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Virtue and Virility: Governing With Honor and the Association or Dissociation Between Martial Honor and Moral Character of U.S. Presidents, Legislators, and Justices

Dov Cohen¹ and Angela K.-y. Leung²

Abstract

In many honor cultures, honor as martial honor and honor as character/integrity are often both subsumed under the banner of honor. In nonhonor cultures, these qualities are often separable. The present study examines political elites, revealing that Presidents, Congresspeople, and Supreme Court Justices from the Southern United States with a greater commitment to martial honor (as indexed by their military service) also show more integrity, character, and moral leadership. This relationship, however, does not hold for nonsoutherners. The present studies illustrate the need to examine both between-culture differences in cultural logics (as these logics connect various behaviors under a common ideal) and within-culture differences (as individuals rise to meet these cultural ideals or not).

Keywords

culture, honor, integrity, political elites, character, moral leadership, corruption

The words “virtue” and “virility” have the same root—the Latin “vir” meaning masculine. Setting aside the sexist implications, the common root suggests something about an older conception that virtue and virility derived from the same underlying essence. In many, but not all, parts of the English-speaking world, this notion of an underlying essence would be denied. This is primarily because of the sexism that is implied, and also probably because many people in the modern English-speaking world see no necessary connection between being virile and being virtuous.

There is cultural variation on this point, however; and in this article, we contrast the way virtue and virility tend to be bundled together in the honor culture of the Southern United States, as opposed to being separate and distinct outside this culture. In the southern honor culture, virtue and virility are entwined as masculine honor. Honor defined as virility, martial honor, strength, and toughness is inseparable from honor defined as virtue, integrity, principle, and character—they are both manifestations of the same underlying essence (honor). In such a culture, moral courage and physical courage are not easily separated: “More often than not, they are almost exactly the same” (McCain & Salter, 2004, p. 89).

This unity probably derives partly from the original conditions that give rise to the development of honor cultures—lawless environments where weak (or nonexistent) states are unable to effectively enforce contracts, protect the innocent, and punish the guilty. In such environments, a person must

depend on himself or herself to protect family, home, and property. A reputation for being willing to risk one’s life and limb to punish those who would cross you serves as a deterrent, warding off predators and those who would take advantage of you (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994).

In many honor cultures, accompanying this toughness (honor as virility) is a sense of integrity—a willingness to show prosocial reciprocity or act with magnanimity, be true to one’s word (even when it is costly), and be ready to sacrifice oneself for principle (honor as virtue). In lawless environments, a reputation for honest dealing, integrity, and trustworthiness (in addition to toughness) can also be an asset. It is good to be known as someone who will pay back both his threats and his debts—who has the backbone to stand up for himself and his rights and the backbone to *do* what is right (rather than merely expedient). The logic of an honor culture often bundles both sorts of actions together.

In contrast, in many regions outside the South, there is no cultural logic that connects moral and physical courage. They are clearly separable, and honor as virtue and integrity is

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distinct from any sense of martial prowess and physical toughness. If anything, insults and affronts (which are so damaging to one's reputation for toughness in an honor culture) demand self-control. People may get angry, but one is sometimes supposed to be "bigger than all that" (IJerman & Cohen, in press). Thus, outside the South, a willingness to use physical force does not necessarily signal a concomitant commitment to principle, integrity, or sense of honor as virtue.

Above we outlined between-culture differences in cultural logics. However, there are also within-culture differences as people either endorse or reject the ideals of their culture. Those who reject the ideals of their culture are not "error" in the sense of being random. Their behavior is often patterned by the cultural logic as well—so that in the South, for example, those who reject one aspect of the honor ideal (the honor of precedence, prowess, and virility) often end up rejecting other aspects as well (the honor of principle and integrity).

Supporting Evidence From Student Samples

Two recent sets of studies involving college and high school students highlighted the way the cultural logic of honor in the South bundles together the honor of moral integrity and the honor of "Don't tread on me," with the acceptance or rejection of one aspect of honor often entailing the acceptance or rejection of other aspects of honor as well. One set of studies contrasted two honor cultures (southern Anglos and Latinos) versus two nonhonor cultures (northern Anglos and Asian Americans). Among those from honor cultures, it was those who most endorsed violence to retaliate for insults and affronts who were also likelier—in behavioral tests—to go to greater lengths to pay back a favor (thus, displaying prosocial reciprocity) and behave more honestly in a situation where they could cheat to win money (thus, displaying trustworthiness), once honor concepts had been primed. In contrast, for northern Anglos and Asian Americans, the effects were reversed. Among those from nonhonor cultures, participants who most endorsed retributive violence were also least likely to pay back a favor and most likely to cheat on a test (Leung & Cohen, 2011).

A second set of studies compared probability samples of male high schoolers in the South versus outside the South to examine whether behaviors indicating honesty, trustworthiness, and integrity were bundled together with a student's sense of martial honor. The independent variable of martial honor concerned students' post-high school plans, with the primary contrast of interest being between those planning to enter the military versus those planning to join the civilian workforce. These two groups are otherwise extremely similar in terms of school achievement, family background, and many demographic variables (Crane & Wise, 1987). The dependent variables were a standardized 2-item index of dishonest behavior (self-reported acts of cheating and lying to parents) and a standardized 6-item index that also asked about shoplifting as well as whether cheating and lying were ever justified. Among southern men, a commitment to martial honor (as indicated by the student's plan to join the military) was associated with

less (self-reported) cheating and lying (military vs. civilian workforce simple effect: $M_s = .11$ vs. $-.31$; $t(69) = 2.33$, $d = .56$, on 2-item index; $M_s = .20$ vs. $-.26$; $t(69) = 2.88$, $d = .69$, on 6-item index). Among nonsouthern men, the pattern actually reversed with those planning to enter the military reporting more cheating and lying (military vs. civilian workforce simple effect: $M_s = -.19$ vs. $.06$; $t(143) = 1.92$, $d = -.32$, on 2-item index; $M_s = -.16$ vs. $.07$; $t(143) = 2.09$, $d = .35$, on 6-item index).

Beyond Students and the Lab

This article seeks to go beyond the lab, self-reported attitudes and behaviors, and college/high school students to examine the behaviors of political elites in the three branches of American government—people whose actions have consequences for national and international history. Because we are studying political elites, we have neither questionnaire data to analyze their personal endorsement of honor-related violence nor laboratory measures of their integrity or trustworthiness. However, we have *biographical markers* that are behavior-based and probably more ecologically valid measures of an individual's (a) commitment to martial honor and (b) integrity and character. Thus, instead of questionnaire data on people's sense of martial honor, we assess their actual behavior, namely, their military service and accomplishment (or lack thereof). Instead of laboratory measures of integrity, we analyze, for example, historians' ratings of a President's character/integrity.

Clarification of Assumptions

Two assumptions should be clarified about (a) the nature of military service and (b) self-selection and issues of causality.

Military Service

We assume that political leaders who are more accomplished in the military, have actually fought in combat, and commit more years of their lives to the military have a greater commitment to martial honor. Military service and combat are traditional masculine behaviors that call for physical courage and stereotypically "manly" behavior.

We acknowledge that people may join the military and commit themselves to it for reasons other than a sense of martial honor—just as many other major life decisions and commitments are overdetermined, driven by more than one potentially relevant causal factor. As such, a person's record of military service is not a pure, uncontaminated assay of a person's sense of martial honor. This is a trade-off one makes when examining real-world behavior. However, we sought to balance this trade-off by investigating both student samples in the research described above and political elites in the present research. Suppose one wants to assess a person's true commitment to a sense of martial honor—Would one rather know about (a) the person's *costly-to-fake* experience and accomplishments in the military (or lack thereof) or (b) the

person's answers to a lab-administered questionnaire about honor? Reasonable people can disagree, but most would agree that both (a) and (b) contribute to measuring martial honor. Research with students described above relied on data of type (b); the present research complements this using type (a) data.

Issues of Causality

The argument here is one of correlation, namely, norms in the South have bundled together ideals of martial honor with ideals of integrity/character. The same southerners who embrace one ideal will also embrace the other, and the same southerners who reject one ideal will also reject the other. Notably, it could be that (a) southerners of high integrity self-select into military service and accomplishment or (b) the military fortifies a nascent sense of integrity in southerners in a way that it does not for nonsoutherners. We think (a) is intuitively more plausible and, given the high school student data above, has more empirical support. However, we cannot rule out (b) and for the present purposes, this is actually not that important. Our argument is that the cultural logic of the South bundles together martial honor with honor as integrity—whether this bundling occurs in socialization before one enters the military or whether the crucible of military service is also necessary to help forge this nascent connection for southerners (but not nonsoutherners) is an interesting question but beyond the scope here.

With correlational data, one might also argue that military service and virtuous behavior are bundled together for southerners not by some underlying logic of honor but rather by some other variables. Thus, it could be that southerners with higher skills, better connections, or more elite backgrounds somehow end up in the military and also have greater qualities of character. Alternatively, it could be that southerners who were in the military and behave with more integrity are just more conforming to all local norms—even those *unrelated* to honor. The present research attempts to rule out these possibilities by examining the behavioral profiles and backgrounds of the leaders. Different indicators are available for each study; but across studies, data converge in showing that these third variables are not likely to explain the effects.

Overview

The current studies investigated the link between martial honor and behaviors reflecting the moral character of elites in the three branches of government, examining as dependent variables: (a) ratings of the character and integrity of U.S. Presidents, (b) egregious corruption among legislators in the U.S. Congress, and (c) the moral leadership of Supreme Court Justices, as indexed by their precedent-setting decisions and ratings of their greatness as a Justice. For those from the honor culture of the South, we predict that the logic of honor bundles together a commitment to martial honor with qualities of character, integrity, and moral leadership; for those outside the South, however, martial honor and moral integrity should be clearly separable.¹




Figure 1. Predicted values for character/integrity ratings for southern and nonsouthern Presidents with low or high military ranks ($\pm .5$ SDs from the mean).


Study I: Martial Honor and Character/Integrity of Presidents

Method

Character ratings. Among historians and political scientists, several surveys have been conducted about Presidents. We examined all accessible surveys or rankings in which expert respondents rated all Presidents on various dimensions, including those related to character and integrity. Our index of character ($\alpha = .91$) was the average of ratings for “character and integrity” made by 719 mostly academic historians (Ridings & McIver, 1997); “moral authority” made by 65 Presidential historians and observers (C-SPAN, 2009); “integrity” made by 201 historians and political scientists (Sienna College, 2002); “character” made by Felzenberg (2008); “personal qualities” made by Faber and Faber (2000), as defined by 10 criteria, including honesty, integrity and trustworthiness, morality, presidential comportment, and so on.²

Military achievement. In assessing martial experience and achievement, we examined the military rank achieved by Presidents, scored according to Department-of-Defense guidelines (<http://www.defense.gov/specials/insignias/index.html>). Many Presidents had a military title, though not all were earned through active military service (e.g., one might not want to consider as “true” ranks Andrew Johnson’s rank of Brigadier General or Jefferson’s rank of Colonel). To eliminate such “unearned” or overly liberal scores, we used the most stringent criteria we could find (Mattox, 1996)—not crediting military service to anyone that Mattox did not (thus excluding militia service) and also not crediting the six Presidents whose military service Mattox regarded as questionable.³ A President with no military service received a score of 0, enlisted soldiers a score of 1, and officers scores of 2 to 12 (according to their rank).⁴

Consistent with previous research (Leung & Cohen, 2011; Vandello & Cohen, 2003), a President was considered southern



Figures 2. Profile for ratings of the background (family, education, and experience), political skills, intelligence, administrative skills, domestic accomplishments, ability to “handle” the economy, and foreign policy accomplishments of southern Presidents (a) and nonsouthern Presidents (b) with and without military experience.

if the state he was nominated from included Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. All others were considered nonsouthern.

Results

There were no main effects of Culture or Military Rank ($t_s < 1$), but the predicted Culture \times Military Rank interaction was significant, $b = .29$, $t(38) = 2.12$, $p = .04$, $pr = .33$; Figure 1. Among southern Presidents, those scoring higher (vs. lower) on military rank were rated as having more character and integrity (zero-order $r = .55$, simple slope in regression, $b = .51$, $t(14) = 2.12$, $p = .04$). This pattern did not occur for nonsouthern Presidents ($r = -.13$, n.s.).

Further analyses. The same interactions hold if one examines other (correlated) indicators of military experience: (a) whether the President was a war veteran (Culture \times War Veteran interaction, $F(1,38) = 4.18$, $p < .05$, effect size $f = .33$),⁵ (b) length of military service (Culture \times Military Service Length interaction, $t(38) = 1.86$, $p = .07$, $pr = .29$),⁶ or (c) a dichotomous indicator of whether the President was ever in the military at all (Culture \times Military or Not interaction, $F(1,38) = 3.88$, $p = .056$, $f = .32$).

Using other dimensions derived from the surveys, we also examined the “behavioral profile” of the Presidents. Although southern Presidents who were in the military (vs. not in the military) scored higher on character/integrity, this did not come from any general advantage in ability, accomplishment, or background: There were no significant correlations between military service and ratings of “background (family, education,




Figure 3. Percentage of congresspersons considered among the “most corrupt,” as a function of region and whether the congressperson was ever on active military duty.

experience),” intelligence, administrative skills, domestic accomplishments, political skills, or ability to “handle” the economy.⁷ (Figure 2a and b shows a similar null effect for nonsoutherners.)

Notably, the only domain in which southern Presidents with military experience excelled (besides character/integrity) was in foreign policy accomplishments ($r = .50$ with rank and $.46$ with a dichotomous military service [or not] variable, both $ps < .10$). Honor cultures seem to develop in places where there is no adequate law enforcement to protect individuals—where “self-help” justice is the rule, because there is no overarching authority (like the state) that one can appeal to for protection (Pitt-Rivers, 1968). At the level of nation-states, international affairs are much the same way: They are conducted in a world of self-help justice where there is no effective central authority that nations can reliably turn to for protection (Viotti, 1994; The League of Nations was formed after World War I and the United Nations after World War II but neither seem to have effectively guaranteed peace and stability). Honorable southerners have an ethic well suited to environments of self-help justice, and thus—from a “realist” perspective on foreign policy—one might speculate that they may be particularly well prepared for dealing with international affairs (even if their accomplishments in other domains are unspectacular; see also Dafoe & Caughey, 2011).

Study 2: Martial Honor and Egregious Corruption

Congresspersons are not studied as extensively as Presidents, and thus we do not have character/integrity ratings for them. In Study 2, however, we examined whether a Congressperson was rated as corrupt by government watchdog groups.

Method

We analyzed corruption ratings by two organizations—one relatively conservative (Judicial Watch, years 2006–2009), one relatively liberal (Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, 2005–2009)—that compile lists of the most corrupt legislators.

Biographical data came from Barone and Cohen (2005), Congressional Quarterly (2005), and Congressional Biographical Directory for all members of the 109th Congress. Former and subsequent Congresspersons were included in the data set if they appeared on one of the corruption lists.⁸ Military ranks were not readily available; however, we collected data on whether a Congressperson had been in the military, length of military service, and whether the Congressperson had fought overseas in a war.

Results


Figure 3 displays the predicted interaction between culture and active military duty (contrast on proportions, $Z = 2.43$, $p < .05$, $f = .11$). Of the 166 southern Congresspersons who had not been on active military duty, 13% made at least one corruption list; of the 33 southern Congresspersons who had been on active duty, only 3% made the corruption lists (contrast, $Z = -2.56$, $p = .01$, $d = .40$). For nonsoutherners, the pattern was nonsignificantly reversed (14% vs. 21%, $Z = 1.23$, n.s.)

Further analyses. Interactions looked relatively similar for other indicators of military experience: (a) length of active military service (for southerners, r between being on the corruption list and years of service (square root transformed) = $-.12$, $p = .10$; for nonsoutherners, $r = .08$, $p = .13$) and (b) whether the legislator was a war veteran (Culture \times War Veteran interaction, $Z = 2.67$, $p < .05$, $f = .12$).

As Figure 4 indicates, norms unrelated to honor are generally more conservative in the South versus Nonsouth. However, southerners with military experience were no more likely to conform to these conservative norms (that were unrelated to honor), as compared to their nonmilitary counterparts; thus, ratings by various conservative and liberal groups showed no difference in conformity to norms about civil liberties, organized labor, environmental issues, limited government spending, probusiness policies, using government to uphold Christian moral beliefs, or norms concerning various other liberal or conservative causes. For nonsoutherners, those with active military duty were more conservative than those without ($p < .05$ for conservative minus liberal interest group ratings).

Study 3: Martial Honor, Justice, and Moral Leadership

Study 3 considered elites who are supposed to provide moral leadership. The very nature of judging calls for fairness, attention to principle, and a moral leadership in deciding how rules should be interpreted and applied—and a sense of when they should be overturned. This is particularly true in the U.S. legal



Figures 4. Profile for ratings of congresspersons by various conservative and liberal interest groups (and their causes in parentheses) for southern legislators (a) and nonsouthern legislators (b): Americans for Democratic Action (various liberal causes); American Civil Liberties Union (civil rights); American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (organized labor); League of Conservation Voters (the environment), National Taxpayers Union (limited government spending), Chamber of Commerce (pro-business policies), American Conservative Union (various conservative causes), National Tax Limitation Committee (limited government spending), and Christian Coalition (Christian morality).

system, which—unlike most countries in Europe and Latin America—is based in the common law tradition. Much of the common law has “never been [formally] codified; the judges themselves developed the rules and principles in the course of deciding actual cases” (Friedman, 2008, p. 62). Moreover, unlike British common law, in the United States, “a powerful tradition of judicial review evolved” (Friedman, 2008, p. 62). Unlike the British tradition of parliamentary supremacy, in the United States, the judiciary can strike down acts of the legislature as unconstitutional or illegal.

Method

Our measure of the moral leadership of Supreme Court Justices was based on two indicators. One indicator was

from a landmark survey (Blaustein & Mersky, 1978) of 65 law school deans and eminent scholars, who rated Justices as *great*, *near great*, *average*, *below average*, or *failures* (scored from 5 to 1, respectively). The second was an “objective” (or at least, *nonsubjective*) indicator of how much each Justice influenced future judges’ interpretations of fairness and justice: The number of times each Justice’s majority opinions were cited in subsequent Supreme Court decisions (Kosma, 1998).⁹ This second indicator is thus a (rough) measure of the extent to which a Justice shaped conceptions of fairness, justice, morality, and lawfulness for future courts to abide by. After square root transforming the citation data to reduce skew, we standardized and averaged the two indicators to get a moral leadership score for each Justice (2-item $\alpha = .62$).




Figure 5. Predicted values for index of moral leadership for southern and nonsouthern Supreme Court Justices with low or high military ranks ($\pm .5$ SDs from the mean).

Military service was scored following Department of Defense guidelines as in Study 1, except we used the full range of nonofficer ranks because there were many nonofficers among the Justices. Biographical data were taken from Epstein, Walker, Staudt, Hendrickson, and Roberts (2009) and Schmidhauser (1972).¹⁰

Results and Discussion

There were significant main effects of Culture, $b = -.28$, $t(90) = 3.55$, $p = .001$, $pr = -.35$, and Military Rank, $b = .18$, $t(90) = 2.42$, $p = .02$, $pr = .25$. However, these were qualified by the predicted Culture \times Military Rank interaction, $b = .28$, $t(90) = 3.74$, $p < .001$, $pr = .37$ (Figure 5). Among southern Justices, greater military rank was associated with more moral leadership on the Court (zero-order $r = .62$, simple slope of Rank in regression, $b = .56$, $t(31) = 4.37$, $p < .001$). Among nonsouthern Justices, this effect was absent ($r = -.04$, n.s.).

Further analyses. The same interactions hold if one looks at indicators for (a) length of military service (log-transformed to reduce skew; Culture \times Service Length interaction, $t(94) = 1.97$, $p = .05$, $pr = .20$) and (b) whether the Justice was a war veteran (Culture \times War Veteran interaction, $F(1,94) = 6.16$, $p = .02$, $f = .26$).

The effect among southern Justices cannot be explained by other background, training, or intellect factors that might go into being a good judge. Southern Justices who were in the military were no more likely to come from families with higher socioeconomic status or a tradition of judicial service; have parents who came from “humble” origins; have a public-spiritedness that would lead them to choose a career giving them extensive judicial experience or a career in public service (prior to their judicial appointment); or have the ambition, connections, intelligence, or any other quality that would have gotten them elite educations, compared to their nonmilitary

counterparts (Figure 6; all ps n.s.). (For nonsoutherners, there were also no differences, except that Justices with military experience went to more elite law schools than those without, $p < .03$)


Adequate training and intellect are necessary qualities for a Justice, but there must be something more that makes a great Justice and something other than their absence that makes a particularly poor Justice. In terms of the latter, a number of other factors were relevant to a Justice being deemed a failure: poor work ethic, a lack of conviction, insolence, prejudice, arrogance, and other character flaws (Blaustein & Mersky, 1978; Schwartz, 1997). In terms of being a great Justice, analyzing the comments of their scholarly respondents, Blaustein and Mersky (1978) wrote, “the key would seem to lie in the realm of character and temperament . . . Perhaps one of the best tests is one of courage. President Kennedy’s conclusion in his choice of great politicians in *Profiles in Courage* may be equally applicable to Supreme Court Justices” (1978, p. 1188).¹¹ This emphasis on moral courage is consistent with the hypothesis advanced here: A southern honor ethic—one that subsumes both moral courage and physical courage under the banner of honor, treating them as manifestations of the same underlying essence—helps explain why military experience is so predictive of future greatness among southern Justices.

General Discussion

Among southerners, a greater concern with martial honor (as shown through military service, achievement, and combat) was associated with character and integrity, moral leadership and courage, and a lack of corruptibility. Thus, compared to their counterparts with less military experience, southern Presidents with more military experience showed greater character and integrity, southern legislators with more military experience were less egregiously corrupt, and southern Justices with more military experience exhibited greater moral leadership, having a larger impact on future generations’ sense of what is fair, legal, and just.

Such findings are consistent with the logic of southern honor culture in which norms of honor as virility and physical courage are entwined with norms of honor as virtue and moral courage, because both are seen as manifesting the same underlying quality of honor. None of the effects above were found among nonsoutherners—for whom martial prowess and physical courage are clearly separable from character, integrity, and moral courage.

Notably, in examining the leaders’ behavioral and background profiles, we found that southerners with military experience were no different than their nonmilitary counterparts in their overall abilities, training, public-spiritedness, or socioeconomic background; and further they were no more likely to conform to local cultural norms that were unrelated to honor. These no longer seem plausible as third variables that could parsimoniously explain the association between character and military service for southerners.



Figures 6. Profile of background, service, and training of Supreme Court Justices, as a function of region and military experience.

One limitation of the present work is that we cannot pinpoint why the elites in our studies joined and committed to the military. Besides a sense of honor, it could be that high-integrity southerners are drawn to the military because in the South military service is accorded greater prestige, valued more as a display of patriotism, or acts more as a stepping stone for social/political advancement. However, if this were the case, we might expect southern elites with military experience to show more ambition, ability, public-spiritedness, or conformity than their counterparts without military experience—though, again, the behavioral profiles do not suggest this is likely. Moreover, even though these explanations cannot be definitively ruled out, they beg the question as to why southern

culture imbues martial service with such significance and meaning that it draws people of high integrity to it.

In sum, the studies here illustrate the usefulness of examining between-culture differences in cultural logics (as southern culture, unlike nonsouthern culture, bundles together the ideal of martial honor and the ideal of honor as integrity) as well as within-culture variability (as individuals rise to meet the honor ideal or not). The results here extend experimental findings with young adults (Leung & Cohen, 2011) to political elites. More importantly perhaps, they extend the scale of the behaviors being examined—from matters of everyday morality in the lab to those affecting the integrity with which American society is governed.

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Notes

1. One additional assumption and one caution should be noted. The assumption is that the military—itsself a culture of honor—did not sufficiently indoctrinate nonsoutherners such that they would chronically pattern their behavior in response to honor (rather than nonhonor) norms after leaving military life. The assumption seems reasonable given that few nonsouthern Presidents, legislators, or Justices spent sizable portions of their lives in the military. Excluding those who did has little effect.
The caution: In operationalizing martial honor as national military service and virtuous honor as governing with integrity, we note that our predictions about the behavior of political elites may be specific to honor cultures with a strong sense of sacrifice for the national good rather than simply the good of one's family or clan.
2. Ranks were transformed to normalize the distribution. Rating sources were equal weighted. If weighted by n , results remained similar (Culture \times Military Achievement interaction, $t = 2.05$, $p < .05$).
3. Conclusions remained similar using the most lenient criteria for defining military service (Culture \times Rank interaction, $t = 2.36$, $p = .02$). The exception to the use of Mattox's criteria was Franklin Pierce, whom we *did* credit with military service (DeGregorio, 1993; also Boulard, 2006; Gara, 1991; Miller Center, 2008).
4. We collapsed enlisted ranks down to one score because even by the most liberal criteria, only one President left the service with an enlisted rank.
5. Veteran data came from Murray and Blessing (1994).
6. Because of extreme skew, we collapsed years of service down: 0 = no service, 1 = 1 to 9 years of service, 2 = 10 or more years (DeGregorio, 1993). Ten years seemed an appropriate cut point, because no one with fewer than 10 years had the military as their primary career (Murray & Blessing, 1994).
7. Intelligence ratings included data from Simonton (2006). "Background (family, education, experience)" ratings were from the Sienna poll. Other ratings came from multiple polls noted above.
8. If former and subsequent corrupt legislators were not included, the Culture \times Military Service interaction remained ($p = .01$).
9. Kosma's figures are adjusted for "citation inflation."
10. Militia rankings were excluded; if included, the Region \times Military Rank interaction remained significant, $t = 3.07$, $p = .003$. In a few cases, rank data were treated as missing. From Epstein and colleagues' data, for example, "Mustermaster" or "Enlisted soldier" could not be converted into numbers. Data from Justice William Woods were dropped. Though appointed from Georgia, Woods was hardly a southerner, being a Brigadier General in the

Union army who commanded troops on Sherman's march through Georgia.

11. Invoking *Profiles* is apt for the present thesis. Kennedy identified 19 men of great political courage. Of 10 nonsoutherners, two had military experience. Of nine southerners, six had military experience (Culture \times Military Experience Fischer Exact Test), $p < .07$, $\phi = .47$.

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