinces such as North Sumatra, Maluku, Kalimantan, and Papua. No candidates had any posters that included bonding appeals to Hindu or Buddhist religious groups. These findings suggest some broad social constraints on appeals to religious minorities—at least in a very public setting such as street-level election posters.




Figure 8.1. Frequency of ethnic bonding, ethnic bridging, and partisan appeals in the National Poster Dataset. Bars show percentage of campaign posters containing each type of appeal. N = 3,929 posters.

#### SOCIAL CONSTRAINTS ON RELIGIOUS MINORITY APPEALS

Social constraints on religious minority appeals are likely the result of past and current constraints on the formation of religious minority political parties. Religious minorities have traditionally found representation among nationalist-secular political parties. In the 1955 election, there were a number of small religious minority political

parties, but during Suharto's New Order, only three parties were allowed to compete in elections: the Islamic PPP and the secular-nationalist parties of PDI<sup>3</sup> and Golkar. With the transition to democracy, new parties were allowed to form, but competitive religious minority parties did not emerge.

Religious minorities constitute only a small percentage of the population and are not large enough to support successful parties at the national level. While they could achieve some success in regions where they form majorities, electoral rules prevent the formation of regional parties for national elections. Parties must establish offices in half of Indonesia's provinces and in half of the districts in those provinces. This rule was put in place to prevent regional parties from forming and to limit the number of contenders (Hwang 2007, 242).<sup>4</sup> With the lack of incentives to form their own parties and the lack of support for minority religious parties over the last half-century, religious minorities have continued to vote for nationalist-secular parties. Thus, religious minority identities lack a certain amount of political salience. Even PDS, the small Christian party that emerged after the transition, does not overtly refer to Christianity. Instead, they are more rooted in the national ideology of Pancasila.

There are other, more immediate, reasons why voters and candidates avoid engaging in the overt politicization of minority religions in Indonesia. With recent cases of large-scale religious violence in Maluku and Sulawesi, voters tend to be put off by candidates who attempt to politicize religion. This is particularly true for religious minorities that are in a more vulnerable situation. Also, candidates who are from

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<sup>3</sup> PDI largely absorbed the former nationalist party, PNI, and a number of Christian parties. See Evans (2008, 13).

<sup>4</sup> 200 parties formed in 1998, but 152 failed to qualify for the 1999 election. See King (2003, 51).

religious minorities have career-related incentives to avoid the politicization of their religion. Those with aspirations to run for higher office will need to get broader support (both from voters and party leaders) and it would likely hurt their careers to become known as a politician who primarily appeals to a religious minority.<sup>5</sup>

Overall, social constraints on the politicization of minority religions in Indonesia result in a lack of religious minority appeals in the public sphere. This does not mean that candidates never make religious minority appeals. At campaign events in Indonesia, candidates often make political speeches in churches, engage in religious activities such as praying with voters, and make Christian references in their speeches. However, these religious appeals are more targeted. They tend to occur in private settings with smaller groups and not in the larger public arena, such as street-level election posters. To accommodate the lack of religious minority appeals in the poster dataset, I focused on Islamic bonding appeals rather than general religious bonding appeals.

## HYPOTHESES

As discussed in chapter 4, Indonesia's 2009 legislative elections were semi-candidate-centric. Parties still controlled the nomination of candidates, many parties had loyal followings, and voters could simply vote for a party on the ballot.

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<sup>5</sup> Another argument is that religious minorities may be more connected with their indigenous identities, particularly in the case of Christianity. Christianity is a relatively recent phenomenon in Indonesia. Many Christian conversions occurred in the last 100 years, particularly during the mid 1960s. Those who converted previously followed animist religions, which were intertwined with their ethnic identity. In addition, Christianity (both Protestantism and, more recently, the Catholic Church) has engaged in acculturation in Indonesia—accommodating Christian beliefs and practices with indigenous ethnic identities. The Christian churches in Indonesia draw on ethnic beliefs and customs, conduct sermons in indigenous ethnic languages, and incorporate indigenous signs and symbols. In this respect, Christianity has grafted onto a stronger and deeper form of identification.



(Alternatively, they could vote for a specific candidate.) However, the open list aspect generated more competition between candidates within parties, which offered incentives for candidates to run more personal and localized campaigns. In contrast, the district head elections were highly candidate-centric in terms of how candidates were nominated, financed, and elected. It should be noted that these elections are not at polar opposite ends of the party-centric/candidate-centric continuum (see figure 4.1). As a result, they represent a more challenging test of the argument.

The main argument posits that the degree to which electoral rules are party- or candidate-centric will affect candidates' choice of ethnic and partisan appeals (see chapter 3). Under candidate-centric rules, candidates will tailor their appeals directly to voters and groups within their electoral district. To directly connect with constituents, I argue that candidates will forego partisan appeals and appeal directly to salient ethnic identities. Depending on the size of the ethnic group, candidates will do this by making either ethnic bonding or ethnic bridging appeals. If this argument is correct, I expect to find more ethnic appeals in the highly candidate-centric district head elections compared to the more party-centric legislative elections. In contrast, under party-centric rules, the candidate's party affiliation is more important. As a result I expect more partisan appeals in the semi-candidate-centric legislative elections compared to the candidate-centric district head elections. This argument was tested in Indonesian elections using the following three hypotheses:

H1. Candidates in district head elections make more ethnic bonding appeals compared to candidates in legislative elections.

H2. Candidates in district head elections make more ethnic bridging appeals compared to candidates in legislative elections.

H3. Candidates in district head elections make fewer partisan appeals compared to candidates in legislative elections.

## MODEL

I examined the impact of candidate-centric district head elections on six types of ethnic bonding, bridging, and partisan appeals. Descriptive statistics (e.g., mean, standard deviation) for these six dependent variables are shown in table 8.2. The key independent variable is district head election, which represents the type of electoral rules under which a candidate is operating. It was coded 1 for the candidate-centric district head elections and 0 for the semi-candidate-centric legislative elections. If my argument is correct, I expect more ethnic appeals and less partisan appeals in the candidate-centric district head elections. Alternatively, if the PR-majoritarian thesis is correct, there should be more ethnic appeals in the legislative elections because the legislative elections use proportional representation, while the district head elections employ a majoritarian formula.

**Table 8.2: Descriptive statistics for dependent variables coded from election posters**

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Indigenous bonding	2138	13.56	32.90	0	100
Islamic bonding	2138	23.91	41.69	0	100
Indigenous bridging	2138	3.90	18.41	0	100
Religious bridging	2138	4.38	19.43	0	100
Nationalist bridging	2138	43.73	47.28	0	100
Partisan	2138	58.65	47.66	0	100

Eight other independent variables were examined in order to control for ethnic group size, ethnic attachment, and economic development. These variables also allow me to test the competing arguments. First, to control for ethnic group size, I used two variables: the percentage of the population from the largest indigenous group in the candidate's electoral district (largest indig. grp. %) and the percentage of the Muslim population in the candidate's electoral district (Muslim pop.<sup>6</sup> %). Given that religious appeals were almost entirely Islamic, the size of the Muslim population in electoral districts was most important.

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<sup>6</sup> While demographic data on the size of the Muslim population comes from the 2010 national census, data on the size of the largest indigenous groups was only available from the 2000 national census. The raw data for indigenous groups was acquired at the subdistrict level (Kecamatan) from the national statistics office (Badan Pusat Statistik) in Jakarta. From this, group sizes of electoral districts for the national and provincial legislative elections and the district head elections were calculated. For the district legislative elections (DPRD II), each administrative district contains multiple electoral districts. Unfortunately, it proved impossible to calculate the exact sizes of indigenous groups for these electoral districts. This is because there has been a lot of splitting of administrative districts (and subdistricts) since 2000. For these electoral districts, indigenous group sizes from the district level (one level up) were used as an approximation. Measures of indigenous diversity using an ethnic fractionalization index were also calculated using the Herfindahl concentration formula. The results from the analysis were similar to using the size of the largest indigenous group. Measures of the largest indigenous group were used in the final analysis because they relate more directly to the dissertation's argument, which stresses ethnic group size.

Second, I included two variables that measure the strength of indigenous and Islamic attachment. Indigenous attachment was measured by using the percentage of villages in a candidate's electoral district that use indigenous law (indigenous law).<sup>7</sup> Islamic attachment was measured by the number of mosques per 1,000 Muslim constituents in the candidate's electoral district (mosques).<sup>8</sup> These variables help test the ethnic attachment thesis regarding the fusion of culture and politics. If cultural forms of attachment translate smoothly into political cleavages, I expect these variables to have an impact on the kinds of appeals made by candidates. Candidates' campaign appeals, in effect, would be a reflection of underlying patterns of ethnic attachment; they respond to the strongest forms of ethnic attachment. When attachment to a particular ethnic category is high, we would expect appeals to that category to also be high.

Third, I included two independent variables to test the cultural modernization thesis. The modernization argument predicts that traditional identities of indigeneity and Islam will be stronger in poor, rural areas and among individuals working in traditional sectors such as farming and fishing. If this is correct, we expect to find more indigenous and Islamic appeals in these regions and among these kinds of constituents. In addition, modernization theorists have argued that nationalism becomes a more prevalent form of attachment in urban areas, where more individuals are working in the

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<sup>7</sup> Measures of indigenous ethnic law (Adat) come from Village Potential Statistics (Potensi Desa 2003 (PODES), Badan Pusat Statistik).

<sup>8</sup> Data for the number of houses of worship comes from Village Potential Statistics 2008 (Potensi Desa 2008 (PODES), Badan Pusat Statistik). Data on religious social activity was initially included in the regression models. Specifically, this reflects the percentage of people who have engaged in religious social activities during the last three months. Unfortunately, the data did not separate out Muslim and non-Muslim social activities and was only available at the provincial level. It had no effect on the models and was therefore excluded.

modern sector and attaining more wealth and social mobility. If this is correct, we can expect candidates to make more nationalist appeals in urban areas. Accordingly, to test the cultural modernization thesis, I included two economic variables—the percentage of individuals living under the poverty line (poverty<sup>9</sup> %) and the percentage of gross regional domestic product that comes from farming or fishing (GRDP farming<sup>10</sup> %). Each pertains to the candidate’s electoral district. If the modernization argument is correct, candidate appeals in districts with more poverty and farming will contain more indigenous and Islamic appeals and fewer nationalist appeals. Beyond testing the modernization argument, these variables also control for economic and urbanization conditions.<sup>11</sup>

Finally, the independent variables included two controls. The female candidate variable controls for the gender of the candidate and is coded 1 for female or 0 for male. This was necessary because there are stronger norms for women in Indonesia to wear a jilbab (Islamic headdress), which symbolizes their Islamic identity. The population of the electoral district was also controlled for. For easier interpretation I used the natural log of the population (population (log)).<sup>12</sup> Descriptive statistics for the independent variables are shown in table 8.3.

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<sup>9</sup> Data on the percentage of individuals living under the poverty line comes from Data and Poverty Information of Regency/Municipalities 2009 (Data Dan Informasi Kemiskinan Kabupaten/Kota 2009, Badan Pusat Statistik).

<sup>10</sup> Data on the percentage of the GRDP per capita that comes from farming or fishing is from the Financial Statistics of Regency/Municipality Governance (Statistik Keuangan Pemerintah Daerah Kabupaten/Kota 2008-2009, Badan Pusat Statistik).

<sup>11</sup> A logged GRDP per capita variable was initially used in the model. However, it was relatively highly correlated with the percentage of GRDP that comes from farming. Since it added little to the model, it was excluded.

<sup>12</sup> Population figures are from the 2010 national census.

**Table 8.3: Descriptive statistics for independent variables coded from election posters**

Variable name	Variable Type	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
District head election	Binary	2138	0.12	0.33	0.00	1.00
Largest indig. grp. %	Continuous	2138	64.39	29.17	11.12	99.80
Muslim pop. %	Continuous	2138	75.45	30.85	1.17	99.68
Indigenous law <sup>a</sup>	Continuous	2138	26.95	24.42	0.00	100.00
Mosques <sup>b</sup>	Continuous	2138	1.27	1.67	0.11	48.18
Poverty %	Continuous	2138	15.59	9.57	2.20	40.80
GRDP farming %	Continuous	2138	18.35	15.90	0.02	63.55
Female candidate	Binary	2138	0.22	0.41	0.00	1.00
Population (log)	Continuous	2138	13.73	1.01	11.42	15.36

<sup>a</sup> Percent of villages with indigenous law.

<sup>b</sup> Mosques per 1,000 Muslim constituents in candidate's electoral district.

Estimates for the effect of candidate-centric rules on ethnic and partisan appeals were obtained using a linear probability model (ordinary least squares, or OLS). One potential issue with the data relates to how the posters were gathered from electoral districts dotted across the country. Given the clustered nature of the data, we can not assume that observations within each electoral district cluster are independent. Candidates who campaign in the same electoral district might share a similar predisposition to appeal to voters in particular ways. Without accounting for this correlation, the OLS estimates remain unbiased; however, the standard errors may have a downward bias. If this is the case, the spurious significance of the independent variables results in incorrect inferences. There are two approaches to dealing with this problem. The first is to treat the electoral district as the unit of analysis and avoid the problem of intracluster correlations. However, this throws away potentially useful

variance on appeals across candidates within electoral districts and severely reduces the number of cases. Instead, I employ a second approach: cluster-robust standard errors. This allows me to keep the candidates as the unit of analysis, but correct the standard errors by clustering on the electoral district.

Results from the linear probability model (OLS) with clustered robust standard errors showed the key independent variable, district head election, was pointed in the expected direction and was significant. However, the non-normal distribution of the dependent variables was a cause of concern. As explained earlier, each dependent variable is the average percentage of a candidate's posters with a particular type of appeal, ranging from 0 to 100%. On average there were 1.8 posters per candidate (3,929 posters from 2,138 candidates).<sup>13</sup> The low number of posters per candidate meant that there were many values of 0% and 100% for the dependent variables. Effectively, the dependent variables resembled bounded binary variables.

As an alternative to OLS, I tested logit models after using two approaches to dichotomizing the dependent variables. In the first approach, the dependent variable was assigned a value of 1 if over half of the candidate's posters included the appeal; otherwise it was assigned 0. In the second approach, I assigned 1 to the dependent

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<sup>13</sup> There are 266 district head candidates and 1,872 legislative candidates in the dataset. District head candidates have an average of 5.6 posters, and legislative candidate have an average of 1.3 posters. This is reflective of the number of posters and, ultimately, the appeals these candidates made in their posters. The reason for the high number of posters per district head candidate is because fewer candidates compete in these single-seat elections and they often had larger budgets. In addition, there is more space in cities and towns to post their posters because the elections are not held at the same time as the legislative elections. As a result, each district head candidate employs an increased number of unique poster designs and posts more of them in the district. In contrast, during the legislative elections, there can be well over 100 candidates campaigning in any given district. These candidates are competing in multi-seat districts for three legislative bodies (district, provincial, and national legislatures). Most are competing for seats in the district legislature. They have tighter budgets and produce far fewer poster designs.

variable if the candidate had any posters with the appeal, and 0 if they had no posters with the appeal. Logit regressions were run on the six dependent variables using both approaches for creating binary variables. I also ran an ordered logit model with three categories of outcomes: 1 for candidates who had no posters with the appeal, 2 for candidates who had some posters with the appeal, and 3 for candidates who had the appeal in all their posters. The results for all models were very similar to the OLS, with little or no change in the significance level of the independent variables. The only difference was that the coefficients for district head elections were larger, indicating a greater effect. Overall, the different model specifications did not make a significant difference to the results, and the OLS model offered more conservative estimates for the coefficients. In addition, OLS results are more easily interpreted. Given the above, I report only the OLS results.

## Part II: Testing the Argument

Regression analysis was used to test the impact of electoral rules (and the seven other independent variables) on candidate appeals for the six dependent variables: indigenous bonding appeals, religious bonding appeals, indigenous bridging appeals, religious bridging appeals, national bridging appeals, and partisan appeals. The results are shown in table 8.4.



**Table 8.4. Impact of candidate-centric electoral rules on candidate appeals**

	BONDING APPEALS		BRIDGING APPEALS			
	Indigenous	Islamic	Indigenous	Religious	Nationalist	Partisan
District head election	12.49** (2.49)	8.53** (3.17)	2.07 (1.63)	1.85 (2.06)	10.01** (3.81)	-57.74** (3.40)
Largest indig. grp. %	0.31** (0.04)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.04* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)
Muslim population %	-0.23** (0.05)	0.39** (0.04)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.08** (0.02)	-0.10 (0.06)	0.04 (0.04)
Indigenous law	-0.00 (0.04)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.03^ (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.05)
Mosques <sup>a</sup>	-0.92** (0.29)	0.16 (0.21)	0.08 (0.15)	0.03 (0.25)	-0.15 (0.51)	0.17 (0.56)
Poverty %	0.26* (0.11)	-0.11 (0.12)	0.02 (0.07)	0.11 (0.07)	0.62** (0.15)	-0.15 (0.15)
GRDP farming %	0.00 (0.08)	0.00 (0.08)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.23* (0.10)	0.02 (0.09)
Female candidate	1.45 (1.68)	35.48** (3.12)	-2.06** (0.77)	-2.74** (0.68)	3.14 (2.43)	7.28** (2.18)
Population (log)	3.35** (1.01)	-1.67 (1.07)	-0.13 (0.48)	0.13 (0.48)	5.28** (1.61)	-2.57* (1.29)
Intercept	-39.59** (14.30)	9.78 (14.44)	7.81 (6.83)	7.66 (7.00)	-17.34 (23.39)	103.62** (17.80)
N	2,138	2,138	2,138	2,138	2,138	2,138
R squared	0.08	0.19	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.16

*Note:* Results of regression analyses for independent variables (rows) and dependent variables (columns). Entries are coefficients from OLS regression model. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses.

<sup>a</sup> per 1,000 Muslim constituents in candidate's electoral district

^p < 0.10, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01

To get a clearer picture of the substantial impact of candidate-centric rules, I calculated the predicted probabilities of appeals for district head and legislative candidates. The probabilities are based on the OLS regression and the other variables are controlled for by holding them at their mean. Results are shown in figure 8.2.




Figure 8.2. Predicted probabilities of candidate appeals for legislative versus district head elections. Computed using MARGINS in Stata 12. Probabilities are calculated for election type (district head election variable) while holding all other independent variables at their mean. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Hypothesis 1 posits that candidate-centric electoral rules will lead to more ethnic bonding appeals (both indigenous and Islamic) from candidates. The results show that candidate-centric district head elections had a significant positive impact on indigenous and Islamic bonding appeals ( $p < 0.01$ ; see table 8.4). These findings are consistent with the predicted probabilities (see figure 8.2), which show that district head candidates' poster campaigns are predicted to contain over twice as many indigenous bonding appeals and approximately 25% more religious bonding appeals compared to the poster campaigns of legislative candidates. Thus, hypothesis 1 is supported by the findings.

Hypothesis 2 posits that under candidate-centric electoral rules, there will be more bridging appeals. The coefficients for district head elections were positive for indigenous, religious, and nationalist bridging appeals, but only significant for nationalist bridging appeals ( $p < 0.01$ ). From figure 8.2 we can see that indigenous and religious bridging appeals were low overall, though slightly higher in district head elections. However, predicted probabilities for nationalist appeals were much higher, particularly in district head elections.

Regionalist appeals were also measured from the election posters. Regionalism, I argue, is another form of ethnic bridging, and it was over twice as high in candidate-centric district head elections compared to the legislative election. On average, 20% of candidates' poster campaigns had regionalist appeals in district head elections compared to only 9% in the legislative elections. For regionalism, I coded regional elements such as: images of the city, coast, forests, and jungles; regional maps; regional monuments; and references to the region. The coding of these appeals was not quite as clear-cut as coding indigenous, religious, nationalist, and partisan appeals so it was not included in the main findings. Still, the evidence on nationalist bridging and tentative evidence on regionalist bridging supports hypothesis 2, which posits that there is more ethnic bridging in district head elections compared to legislative elections.

Finally, I tested the impact of district head elections on partisan appeals. Hypothesis 3 posits that more partisan appeals are expected under the semi-candidate-centric rules of the legislative elections. The results show that candidate-centric district head elections had a significant and negative impact on partisan appeals ( $p < 0.01$ ; see table 8.3). In addition, the predicted probabilities show that candidates were far more

likely to use partisan appeals in the semi-candidate-centric legislative elections (see figure 8.2). On average, close to 70% of campaign posters for legislative candidates were predicted to contain partisan appeals, compared to less than 10% of posters for district head election candidates. This offers strong support for the third hypothesis.

The analysis of the National Poster Dataset clearly showed that district head candidates used a richer variety of ethnic images and messages to appeal to ethnic groups. Compared to legislative candidates, they were more likely to connect with ethnic groups by using Arabic or indigenous languages, dressing in Islamic or indigenous clothing, and including images of mosques and traditional indigenous dwellings. District head candidates were three to four times more likely to use these forms of nonverbal communication compared to the legislative candidates.

In the previous chapter, I showed how candidates in the 2009 legislative election often engaged in local campaign events with ethnic community-based groups and sought support from local associations and elites. This pattern of connecting with local groups was even more pronounced in the district head elections. A common tactic for district head candidates was to include endorsements from local associations, businesses, and institutes in their election posters. Their posters frequently included images of local leaders and the logos of local worker, youth, Islamic, and indigenous associations. They designed one-off posters that included endorsements from business owners and posted them outside each owner's business. In addition, candidates promoted institutes they had founded that were (at least in name) engaged in community welfare. As shown in table 8.5, 11.9% of district head candidate posters contained these kinds of local endorsements, compared to only 1.2% of posters for

candidates in the 2009 legislative elections. These public displays of local support helped candidates show that they had tight connections with local groups.

**Table 8.5. Number and percent of posters with endorsements from associations or groups in district head and legislative elections**

Association or group	District head		Legislative	
	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%
Indigenous association	31	2.1	6	0.2
Local business	31	2.1	2	0.1
Candidate institute	30	2	5	0.2
Community group	24	1.6	1	0.0
Religious association	18	1.2	10	0.4
Youth association	16	1.1	5	0.2
Workers association	12	0.8	-	-
Nationalist association	8	0.5	1	0.0
Regional association	7	0.5	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>177</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>1</b>

*N* = total number of posters that contained endorsements from an association or group in the district head election or the legislative election. % = the percentage of the total number of posters in the district head election (*N* = 1,502) or the legislative election (*N* = 2,427).

Candidates in the semi-candidate-centric legislative elections in Indonesia employed many of the same general tactics to connect with voters, but their election posters focused on party affiliations to a greater extent. In their election posters, legislative candidates often wore party clothing, used the party color and logo prominently in their poster design, included images of party leaders and rallies, and used party slogans.

## ETHNIC GROUP SIZE

Aside from the impact of electoral rules, the results in table 8.4 show that ethnic group size had a significant and substantial impact on ethnic appeals. The impact of ethnic group size on ethnic appeals in legislative versus district head elections will be explored more thoroughly in the following chapter. However, for now, it is important to emphasize that these results are consistent with the argument, which predicts how group size affects candidates' decisions to bond with, or bridge across, ethnic groups. The argument states that candidates will bond when they are in a winning group (i.e., enough members to win the vote) and bridge when they are in a losing group (i.e., not enough members to support a winning vote). The findings here show that indigenous group size had a positive impact on indigenous bonding appeals and a negative impact on indigenous bridging appeals. In other words, as the size of the largest indigenous group increased, indigenous bridging appeals declined and indigenous bonding appeals increased. The size of the Muslim population had the same effect on Islamic appeals.<sup>14</sup> In addition, ethnic group size had a significant and negative impact on nationalist appeals, indicating that candidates use nationalism to bridge across voters when districts are more diverse. The effect of group size on bonding appeals was particularly substantial, and all of these results (with the exception of religious bridging appeals) were significant ( $p < 0.05$ ; see table 8.4). This pattern of appeals suggests that candidates bond with ethnic groups when districts become more homogenous, but

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<sup>14</sup> An increase in the Muslim population has a negative impact on indigenous bonding appeals. These findings indicate that in Muslim-majority districts, candidates (who are mostly Muslim) bond with their religious kin. Meanwhile, in Muslim-minority districts, candidates (who are mostly non-Muslim) appeal to indigenous identities. In short, it shows that Muslim candidates tend to appeal to Islam, while religious minorities in Indonesia tend to appeal to indigenous identities.

bridge across ethnic dimensions when districts are more ethnically fragmented. These results offers preliminary evidence in support of a connection between ethnic group size and candidate appeals.

## Part III: Competing Arguments

### THE PR-MAJORITARIAN THESIS

The most prominent competing argument for the politicization of ethnicity is the PR-majoritarian thesis. According to this argument, proportional representation rules create more proportionality, which offers incentives for smaller—often ethnic—parties to form. The ethnic parties, in turn, seek support from their ethnic kin through ethnic bonding appeals, raising the overall level of ethnic politicization during elections. In contrast, under majoritarian rules, candidates and parties need to achieve majority support. This fosters national-oriented parties and candidates that have strong incentives to reach out across ethnic groups, which results in more ethnic bridging appeals and less ethnic bonding appeals. The evidence presented here shows more ethnic bonding appeals in the majoritarian elections compared to the proportional representation elections, which is the opposite of what we expect from the PR-majoritarian thesis.

The PR-majoritarian thesis fails because a number of assumptions do not hold true. First, It assumes that proportional representation will foster niche parties with narrow ethnic ideologies. This has not occurred in Indonesia. While Indonesia's proportional representation system has prompted multiple political parties to form, other rules have put constraints on the formation of regionally-based indigenous

parties. Increases in thresholds to secure seats in the legislature have also put smaller parties under pressure. As a result, both nationalist and Islamic parties have been forced to compete nationally for the large moderate Muslim vote in order to survive.<sup>15</sup>

Evidence suggests that this has caused nationalist parties to become more Islamic and Islamic parties to become more nationalist (Evans 2009 3/13; Platzdasch 2009; Sukma 2010; Tanuwidjaja 2010). For example, in 2009, candidates in the three most successful Islam-inspired parties (PAN, PKB, and PKS) promoted broader identities (such as nationalism) or broader interests (such as an anticorruption platforms and community welfare) (Menchik 2009) (Hamayotsu 2011c). In effect, there is a move to the center in terms of Islamic politics. This is not the kind of ethnic polarization we would expect from a PR system.

Another assumption of the PR-majoritarian thesis is after ethnic parties form, candidates follow the ideology of their ethnic party and campaign using the party's ethnic appeals. Evidence from Indonesia suggests that this is often not the case, particularly under candidate-centric rules. In Indonesia's candidate-centric district head elections, candidates have a lot of independence, and the ideology of the party has little influence on their campaign strategy. Candidates appeal directly to constituents and ethnic groups by promoting themselves, rather than their party. This suggests that we need to consider the incentives and constraints on candidates to campaign on the party platform or not. In the case of candidate-centric rules we need to look beyond party ideology to understand if and when ethnicity becomes politicized.

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<sup>15</sup> Huber also argues that, "In [proportional representation] systems...because it is easy for parties to form, it is easy for multiple parties to target members of the same group, often on issues unrelated to group identity. This divides the group against itself"(Huber 2012, 987).



Finally, there is the assumption that in ethnically diverse countries each, or most, electoral districts are ethnically fragmented. If this were true, it would make sense that candidates competing under majoritarian rules would need to make ethnic bridging appeals, while candidates competing under PR could make ethnic bonding appeals. However, electoral districts in ethnically diverse countries are often not ethnically fragmented. In Indonesia (and in many other countries) ethnic groups tend to be regionally concentrated so electoral districts are often ethnically homogenous. In these districts, candidates competing under majoritarian rules have incentives to appeal to the majority ethnic group and avoid ethnic minority appeals. This results in plenty of ethnic bonding and very little ethnic bridging. Overall, the evidence indicates that a narrow focus on proportional representation versus majoritarian rules is too simplistic to explain ethnic politicization on the ground. There are many ways in which majoritarian systems can lead to just as much, or even more, ethnic politicization.

#### THE ETHNIC ATTACHMENT THESIS

The ethnic attachment thesis is bottom up in nature and based on a proposed fusion between cultural and political spheres. The argument contends that ethnic politicization is driven by deeply rooted psychological attachments to ethnicity. If this argument is correct, candidates would appeal to the ethnic identities that are the most socially salient. As a result, there should be a correlation between the strength of ethnic attachment and ethnic appeals. The findings from Indonesia indicate a lack of support for this argument.

First, despite evidence that religious minorities have strong religious attachments, religious minority appeals were rare—both in candidates’ poster campaigns and in other aspects of their campaigns. Second, variables for indigenous attachment (indigenous law) and Islamic attachment (mosques) were included in the regression but were largely statistically insignificant (see table 8.4).<sup>16</sup> Overall, while some ethnic salience is necessary before an ethnic identity can be politicized, variations in the degree of ethnic salience do not explain the observed variation in ethnic politicization in Indonesian elections.

#### THE CULTURAL MODERNIZATION THESIS

The second bottom-up argument originates from scholars writing on cultural modernization. According to the cultural modernization thesis, modernization and the host of changes it brings about (e.g., urbanization, social mobility, increased prosperity) undermines traditional ethnic identities and strengthens class-based and nationalist identities. If this argument is correct (and we assume that candidates appeal to salient ethnic identities) we expect that Indonesian candidates would make more Islamic and indigenous bonding appeals in traditional rural regions and more nationalist appeals in modern urban areas.

Evidence from Indonesia indicates that modernization fails to explain variations in the politicization of ethnicity. First, modernization can’t offer a good explanation for the lack of politicization of religious minority groups in elections. Second, variations in levels

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<sup>16</sup> The indigenous law variable was significant and negative for religious bridging appeals ( $p < 0.01$ ). Indigenous law had a slight negative impact on indigenous bridging appeals, but the effect was not significant ( $p = 0.10$ ). While the number of mosques did not increase Islamic bonding appeals as we might have expected, an increase in mosques did have a slight negative impact on indigenous appeals.

of modernization have an inconsistent effect on ethnic appeals. To test the impact of modernization, I included two key economic variables in the regression analysis: the percentage of individuals living under the poverty line (% in poverty) and the percentage of GRDP that comes from farming or fishing (% GRDP farming). Consistent with the cultural modernization thesis, poverty had a positive impact on indigenous bonding appeals. However, the traditional employment of farming and fishing had no impact. This suggests that indigenous bonding appeals are more common in poor regions, but not necessarily rural regions.

Third, neither of these two variables had any effect on Islamic bonding appeals or indigenous and religious bridging appeals. However, both showed significant effects on nationalist bridging appeals: poverty had a positive impact and percentage of GRDP from farming and fishing had a negative impact. This suggests that there are more nationalist appeals in urban areas, as predicted by the cultural modernization thesis. However, these appeals are concentrated in poor urban regions, which runs counter to the argument. An alternative interpretation of these results is that candidates use nationalism to bridge across the poorer classes in urban areas. The poorer classes are often more indigenously diverse in urban areas compared to rural areas. This interpretation is also consistent with numerous empirical studies that have found that the working class tends to be more attached to nationalist identities.<sup>17</sup> Overall, the three competing arguments failed to explain the observed politicization of ethnicity in Indonesian elections.

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<sup>17</sup> See Shayo (2009).

## Conclusions

To conclude, Indonesian elections have become more candidate-centric in recent years. The key changes were a move toward open lists in 2004, fully opening up lists in 2009, and the introduction of direct elections for regional heads in 2005. Drawing on survey evidence, Mietzner (2013, Kindle Locations 1150-1197) argued that the changes in Indonesia's electoral system were having an effect on Indonesians' identification with political parties. Surveys on the degree to which Indonesians feel close to any political party have shown a marked decline since 1999. As shown in figure 8.3, right before the 1999 elections, 86% of voters identified with a particular political party. Part of this can be attributed to a general sense of euphoria and the introduction of a multiparty system that gave voters some choice at the polls. Party identification fell by the 2004 legislative election, but it was still reasonably high compared to other countries. There was a steep decline in party identification after the introduction of the first direct presidential election in July 2004<sup>18</sup> and regional head elections in 2005. The regional head elections were held on a rolling basis, and by the time the first wave of elections were completed in July 2005, party identification was at a low of 30%. With ongoing district head elections across the country, partisan identification continued to decline, hitting a meager 10% right before the 2009 legislative elections. However, the mobilization of voters by parties in the 2009 election fostered an increase in party identification—it rebounded up to 20%. However, as the second round of regional head elections began in 2010, party identification again declined. These findings indicate that the overall move towards a candidate-centric electoral system, particularly in the regional head

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<sup>18</sup> Previously, presidents had been elected by the legislature.

elections, has resulted in a decline in party identification. This is hardly surprising considering the evidence presented on candidates running personal, localized campaigns—to a very high degree in district head elections and to a somewhat lesser degree in the legislative elections.




Figure 8.3. Party Identification in Indonesia. The chart is based on figures on party identification from (Mietzner 2013, 44), table 1.2. Data is originally from Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI).

In sum, this chapter and the previous chapter presented both qualitative and quantitative evidence to support the the dissertation’s argument. The results indicate that the move towards a candidate-centric system in Indonesia has resulted in an increase in politicization of local ethnic identities and a decline in appeals to partisan identities. As described in the next two chapters, I tested the central argument further by exploring the factors that influence candidates’ choice of ethnic appeal. Specifically, I

used poster data to examine the conditions under which candidates chose to use ethnic bonding versus ethnic bridging appeals.

SECTION IV

# Ethnic Bonding and Bridging

# Party Ideologies and Ethnic Groups

The previous two chapters presented evidence showing that bonding and bridging appeals to local ethnic groups increase, and partisan appeals decrease, as elections become more candidate-centric. What hasn't been tested is how candidates decide between making ethnic bonding appeals or ethnic bridging appeals. This question will be the focus of this chapter and the next. The dissertation posits that under party-centric rules, candidates' ethnic appeals will largely align with the ideology of their party. Candidates from a party with an exclusive ethnic ideology will make bonding appeals targeting that group. Meanwhile, candidates from multi-ethnic national parties will make ethnic bridging appeals. In contrast, under candidate-centric rules, candidates are less constrained by their party's ideology. They are more concerned that their ethnic appeals resonate with a critical mass of supporters in the district. As a result, the size of ethnic groups in the electoral district is pivotal. Candidates bond with one of their ethnic groups if it is large enough to secure victory. If not, they make bridging appeals that reach out to other ethnic groups across that dimension of ethnicity. In this chapter, I again draw on appeal data from election posters photographed across Indonesia. Appeals were made by candidates from all political parties and across districts that



varied in their religious and indigenous demographics. This data enabled me to broadly test the impact of party ideology and ethnic group size on the appeals made by candidates in different parties across various ethnic demographics.

Part 1 presents an analysis of the impact of party ideology on bonding and bridging appeals. According to my argument, party ideology should have a greater influence on appeals made by candidates competing in the semi-candidate-centric legislative elections compared to the candidate-centric district head elections. To test this argument, I classified Indonesian political parties according to their ideology, fitting them into two categories: Islamic parties and nationalist parties. I then compared Islamic bonding appeals and nationalist bridging appeals from candidates in each type of party to see if they aligned with Islamic or nationalist ideologies. The results showed that party ideology had an effect on candidate's bonding and bridging appeals in the legislative elections, but little or no impact on candidates' appeals in the candidate-centric district head elections.

Using regional data, I also tested the impact of regional ethnic party ideology on candidates' appeals. According to my argument, regional ethnic party ideology should have a more powerful influence on regional party candidates, driving them to make more bonding appeals with the party's favored ethnic group. Findings from elections in the province of Aceh support these expectations. They showed that regional ethnic party candidates more frequently use ethnic bonding appeals targeting their party's favored ethnic group.

Part 2 presents an analysis of the impact of ethnic group size on bonding and bridging appeals across electoral districts. I argue that ethnic group size should have a

stronger impact on candidates competing in the candidate-centric district head elections. By comparing indigenous and Islamic appeals across districts that vary in their level of ethnic diversity, I showed that as the size of ethnic groups increased, ethnic bonding increased and ethnic bridging decreased. Importantly, this outcome was more dramatic in the candidate-centric district head elections, where candidates were more sensitive to the size of ethnic groups when deciding to make bonding or bridging appeals. These findings support the argument that ethnic group size is more influential in candidate-centric elections compared to party-centric elections. In addition, the results help to explain why Islamic appeals or indigenous appeals are more prominent in some electoral districts, but not others.

## Part I: Impact of Party Ideology

### PARTY IDEOLOGY AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS

In laying out the argument in chapter three, I argued that in party-centric elections, the ideology of a political party is the key to understanding whether a candidate will make ethnic bonding or ethnic bridging appeals. Under party-centric rules, party leaders have the power to sanction and reward candidates, so the success of candidates is highly dependent on appeasing these leaders. Candidates do this by making ethnic appeals that align with the party's stance on ethnicity. For example, candidates from an ethnic party will be more successful if they make ethnic bonding appeals that target their party's favored group. Meanwhile, candidates in multiethnic parties will advance their political careers if they make ethnic bridging appeals that reach out across ethnic groups. Since the legislative elections in Indonesia are semi-

candidate-centric, we can expect that party ideology has some impact on the ethnic bonding and bridging appeals that candidates make.

In terms of their stance on ethnicity, Indonesian parties fit largely into two categories: national parties and Islamic parties. In fact, Indonesian parties are primarily defined by their views on Islam. Unlike in the West, where party differences are often rooted in right-left splits based on economic ideology, the main division among Indonesian parties is based on how they view the role of Islam in the public domain.<sup>1</sup> Nationalist parties are based on the principles of the state's philosophical foundation and national ideology, Pancasila.<sup>2</sup> Drawing on the principles of Pancasila (religiosity, internationalism, nationalism, representative democracy, social justice), these parties have a nationalist and multi-ethnic ideology. The main nationalist parties are PD, PDI-P, Gerindra, Golkar, Hanura, and PDS.<sup>3</sup> They do not see a special role for Islam in politics. Beyond their national and multi-ethnic orientation, there is some variation among the nationalist parties. Both PDI-P and Gerindra have some leftist leanings—PDI-P is influenced by Sukarno's Marhaenist thought (a commitment to the poor), while Gerindra, under the leadership of Prabowo, styles itself as a representative of Indonesia's rural farming and fishing communities. Meanwhile, PDS is a Christian party, though its ideological commitments are rooted in Pancasila.

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<sup>1</sup> For scholarly views on the ideologies of various Indonesian political parties and, more generally, what they stand for, see (Mietzner 2013), (Sherlock 2004), Evans (2009 3/13), Hwang (2011, 77-79), Ufen (2008, 28-29) and Suryakusuma (1999, 592) (cited in Ufen (2008, 28)).

<sup>2</sup> Before Indonesia's democratic transition, Pancasila was a required philosophical basis for every party. After transition, the new laws permitted parties with any ideology to form, so long as it did not conflict with Pancasila. See, (King 2003, 51) As a result none of the current Islamic parties oppose Pancasila.

<sup>3</sup> Scholars have also defined a number of the nationalist parties as 'presidentialist parties'. The main three parties that fit into this category are Partai Demokrat, Hanura, and Gerindra. It has been argued that a major role of these parties is to serve vehicles for their founding leaders presidential ambitions. See, (Ufen 2008) and (Mietzner 2013, Kindle Locations 1355-1400)

On the other side are the Islamic parties. The main Islamic parties that overtly self-identify as Islamic are PKS, PPP, PBB, PBR, and PKNU. These parties believe that Islam has a critical role to play in politics, and they are guided by an Islamic ideology. In this context, PAN and PKB could also be defined as Islamic parties, not because of their official ideology but because they have strong ties to Indonesia's largest Islamic organizations (Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah) and they are largely supported by orthodox Muslims. However, while they view Islam as an important source of inspiration and guidance, they do not believe that it should be the basis for public policy. Overall, they have a more neutral stance when it comes to religion. They do not include Islam as part of their formal ideology; instead, they draw on the national ideology of Pancasila. Because of this, I grouped PAN and PKB as nationalist, rather than Islamic.

Having divided the parties by ideology, I performed regression analysis on poster data from the semi-candidate-centric legislative elections to see if candidates' appeals were influenced by their political party's ideology. According to my argument, party ideology should affect candidates' ethnic bonding and ethnic bridging appeals. Thus, in looking at the impact of nationalist and Islamic party ideologies on bonding and bridging appeals, the first hypotheses is:

H1. In legislative elections, candidates in nationalist parties make more nationalist bridging appeals, while candidates in Islamic parties make more Islamic bonding appeals.

The regression models to test this hypothesis used two dependent variables: nationalist bridging appeals and Islamic bonding appeals. As described above, these are continuous variables ranging from 0 to 100 that represent the average of the percentage of each candidate's poster campaign that contained the appeal. The main independent variable was Islamic party, a binary measure that was coded 1 if the candidate was in an Islamic party and 0 if the candidate was in a nationalist party. In total, there were 305 Islamic party candidates and 1,567 nationalist party candidates. Control variables for ethnic group size, ethnic attachment, economic factors, candidate gender, and population size were also included in the regression. I used a linear probability model (OLS) with clustered robust standard errors to estimate the effect of party ideology on nationalist bridging appeals and Islamic appeals.<sup>4</sup> See chapter 8 for a more complete explanation of the dependent and independent variables, plus justification for using an OLS regression model.

Table 9.1 shows the results of regression analysis and figure 9.1 shows the predicted probabilities of nationalist bridging appeals and Islamic bonding appeals by party ideology type. The results show that Islamic party ideology had a significant negative impact on nationalist bridging appeals after controlling for other variables ( $p < 0.01$ ). Based on predicted probabilities, 47% of the poster campaigns by nationalist party candidates contained nationalist bridging appeals, compared to 31% of poster campaigns by Islamic party candidates. Islamic ideology had a significant positive impact on Islamic bonding appeals ( $p < 0.01$ ). Similarly, based on predicted probabilities, 51% of

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<sup>4</sup> Logit models with transformed dichotomous versions of the dependent variables were also used to study the impact of party ideology. The results were very similar.

poster campaigns by Islamic party candidates contained Islamic bonding appeals, compared to only 20% of poster campaigns by nationalist party candidates.<sup>5</sup>

These findings offer evidence to support hypothesis 1, which states that party ideology has an impact on candidates' bonding and bridging appeals in the legislative elections. Notably, aside from the control variable for female candidates, the only other variable with a significant effect on Islamic bonding appeals was the size of the Muslim population. As expected, this variable had a positive impact on Islamic appeals and a negative impact on nationalist bridging appeals. A number of other variables had a significant effect on nationalist bridging appeals. The number of mosques and the percentage of GRDP from farming had a negative impact, while poverty and population size had a positive impact. Indigenous law also had a negative impact, but it was only significant at the 90% level ( $p < 0.10$ ). This indicates that nationalist appeals were higher in highly populated poor urban areas with weaker forms of Islamic attachment.

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<sup>5</sup> In calculating these results, the 253 candidates from PAN and PKB were coded as nationalist party candidates. The regression was run again with PAN and PKB candidates coded as Islamic party members. The results were very similar. This indicates that in terms of Islamic and nationalist appeals, PAN and PKB candidates use a combination of both. This is what we might expect from parties with a nationalist ideology but strong connections with Islamic organizations.

**Table 9.1. Impact of party ideology on nationalist and Islamic appeals**

	<b>Nationalist bridging</b>	<b>Islamic bonding</b>
Islamic party	-15.36** (2.94)	31.48** (3.03)
Largest indig. grp. %	-0.07 (0.06)	0.02 (0.05)
Muslim population %	-0.15* (0.07)	0.30** (0.04)
Indigenous law	-0.12^ (0.07)	0.03 (0.05)
Mosques <sup>a</sup>	-0.73** (0.24)	0.12 (0.19)
Poverty %	0.74** (0.17)	-0.15 (0.12)
GRDP farming %	-0.24* (0.12)	0.02 (0.10)
Female candidate	2.77 (2.51)	36.99** (3.05)
Population (log)	6.78** (1.71)	-0.75 (1.03)
Intercept	-35.96 (25.69)	-2.33 (13.87)
<i>N</i>	1,872	1,872
R squared	0.05	0.27

*Note:* Results of regression analyses for independent variables (rows) and dependent variables (columns). Entries are coefficients from OLS regression model. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses.

<sup>a</sup> per 1,000 Muslim constituents in candidate's electoral district

^p < 0.10, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01




Figure 9.1. Predicted probabilities of candidate appeals for nationalist versus Islamic party ideology. Computed using MARGINS PLOT in Stata 12. Probabilities are calculated for party type (Islamic party variable) while holding all other independent variables at their mean. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

We can look more closely at levels of nationalist and Islamic appeals by placing the main parties along axes for nationalist and Islamic appeals. In figure 9.2, the horizontal axis measures Islamic appeals and the vertical axis measures nationalist appeals. Each circle represents a political party, and the size of the circle denotes the percentage of votes for that party in the national legislative elections in 2009. Parties are coded black for the nationalist parties and gray for the Islamic parties. I also categorized PKB and PAN as nationalist-Islamic parties and colored their circles with black and white stripes. Overall, there is a fairly clear split between the Islamic and nationalist party candidates, with lower levels of nationalist appeals and higher levels of Islamic appeals in posters belonging to the Islamic party candidates.

While the main nationalist party candidates used some Islamic appeals, they primarily used nationalist symbolism mixed with some populism in their posters. Party



slogans were also non-group specific and often populist in nature. While one of the Democrat Party's slogans was both religious and nationalist, most nationalist party slogans avoided making even vague references to religion, and none invoked indigenous groups. Nationalist party candidates did, however, invoke Islam in other ways, such as through their clothing, imagery, or additional slogans.

Candidates in the four Islamic parties shown in the lower right of figure 9.2 employed higher levels of Islamic appeals and lower levels of nationalist appeals. The vote-share for these parties in the national legislature (DPR-RI) pales in comparison to the nationalist parties. The Islamic PKS, plus PAN and PKB, occupied the middle of the chart. Their candidates made fewer Islamic appeals and more nationalist appeals in their posters. While Islam is important for these parties, there is evidence of some moderation in the use of Islamic rhetoric and symbolism in their campaigns. These three parties, which occupy the middle ground in figure 9.2, performed much better in terms of votes compared to the other Islamic parties.

Overall, the results showed that party ideology had at least some impact on the kinds of Islamic bonding and nationalist bridging appeals that candidates made in the semi-candidate-centric legislative elections. More specifically, the Islamic-nationalist divide among Indonesian political parties was reflected in the campaigns of individual candidates in the legislative elections. As we shall see, this was not the case in the district head elections.




Figure 9.2. Nationalist and Islamic appeals in national, provincial, and district legislative elections by political party. The size of the circles indicate the percentage of the vote for the national legislature for each political party.

#### PARTY IDEOLOGY AND DISTRICT HEAD ELECTIONS

I argue that party ideology will have little or no impact on the bonding and bridging appeals candidates make in candidate-centric elections. Instead, these candidates look to the voters and the size of ethnic groups in deciding whether to bond

with, or bridge across, ethnic groups. This is because party leaders lack power to sanction candidates who are out-of-step with the party's ideology or to reward ideologues. In addition, voters are not voting for a party and its ideology, they are choosing an individual candidate who they believe will represent their particular interests. This provides candidates with the independence and incentive to determine the kinds of ethnic bonding or bridging appeals they will make, without being constrained by party leaders and ideologies. In regard to the candidate-centric district head elections, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H2. In district head elections, party ideology has no effect on the frequency with which candidates make nationalist bridging appeals or Islamic bonding appeals.

In Indonesian district head elections, candidates can be supported by multiple parties. This complicates quantitative investigations into the effect of party ideology. Scholars have, however, noted the irrelevance of party ideologies in these elections (Mietzner 2010). Very often, coalitions of nationalist and Islamic parties support the same candidate and unusual coalitions are not uncommon. For example, one of the staunch Islamic parties, PKS, has occasionally formed coalitions with the Christian party, PDS, in district head elections (Tempo 2005 8/1). From my own observations in the field, it was often hard to see a connection between the kinds of appeals candidates made and the parties that supported them.

In an effort to quantify the impact of ideology, I created a list of parties that supported 63 candidates who competed in nine district head elections (these elections

are analyzed in detail in the next chapter). I measured the Islamic and nationalist appeals made by candidates in their election posters and plotted them according to party ideology. As shown in figure 9.3, there was very little relationship between party ideology and the kinds of appeals that candidates made in these nine district head elections. For example, a number of Islamic parties were associated with candidates who made the highest level of nationalist appeals in their posters. This evidence provides good support for hypothesis 2 and indicates that party ideology had no effect on nationalist bridging appeals or Islamic bonding appeals made by district head candidates.

One outlier should be noted: the Islamic PKS party had the highest frequency of Islamic appeals. In addition, the frequency of nationalist and Islamic appeals by district head PKS candidates was quite consistent with those made by legislative PKS candidates in the same party (see figure 9.2). This can be explained by PKS's origins as an Islamic social movement and its institutionalized and rigorous recruitment system. Compared to the other Indonesian parties, PKS is a more cohesive party, which has fostered higher degrees of loyalty among its cadre.<sup>6</sup> As a result, candidates' appeals are more consistent across different types of electoral rules. Nevertheless, the overall findings on party ideology support the argument. Party ideology had some effect on ethnic bonding and

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<sup>6</sup> PKS is quite different from other parties in that it originated from an Islamic social movement in universities in the late 1970s. As a political party, PKS candidates are selected through a rigorous recruitment system. They have already been socialized into the party and have more loyalty and attachment to the party's ideological foundations. However, internal tensions have developed within PKS. Pragmatists in the party want to take a more moderate approach to Islam in an effort to broaden the party's electoral appeals. The more puritanical members want to stay true to the movement's original Islamic mission. On recruitment, see (Hamayotsu 2011a) and on the development of PKS as a party, see Bubalo et al. (2008, 49-74).

bridging appeals in the semi-candidate-centric legislative elections, but very little impact in the more highly candidate-centric district head elections.




Figure 9.3. Nationalist and Islamic appeals in district head elections by political party

## PARTY IDEOLOGY AND REGIONAL ETHNIC PARTIES

In chapter 3, I differentiated between ethnic parties that compete for votes across the country and ethnic parties that only compete regionally. According to the argument, regionally-based ethnic parties, who often seek political power in ethnically homogenous regions, will tend to be more ethnocentric and their candidates will be more likely to appeal to the party's favored ethnic group. In contrast, ethnic parties that compete nationally regularly seek support in regions where they constitute a minority. Because they need to reach out to other groups, they will tend to be more moderate in their ethnic appeals and will often use bridging strategies.

The argument that regional ethnic parties make more ethnic appeals than national ethnic parties can be tested in the province of Aceh. Aceh is the one province in Indonesia where regional parties are allowed to compete in Aceh's provincial and district legislative elections. They do not compete in other provinces. This situation arose because, until 2004, the province of Aceh had an ongoing separatist insurgency led by the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM). Following the 2004 tsunami, which devastated parts of Aceh, the GAM signed a peace deal with the Indonesian government. A key component of the peace deal was that regional parties from Aceh would be allowed to compete in Aceh's local legislative elections.

Six regional parties formed to compete in the local legislative elections in 2009. Partai Aceh (Aceh Party) was the most prominent regional party and was composed primarily of former members of GAM. As an ethno-nationalist group, GAM cultivated a strong indigenous Acehnese identity in order to differentiate itself from the Indonesian

state.<sup>7</sup> This Acehese identity has been inherited by Partai Aceh and is reflected in their support. In the 2009 election, they were popular among the indigenous Acehese, but lacked support among other indigenous minorities in Aceh (Barter 2011). The Islamic parties were the Aceh Sovereignty Party (Partai Daulat Aceh, PDA); the Prosperous and Safe Aceh Party (Partai Aceh Aman Sejahtera, PAAS), which represented many of Aceh's ulama; and the Aceh Unity Party (Partai Bersatu Aceh, PBA), which was founded by a former Muhammadiyah activist and included many former members of PAN.<sup>8</sup>

To test whether regional ethnic parties are more ethnocentric in their appeals, I compared the ethnic bonding appeals by Acehese ethnic party candidates with the ethnic bonding appeals by candidates from Indonesian parties that compete right across the country. According to my argument, party ideology should have a greater impact on ethnic bonding appeals by candidates in the Acehese ethnic parties. As a result I expected candidates from Aceh's indigenous party, Partai Aceh, to use more indigenous bonding appeals and candidates from Aceh's Islamic parties to use more Islamic bonding appeals. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed:

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<sup>7</sup> See Aspinall (Aspinall 2009) on how GAM emerged out of the remnants of an Islamic movement (Darul Islam) and grew into an ethnonationalist movement, not an Islamic movement. He argues that in order to try and achieve statehood "the justification for the struggle became a claim of distinct Acehese national identity and history" (Aspinall 2009, Kindle Locations 3306-3307).

<sup>8</sup> See, Barter (2011, 8) Also, of the Islamic parties, PDA was the main vehicle for non-GAM religious clerics (Ulama) from Acehese Islamic schools. See, International Crisis Group (2008, 2) for brief descriptions of the parties. The two other parties were Aceh People's Party (Partai Rakyat Aceh, PRA) and the Independent Voice of the Acehese People (Suara Independen Rakyat Aceh, SIRA). SIRA had former connections with GAM and PRA was a party of left-leaning intellectuals and activists. It was a critic of how Islamic law was applied in Aceh.

H3. The ideology of Acehese ethnic parties (indigenous and Islamic) has a greater impact on their candidates' ethnic bonding appeals than the political parties (nationalist and Islamic) that compete nationally.

To analyze campaign appeals, I will use a subset of posters in the National Poster Dataset from candidates competing in the 2009 legislative elections in the province of Aceh. These posters were photographed in Aceh's capital, Banda Aceh, which is located on the northern tip of Sumatra. The city is homogeneously Islamic (96%) and the majority is indigenously Acehese (86%). The posters came from 137 candidates who competed in Banda Aceh's district and provincial legislative elections. The candidates represent 5 different types of parties: Indonesian nationalist parties, Indonesian Islamic parties, the Acehese indigenous party, the Acehese Islamic parties, and other Acehese parties. Table 9.2 shows a breakdown of the parties by type, including the number of posters and candidates.

**Table 9.2. Number of posters and candidates in Banda Aceh's 2009 legislative elections**

Party Type	Party names	Parties	Posters	Candidates
Indonesian nationalist	Gerindra, Golkar, Hanura, PAN, PD, PDI-P, PDK, PKB, PIS, PKPB, PKPI, PPD, PPI, PPPI, PPRN, Republikan	16	77	64
Indonesian Islamic	PBB, PBR, PKNU, PKS, PPP	5	33	27
Acehese Islamic	PAAS, PBA, PDA	3	20	16
Acehese indigenous	Partai Aceh	1	24	21
Acehese other	PRA, SIRA	2	15	9
<b>Total</b>		<b>27</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>137</b>

*Note:* The Acehese parties by law were only allowed to compete in district and provincial legislative elections in the province of Aceh.



To test the impact of party type on ethnic appeals in Aceh, I used OLS regression analysis with clustered robust standard errors. Three dependent variables were used in the analysis: indigenous bonding appeals, Islamic bonding appeals, and nationalist bridging appeals.<sup>9</sup> The key independent variables were the three types of parties: the Indonesian Islamic parties, the Acehese Islamic parties, and the one Acehese indigenous party (Partai Aceh).<sup>10</sup> These variables were coded with binary data. In the analysis, their coefficients were compared with the Indonesian nationalist parties, which is excluded from the regression. I included one control, a binary variable for female candidate. Because there was only slight variation in ethnic demographics and economic development across the electoral districts in Banda Aceh, including the demographic, ethnic attachment, and economic controls had no effect on the main independent variables. Table 9.3 presents the regression results.

The results of regression analysis showed that compared to Indonesian nationalist parties the Acehese indigenous party (Partai Aceh) had a significant and very substantial positive effect on indigenous bonding appeals. The Acehese Islamic parties also had a significant and positive impact on Islamic bonding appeals. All of these Acehese ethnic parties had a significant and negative impact on nationalist bridging appeals compared to the Indonesian nationalist parties.

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<sup>9</sup> Indigenous and religious bridging appeals are rare in Banda Aceh, primarily because the region is ethnically homogenous.

<sup>10</sup> I excluded other Acehese parties, PRA and SIRA, as they did not have an indigenous or Islamic ideology.

**Table 9.3. Impact of party type on candidate appeals in Aceh**

	<b>Indigenous bonding</b>	<b>Islamic bonding</b>	<b>Nationalist bridging</b>
Indonesian Islamic party	6.28 (7.56)	24.79 (14.02)	-23.20** (1.46)
Acehnese Islamic party	-2.02 (5.34)	39.97** (3.40)	-22.67** (1.46)
Acehnese indigenous party	80.86** (4.71)	-10.84 (8.93)	-18.40** (4.54)
Female candidate	4.92 (3.78)	51.41** (8.94)	-8.18 (7.10)
Intercept	3.92 (2.81)	22.09** (4.94)	24.72** (2.63)
<i>N</i>	128	128	128
R squared	0.59	0.31	0.13

*Note:* The three party variables are binary variables and they are being compared with Indonesian national parties. The 9 posters from the other Acehnese parties (PRA and SIRA) were excluded from the regression, though their inclusion had no effect on the results. Results of regression analyses for independent variables (rows) and dependent variables (columns). Entries are coefficients from OLS regression model. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses.

^p < 0.10, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01

Figure 9.4 shows the predicted probabilities for each party. As shown that the regression model predicted that 85% of Partai Aceh’s poster campaigns would include indigenous Acehnese. For all the other parties, this figure was 11% or less. Candidates in the Acehnese Islamic parties had the highest predicted probability for the frequency of Islamic bonding appeals in their poster campaigns, but this number was not significantly different than that for Indonesian Islamic parties. Finally, the Indonesian nationalist party candidates made the most nationalist appeals. These results offer evidence to support hypothesis three.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Regressions on partisan appeals (not shown) revealed that there was no statistical difference in levels of partisan appeals between the parties. The frequency of partisan appeals in poster campaigns was approximately 60% for candidates in each type of party.




Figure 9.4. Predicted probabilities of candidate appeals in the 2009 legislative elections in Banda Aceh. Computed using MARGINSPLIT in Stata 12. Probabilities are calculated for each of the four types of parties while holding all other independent variables at their mean. Probabilities are calculated holding all variables at their mean. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The two Acehese parties that did not have an Acehese or Islamic ideology were not included.

Given that Aceh is one of the most Islamic parts of Indonesia and a region with a history of separatism it is not too surprising that Indonesia’s national party candidates emphasized Islam rather than nationalism in their campaigns. A comparison of figures on appeals made nationally (figure 9.1) and in Aceh only (figure 9.4) show that Indonesian nationalist party candidates made more Islamic appeals in Aceh compared to the rest of the country (30% versus 20%, respectively), as did the Indonesian Islamic parties (58% versus 51%). Meanwhile the Indonesian parties made less nationalist

appeals in Aceh. For the Indonesian nationalist parties the figure was 23% in Aceh versus 47% across the rest of the country, and for the Indonesian Islamic parties it was 2% in Aceh versus 31% nationally. Clearly, candidates were toning down their Indonesian nationalist appeals given Aceh’s separatist past. This indicates that while ideology does matter in the semi-candidate-centric legislative elections, regional factors also influence candidates appeals.

Overall, the poster analysis in Aceh offers some evidence that regional parties are more ethnocentric and engage in higher levels of ethnic bonding appeals. As expected, candidates in Partai Aceh promoted a strong Acehnese indigenous identity, while the Islamic Acehnese parties primarily made Islamic appeals. Photo 9.1 offers examples of posters from candidates competing in the Aceh elections which illustrates the kinds of ethnic symbolism the different parties used.



Photo 9.1. Posters from Banda Aceh. Left: Partai Aceh candidate. It was very common for candidates from Partai Aceh to wear traditional Acehnese clothing. Middle: Nationalist symbolism in the form of the Indonesian flag from a nationalist party poster (Partai Demokrat). Right: An Acehnese Islamic party (PDA) candidate poster. Use of Islamic symbolism, Banda Aceh's mosque (Masjid Raya Baiturrahman) and references to the Islamic clerics (Ulama). Source: Author

In sum, the results presented in part 1 show that in legislative elections, the ideology of the party can at least partially explain candidates' choice of Islamic bonding appeals or nationalist bridging appeals. In the district head elections, there was little or no connection between party ideology and candidates' appeals. Finally, candidates in regional ethnic parties made more ethnic bonding appeals than candidates in national parties. Overall, this shows that the influence of party ideology on ethnic appeals declines as elections become more candidate-centric. In the second part of this chapter, I show that as the influence of party ideology declines, the impact of ethnic group size increases.

## Part II: Impact of Ethnic Group Size

According to the argument, the size of ethnic groups can have an important impact on whether candidates choose to make ethnic bonding appeals or ethnic bridging appeals. Candidates bond with one of their ethnic groups if it is a winning group—that is, a group large enough that their support would enable electoral victory. In contrast, if candidates belong to losing ethnic groups, their best option is to use ethnic bridging appeals to foster the necessary support. Ethnic group size becomes particularly pivotal in candidate-centric elections. In these elections, candidates are less constrained by the ideology of their party in choosing to bond with, or bridge across, ethnic groups. Instead, they choose an ethnic bonding or bridging strategy based primarily on achieving a critical mass of support. As a result, the size of ethnic groups will have a particularly strong effect on candidates' decisions to bond or bridge.

This argument can be tested by comparing ethnic bonding and ethnic bridging appeals in the semi-candidate-centric legislative elections with the candidate-centric district head elections across districts that range in ethnic group size. If my argument is correct, ethnic group size should show a stronger impact on the appeals made in district head elections compared to the legislative elections. Specifically, levels of indigenous bridging should be higher when the size of the largest indigenous group is small, whereas levels of indigenous bonding will be higher when the size of the largest indigenous group is large. The size of the Muslim population should have a similar effect on Islamic bonding appeals and religious bridging appeals. Accordingly, the following hypotheses are proposed:

H4. Indigenous bonding appeals increase more rapidly in district head elections compared to legislative elections as the size of the largest indigenous group rises.

H5. Islamic bonding appeals increase more rapidly in district head elections compared to legislative elections as the size of the Muslim population rises.

H6. Indigenous bridging appeals increase more rapidly in district head elections compared to legislative elections as the size of the largest indigenous group falls.

H7. Religious bridging appeals increase more rapidly in district head elections compared to legislative elections as the size of the Muslim population falls.

#### COMPARING APPEALS ACROSS DISTRICTS

In chapter 8, I showed that ethnic group size had a statistically significant impact on ethnic bonding and bridging appeals when we looked at the full dataset of legislative

and district head candidates combined. However, those results did not tell us whether the effect of ethnic group size was different for district head candidates versus legislative candidates. To test for such a difference, I divided the National Poster Dataset into district head and legislative candidates and used the OLS regression model with clustered robust standard errors.

The key dependent variables were: indigenous bonding, indigenous bridging, Islamic bonding, and Islamic bridging. The first key independent variable to be tested was the percentage of the population belonging to the largest indigenous group in the candidate's electoral district (Largest indig. grp. %); this value ranged from 11% to 100%. The second key independent variable was the percentage of the Muslim population in the candidate's electoral district; this value ranged from 1% to 100% (see table 8.3). Control variables for ethnic attachment, economic factors, candidate gender, and population size were also included. Chapter 8 provides a more complete description of the variables and the choice of OLS regression model.

Table 9.4 presents the results for ethnic bonding appeals. All control variables were included, but not shown. See table 9.C.1 appendix C for the full regression results. In both elections, there was a significant positive impact of indigenous group size on indigenous bonding appeals, and a significant and positive impact of Muslim group size on Islamic bonding appeals ( $p < 0.01$ ). Importantly, in both cases, the coefficients were larger for district head candidates. These findings support hypotheses 4 and 5, which posit that indigenous and Islamic bonding appeals increase more sharply in district head elections as group size increases.

**Table 9.4. Impact of group size on candidate bonding appeals**

	INDIGENOUS BONDING		ISLAMIC BONDING	
	District head	Legislative	District head	Legislative
Largest indig. grp. %	0.42** (0.08)	0.26** (0.04)	-0.02 (0.11)	0.01 (0.06)
Muslim population %	-0.37** (0.09)	-0.17** (0.05)	0.45** (0.10)	0.36** (0.04)
<i>N</i>	266	1,872	266	1,872

Control variables included, but not shown. See table 9.C.1 appendix C for full regression results.

*Note:* Results of regression analyses for independent variables (rows) and dependent variables (columns). The dependent variables are the percentage of candidates' posters with the appeal, segmented into district head candidates and legislative candidates. Entries are coefficients from OLS regression model. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
<sup>^</sup>p < 0.10, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01

Table 9.5 contains the results for ethnic bridging appeals. All control variables were included, but not shown (see table 9.C.2 appendix C for the full regression results). Indigenous group size had a significant and negative impact on indigenous bridging appeals in the district head elections, but not in the legislative elections. The size of the Muslim population had a significant negative impact on Islamic bridging appeals in both elections. As expected, the coefficients for indigenous group size and size of the Muslim population were larger in the district head elections. These findings support hypotheses 6 and 7, which posit that indigenous and Islamic bridging appeals decrease more sharply in district head elections as group size increases.



**Table 9.5. Impact of group size on candidate bridging appeals**

	INDIGENOUS BRIDGING		ISLAMIC BRIDGING	
	District head	Legislative	District head	Legislative
Largest indig. grp. %	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.12^ (0.07)	0.03 (0.02)
Muslim population %	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.08** (0.02)
<i>N</i>	266	1,872	266	1,872

Control variables included, but not shown. See table 9.C.2 appendix C for full regression results.

*Note:* Results of regression analyses for independent variables (rows) and dependent variables (columns). The dependent variables are the percentage of candidates' posters with the appeal, segmented into district head candidates and legislative candidates. Entries are coefficients from OLS regression model. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
 ^p < 0.10, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01

While the regression results indicate some difference in the impact of ethnic group size on appeals between district head and legislative elections, a more intuitive way to show the impact of ethnic group size is to chart the frequency of appeals across electoral districts that vary by the size of ethnic groups. Figure 9.5 presents the average frequency of appeals across districts by ethnic group size.

In district head elections, the frequency of ethnic bonding appeals increased as ethnic group size increased (A and C). Ethnic bridging appeals increased slightly as the size of the largest indigenous group grew to 50%, after which they dropped off. This marks a critical turning point because these are single-seat majoritarian elections—when an indigenous group forms the majority, it becomes a winning ethnic group and it becomes more prudent for candidates to use bonding appeals with that group, rather than use bridging appeals across ethnic groups. This effect was more pronounced for religious bridging appeals than for indigenous bridging appeals (C vs. A). In the legislative elections, the frequency of indigenous bonding appeals increased as the size

of the largest indigenous group increased (B). This increase was more pronounced for religious bonding appeals (D). However, overall ethnic bridging appeals showed little relationship to ethnic group size.

From these charts, we can see that the effect of ethnic group size on bonding and bridging appeals is not linear, particularly in the district head elections. To get a better sense of the relationship between ethnic group size and appeals, I charted appeals using fractional polynomial plots. Figure 9.6 shows the frequencies of each type of appeal versus ethnic group size for district head and legislative elections. Plot A and B show that the shapes of the curves for indigenous and Islamic bonding appeals are similar in district head elections. Bonding appeals increase rapidly as the size of the ethnic group increases from 30% to 80%; it then plateaus and declines somewhat. In legislative elections, the increase in ethnic bonding appeals is more gradual. Plots B and C show that bridging appeals are relatively flat in legislative elections, but have more of a downward slope in district head elections. Overall, the results of the regression analysis and the visual representations support hypotheses 4-7. The results indicate that ethnic group size has a more acute effect on ethnic bonding and bridging appeals made by candidates in candidate-centric elections compared to semi-candidate-centric election.




Figure 9.5. Frequency of ethnic bonding and bridging appeals based on size of ethnic group. A and C show appeal data from district head elections, while B and D show data from the legislative elections. The bars above zero (black) are bonding appeals and the bars below zero (gray) are bridging appeals. The height of each bar is the average percentage of candidate's poster campaigns that contain bonding or bridging appeals. Each bar represents a particular ethnic group size (e.g., 0-10%, 10-20%). One bar represents 50-70% due to a limited number of districts in the dataset within that band. n/a = no appeals for that group size.




Figure 9.6. Fractional polynomial plots of ethnic bonding and bridging appeals based on size of ethnic group. Data from figure 9.5 was transformed into a fractional polynomial plot using Stata 12. The light gray shading around the lines represents 90% confidence intervals.

### CHOOSING BETWEEN INDIGENOUS OR ISLAMIC APPEALS

Indonesian candidates often have options when it comes to the ethnic group to which they make bonding appeals—Indonesian candidates can choose either their indigenous group or their religious (Muslim) group. According to my argument, their decision is largely based on a comparison between the size of their indigenous group and the size of the Muslim group. Consider the example of a candidate who belongs to

an indigenous group that is too small to support an electoral victory. If they are also a member of a Muslim group that is large enough to secure a victory, then they will strategically choose to make Islamic bonding appeals. If the group sizes are reversed, they will make bonding appeals to their indigenous group.

To test this argument, I examined levels of bonding appeals across districts that varied in both their religious and indigenous diversity. To do so, I took the data on bonding appeals and divided it into four types of districts based on whether they had a Muslim majority or minority and whether the largest indigenous group represented a majority or minority. The results are shown in figure 9.7. The relative levels of bonding appeals across these four types of districts are similar in district head (chart A) and legislative elections (chart B), but are more accentuated in the candidate-centric district head elections. The highest level of Islamic appeals is in districts where the largest indigenous group is a minority and the Muslim population is a majority. In districts with an indigenous majority and a Muslim minority, candidates almost exclusively engage in indigenous bonding appeals. In districts where there are no Muslim or indigenous majority groups, Islamic bonding and indigenous bonding are very low.

These charts show how the size of Muslim and indigenous groups in a district largely determines whether Islam or indigenous identities become politicized. This suggests that we can predict, with a good degree of accuracy, the types of ethnic bonding appeals that will be prominent in particular districts based on their religious and indigenous demographics, especially in district head elections.




Figure 9.7. Frequency of ethnic bonding and bridging appeals based on both the size of the Muslim population and the size of the largest indigenous group. Each district was categorized as 1 of the 4 possible types based on whether the Muslim population and the largest indigenous group was a majority or minority in the electoral district. Data from district head elections is in A and legislative election data is in B.

There were some differences in the kind of bridging appeals candidates made in the legislative and district head elections. District head candidates tended to make bridging appeals to specific indigenous groups (i.e., cross-bridging). In a sense, they were also more forthright in appealing to other ethnic groups. They dressed in indigenous clothes belonging to the other groups, used their language, and included images of their traditional houses. Non-Muslim candidates also frequently included images of mosques and celebratory messages for Islamic holidays. In contrast, legislative candidates rarely made specific bridging appeals to other groups. Instead, they tended to make very general (i.e., broad-bridging) appeals to religious and indigenous identities.

District head candidates were more likely to bridge across ethnic groups through regionalist and nationalist appeals. In their posters, candidates included more regional

monuments and maps, and they conveyed a close connection to the land by promoting themselves as “son of the soil” and using images of local scenic landscapes. Nationalist appeals primarily took the form of the Indonesian flag, and it was most frequently used to bridge across voters in indigenously fragmented districts or to appeal to religious minorities.

In sum, the results indicate that ethnic group size has a significant and substantial impact on the kinds of appeals candidates make. Importantly, candidates are more sensitive to ethnic group size under candidate-centric rules. Compared to legislative candidates, district head candidates made more ethnic bonding appeals, particularly when there was an indigenous or Muslim majority in the electoral district, and they made more bridging appeals when no group formed a majority.

## Conclusions

The results of the analyses presented in this chapter reveal the interplay between three key factors: the degree to which electoral rules are candidate-centric, party ideology, and the size of ethnic groups. The results showed how these factors affected candidates’ decisions to use ethnic bonding or ethnic bridging appeals. In the semi-candidate-centric legislative elections, candidates were more influenced by the ideology of their party. Nationalist party members were more likely to make nationalist bridging appeals, while Islamic party members made more Islamic bonding appeals. The party’s ethnic ideology was particularly influential among candidates in Aceh’s regional ethnic parties. On the other hand, candidates competing in candidate-centric district head elections were more sensitive to the size of ethnic groups in the district. They bonded

more with their ethnic groups when the groups were large, but engaged in ethnic bridging appeals when their ethnic groups were small.

The next chapter extends the investigation into choosing between ethnic bonding and ethnic bridging appeals. However, instead of looking broadly across districts, I primarily look within districts. Drawing on nine district head elections, I examine the kinds of appeals individual district head candidates made based on the size of their ethnic groups. In addition, I elaborate on the kinds of ethnic symbolism and messages that candidates used in their election posters.



# The Strategy of Bonding and Bridging

In the previous chapter, I looked broadly across districts that ranged in size in terms of their largest ethnic group. As expected, I found that candidates switched from bonding to bridging as the size of ethnic groups in the district declined. In addition, this change in appeals was sharper in candidate-centric district head elections compared to party-centric legislative elections. This provided good evidence that ethnic group size has a major impact on candidates' decisions to bond or bridge.

This chapter presents the results of a more focused test of how ethnic group size affects ethnic bonding and bridging appeals. Rather than comparing appeals across electoral districts that varied in terms of ethnic group size, I compared across individual candidates that varied in terms of their ethnic identities. According to my argument, candidates from winning and losing groups will pursue different appeal strategies. Broadly speaking, candidates from a winning ethnic group should engage in bonding appeals and candidates from a losing ethnic group should engage in bridging appeals.

In part 1, I draw on the dissertation's argument to explain why candidates chose to use ethnic bonding or bridging appeals in Indonesian district head elections. Taking into consideration the electoral rules and social constraints on religious-minority appeals, I

defined the four types of candidates who competed in these elections. Based on the size of their ethnic groups, I predicted what their dominant and secondary ethnic appeals would be and identified them by using terms that describe their expected behavior: dual-bonding candidates, Islamic-bonding candidates, indigenous-bonding candidates, and dual-bridging candidates.

In part 2, I describe how I selected nine district head elections in Indonesia to test the ethnic appeal predictions across candidates. I also provide an overview of the ethnic appeals coded from almost 10,000 campaign posters from 63 candidates competing in these elections. In part 3, I present the results of various quantitative tests of the ethnic appeal data. The evidence shows that in most cases, candidates made ethnic bonding and bridging appeals as predicted. The fourth and final part of this chapter reports on a qualitative analysis of the campaigns of individual candidates and the content of their posters. I present examples from each of the four types of candidates. Before concluding, I offer some explanations for the outliers—candidates who used divergent appeals strategies.

## Part I: Bonding and Bridging Appeals Across Candidates

### WINNING AND LOSING ETHNIC GROUPS IN DISTRICT HEAD ELECTIONS

According to the argument, ethnic group size can be used to predict whether Indonesian candidates will make bonding or bridging appeals. To hold the electoral rules constant, I focused on district head elections, but candidates varied depending on whether they were in a winning or losing ethnic group. In order to predict whether a

candidate would make bonding appeals to their indigenous or religious group or bridge across groups, four key pieces of information were needed:

1. What percentage of the population in an electoral district constitutes a winning group?
2. Is the candidate in a winning or losing indigenous group in the electoral district?
3. Is the candidate in a winning or losing religious group in the electoral district?
4. Are there any social restrictions on appeals to particular ethnic groups?

A winning ethnic group is defined by its relative size; it must constitute enough of the population in an electoral district that its support can secure the candidate's victory. In majoritarian elections, this value is close to 50%, but it is lower in multi-member districts because candidates need a lower percentage of the vote and can win a seat by only relying on support from a small ethnic group. The district head elections in Indonesia are one-seat majoritarian elections that use a two-round system. Candidates can win in the first round if they get the highest number of votes and their vote-share is over 30% of the total votes. If there is no winner in the first round, the top two candidates compete in a run-off election and need a majority of the vote to win. With a two-round majoritarian system it can be a risky strategy to limit your campaign to minority group appeals when there is a chance that the election will go to a second round. Overall, candidates have strong incentives to craft electoral campaigns that appeal to a majority of the voters. Because of this, I chose 50% as the minimum percentage that constitutes a winning group in district head elections.

To predict whether a candidate will make bonding or bridging appeals, I needed to identify the indigenous group to which the candidate belonged and whether it constituted a majority or minority in the electoral district. While candidates run on a joint ticket (head and deputy) in district head elections, this analysis focused on the indigenous and religious identity of the head candidate, for two reasons. First, the head candidate is more relevant for voters, so their identity will be scrutinized the most. Second, head candidates choose their running mate and that choice is part of their electoral strategy. A candidate that wants to bridge across ethnic groups has strong incentives to recruit a deputy candidate who is from a different ethnic group. On the other hand, a candidate who wants to bond will choose a deputy from his or her own ethnic group. For both of these reasons the head candidate was chosen for this analysis.

In addition to the candidate's indigenous identity, I needed to know their religious identity and whether their religious group made up a majority or minority in the candidate's electoral district. As noted in chapter 7, there are social constraints on appeals to religious minorities in Indonesia. This means that the relevant information for religious identity was whether the candidate was Muslim and whether the Muslim population was a majority or minority in the candidate's district.

After establishing the minimum percentage of the population that defined a winning ethnic group, choosing a candidate (the head), and establishing that there were restrictions on appeals to religious minorities (meaning that the key religious identifier was whether the candidate was Muslim), the following predictions were made:

1. Candidates will make indigenous bonding appeals if they belong to an indigenous majority in the district.
2. Candidates will make Islamic bonding appeals if they belong to a Muslim majority in the district.
3. Candidates will make indigenous bridging appeals if they belong to an indigenous minority in the district.
4. Candidates will make religious bridging appeals if they belong to a Muslim minority OR any other religious group (regardless of size) in the district.

#### Bonding Trumps Bridging

These predictions yield optimal strategies for candidates' religious and indigenous appeals. But how do candidates decide which type of bonding or bridging appeal to focus on? With a limited amount of time and resources, candidates often focus their attention on one dimension of ethnicity rather than the other. In the scenario where the optimal strategy is to bond along one dimension and bridge across the other, I argue that candidates will prefer the ethnic bonding strategy. Bonding with a majority group is easier because you can rely on ingroup solidarity and the content of your appeals will be more coherent and focused. Using bridging strategies to appeal to multiple ethnic groups is a harder and more risky strategy. Bridging takes more time, resources, and skill, and runs the risk of backfiring. Multi-ethnic bridging appeals can antagonize some groups and increase the chance of desertion. In sum, when candidates have the option to bridge across one dimension of ethnicity or bond in another dimension, bonding will trump bridging.

## FOUR CANDIDATE TYPES

Figure 10.1 describes the four types of candidates. Each type of candidate is identified in terms of their indigenous and religious group and the size of those groups in the electoral district (except for non-Muslims, which are independent of religious group size). Based on this information, the dominant ethnic bonding and bridging appeals strategy for each candidate type can be predicted. The four types are as follows:

**1. Dual-bonding candidates:** Candidates who fit into this category are members of a Muslim majority and an indigenous majority in their electoral district. They have the option to make bonding appeals to either their fellow Muslims or to their indigenous group. Whether the candidate targets one or the other is dependent on other factors, such as regional dynamics, the strategic interaction between candidates, current issues, and candidate-specific idiosyncrasies. Given that they have good bonding options for both indigeneity and religion, I predict a high level of indigenous bonding and Islamic bonding among these candidates.<sup>1</sup>

**2. Islamic-bonding candidates:** Candidates in this category are members of a Muslim majority and an indigenous minority in their electoral district. I predict these candidates

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<sup>1</sup> In some cases, constituents who share the same indigenous identity and the same religious identity are the majority; for example, when Javanese-Muslims are the majority. In this case, candidates can use Javanese or Islamic bonding appeals, but they are effectively bonding with the same group. In other cases, the Javanese might be the majority indigenous group and Muslims might be the majority religious group, but Javanese-Muslims are a minority. This happens when indigenous and religious groups overlap to some extent (i.e., cross-cutting). In this scenario, we can expect candidates to target either Muslims or Javanese with bonding appeals. In either case, we can expect a high degree of ethnic bonding.

will predominantly make Islamic bonding appeals, but may choose to make bridging appeals across indigenous groups as a secondary option.

**3. Indigenous-bonding candidates:** Candidates in this category are members of an indigenous majority in their electoral district. In terms of religion, they are either non-Muslim candidates or members of a Muslim minority in their electoral district. I predict these candidates will primarily engage in bonding appeals to their indigenous group, but may choose to engage in bridging appeals across religious groups as a secondary strategy.

**4. Dual-bridging candidates:** All these candidates are members of an indigenous minority. In terms of religion they are either non-Muslims or members of a Muslim minority in their electoral district. These candidates have incentives to avoid indigenous and religious bonding appeals. They may make indigenous or religious bridging appeals. However, bridging across indigenous and religious groups entails risks and uncertainties for candidates. In addition, candidates often lack a certain amount of legitimacy in making these appeals. Because ethnic bridging is the only ethnic appeal strategy open to these candidates, they are the most likely (among the four candidate types) to avoid indigenous and religious appeals altogether. Instead, they will often present themselves as secularists and downplay their indigenous or religious affiliations. In addition, I predict these candidates will be more likely to make nationalist appeals. Nationalism is a broadly inclusive form of identity in Indonesia, and it can be used to bridge across indigenous and religious groups.

<p><b>1. Dual-bonding candidates</b></p> <p>Candidate ethnicity: Muslim majority + indigenous majority</p> <p>Dominant appeal: Islamic bonding &amp; indigenous bonding</p>	<p><b>2. Islamic-bonding candidates</b></p> <p>Candidate ethnicity: Muslim majority + indigenous minority</p> <p>Dominant appeal: Islamic bonding Secondary appeal: Indigenous bridging</p>
<p><b>3. Indigenous-bonding candidates</b></p> <p>Candidate ethnicity: Muslim minority + indigenous majority or Non-Muslim + indigenous majority</p> <p>Dominant appeal: Indigenous bonding Secondary appeal: Religious bridging</p>	<p><b>4. Dual-bridging candidates</b></p> <p>Candidate ethnicity: Muslim minority + indigenous minority or Non-Muslim + indigenous minority</p> <p>Dominant appeal: Religious bridging, indigenous bridging, and nationalist bridging</p>

Figure 10.1. The four candidate types and their ethnic appeal strategies

This categorization of candidates is not meant to be deterministic. There will always be some candidates who will do the unexpected. Regional and election-specific factors, the interaction between candidates, the internal structure of political parties, plus other aspects of a candidate’s identity, can constrain and propel candidates to make certain types of appeals. However, I argue that the size of a candidate’s ethnic groups offer considerable explanatory power while being relatively parsimonious. This information can also help reveal outliers. Having identified the four types of candidates, I analyzed campaign appeals to probe other potential factors that might affect ethnic appeal choice.



## Part II: Ethnic Appeals in Nine District Head Elections

### THE DISTRICT HEAD ELECTIONS

To study the appeals made by individual candidates, I focused my analysis on nine district head elections that were held between 2010 and 2011. During my fieldwork, I spent a number of weeks or months in each district photographing election posters; interviewing candidates, campaign managers, local elites, and voters; and reviewing the local press coverage. These nine elections were selected because their districts range in their level of indigenous and religious diversity. Seven elections were in the primary region of my field research, North Sumatra. North Sumatra is a particularly good place to study ethnic politics because it is an ethnically diverse province and there are wide variation in the levels of ethnic diversity across North Sumatra's electoral districts. Two districts were selected outside of North Sumatra: Ambon in the province of Maluku and Salatiga in Central Java. Overall, four districts had an indigenous majority and five did not, and four had Muslim majorities and five had Christian majorities.<sup>2</sup> It should be noted that this selection of district head elections is not meant to be a representative sample of Indonesia. The majority of Indonesian districts have a Muslim majority and an indigenous majority. These nine districts were selected with the expectation that there would be a reasonable number of candidates that fit each of the four candidate types—dual-bonding, Islamic-bonding, indigenous-bonding, and dual-bridging. As shown in

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<sup>2</sup> The selected districts in North Sumatra with a majority Muslim population were Medan, Serdang Bedagai, and Simalungun. The Christian majority districts were Karo, Samosir, Toba Samosir. One district, Pematang Siantar, did not have a majority religious group. Also, there are small numbers of Buddhists in Medan and Pematang Siantar. According to the 2000 national census the size of the largest indigenous group ranged in these districts from 32% (Javanese) in Medan, to 75% (Batak Karo) in Karo. Ambon is majority Christian and the largest indigenous group, the Ambonese, are 39% of the population. Salatiga is majority Muslim and the Javanese are the largest indigenous group (94%).

figure 10.2, the sample contained plenty of variation in regard to the size of the Muslim population and the largest indigenous group in each district.




Figure 10.2. Size of the Muslim population and largest indigenous group by district for the Nine Cases Poster Dataset. Data from Badan Pusat Statistik, Jakarta. Size of Muslim population is from the 2010 national census. Size of the largest indigenous group is from the 2000 census.

In total, 63 candidate tickets (each ticket = head + deputy) competed in the nine elections. Data on candidate identities was gathered from the electoral commission office in each of the districts and from local informants.<sup>3</sup> Table 10.1 shows how the candidates varied in terms of religious identity, indigenous identity, gender, and candidate type. In terms of religious identity, 23 of the head candidates were Muslim. The other candidates identified themselves as Christian, Protestant, and Catholic, and

<sup>3</sup> The electoral commission collects data on candidates' religious identity, but not their indigenous identity.

there was one Buddhist. The candidates represented 12 different indigenous groups (see table 10.C.1 in appendix).

**Table 10.1. Identity of 63 candidates in nine district head elections**

<b>Identity</b>	<b><i>N</i></b>
<b>A. Religious identity</b>	
Muslim	23
Non-Muslim	40
<b>B. Indigenous identity</b>	
Largest indigenous group	25
Smaller indigenous group	38
<b>C. Gender</b>	
Male	57
Female	6
<b>D. Candidate type</b>	
Dual-bonding candidate	4
Islamic-bonding candidate	15
Indigenous-bonding candidate	21
Dual-bridging candidate	23

*Note:* For the religious and indigenous identities of district head and deputy candidates, see appendix table 10.C.1.

In terms of candidate type, the number of dual-bonding candidates was lower than expected, primarily due to one electoral district, Serdang Bedagai. This was one of two districts with a Muslim majority and an indigenous Javanese majority. While I expected at least some candidates would fit the dual-bonding type (i.e., Muslim-

Javanese), none did. This is partly due to a certain amount of marginalization of Javanese in this district and the fact that they constitute a slim majority.<sup>4</sup>

To study the variation in ethnic appeals, I used data from the Nine Cases Poster Dataset, which contains ethnic appeal data coded from 9,475 posters that I photographed during the nine district head elections held between 2010 and 2011. Details on how the posters were photographed and coded, plus summary statistics on the numbers of posters and candidates by district, are presented in chapter 6 and table 6.2. I photographed many posters with the same design that were posted in multiple locations across the district. All of the posters (including duplicate design posters) were included in the dataset. By doing so, the appeals in posters that were favored by candidates will carry more weight in the analysis. I analyzed five ethnic appeals made by candidates: indigenous bonding, Islamic bonding, indigenous bridging, religious bridging, and nationalist bridging. For each candidate, I calculated the percentage of their posters that contained each type of ethnic appeal. There are 63 candidates in the dataset, thus there are 63 observations for each ethnic appeal.

## OVERVIEW OF CAMPAIGN APPEALS

Figure 10.3 shows the average percentage of candidates' poster campaigns that contained each type of appeal for all 63 candidates. Nationalist bridging was the most common type of appeal. On average, 52% of candidates' posters contained nationalist

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<sup>4</sup> While I expected a number of Muslim-Javanese candidates to enter the race (qualifying as dual-bonding candidates), none of the candidates were Javanese. Two reasons might account for this. First, compared to Salatiga (the other Javanese-Muslim majority district) the Javanese in Serdang Bedagai constitute a slim majority (53%). Second, unlike Salatiga, the Javanese are not native to Serdang Bedagai. Most migrated there over the last century to work on the plantations and have experienced a certain amount of marginalization.

bridging appeals. This usually came in the form of the Indonesian flag. This was followed by indigenous bonding appeals (33%). Indigenous bonding appeals were twice as common as Islamic bonding appeals, and religious bridging was particularly high. This is different from the broader pattern in Indonesia, where Islamic bonding appeals are higher, and religious bridging appeals are relatively low. The reason is because five of the nine districts were Christian majority districts. With social constraints on non-Muslim appeals, Christians in Christian majority districts primarily bonded with their indigenous groups and used religious bridging appeals to reach out to the Islamic minority in their districts.




Figure 10.3. Campaign appeals in nine district head elections. Appeal data was based on coding 9,475 election posters posted by 63 candidates in 9 district head elections. Each bar represents a type of appeal. Appeals were aggregated by candidate, so the height of the bar is the average percentage of a candidates' poster campaigns that contained the appeal type.

My analysis also included regional bridging appeals, partisan appeals, and policy appeals for some contrast. Regional bridging appeals (e.g., images of regional maps and monuments, images of the land) were quite high. They were particularly prevalent in the Christian majority rural districts. Similar to the cross-national data from the National Poster Dataset, partisan appeals were particularly low in these district head elections. Finally, on average, 18% of candidates' posters contained policy appeals. Policy appeals were coded in a liberal fashion. Any reference to development or a particular policy area such as health, education, or infrastructure was coded as policy.<sup>5</sup>

## Part III: Quantitative Analysis

### APPEALS BY CANDIDATE TYPE

The results of the analysis of appeals by candidate type are shown in figure 10.4. For each type of candidate, I calculated the average percentage of candidates' posters that contained the ethnic appeal. I compared this number to the mean for all 63 candidates. Each bar represents one type of ethnic appeal for one type of candidate, and the height of the bar measures the degree to which the frequency of the ethnic appeal is above or below the mean (see appendix D for frequency of appeal type for each individual candidate).

The first candidate type is dual-bonding. This category contained four candidates who were members of Muslim majorities and indigenous majorities in their electoral districts. Based on their candidate type, I predicted that these candidates would predominantly engage in ethnic bonding appeals with their indigenous or Muslim group

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<sup>5</sup> Overall, policy appeals were more common in district head elections compared to legislative elections.

and avoid religious, indigenous, and nationalist bridging appeals. As shown in table 10.4, the results of the analysis support these predictions. The frequency of Islamic bonding appeals in posters from this group of candidates was considerably higher than the average for all 63 candidates (39% vs. 14%, respectively). In addition, the frequency of indigenous bonding appeals in poster campaigns from this group of candidates was higher than the mean (68% vs. 33%, respectively). Meanwhile, the frequencies of religious and nationalist bridging appeals were below the mean, and the frequency of Indigenous bridging appeals was only slightly above the mean.




Figure 10.4. Frequency of ethnic appeals by candidate type in nine district head elections. Each bar represents a type of appeal for one type of candidate. The height of the bar is the average percentage of candidates' campaign posters above or below the mean for the entire dataset. There is a total of 63 candidates in the dataset: 4 dual-bonding candidates, 15 Islamic-bonding candidates, 21 indigenous-bonding candidates, and 23 dual-bridging candidates.

The second group of candidates are the Islamic-bonding candidates. This group contained 15 candidates who belonged to a Muslim majority and an indigenous minority in their electoral districts. Based on their candidate type, I predicted that these candidates would predominantly engage in Muslim bonding appeals, while their secondary strategy would be to bridge across indigenous groups. The results of the analysis are consistent with these predictions. The frequency of Islamic bonding appeals in these candidates' posters was much higher than the mean (36% vs. 14%, respectively), while indigenous bridging was slightly above the mean (10% vs. 7%, respectively). All the other appeals were well below the mean, as expected.

There were 21 indigenous-bonding candidates; these candidates were members of an indigenous majority and were either non-Muslim or members of a Muslim minority in their electoral district. I predicted that these candidates would primarily make indigenous bonding appeals, with some religious bridging appeals as a secondary strategy. In line with these predictions, the results showed that the frequency of indigenous bonding appeals for these candidates was much higher than the overall frequency for all 63 candidates (67% vs. 33%, respectively). In addition, the frequency of religious bonding, indigenous bridging, and nationalist bridging appeals were below the mean. While I predicted that the frequency of religious bridging may be slightly higher, clearly the dominant strategy for these candidates was to bond with their indigenous group.

Finally, in the dual-bridging candidate category there were 23 candidates who were members of an indigenous minority and either non-Muslim or members of a Muslim minority in their electoral district. These candidates lack an ethnic majority to



which they can make bonding appeals (recall that there are some social constraints on making religious bonding appeals to non-Muslim religious groups). I predicted that these candidates would primarily engage in religious, indigenous, and nationalist bridging appeals, with a possible emphasis on nationalist bridging. The results from the data reflect these expectations. Religious, indigenous, and nationalist bridging appeals are all above the mean, while religious and indigenous bonding are below the mean. Overall, the data are consistent with the predictions. Bridging appeals were all above the mean for all 63 candidates. In particular, the frequency of nationalist bridging appeals was 65% compared to the mean of 52%, and religious bridging was 36% compared to the mean of 14%. Overall, the results for all four candidate groups strongly support the argument in terms of the factors that determine whether candidates choose bonding or bridging appeals

To assess whether the relationship between candidate type and ethnic appeals was statistically significant, I used regression analysis. Given the small number of cases (N=63) I only included binary candidate type variables as the independent variables. The dual-bridging candidate type was excluded, so the coefficients for each of the other candidate types were interpreted in relation to the dual-bridging candidates. Five regressions using OLS with clustered robust standard errors were run on the five bonding and bridging dependent variables. Table 9.2 presents the results. The coefficients all point in the expected direction for each candidate types' dominant ethnic appeal and they were statistically significant.

**Table 10.2. Impact of candidate type on ethnic appeals in nine district head elections**

	<b>Islamic bonding</b>	<b>Religious bridging</b>	<b>Indigenous bonding</b>	<b>Indigenous bridging</b>	<b>Nationalist bridging</b>
Dual-bonding candidate	31.42** (5.46)	35.46** (6.44)	62.67** (4.66)	0.55 (5.83)	-15.34* (5.95)
Islamic-bonding candidate	27.92^ (12.87)	-34.57** (6.40)	13.89 (7.88)	2.35 (8.98)	-26.72* (8.50)
Indigenous-bonding candidate	-7.83 (5.46)	-33.20** (6.70)	61.22** (8.56)	-4.78 (6.27)	-16.91 (11.53)
<i>N</i>	63	63	63	63	63
R squared	0.23	0.28	0.44	0.03	0.07

*Note:* Candidate types are compared to dual-bridging candidates. Results of regression analyses for independent variables (rows) and dependent variables (columns). Entries are coefficients from OLS regression model. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses.

^p < 0.10, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01

Other aspects of a candidate’s identity were also tested using regression analysis to determine whether they had any effect on ethnic appeals. Tests were done on the gender, birthplace (in or outside the district), age, level of education, and occupation. Again with the small number of observations, each of these variables was included in a regression alone. Results are shown in the appendix (see table 10.C.2). Only one of these identity variables stood out as having any significant impact on ethnic appeals—candidate’s age.

Figure 10.5 shows the relationship between candidate age and type of appeal. The age of the candidates ranged from 36 to 67. I divided candidates into three age groups—under 45, 45 to 55, and over 55. Considering the eras when candidates experienced their transformative years might offer one explanation for some of the variation in this chart. The older candidates (over 55) made more indigenous bonding appeals and less nationalist appeals compared to the younger candidates. Born before 1955, the older

politicians had their formative years during the Sukarno and early New Order era. During this time indigenous ethnicity was particularly strong and the use of indigenous languages was more common. The younger candidates made more nationalist bridging appeals. These politicians had their formative years during the New Order. Throughout the New Order, the government heavily promoted Indonesian nationalism and the use of the national language, Bahasa Indonesia. In addition, politicians under 45 made far more religious bridging appeals, suggesting a more pluralist approach from this younger generation.




Figure 10.5. Ethnic appeals by age of candidate in nine district head elections. 8 candidates were under 45, 25 were between 45 and 55, and 22 were over 55. No age data was available for the 8 candidates in Ambon.

This pattern suggests that candidate appeals might relate to the process of socialization during their youth. Some caution, however, is needed. An alternative explanation is that older candidates tend to run for election in rural districts that have larger indigenous groups (and thus make more indigenous bonding appeals).

Meanwhile, younger candidates tend to compete in urban areas with more ethnically fragmented populations (and thus make more nationalist bridging appeals). To make any generalizations, a larger sample and more controls are needed.

#### APPEAL PREFERENCE

As a final test of the argument, I engaged in statistical hypotheses testing for religious, indigenous, and nationalist appeals. According to the argument and based on the proposed relationship between ethnic group size and type of ethnic appeals, the following hypotheses were developed:

H1. Compared to all other candidates, candidates who are from a Muslim majority have a preference for Islamic bonding appeals.

H2. Compared to all other candidates, candidates who are from a Muslim majority disfavor religious bridging appeals.

H3. Compared to all other candidates, candidates who are from an indigenous majority have a preference for indigenous bonding appeals.

H4. Compared to all other candidates, candidates who are from an indigenous majority disfavor indigenous bridging appeals.

H5. Compared to all other candidates, candidates who are from an indigenous minority and are either non-Muslims or members of a Muslim minority have a preference for nationalist bridging appeals.




Figure 10.6. Ethnic appeal preference by type of candidate in nine district head elections. The t-statistics come from a test of the equality of the means for each type of appeal by candidate type. p-values are for two-sided tests. Appeal preference is the average percent of candidates' campaign posters that contain the appeal, above or below the average for all other candidates.

The hypotheses were tested using a t-test comparing the mean of ethnic appeals made by candidates in the test group with the mean of ethnic appeals made all the other candidates. The results are shown in Figure 10.6. Appeal preference refers to the degree to which the test group prefers to make a specific type of ethnic appeal compared to all other candidates combined. This number can be positive (indicating a preference) or negative (indicating a lack of preference). Specifically, it is the average percentage of candidates' campaign posters that contain the appeal, above or below the average for all other candidates. The results for hypotheses 1 and 2 were as

expected. Muslim majority candidates showed a significantly higher frequency of Islamic bonding appeals in their posters, with an Islamic bonding appeal preference of 32%.

These candidates disfavored religious bridging, with an appeal preference of -19%.

The outcome for hypothesis 3 was also significant and positive, as expected. The appeal preference for indigenous bonding among indigenous majority candidates was very large (+56%). These candidates also engaged in less indigenous bridging compared to the rest of the candidates, as predicted in hypothesis 4, although this difference was not significant. Finally, as predicted in hypotheses 5, indigenous minority candidates who were either non-Muslims or members of a Muslim minority had a preference for nationalist bridging appeals (appeal preference = 20%). Overall, the outcomes for each hypothesis pointed in the expected direction, and four out of five were statistically significant.

## Part IV: Qualitative Analysis

### DUAL-BONDING CANDIDATES IN SALATIGA

In this section, I provide a qualitative analysis of the above findings by means of a detailed discussion of the 63 candidates from the nine district head elections, grouped by candidate type. Four candidates in the dataset qualified as dual-bonding candidates, being members of a Muslim and indigenous majority. All four candidates came from the election in Salatiga, Central Java, a region which is 76% Muslim and 94% Javanese.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Serdang Bedagai also has a Muslim-Javanese majority, but there were no dual-bonding candidates for reasons explained above.

These candidates used the team names, Dihati, Basis, Poros, and Yaris.<sup>7</sup> The results of statistical analysis showed that the average frequency of Islamic and indigenous bonding appeals in their campaign posters were higher than that of the other candidates (see figure 10.6). Two candidate teams, Dihati and Basis, mixed Javanese and Islamic symbolism to a great extent. Dihati was a religiously mixed ticket. Diah Sunarsasi, a Muslim woman and the outgoing deputy mayor, led Dihati. Her running mate was a young chairman of the local parliament and a Christian. Their posters had a youthful and bright feel to them (for an example of their posters see Photo 10.1, left). Rather than wearing very traditional Javanese batik clothing, they dressed in bright red modern batik. Diah Sunarsasi wore the Islamic headdress in all the posters, but in a loose style, allowing her Javanese hairstyle to show through. To shore up their Islamic affiliations, Dihati also had posters that advertised their endorsement by Salatiga's Kyai forum. To affirm their Javanese connections, Javanese language was used on their posters with phrases such as *Cedhak Karo Wong Cilik* (Close to the Little People) and *Ora Iki Ora!* (This Is My Only Choice). In addition, most of Dihati's posters used some nationalist bridging appeals by incorporating design elements that represented the red and white of the Indonesian flag. Red, the primary color of their posters and clothing, is also the main color of Diah's supporting party, PDI-P. Overall, their posters primarily espoused Islam and Javanese indigeneity, but also keyed into youth, class, and nationalism.

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<sup>7</sup> Often, one of the most prominent elements on campaign posters is the team name. This is usually a simple word, which is often a combination of letters from the head and deputy candidates. Invariably, the letters stand for words or spells out a term that has positive connotations. It's used so voters can easily remember and differentiate between the candidates.



Photo 10.1. Posters from dual-bonding candidates. Left: Diah Sunarsasi and Teddy Sulistio (Dihati), Salatiga, Central Java. Middle: Bambang Supriyanto and Andriana Susi Yudhawati (Basis), Salatiga, Central Java. Right: Bambang Soetopo and Rosa Darwanti (Poros) Salatiga, Central Java. Source: Author

The candidate team Basis also used Islamic and Javanese imagery in their posters. Bambang Supriyanto was involved in the construction business and his running mate was a local academic. Both were Muslim candidates. Bambang Supriyanto wore a secular suit and a songkok—a traditional truncated cone shaped hat (see Photo 10.1, middle). The significance of the songkok is somewhat debated, but it can be seen to signify both nationalism and possibly Islam.<sup>8</sup> Bambang’s running mate, Adriana Susi Yudhawati wore a conservative Islamic headdress, which fully covered her hair. They also used Javanese language such as *Iki Sing Tak Pilih* (These Are My Choices) and Islamic calligraphy in some of their posters. On top of that, the Indonesian flag appeared in about 40% of their posters. Overall, Basis had the highest level of Islamic appeals among

<sup>8</sup> Many of the Muslim candidates in the sample wore a songkok, while only one or two Christians did. Due to the debatable nature of the songkok, it was not interpreted as nationalist or Islamic in coding appeals from the posters. *Peci* is another name for the songkok.



the four candidates, but they also used moderately high levels of Javanese imagery and language in their posters.

In contrast to these first two candidate tickets, Poros drew exclusively on Javanese identity and avoided Islamic symbolism altogether. This was Bambang Soetopo's third attempt at competing for the district head position. In previous attempts, Bambang used more Islamic appeals, but due to the lack of success he tried a different tactic this time round—appealing to Javanese indigeneity and reaching out across religious divides.<sup>9</sup> He chose a Christian running mate, Rosa Soetopo. In his posters she dressed in Javanese clothing, complete with a traditional Javanese hairstyle. The background imagery gave the posters a feeling of mysticism and timelessness, with ancient Javanese patterns etched into a background of bright stars and contrasting shades of yellow (see Photo 10.1, right). Religious and nationalist imagery were noticeably absent from all their posters. While these three candidate tickets in Salatiga drew extensively on Islam or Javanese identity in their poster campaigns, the final candidate team, Yaris, did not. They will be discussed in the final section on candidates who made unexpected campaign appeals.

#### ISLAMIC-BONDING CANDIDATES IN MEDAN AND SIMALUNGUN

Fifteen candidates qualified as Islamic-bonding candidates, members of a Muslim majority and an indigenous minority. Two candidates ran in Simalungun's election, four candidates ran in the election in Serdang Bedagai, and nine candidates ran in Medan's election.

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<sup>9</sup> Interview with informants in Salatiga. May June 29-May 5, 2011.

A good example of this type of candidate is Sigit Pramono Asri, a Muslim Javanese candidate who competed in the Medan election. He is a high-ranking PKS politician and, at the time, a member of North Sumatra's provincial government. In his posters, images of Medan's famous mosque (Mesjid Raya) frequently served as a backdrop for photos of Sigit and his running mate—both impeccably dressed in clean white Islamic clothing (see Photo 10.2, left). He also heavily promoted himself as the PKS candidate in his posters and included images of prominent PKS leaders.<sup>10</sup> Occasionally, the logos of his other supporting Islamic parties (PBR, PKNU, and PBB) were displayed in his posters. Poster text messages such as *Insya Allah (God willing)* and *Rajin sholat, jama'ah ke masjid dari kecil sampai sekarang (Diligently praying, worshiping in the mosque from a young age until now)* invoked Allah and cast Sigit as a pious Muslim.

His running mate, Nurlisa Ginting, was a Muslim bureaucrat and from the indigenous Karo. In most of the posters, she wore the Islamic headdress and clothing. However, her Karo indigeneity enabled Sigit to bridge across indigenous groups by appealing to the Karo. In the region of Medan that is predominantly inhabited by the Karo, Sigit designed a whole new set of campaign posters. In these posters, Nurlisa became the most prominent visual element and Sigit's image was reduced in size or absent. Against a backdrop of traditional Karo houses and cloth patterns, Nurlisa was dressed in ornate traditional Karo clothing. Overall, Sigit Pramono's appeals were what we would expect from an Islamic-bonding candidate. He primarily made Islamic bonding appeals, but engaged in some indigenous bridging appeals.

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<sup>10</sup> PKS leaders featured on the posters included Surianda Lubis, Salman Alfarisi, and Siti Aminah.



Photo 10.2. Posters from Islamic-bonding candidates. Left: Sigit Pramono Asri and Nurlisa Ginting (Bersinar), Medan, North Sumatra. Middle: Rahudman Harahap and Dzulmi Eldin, Medan, North Sumatra. Right: Muknir Damanik and Miko, Simalungun, North Sumatra. Source: Author

Rahudman Harahap was another candidate in the Medan election that portrayed a strong Islamic image in his election posters. Rahudman and his running mate primarily wore Islamic garb in their posters. They also incorporated images of the city's financial and government buildings, and photos of political leaders from their supporting parties, Golkar and Partai Demokrat. Walking a line between the traditional and the modern, one of their slogans was Modern, Madani, & Religius (Modern, Civil, and Religious; see Photo 10.2, middle). Maulana Pohan used Islamic imagery to a slightly lesser degree, alternating between the sheer white Islamic garb and a suit and tie. However, he consciously chose green, which is the color of Islam and the main color of his supporting political party, PPP.

Two Islamic-bonding candidates also competed in the election in Simalungun, Muknir Damanik and Zulkarnain Damanik. Both candidates are Muslim and from the

Batak Simalungun indigenous group. Simalungun has a slim Muslim majority (58%) and no indigenous majority. As expected, both candidates primarily bonded with their fellow Muslims. In almost all of their posters they used a variety of Islamic signs and symbols, such as Islamic clothing and the use of Arabic (see Photo 10.2, right). In addition, both candidates used some indigenous bridging strategies by reaching out to the larger Javanese population. They had strong incentives to connect with the Javanese community considering the Javanese were almost a majority in Simalungun, constituting 46% of the population. Muknir recruited a Javanese deputy candidate who wore Javanese-patterned clothing in their posters. Meanwhile, Zulkarnain promoted his endorsement by local branches of the Javanese association, Pujakesuma. These candidates also targeted the Javanese population through the placement of their posters—most were posted in the lowland plantation belt primarily inhabited by the Javanese. While both candidate teams used a moderate degree of nationalism in their posters, their dominant strategy was to make Islamic bonding appeals. This contrasted with the religious bridging approach by the two Christian candidates in Simalungun. Being Christian, they qualified as Dual-bridging candidates and their poster campaigns are discussed below.

#### INDIGENOUS-BONDING CANDIDATES IN KARO, SAMOSIR, & TOBA SAMOSIR

Candidates that qualified as indigenous-bonding candidates are members of the district's indigenous majority and are either Christian or from a Muslim minority. All 21

candidates that fit this type happened to be Christians.<sup>11</sup> They competed in elections in the Christian majority districts of Samosir, Toba Samosir, and Karo in North Sumatra. Samosir is a very scenic district surrounded by a large lake in the highlands of North Sumatra. The region is recognized as the ancestral homeland of the Batak people. Primarily inhabited by the Batak Toba, it is also homogeneously Christian<sup>12</sup> and one of the premier tourist destinations in North Sumatra. All seven candidates in the election were Christian and Batak Toba. They primarily bonded with their indigenous group through the use of indigenous Batak symbolism, invariably dressing in suits with a traditional Batak Toba cloth (an ulos) slung over the shoulder (see Photo 10.3, left). Background images were composed of Samosir's scenic landscape and the distinctive Batak Toba traditional houses. Text messages were often written in the Batak Toba language and the Batak greeting, Horas, was a common feature.

Toba Samosir is a district to the east of Samosir. Its demographics are similar to Samosir, though it is more of a business hub. In Toba Samosir, candidates primarily mixed indigenous symbolism with regional imagery. Two of the candidates, Mindo Tua Siagian and Kasmin Simanjuntak, included Batak Toba language and patterns or wore the ulos in almost all of their posters (see Photo 10.3, middle). The other three candidates used explicit indigenous appeals to a lesser extent, instead presenting themselves in business suits photographed against a scenic image of Samosir. Drawing on the imagery of the Batak heartland was a more subtle indigenous appeal, not

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<sup>11</sup> No Muslim minority candidates who were part of an indigenous majority are in the sample. The one place where this might have occurred was the district of Karo, which is 75% Karo and 26% Muslim. While one of the ten candidates that entered that race was Muslim, that person was also a member of the minority Batak Toba. As a result, the candidate qualified as a dual-bridging candidate.

<sup>12</sup> The Christian population in Samosir is 58% Protestant and 40% Catholic, according to the 2010 national census.

captured in the coding of the posters. In one of the very few cases of Christian symbolism, Monang Sitorus included images with a church in the background—albeit at a considerable distance.



Photo 10.3. Posters from indigenous-bonding candidates. Left: Martua Sitanggang and Mangiring Tamba, Samosir, North Sumatra. Middle: Mindo Tua Siagian and Ervan Gani P. Siahaan (Juara), Toba Samosir, North Sumatra. Right: Sumbul Sembiring Depari and Paham Ginting (Erdilo), Karo, North Sumatra. Source: Author

To the north of Samosir is the district of Karo. It is predominantly Christian (75%) and has a majority indigenous Karo population (75%), but also smaller numbers of Javanese, Batak Toba, Batak Tapanuil, and Batak Simalungun. While most of the Karo people are Christian, some are Muslim. Nine of the ten candidates that competed in the election were Karo Christians and qualified as indigenous-bonding candidates. Six of these candidates used Karo ethnic symbolism in almost all of their posters. Karo identity was symbolized through the use of the red traditional Karo fabric draped over candidates' shoulders, slogans in the Karo language, imagery of traditional Karo houses,

and traditional Karo patterns used as design elements (see Photo 10.3, right). In addition, Karo's scenic imagery was a common visual element. Images included the region's well-known active volcano, Gunung Sinabung, and agricultural fields lush with produce. One Christian candidate, Andy Manik, attempted some religious bridging—the secondary appeal strategy for this type of candidate. He ran with a Muslim running mate and designed some posters celebrating Idul Fitri, the Muslim holiday.

Overall, the indigenous-bonding candidates frequently used indigenous symbolism and regional imagery that reflected a tight connection to the land. There is also evidence that this kind of symbolism does not hurt a candidate's vote. All the candidates that won in Samosir, Toba Samosir, and Karo used indigenous imagery, symbols, or messages in almost all their posters.

#### DUAL-BRIDGING CANDIDATES IN SIANTAR, AMBON, SIMALUNGUN, KARO, AND MEDAN

The 23 candidates that qualified as dual-bridging candidates were probably the most interesting group. Due to the small size of their ethnic groups and/or social constraints, they have strong incentives to make bridging rather than bonding appeals. There are two districts that have no religious or indigenous majority, so by default all candidates in these elections qualified as dual-bridging candidates. Both are urban districts, Pematang Siantar in North Sumatra and Ambon in Maluku.<sup>13</sup> Ten candidates competed in the election in Pematang Siantar, and eight contested the Ambon election. There were a few dual-bridging candidates in other districts—one in Karo, one in

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<sup>13</sup> Pematang Siantar's religious population is 44% Muslim, 47% Protestant, 5% Catholic, and 4% Buddhist. Most of the Buddhists are also ethnic Chinese. Batak Toba is the largest indigenous group (28%), followed by Javanese (25%), and Batak Tapanuli (20%).

Medan, and three in Simalungun. The statistical analysis showed that this group of candidates engaged in more indigenous, religious, and nationalist bridging appeals compared to the other candidates (see figure 10.6).

### Pematang Siantar

Even before the campaign began, candidates' choices of running mates in the Pematang Siantar election indicated that candidates aimed to bridge across ethnic groups. Out of the ten candidates, nine were religiously mixed pairs and five were indigenously mixed.<sup>14</sup> Islamic and indigenous bonding appeals were almost totally absent in the posters from Pematang Siantar. A few candidates engaged in a small amount of indigenous bridging. Religious bridging was more common. A number of Christian candidates used some Islamic symbolism and a few Christian and Muslim candidates made very general references to improving the religiosity of the city and promoting indigenous and religious pluralism. However, more than in any other election, nationalism and the Indonesian flag was by far the most common visual element in candidates' posters. Nine of the ten candidates used the Indonesian flag or references to nationalism in all, or most, of their posters. Even the candidate supported by a coalition of Islamic parties, Heriza Syahputra, crafted a secular-nationalist image of himself in his poster campaign (see Photo 10.4, left). The eventual winner of the election, Hulman Sitorus, primarily used nationalist imagery, with his posters designed in the red and white colors of Indonesia's flag. He made no references to religion or

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<sup>14</sup> There was some over-representation of the Christian Batak Toba identity group among the head candidates. Six shared a Christian Batak Toba identity.



indigeneity. In a very diverse district like Pematang Siantar, nationalist appeals serve to bridge across indigenous and religious groups.

The poster campaigns of Christian Batak Toba candidates in Pematang Siantar and in neighboring districts make for a very good controlled comparison that holds the electoral rules, the region, and the religious and indigenous identity of the candidates constant, while varying the district demographics. There were six Christian Batak Toba candidates competing in the Pematang Siantar election who qualified as Dual-bridging candidates. In the elections in neighboring Samosir and Toba Samosir, a total of 12 Christian Batak Toba candidates qualified as dual-bonding candidates due to their district's majority Batak Toba population. In almost all of their posters, they bonded with their indigenous Batak Toba group by using Batak Toba clothing, patterns, and imagery. In the vast majority of their posters there were no indigenous or religious bridging appeals.

In contrast, the Christian Batak Toba candidates in the ethnically fragmented district of Pematang Siantar did not appeal to the Batak Toba identity. Instead, they primarily made nationalist bridging appeals, presenting themselves in suits against the backdrop of the Indonesian flag. They also made some bridging appeals directed at the large Muslim population. In sum, this comparison shows that Christian Batak Toba candidates make a sharp switch from ethnic bonding when their group was a majority, to ethnic bridging when it was a minority.



Photo 10.4. Posters from dual-bridging candidates. Left: Barkat Shah and Boundeth Damanik (Akate), Pematang Siantar, North Sumatra. Middle: Paulus Kastanya and La Hamsidi (Kasih), Ambon, Maluku. Right: Sofyan Tan and Nelly Armayanti, Medan, North Sumatra. Source: Author

## Ambon

Ambon is the capital city of Maluku in eastern Indonesia. It experienced a devastating conflict, which fell along religious lines, after the transition to democracy. Since then, there have been some tensions between the majority Christian and the minority Muslim communities. The largest indigenous group is the Ambonese (39%) and many of the other indigenous groups come from islands nearby. Like Pematang Siantar, in Ambon all the candidate tickets were religiously mixed;<sup>15</sup> however, only one of the eight head candidates was a Muslim. There were fewer indigenously mixed tickets, with most of the candidates being Ambonese.

While there are still religious tensions in Ambon, religious symbolism in campaign posters was low overall. Olivia Latuconsina, the only Muslim head candidate and the

<sup>15</sup> It should be noted that there is no institutional law enforcing this. Over the years it has become a general norm in both Pematang Siantar and Ambon.

outgoing deputy mayor, used Islamic symbolism, but that was mainly due to her wearing the standard Islamic clothing. In an effort to broaden her appeal she chose a popular local Christian singer, Andre Hehanussa. A few candidates had some general mentions of god or religion in their posters. Also, Paulus Kastanya and Richard Louhenapessy had an occasional poster with Christian symbolism, such as a Christmas tree and messages wishing the Christian community a happy Easter. However, these posters were placed well inside Christian communities, often next to churches. Overall, religious appeals were very muted in the Ambon posters. Indigenous bonding appeals were also rare, except in one case. Richard Louhenapessy and his running mate Latuconsina are both native Ambonese and in most of their posters they wore traditional Ambonese jackets. The promotion of Ambonese identity can however be interpreted as a bridging strategy in the context of Ambon. The Ambonese indigenous group are both Muslim and Christian, so the promotion of an Ambonese identity is one way to reach out across religious groups.

Overall, candidates in Ambon's election acted and presented themselves in very similar ways to the candidates in Pematang Siantar. They formed multi-religious tickets, tended to dress in more formal business attire, and primarily used regionalist and nationalist imagery (see Photo 10.4, left). They drew on regional scenic views of the island and historic monuments such as Maluku's regional symbol Kapitan Pattimura. Also, the Indonesian flag was probably the most common visual element among the posters. This is somewhat surprising for a region that had a history of rebellion and separatist aspirations. However, like Pematang Siantar, the demographics of Ambon and the broader social constraints on the politicization of religious minorities in Indonesia

offered strong incentives for candidates to bridge across religious and indigenous groups.

#### Simalungun, Karo, and Medan

A total of five candidates qualified as dual-bridging candidates in Simalungun, Karo, and Medan. Given their minority status, the primary way these candidates competed was through bridging appeals. In Simalungun, the three minority Christian candidates all teamed up with Muslim-Javanese running mates who could tap into the Muslim majority and the large Javanese population. They featured their running mate in Islamic or indigenous Javanese clothing, created posters celebrating Islam's fasting month, and used the Indonesian flag in almost all of their posters.

The dual-bridging candidate in the Medan election, Sofyan Tan, ran a very successful campaign in the first round. He is a Buddhist and of Chinese descent, but against the odds, he managed to secure enough votes to compete in the runoff election. He chose to run late, having just secured support from the secular-nationalist party PDI-P and the Christian party PDS. Competing in the Muslim majority district of Medan, he chose a Muslim woman from the Minangkabau indigenous group, Nelly Armayanti, as his running mate. More than any other candidates, bridging appeals were central to their campaign. 80% of his posters contained nationalist bridging appeals and he had the highest combined level of indigenous and religious bridging appeals among all 63 candidates. In his posters, he was one of the few candidates that used images of all the religious places of worship side-by-side—a mosque, a church, plus Hindu and Buddhist temples (see Photo 10.4, right). He also drew on regionalist and nationalist images in his

campaign posters and indigenous Karo symbolism. While he ran an effective campaign in the first round, Rahudman Harahap soundly beat him in a runoff election, picking up many votes from the other popular Muslim candidates such as Sigit Pramono.

#### DIVERGENT APPEAL STRATEGIES

While the statistical analysis and the discussion so far has shown a tight connection between the size of candidate's ethnic groups and their ethnic appeal choice, there were a number of candidates who did not engage in the dominant appeal strategy that we expected. Some of these outliers were quite successful, so they deserve particular attention. A closer look at these candidates suggest that there are at least three factors that can prompt candidates to diverge from the expected ethnic appeal strategy: a well-known personal reputation as a supporter of a particular indigenous or religious group, a lack of competition in the election, and a high number of candidates competing in the election.

#### Candidate's Reputation

Some candidates who run for election have a reputation as a champion of a particular ethnic group, and this can reduce their need to make ethnic bonding appeals. There was one example of this in the Salatiga election. The candidate, Yuliyanto, was defined as a dual-bonding candidate and my argument predicted that he would use Islamic and/or indigenous Javanese bonding appeals in his posters. In contrast, he only occasionally used Javanese symbolism and his posters were almost totally void of any

reference to Islam.<sup>16</sup> Instead, he primarily presented an image of professionalism, business, and nationalism. Together with his running mate, they wore smart suits and ties, and the main graphic element in almost all posters was a large and realistic Indonesian flag. Emblazoned over the flag was their slogan Nasionalis Merakyat (Nationalist Populist; see Photo 10.5, top left). They were also the only ticket in the Salatiga election that explicitly used pluralist messages such as Menjaga Pluralisme di Kota Salatiga (Preserve Pluralism in Salatiga) in their posters.

The reason for this unexpected outcome was that even before campaigning began, the Yuliyanto team was widely seen as the Islamic ticket. This had a lot to do with Yuliyanto's choice of running mate. He chose Muhammad Haris, a high-ranking member of the Islamic party, PKS, and the coordinator for Muslim youth in Central Java. They also received support from two of the larger Islamic parties, PKS and PPP. Given that they had strong and well-known Islamic credentials, they did not need to play up Islam in their election posters. In fact, avoiding Islamic bonding appeals likely helped expand their support. While Salatiga has a Muslim majority population (76%), it is the district in Java with the largest Christian population. Promoting pluralism may have helped them reach out to the sizable Christian population and also inspire confidence among the more moderate Muslims in Salatiga. They went on to win the election in the first round with 37.8% of the vote.

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<sup>16</sup> Yuliyanto did put up a few posters that reflected their support by Islamic parties.



Photo 10.5. Candidates with divergent appeal strategies. Top Left: Yuliyanto and Haris (Yaris), Salatiga, Central Java. Top Middle: Erry Nuradi and Soekirman (Paten), Serdang Bedagai, North Sumatra. Top Right: Sjahrial R. Anas and Yahya Sumardi, Medan, North Sumatra. Bottom Left: Usman Siregar and Gunawan Ang, Medan, North Sumatra. Bottom Middle: Siti Perangin-Angin and Salmon Sagala (Si-Sura), Karo, North Sumatra. Source: Author

### Low Levels of Political Competition

A second reason why candidates diverge from the expected appeals is when there is little electoral competition. Some candidates are well-liked in districts by multiple ethnic groups, having built up strong connections across ethnic groups over the years.

With victory almost inevitable, they do not need to rely on the internal solidarity of their ethnic kin. A good example of this divergent pattern is the campaign of Erry Nuradi in Serdang Bedagai. As the incumbent and favorite going into the race, he had a virtual monopoly on political party support. He was supported by a range of parties from across the ideological spectrum, from the Islamist PKS, to the Islamic-Nationalist PAN, to the Christian PDS party, to major secular-nationalist parties such as Golkar, PDI-P, and Partai Demokrat. For the most part, Erry and his running mate presented themselves as the smiling, secular, suit-and-songkok-wearing candidates, pictured in front of a backdrop colored in one or another of their party's colors (see Photo 10.5, top middle). To mix it up across posters, they donned Islamic clothing in some posters, the Batak headdress in others, and switched to traditional Malay clothing in another. Overall, the Erry ticket was a chameleon when it came to appeals—they could be everything to everyone. As a popular candidate with deep connections and broad appeal across ethnic divides, Erry could play up his broad party support and not rely on any individual ethnic group. As expected, Erry Nuradi won the election in a landslide with 57%. This was the largest margin of victory in all nine elections.

#### High Number of Candidates

Finally, a high number of candidates competing in an election can also lead to some unexpected appeal strategies. When numerous candidates are attempting to mobilize the same ethnic majority, there is a high probability that the group will split its vote across candidates. As a result, candidates are less certain that they can get enough votes from the majority ethnic groups to win. One option for a candidate is to gamble



on appealing to smaller groups and/or attempting to stitch together a multi-ethnic coalition. A plurality of 30% is needed to win the election in the first round, so this strategy can potentially pay off if the candidate can steal an early victory. Examples of candidates who took this gamble come from Medan and Karo. Ten candidates competed in each of these elections—the highest number of candidates among the nine elections.<sup>17</sup>

With so many candidates in the Medan election, it was likely that the Muslim vote would be split. As a result, a number of Muslim candidates (who qualified as Islamic-bonding candidates) made indigenous bonding appeals, despite the fact that all indigenous groups are a minority in Medan. Two examples are the Sjahrial Anas ticket and Joko Susilo ticket. Sjahrial and his running mate were both indigenously Minangkabau. In almost all of their posters, they dressed in traditional Minangkabau clothing and occasionally used images of Minangkabau buildings (see Photo 10.5, top right). Meanwhile, Joko Susilo wore Javanese-inspired batik shirts in almost all of his posters. Another two candidate tickets avoided indigenous and Islamic appeals altogether and instead used nationalist and non-ethnic appeals. Indra Harahap drew on the Indonesian flag and played up his youth with phrases such as *Orang Muda*, *Generasi Baru*, and *Energik* (young person, new generation, and energetic). Another candidate, Usman Siregar (who didn't get past campaigning for signatures to enter the race), also made appeals to the youth through youthful dress style, hand gestures, and slang (see Photo 10.5, bottom left). Finally, the candidate Bahdin presented an image of a smart businessman against a backdrop of financial and government buildings.

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<sup>17</sup> The other district that had 10 candidates was Pematang Siantar, but as explained, these candidates had incentives to avoid bonding appeals due to the ethnically fragmented nature of the district.

Candidates in Medan also produced many more poster designs and had a greater variety of appeals in their poster campaigns compared to candidates in other elections. Some had more than sixty poster designs and new ones were produced on the fly during the campaign. Often posters were produced in small batches and only posted in particular neighborhoods. This kind of microtargeting was particularly evident in Medan's Karo and Chinese neighborhoods, where posters incorporated signs and symbols tailored towards the residents. The intensive and often very creative efforts to build multi-indigenous coalitions in Medan was driven by the highly competitive nature of this election, the potential splitting of the Islamic vote, and Medan's indigenously fragmented demographic. Candidates in Medan also had more financial resources to invest in large elaborate poster campaigns. As the fifth largest city in Indonesia, winning the election is a major prize and attracted wealthy candidates and supporters. There was no winner in the first round, so a runoff election took place between the Muslim Batak Tapanuli candidate, Rahudman Harahap, and a Buddhist Chinese candidate, Sofyan Tan. Moving from a ten-candidate race to a two-candidate race radically changed the nature of the campaigns. With far less fear of vote splitting, Rahudman's campaign became more exclusively focused on appealing to the Muslim population. He won the election easily with 66% of the vote.<sup>18</sup>

The election in Karo also had ten candidates. Most qualified as indigenous-bonding candidates and, as expected, they primarily made indigenous bonding appeals. One candidate however, chose a different strategy. Siti Perangin-Angin was a prominent

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<sup>18</sup> See Aspinall et al. (2011) for an analysis of how the campaign strategies in the Medan election. Their analysis showed how there was a switch from a broad pattern of cross-ethnic alliance building by candidates in the first round of the election, to strategies that focused on religion in the second round—specifically the obligation of Muslims to support the Muslim candidate.

local leader in the PDI-P and one of only two women in the race. In her posters, she primarily made partisan appeals by drawing on her party label, and together with her running mate, dressed in professional business attire. They included images of PDI-P's leader, Megawati, and her late father and Indonesia's former president, Sukarno (see Photo 10.5, bottom middle). There was a good reason for this appeal strategy. With so many candidates drawing on the indigenous Karo identity in their campaigns, they all began to look the same. Promoting a party image could make a candidate stand out. Also, the PDI-P is the most popular party in Karo and has more seats in the local parliament than any other party. By mobilizing PDI-P supporters, Siti won the first round by a slim margin with 19% of the vote. However, while the PDI-P is popular in Karo, the party is not popular enough to mobilize a majority of voters in the district. In the second round, Siti was well beaten by Surbakti, a candidate that bonded with the Karo indigenous group in almost all his election posters.

Overall, in cases where there are a high number of candidates and a higher chance that ethnic groups will split their vote, some candidates will experiment with divergent appeal strategies. They appeal to smaller indigenous groups, make broader nationalist appeals, or appeal to non-ethnic identities such as youth or partisanship. Ultimately, these gambles did not pay off for candidates in Medan and Karo.

## Conclusions

To conclude, this chapter tested the argument that the size of candidates' ethnic groups have an impact on whether the candidate chooses to bond with their indigenous or religious groups or bridge across other ethnic groups. Both the statistical analysis of

ethnic appeals and the qualitative discussion of the candidates' campaigns lend significant support to the argument. The findings help explain not only why exclusive ethnic campaigns occur in some districts and pluralist campaigns in others, but also how campaigns vary across individual candidates competing in the same election. While the argument can explain a lot of the variation, this chapter has also shown that it is not deterministic. Other factors potentially have an impact on ethnic appeals during elections, such as the age and reputation of candidates, the level of political competition, and the number of candidates competing in a race. The primary goal of this chapter was to show the conditions under which candidates will choose to bond or bridge; however, a topic of future research is the short-term and long-term impact of these appeals: do bonding and bridging forms of ethnic mobilization affect voter choice, inter-ethnic tensions, and the construction of local ethnic identities over time?

# Conclusion

Using novel approaches to measure campaign appeals from newspaper reports and election posters, I demonstrated that three key factors have a substantial effect on candidates' decisions to politicize ethnicity: the degree to which the rules are candidate-centric, party ideology, and the size of ethnic groups. Using quantitative and qualitative evidence, I showed that candidate-centric rules reduce the influence of the party and raise the importance of connecting with local ethnic groups. The results indicate that candidates competing in candidate-centric district head elections are particularly sensitive to the size of ethnic groups—candidates bonded more with their ethnic groups when they were large and politically viable, but bridged when they were not. In contrast, candidates competing in party-centric legislative elections made more partisan appeals and their choice of ethnic bonding or bridging appeals was more influenced by the ideology of their party.

My argument differs significantly from previous bottom-up and top-down arguments. By focusing on candidate behavior within an institutional and social context, my argument allows for a more dynamic approach to understanding the forces that foster and impede the politicization of ethnicity. In this final chapter, I highlight how this

research contributes to methodological approaches to studying ethnicity, offers new insights into ethnic politics, and—more specifically—contributes to our understanding of ethnic politics and democracy in Indonesia.

## Studying Ethnicity

This dissertation used an innovative approach to measure the politicization of ethnicity. Previous studies have used ethnic vote shares, ethnic composition of political parties, and political party stances on ethnic issues as measures of ethnic politicization. In contrast, this dissertation coded and quantified candidates' ethnic appeals. This approach provides a more direct measure to capture the actual act of ethnic politicization. The data and these measures have a number of key advantages, particularly when compared to the dominant data source for studies on ethnic politics, the Party Manifesto Project's cross-country dataset.

First, studies on the politicization of ethnicity that use the Party Manifesto Project's data need to assume that candidate appeals are always in line with their party's manifesto. While party leaders might officially define the party and its direction in the manifesto, this may differ significantly from what candidates say to voters in the heat of an electoral competition. In this dissertation, I've argued that under candidate-centric rules, candidates have more freedom to veer from the party line. This allows candidates to tailor their campaign appeals to their electoral district, which can result in a disconnect between a party's official stance on ethnic issues and the actual ethnic appeals made by its candidates. Particularly in large countries like Indonesia, there can

be a great deal of variation in how candidates in the same party appeal for votes across the country.

Second, party manifestos contain verbal statements. While verbal political communications (e.g., press releases, political speeches) are commonly analyzed, a large part of this dissertation consisted of explaining ways in which visual political communications may be analyzed, specifically election posters. Despite the fact that signs and symbols can be a powerful motivating force, the study of visual politics has largely been neglected and deemed irrelevant in political science. Most of our knowledge on campaigning and voting behavior comes from studying verbal campaign messages in highly literate, economically advanced western countries. However, the study of verbal communications may be less effective at helping us understand campaigns in late-developing countries. In these countries, levels of literacy are lower, and the candidates' choice of visual imagery, signs, symbols, and colors can be more important than their slogans or political speeches. These visuals can have a profound meaning for ethnic groups and can influence their voting behavior. In this dissertation, I demonstrated that candidates use visual imagery and symbols in coherent and strategic ways to mobilize support.

In sum, the prominent methods used by scholars to measure the politicization of ethnicity (manifestos, ethnic party composition, and ethnic voting) tell us more about party systems than about the act of politicizing ethnicity. The methods also tend to be relatively static. Manifestos, ethnic party composition, and ethnic voting do not change that much from one election cycle to the next. On the other hand, candidates' appeals are far more dynamic and can exhibit great regional variation.

## Ethnic Politics

There is an extensive body of literature on the impact of ethnic diversity on a host of outcomes, including party formation, voting behavior, economic development, governance, civil wars, and ethnic riots. These important areas of inquiry still garner considerable debate, and they deserve to be studied in depth. However, this dissertation concerns a different outcome, the ethnic politicization of electoral campaigns. In an extensive review of the literature, I found that the effect of ethnic diversity on campaigning has rarely been systematically studied, particularly in late-developing countries. This represents a significant gap in our knowledge, particularly because the ethnicization of electoral campaigns is a common occurrence and a key point where ethnicity and democratic politics meet in regular cycles. The ethnic politicization of elections also has wide-ranging and long-term effects on the ethnic cleavages that develop, and on how these cleavages affect party systems, voting behavior, governance, and communal violence. Overall, if we wish to understand how ethnic diversity contributes to political instability and violence, we must first know when, how, and why politicians mobilize groups along particular ethnic lines.

One of the central findings of this dissertation is that under candidate-centric electoral rules, candidates who are members of losing ethnic groups either avoid ethnicity or use pluralist campaign messages. In contrast, when candidates are members of winning groups they tend to use exclusive campaign appeals. As a result, we generally find more pluralist campaigns in districts with high levels of ethnic diversity. When all candidates are members of losing ethnic groups, plural politics becomes the order of the



day. This finding contrasts with the commonly held view that ethnic diversity poses a threat to democratic values and stability.<sup>1</sup>

A second major finding is that having more dimensions of ethnicity, including ethnic identities that encompass a broad range of ethnic groups, offers candidates more options in how they appeal for support. This situation helps prevent ethnic competition along one master cleavage and promotes stability.<sup>2</sup> Overall, higher levels of ethnic diversity and the politicization of multiple dimensions of ethnicity act as a bulwark against divisive unidimensional forms of ethnic competition that can lead to instability and conflict. To my knowledge, this is the first study to use systematic data on campaign appeals to show such a relationship. The implications of this finding for Indonesian democracy will be discussed in more detail in the final part of this chapter.

## Indonesian Politics

### RELIGIOUS, INDIGENOUS, AND NATIONALIST APPEALS

The results of this investigation provide a deeper understanding of patterns of ethnic politics in Indonesia. The findings explain how Indonesian candidates formulate ethnic appeal strategies and provide insights into how the three most prominent forms of ethnic identification in Indonesia—religion, indigeneity, and nationalism—are used in campaigns. Of these three dimensions, religion is the most prominent, specifically Islam.

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<sup>1</sup> This has been most famously theorized by Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) with their ethnic outbidding model.

<sup>2</sup> Similarly, in India, Chandra Chandra (2005b) found that institutions that foster multiple dimensions of ethnic identity (rather than a single dimension) help foster democratic stability.

One of the enduring debates in Indonesian politics concerns the role of Islam and its effect on political behavior. A common contemporary view among scholars and commentators is that Islam has become less politically relevant since the transition to democracy. Evidence for this comes from voter surveys<sup>3</sup> and the fact that votes for Islamic parties have declined since 1999.<sup>4</sup> A second view argues that Islam is still, and might be even more, relevant. Scholars have argued that Islam has become mainstream and that nationalist parties have increasingly drawn on Islam in their campaigns and in crafting policy.<sup>5</sup> While nationalist parties have become more Islamic, scholars and commentators have also argued that Islamic parties have become more moderate and increasingly blend Islamic appeals with nationalism.<sup>6</sup> Overall, this argument notes a general move by Indonesian parties to the center in terms of Islam.

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<sup>3</sup> Using surveys, Liddle and Mujani (2007; 2010) found that religious orientation was not a significant factor influencing the 1999, 2004, and 2009 legislative and presidential choices of voters. They argued that economic issues and party leaders were more important factors influencing voter choice. In 2008, using experimental survey evidence Pepinsky et al. (2012) showed that Islamic parties have an advantage over non-Islamic parties in generating support only when voters lack knowledge on parties' economic platforms.

<sup>4</sup> Votes for the Islamic parties (including PAN and PKB) in the national legislature declined from 34% in 1999, to 35% in 2004, to 26% in 2009. See Hamayotsu (2011b) for an explanation of why some Islamic parties have floundered while others advanced in the 2009 election. Early results from the 2014 election indicate that the vote for Islamic parties has increased again.

<sup>5</sup> As Platzdasch (2009) explains, "Just as Islamist parties, especially the PKS, have tried to move to the center by abandoning signs of Islamic ideology, so have the major non-Islamic parties been moving toward the center by taking up more Islamic issues and adopting more Islamic rhetoric." Other scholars and commentators have also contributed to this argument, arguing that nationalist parties and candidates have increasingly begun to support Islamic organizations, back religiously inspired legislation, and view Islam as a source of thinking to inform public policy (Evans 2009 3/13; Platzdasch 2009; Sukma 2010; Tanuwidjaja 2010).

<sup>6</sup> Scholars have highlighted how the PKS spends a lot of its time promoting anticorruption platforms and nationalism (Menchik 2009; Ufen 2008; Liddle and Mujani 2009), how there have been calls within PPP to reduce the Islamic rhetoric (Platzdasch 2009), and how PAN and PKB (the parties with links to Islamic organizations) do not see Islam as central to politics (Evans 2009 3/13).

Overall, the results presented in this dissertation are more in line with the second view. Two key pieces of evidence indicate that Islam has become more prominent in recent years. First, the newspaper analysis showed that since 1997, candidates have increasingly met with Islamic groups, sought support from Islamic elites and organizations, invoked their Islamic identity, and promoted their work experience with Islamic organizations. Second, the evidence shows that use of Islam in elections increased after the introduction of district head elections in 2005. The election poster analysis demonstrated that Islamic appeals were higher in district head elections compared to the legislative elections, which contributes to an overall increase in the prominence of Islam in Indonesian electoral competitions.

My research suggests that most of the rise of Islam can be attributed to nationalist party candidates. Evidence from the newspaper analysis showed that these candidates have increasingly reached out to Islamic groups, elites, and associations in their campaigns. In addition, candidates supported by nationalist parties in district head elections were just as likely to make Islamic appeals as candidates supported by Islamic parties. On the whole, with an increased prominence of Islam in Indonesian elections, the evidence suggests that parties have moved to a center-right position. However, while the Islamic divide between parties may have narrowed, it still exists. Evidence from the 2009 election shows that Islamic party candidates made more Islamic appeals while nationalist party candidates made more nationalist appeals.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Mietzner (2013, Kindle Locations 3265-3690) has shown that the nationalist and Islamic ideologies of political parties also matter when it comes to key debates on the national level. He discusses the 2002 debate on the place of Islam in the amended constitution, the 2006 deliberations on the Law on the Governance of Aceh, and the 2008 dispute on the Law on Pornography. In each case, he argues that the parties reacted to these cases in a manner consistent with their ideological commitments.

While Islamic politics have received a lot of attention from scholars and commentators, indigenous ethnic politics have received far less.<sup>8</sup> This is partly because there are no indigenous political parties, so indigeneity is not as prominent on the national stage. Despite this, by studying campaign behavior of candidates across the country, I found that the biggest change in Indonesian ethnic politics has likely been the increasing politicization of indigeneity. As a dimension of ethnicity with which to mobilize local electoral support, it has begun to rival religion in district head elections, and it is commonly used by candidates seeking support from non-Muslim voters. The mobilization of non-Muslim support by appealing to their indigenous identity (rather than their religious identity) has its benefits. Such appeals help to soothe inter-religious tensions by not reducing the election to a battle over which religion is superior. Overall, in religiously mixed electoral districts, indigenous appeals are a less confrontational strategy.<sup>9</sup>

The importance of religion and indigeneity in the political arena since the transition to free and democratic elections should not be all that surprising. In Liddle's research on ethnic politics during Indonesia's previous era of competitive democracy in the 1950s and 60s, he concluded that Islam and indigenous identities would continue to remain prevalent in Indonesian politics despite modernization. At the time, he wrote, "the present strength of ethnic loyalties indicates that they will be with us for a long

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<sup>8</sup> Some exceptions to the rule include a number of works by Edward Aspinall and co-authors {-Aspinall (2011), and Gerry Van Klinken (2008b; 2003; 2008a). Also, see Jamie Davidson and David Henley (2007). In addition, Jemma Purdey (2006) has written specifically on the Indonesian Chinese.

<sup>9</sup> Evidence from the psychology literature offers some support for this point. Brewer (1999) found that in the absence of conflict between groups over material resources, intergroup anxieties and competition can occur if two groups adopt a common measure of relative worth (such as religion). However, when a group feels superior on dimensions that are important to the group's identity (such as indigeneity for non-Muslims), they can tolerate superiority on other dimensions.

time to come and provides an additional reason for dealing with them on their own terms instead of denying their existence" (Liddle 1970, 227 footnote 21).

Finally, my research has shown that Indonesian candidates have the option to appeal to national identity in their campaigns. Nationalist appeals can help candidates reach out across ethnic groups. The evidence indicates that candidates, particularly those who are members of indigenous and religious minorities in the electoral district, frequently utilize nationalist appeals to foster support among a diverse range of ethnic groups.

#### IMPLICATIONS FOR INDONESIAN DEMOCRACY

Overall, ethnic politics has not declined in Indonesia. If anything, democratization and the move towards a candidate-centric system has rejuvenated ethnic politics. However, while a common view is that ethnic politicization would naturally result in deeper divisions between ethnic groups and threaten democratic instability, this has not been the case in Indonesia. Despite a turbulent start and the predictions that the country would implode under the strain of inter-ethnic rivalries, Indonesia has managed to successfully consolidate its democracy. I argue that the multidimensional nature of ethnicity in Indonesia, combined with a largely candidate-centric electoral system with nested electoral districts, has produced fluid ethnic politics that have actually helped sustain democracy.

The multidimensional, cross-cutting nature of ethnicity in Indonesia has created a firm foundation for democratic stability. In regard to the indigenous dimension, indigenous groups are dispersed, numerous, and (with the exception of the Javanese)

relatively small. Meanwhile, religion is more multipolar (e.g., Islam, Christian, Hindu) or bipolar (i.e., Islam vs. religious minorities). Layered across indigenous and religious identities are regional identities and, above those, a broader national identity.

Indonesians belong to multiple ethnic groups and there is a significant amount of cross-cutting between these groups. However, the mere presence of cross-cutting does not prevent a society from being divided along one master ethnic cleavage. To avoid this scenario, multiple dimensions of ethnicity need to be actively politicized.<sup>10</sup>

Indonesia's free and largely candidate-centric electoral system has helped to politicize multiple dimensions of ethnicity. Under a largely candidate-centric system, each Indonesian candidate makes individual choices regarding their ethnic appeal strategy based on calculations of potential support in their electoral district. This situation results in the politicization of a great variety of ethnic categories, both within electoral districts and across the country. As I have shown, some candidates bond with their religious group, others bond with their indigenous group, and still others engage in various bridging strategies, reaching out to other ethnic groups and drawing on the more encompassing regional and national identities.

Despite these findings, the possibility remains that opposing candidates will mobilize voters along one ethnic cleavage within an individual electoral district. However, because of the nested nature of electoral districts, these unidimensional cleavages rarely become entrenched. The size of electoral districts for the district

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<sup>10</sup> In a similar vein Liddle (1970, 230) concluded that ethnic loyalties are not necessarily destructive for national integration, democratic development, or effective government in late developing countries. Rather than ignoring ethnicity, his research on Indonesia in the 1960s highlights the importance of incorporating multiple overlapping ethnic, supraethnic and non-ethnic identities within the arena of political competition.

legislative elections, district head elections, and national legislative elections vary considerably. Given Indonesia's rich ethnic landscape, differences in electoral district boundaries for local and national elections can result in changes to ethnic group sizes—majorities in one election may be minorities in another, and vice versa. Such changes in group size affect candidates' ethnic appeal strategies. For example, while candidates might politicize indigenous groups in a district head election, other candidates in the same region competing in a national legislative election might politicize religion. Multiple ethnic appeals cancel each other out, and ethnic politics begin to resemble stable democratic politics.

The fluid multidimensional nature of ethnic politics means that ethnic appeals are invariably positive. Candidates cannot afford to make ethnic appeals that denigrate an outgroup, as they may need the support of that outgroup at some future point. As a result, candidates' ethnic appeals are primarily focused on connecting with constituents and identifying with the ethnic commitments those constituents value. In sum, ethnic appeals among candidates and across electoral districts show a great degree of fluidity in contemporary Indonesian politics. Ethnic politics are less tightly bound to nationalist versus Islamic political party ideologies; they have effectively become multidimensional and decentralized and have helped to sustain Indonesian democracy.

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- . 2009c 3/30. Sabar Sitepu Kembali Serahkan Loudspeaker Dan Wireless. *Waspada*.
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# Appendix A

## CODING CAMPAIGN-RELATED REPORTS

### 1. Article information

Title  Id.

Page  Day  Month  Year  Report From

Summary

Coding Issues

### 2. Candidate, party, and election information

If article is about a party and not specific candidates, select party only:

Name  Id.

Election  Electoral District No.  List No.

Select District Name for district (Kab/Kota) legislative elections:

Add Another Candidate | +

### 3. Events

Event Type  District  Venue  Attendance  Id.

Group-related Categories

Add Another Event | +

### 4. Elite support and endorsements

Endorsement Type  Institution Name  Id.

Elite Name

Group-related Categories

Add Another Endorsement | +

**5. Verbal appeals**

Appeal

Policy-related Categories

Group-related Categories

---

**6. Candidate identity, experience, and character**

Identity

Experience   Id.

Character  Id.

Figure 5.A.1. Data entry interface for coding campaign-related reports. The custom interface and database was created using Filemaker Pro Advanced 11.

# Appendix B

## CODING ELECTION POSTERS

**POSTER IMAGE**

Index Information	
Candidate 1 name	<input style="width: 100%;" type="text"/>
Candidate 2 name	<input style="width: 100%;" type="text"/>
Sex	<input style="width: 45%; border: none; border-bottom: 1px solid black;" type="text" value="Candidate 1"/> <input style="width: 45%; border: none; border-bottom: 1px solid black;" type="text" value="Candidate 2"/>
Political party	<input style="width: 100%;" type="text"/>
Election type	<input style="width: 100%;" type="text"/>
Province name	<input style="width: 100%;" type="text"/>
District name	<input style="width: 100%;" type="text"/>
Electoral district number	<input style="width: 100%;" type="text"/>

Candidate Clothing	
Clothing	<input style="width: 45%; border: none; border-bottom: 1px solid black;" type="text" value="Candidate 1"/> <input style="width: 45%; border: none; border-bottom: 1px solid black;" type="text" value="Candidate 2"/>
Headdress	<input style="width: 45%; border: none; border-bottom: 1px solid black;" type="text" value="Candidate 1"/> <input style="width: 45%; border: none; border-bottom: 1px solid black;" type="text" value="Candidate 2"/>
Cloth accessory	<input style="width: 45%; border: none; border-bottom: 1px solid black;" type="text" value="Candidate 1"/> <input style="width: 45%; border: none; border-bottom: 1px solid black;" type="text" value="Candidate 2"/>
Party clothing	<input style="width: 45%; border: none; border-bottom: 1px solid black;" type="text" value="Candidate 1"/> <input style="width: 45%; border: none; border-bottom: 1px solid black;" type="text" value="Candidate 2"/>

Background Imagery	
Elite image	<input style="width: 100%;" type="text"/>
Buildings and monuments	<input style="width: 100%;" type="text"/>
Symbols and patterns	<input style="width: 100%;" type="text"/>
Landscape	<input style="width: 100%;" type="text"/>
Event	<input style="width: 100%;" type="text"/>
Map	<input style="width: 100%;" type="text"/>
Endorsement	<input style="width: 100%;" type="text"/>
Other	<input style="width: 100%;" type="text"/>

Textual Content	
Common text elements	<input style="width: 100%;" type="text"/>
Non-Indonesian language	<input style="width: 100%;" type="text"/>
Non-Indonesian transcription	<input style="width: 100%; height: 30px;" type="text"/>
Indonesian transcription	<input style="width: 100%; height: 30px;" type="text"/>

▶ Expand image

Figure 6.B.1. Data entry interface for coding election posters. Coding was done using Extensis Portfolio which provides a number of ways to enter the data. Layout modified for illustration purposes.

## Appendix C

### SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES

**Table 9.C.1. Full regression results for impact of group size on candidate bonding appeals**

	INDIGENOUS BONDING		ISLAMIC BONDING	
	District head	Legislative	District head	Legislative
Largest indig. grp. %	0.42** (0.08)	0.26** (0.04)	-0.02 (0.11)	0.01 (0.06)
Muslim population %	-0.37** (0.09)	-0.17** (0.05)	0.45** (0.10)	0.36** (0.04)
Indigenous law	0.08 (0.11)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.10 (0.13)	0.05 (0.05)
Mosques <sup>a</sup>	-0.97 (0.68)	-0.77** (0.26)	0.82 (0.84)	-0.03 (0.25)
Poverty %	-0.22 (0.40)	0.32** (0.10)	0.35 (0.37)	-0.18 (0.13)
GRDP farming %	0.15 (0.16)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.14)	0.04 (0.09)
Female candidate	6.22 (7.94)	1.26 (1.72)	12.30 (9.93)	36.54** (3.22)
Population (log)	8.12** (2.46)	2.51* (0.98)	-4.26 (2.95)	-1.40 (1.10)
Intercept	-87.77* (36.92)	-29.81* (14.03)	50.55 (40.78)	6.82 (15.15)
N	266	1,872	266	1,872
R squared	0.21	0.04	0.19	0.19

*Note:* Results of regression analyses for independent variables (rows) and dependent variables (columns). The dependent variables are the percentage of candidates' posters with the appeal, segmented into district head candidates and legislative candidates. Entries are coefficients from OLS regression model. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses.

<sup>a</sup> per 1,000 Muslim constituents in candidate's electoral district

^p < 0.10, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01



**Table 9.C.2. Full regression results for impact of group size on candidate bridging appeals**

	INDIGENOUS BRIDGING		ISLAMIC BRIDGING	
	District head	Legislative	District head	Legislative
Largest indig. grp. %	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.12^ (0.07)	0.03 (0.02)
Muslim population %	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.08** (0.02)
Indigenous law	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.03^ (0.02)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.05** (0.02)
Mosques <sup>a</sup>	-0.01 (0.36)	0.02 (0.16)	0.97^ (0.49)	-0.13 (0.13)
Poverty %	-0.22 (0.13)	0.05 (0.08)	0.09 (0.22)	0.13^ (0.07)
GRDP farming %	0.03 (0.07)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.05)
Female candidate	-4.33* (1.88)	-1.94* (0.81)	1.03 (4.17)	-2.88** (0.68)
Population (log)	2.73^ (1.36)	-0.26 (0.50)	2.79* (1.25)	-0.08 (0.48)
Intercept	-18.36 (16.12)	9.26 (7.33)	-18.07 (16.47)	9.91 (7.36)
N	266	1,872	266	1,872
R squared	0.06	0.01	0.06	0.02

*Note:* Results of regression analyses for independent variables (rows) and dependent variables (columns). The dependent variables are the percentage of candidates' posters with the appeal, segmented into district head candidates and legislative candidates. Entries are coefficients from OLS regression model. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses.

<sup>a</sup> per 1,000 Muslim constituents in candidate's electoral district

^p < 0.10, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01

**Table 10.C.1. Ethnic identity of candidates in nine district head elections**

	Head	Deputy
<b>Religious identity</b>		
Muslim	23	5
Christian	10	5
Protestant	26	19
Catholic	3	5
Buddhist	1	0
Total	63	63
<b>Indigenous identity</b>		
Batak Toba	20	23
Batak Karo	9	7
Ambonese	8	6
Batak Tapanuli	7	2
Javanese	6	12
Batak Simalungun	6	5
Malay	3	3
Minangkabau	1	3
Batak Nias	1	0
Chinese	1	0
Pakistani-Indian	1	0
Buton	0	1
Total	63	63

*Note:* Data from the Electoral Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum) and local informants.

**Table 10.C.2. Impact of individual candidate features on ethnic appeals in nine district head elections**


	Islamic bonding	Religious bridging	Indigenous bonding	Indigenous bridging	Nationalist bridging
<b>A. Sex</b>					
Female	15.98 (15.64)	3.64 (13.75)	-5.92 (9.68)	-0.66 (7.00)	8.64 (20.94)
<i>N</i>	63	63	63	63	63
R squared	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
<b>B. Birthplace</b>					
Born in district	-4.98 (9.99)	1.14 (3.30)	6.59 (7.55)	3.72 (2.66)	-8.06 (8.03)
<i>N</i>	56	56	56	56	56
R squared	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
<b>C. Age</b>					
Age of head: 45-55	-0.78 (12.47)	-47.69* (19.63)	12.80 (6.98)	0.27 (6.89)	-29.05* (8.38)
Age of head: 55+	6.12 (16.06)	-53.87* (20.94)	34.96^ (15.03)	-1.44 (4.52)	-52.99** (6.64)
<i>N</i>	55	55	55	55	55
R Squared	0.01	0.38	0.09	0.00	0.21
<b>D. Education</b>					
Education: BA	12.88^ (6.39)	15.16 (8.85)	-17.65 (21.76)	9.18 (6.82)	6.79 (18.67)
Education: MA	17.16* (6.40)	6.77 (6.26)	-21.72 (15.99)	3.39 (4.46)	-27.35 (18.87)
Education: PhD	-1.34 (1.55)	-4.20 (3.00)	-6.17 (19.13)	4.18 (4.67)	-60.96** (12.63)
<i>N</i>	55	55	55	55	55
R squared	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.30
<b>E. Occupation</b>					
Occupation: bureaucrat	-5.29 (10.49)	5.72 (7.49)	6.46 (14.69)	1.59 (3.99)	-20.72* (9.00)
Occupation: business	-20.86^ (9.58)	21.13 (14.70)	16.42 (21.57)	6.79 (6.46)	5.66 (15.89)
Occupation: other	-23.07^ (10.05)	-3.96 (6.70)	-23.95* (10.10)	9.10 (7.28)	-8.45 (22.12)
<i>N</i>	62	62	62	62	62

*Note:* For C age, categories are compared to candidates under 45. For D education, categories are compared to candidates with high school diploma. For E occupation, categories are compared to those with other occupations. Results of regression analyses for independent variables (rows) and dependent variables (columns). Entries are coefficients from OLS regression model. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. ^p < 0.10, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01


# Appendix D

## SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES


### A. Islamic bonding Appeals




### B. Indigenous bonding Appeals



### C. Religious bridging appeals



### D. Indigenous bridging appeals



E. Nationalist bridging appeals




Figure 10.D.1. Frequency of ethnic appeals for each candidate in the Nine Cases Poster Database.